Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University
increasingly engaged in that issue). I seek the explanation in other available ways of early exit, and in the low bargaining position of impaired workers vis-á-vis the management. The shorter period of receipt of the earnings-related unemployment benefit has had a limited effect on firm behaviour, as most firms in my sample rely on the ATZ pathway and do not use the unemployment pathway to early exit based on the ´59 rule´ any more. However, in two firms which utilise that option, it has had a ´positive effect´: both the company management is not willing to pay a higher compensation and workers do not want to cope with the threat of unemployment coupled with the receipt of the low means-tested unemployment benefit (AL-Geld II). The old-age pension for women was seldom used as a vehicle for early exit, with the exception of three firms. One example of ´negative reaction´ shall be named for reasons of its singularity. The bank, which is an unusual case because of the wide array of both branch-wide and firm-level pre-retirement schemes, plans to couple the firm-level preretirement schemes with the seniority pension starting in 2012 (after the expiry of the oldage pension for women), which is an example of instrument substitution (Casey 1989). Raised retirement ages (with the exception of ´retirement at 67´, which will be treated separately) and pension deductions in case of early receipt have had mixed effects, but affected a larger number of firms. Reasons are that coping with those reform elements is unavoidable – even if a firm renounces the unemployment or disability pathway to early exit, it cannot evade the utilisation of old-age pensions by workers and may utilise it in the final result as a flexible instrument for personnel adjustments. However, due to long phasing-in periods, and to the willingness of a large group of workers to cope with permanent deductions, those reforms have not had yet the intended effect upon all firms. Moreover, firms which showed a ´positive reaction´ to one reform element, often at the same time showed a negative adaptation pattern in another respect. In some firms, the ATZ pathway was closed (or planned to be closed) altogether for reasons of to low flexibility and too high costs, or the works council agreements on ATZ adapted the preferred entry and exit age from the scheme to risen retirement ages. ´Negative reactions´ in the form of (higher) compensation payments for pension deductions were more often. The prime example here is a high-tech firm where the successive raising of retirement ages resulted in ever higher severance payments – the 147
severance payment in case of the 58 rule and the early retirement scheme is the higher, the more time is left to the 63 rd birthday of the affected worker. In all firms which offered the early retirement scheme, both the workers and the firms were interested in concluding the ATZ contract with retirement at 60 before the raising of retirement ages from 2004. This happened with active support from the works council and special “promotion days”, during which the workers were offered a calculation of the optimum ATZ model. Some firms released great numbers of older workers that way, notwithstanding internal demand for labour. That vividly demonstrates that institutions shape behaviour even if it does not serve utility maximisation (Meyer/Rowan 1977: 350ff). However, the hidden rationality behind that form of action is the preservation of social peace in the firm, and the observation of the “reciprocity norm” – older workers who invest time and effort at the early stages of their career expect a reward in the form of cushioned early exit, and granting them this increases the work motivation of succeeding cohorts of workers (Kohli et al. 1983: 29). About as many firms reacted to the approaching closure of ATZ at the end of 2009. ´Positive reactions´ were located in various realms of personnel policy, e.g. flexibilisation of working time (part-time work for incapacitated older workers in firms with a very low overall part-time ratio; long-term work accounts), personnel deployment (moving older workers from operational positions to less burdening function units), workplace design (age-adequate workplaces), further training geared to older workers´ needs, or gradual retirement with the help of life-time work accounts or a shorter working week for workers approaching retirement. The objective behind those measures was to prepare for the longer retention of older workers. However, those measures are in large parts only in conceptualisation, at best in the inception phase. ´Negative reactions´ to the termination of the early retirement scheme were far more frequent in the studied firms. The most frequent replacement debated (but not yet implemented) are long-time or life-time work accounts. They can be used both as relief for older workers in terms of shorter working hours (as a ´positive reaction´), and for early exit (as a ´negative reaction´). In long-time of lifetime work accounts, workers can accumulate overtime in the beginning of their careers (maximally up to 10 hours per day), while the payment for those extra hours is postponed. To give one example: In case of a 38-hoursweek, employees would have to accumulate 15 extra hours per month, i.e. 180 hours per 148
- Page 107 and 108: conducive towards the prolongation
- Page 109 and 110: Due to the negligence in the field
- Page 111 and 112: The position of older workers on th
- Page 113 and 114: fact in Germany rather than in Pola
- Page 115 and 116: 2) the supply-side orientated inter
- Page 117 and 118: Difficulties with recruitment of qu
- Page 119 and 120: learning to the needs of older pers
- Page 121 and 122: (Schmidt/Gatter 1997: 168), in Pola
- Page 123 and 124: 4.2.1. Presentation of the Studied
- Page 125 and 126: Firm DE-14 Man. of Transport Equipm
- Page 127 and 128: opinions by adding that similar tra
- Page 129 and 130: Table 16: Focus of personnel policy
- Page 131 and 132: 4.2.3. Recruitment Practice Good pr
- Page 133 and 134: egardless of their individual capab
- Page 135 and 136: “The movements within the firm -
- Page 137 and 138: epresentative or manager). However,
- Page 139 and 140: The interview guideline for my firm
- Page 141 and 142: tear. However, the externalisation
- Page 143 and 144: publicly owned firms (Firm DE-1, Fi
- Page 145 and 146: At aggregate level, the existence o
- Page 147 and 148: means for „exchanging the old for
- Page 149 and 150: Box 4: Good practice in employee ex
- Page 151 and 152: combination of the receipt of unemp
- Page 153 and 154: where workers cancelled the previou
- Page 155 and 156: and the agitation by the works coun
- Page 157: and on the other side, externalisat
- Page 161 and 162: older workers, without further adju
- Page 163 and 164: ationalisation, and foster adaptive
- Page 165 and 166: with a health management professor
- Page 167 and 168: only limited impact (and interest)
- Page 169 and 170: those who cannot was reported by fi
- Page 171 and 172: I made out some forms of irrational
- Page 173 and 174: Another result of my studies, which
- Page 175 and 176: sections of this work. At aggregate
- Page 177 and 178: Table 20: Establishments studied in
- Page 179 and 180: 4.3.2. Overall human resource manag
- Page 181 and 182: wages, jubilee awards, or a longer
- Page 183 and 184: dominate over measures which treat
- Page 185 and 186: education, computer literacy, knowl
- Page 187 and 188: the recruitment practice. In the ab
- Page 189 and 190: To sum up, applicants over 50 are t
- Page 191 and 192: training is provided for persons
- Page 193 and 194: Neither hypothesis 2A nor hypothesi
- Page 195 and 196: an occupational safety inspector. B
- Page 197 and 198: The internalisation strategy - job
- Page 199 and 200: supported with regard to the age of
- Page 201 and 202: firms have an even longer protectio
- Page 203 and 204: standard retirement age, the option
- Page 205 and 206: A striking feature in most firms is
- Page 207 and 208: A polarisation in exit preferences
severance payment in case of the 58 rule and the early retirement scheme is the higher, the<br />
more time is left to the 63 rd birthday of the affected worker.<br />
In all firms which offered the early retirement scheme, both the workers and the firms<br />
were interested in concluding the ATZ contract with retirement at 60 before the raising of<br />
retirement ages from 2004. This happened with active support from the works council and<br />
special “promotion days”, during which the workers were offered a calculation of the<br />
optimum ATZ model. Some firms released great numbers of older workers that way,<br />
notwithstanding internal demand for labour. That vividly demonstrates that institutions<br />
shape behaviour even if it does not serve utility maximisation (Meyer/Rowan 1977: 350ff).<br />
However, the hidden rationality behind that form of action is the preservation of social<br />
peace in the firm, and the observation of the “reciprocity norm” – older workers who invest<br />
time and effort at the early stages of their career expect a reward in the form of cushioned<br />
early exit, and granting them this increases the work motivation of succeeding cohorts of<br />
workers (Kohli et al. 1983: 29).<br />
About as many firms reacted to the approaching closure of ATZ at the end of 2009.<br />
´Positive reactions´ were located in various realms of personnel policy, e.g. flexibilisation<br />
of working time (part-time work for incapacitated older workers in firms with a very low<br />
overall part-time ratio; long-term work accounts), personnel deployment (moving older<br />
workers from operational positions to less burdening function units), workplace design<br />
(age-adequate workplaces), further training geared to older workers´ needs, or gradual<br />
retirement with the help of life-time work accounts or a shorter working week for workers<br />
approaching retirement. The objective behind those measures was to prepare for the longer<br />
retention of older workers. However, those measures are in large parts only in<br />
conceptualisation, at best in the inception phase.<br />
´Negative reactions´ to the termination of the early retirement scheme were far more<br />
frequent in the studied firms. The most frequent replacement debated (but not yet<br />
implemented) are long-time or life-time work accounts. They can be used both as relief for<br />
older workers in terms of shorter working hours (as a ´positive reaction´), and for early exit<br />
(as a ´negative reaction´). In long-time of lifetime work accounts, workers can accumulate<br />
overtime in the beginning of their careers (maximally up to 10 hours per day), while the<br />
payment for those extra hours is postponed. To give one example: In case of a 38-hoursweek,<br />
employees would have to accumulate 15 extra hours per month, i.e. 180 hours per<br />
148
Change language