Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University Dissertation_Paula Aleksandrowicz_12 ... - Jacobs University

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external structural determinants which necessitate the firm to reduce personnel, resp. by a stable employment situation. The decision to stay is in most parts shaped by the calculation to maintain the current standard of living (and thus indirectly by pension reforms) and by high job satisfaction, and is taken more often by men than by women. The firm experts also observed that risen job intensity and faster pace of changes diminish job satisfaction, which is then translated into early exit. Also the inconsistent movements of the legislator and partially backing off from unpopular reform elements moves retirees-to-be to grasp the still existing early exit options. Works councils play in the process of individual decision-making a role as agitators for early exit. Depending on their relations with the management, they do it either with the intention to do older workers something good (e.g. by conducting calculations what they gain and what they use by choosing either the option of early exit or prolonged employment), or in order to smooth the process of personnel reductions. In the latter case, the works council agitates in favour of early exit either from the position of co-manager, the representative of interests of (younger) workers without pension entitlements, or, lastly, as a sub-ordinate “organ of the management” (Kotthoff 1995: 550). The qualitative panel proved useful with regard to tracking the change of retirement preferences over time, as by the time of the first interview, neither firms nor interviewees have had fully realised the impact of pension reforms. 4.2.8. Impact of Legislative Changes In this chapter, I will assess whether firms in my sample have responded to institutional changes within the framework of pension policy and passive and active labour market policy. On that basis, I will test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 6. The reform elements concerned will be any changed rules of participation in the early retirement scheme, the 59 rule, disability pensions, social selection in case of mass lay-offs, retirement ages, antidiscrimination rulings and incentives to hire or to qualify an older worker (see overview in Table 1 in chapter 2. and in section 3.2.). Such reforms were taken into consideration which had come into effect before the first or the second interview. The relevant dimensions for the analysis are defined with regard to the goal of prolongation of working life which can be reached by the recruitment of older workers and by their retention, and which I assume to be the intention of the legislator when passing the reform. Thus, on the one side of the continuum would be internalisation of older workers, 145

and on the other side, externalisation, the emerging patterns being ´negative reaction´, ´positive reaction´ and ´no reaction´ (Hinrichs/Aleksandrowicz 2005: 44-45). A ´negative reaction´ to institutional changes will denote an adaptation pattern which entails the externalisation of older workers, be it by the development of new early exit options or by prolongation of ATZ at firm level. A ´positive reaction´ encompasses policies which open the way for the increased hiring of older workers, which close existing early exit pathways, and which adapt working conditions and overall personnel policy to the demands of an ageing workforce. ´No reaction´ denotes the preservation of status quo, and policies of ´wait and see´. The singular reform elements generated divergent adaptation patterns in the firms. The assessment will therefore proceed from one reform element to the other. The missing impact of incentives for the hiring and qualification of older workers was already described in the preceding sub-section on recruitment policy, and is in line with evaluation results of active labour market measures (BmAS 2006b: xviii-xix). The impact of the anti-discrimination legislation was limited to singular adaptations in some firms, like the non-discriminatory formulation of job ads or the passing of antidiscriminatory rules of conduct. Neither managers nor works council members have perceived an incompatibility of the ubiquitous regulation that the work contract ends upon reaching 65 years or upon reaching the “standard retirement age” with the antidiscrimination legislation. At best, it was planned at the time of my second interview to consult possible problematic areas arising from the new law between management and works council. The changed rules of social selection in cases of dismissals for operational reasons (´high performers´ may be exempted from the social selection, and the limited job prospects of older workers do not have to be considered) have had almost no impact on the studied firms due to the avoidance of dismissals ´for operational reasons´. Only the chairmen of the works council in singular firms associated the new law with a higher risk of older workers with low qualifications to be dismissed. Stricter rules for granting disability pensions have not led to higher retention rates of impaired workers in the studied firms (although in one case, the works council is becoming 146

and on the other side, externalisation, the emerging patterns being ´negative reaction´,<br />

´positive reaction´ and ´no reaction´ (Hinrichs/<strong>Aleksandrowicz</strong> 2005: 44-45).<br />

A ´negative reaction´ to institutional changes will denote an adaptation pattern which<br />

entails the externalisation of older workers, be it by the development of new early exit<br />

options or by prolongation of ATZ at firm level. A ´positive reaction´ encompasses policies<br />

which open the way for the increased hiring of older workers, which close existing early<br />

exit pathways, and which adapt working conditions and overall personnel policy to the<br />

demands of an ageing workforce. ´No reaction´ denotes the preservation of status quo, and<br />

policies of ´wait and see´.<br />

The singular reform elements generated divergent adaptation patterns in the firms. The<br />

assessment will therefore proceed from one reform element to the other.<br />

The missing impact of incentives for the hiring and qualification of older workers was<br />

already described in the preceding sub-section on recruitment policy, and is in line with<br />

evaluation results of active labour market measures (BmAS 2006b: xviii-xix).<br />

The impact of the anti-discrimination legislation was limited to singular adaptations in<br />

some firms, like the non-discriminatory formulation of job ads or the passing of antidiscriminatory<br />

rules of conduct. Neither managers nor works council members have<br />

perceived an incompatibility of the ubiquitous regulation that the work contract ends upon<br />

reaching 65 years or upon reaching the “standard retirement age” with the antidiscrimination<br />

legislation. At best, it was planned at the time of my second interview to<br />

consult possible problematic areas arising from the new law between management and<br />

works council.<br />

The changed rules of social selection in cases of dismissals for operational reasons<br />

(´high performers´ may be exempted from the social selection, and the limited job prospects<br />

of older workers do not have to be considered) have had almost no impact on the studied<br />

firms due to the avoidance of dismissals ´for operational reasons´. Only the chairmen of the<br />

works council in singular firms associated the new law with a higher risk of older workers<br />

with low qualifications to be dismissed.<br />

Stricter rules for granting disability pensions have not led to higher retention rates of<br />

impaired workers in the studied firms (although in one case, the works council is becoming<br />

146

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