IRSE News 176 Mar 12 with Watermark.pdf

IRSE NEWS
ISSUE 176 MARCH 2012

TEN 01/10 Annuncio 190x130 mm.qxd:01/10 Tenconi Annuncio 190x130 mm 8.6.2010 15:20 Pagina 1
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Front Cover:
The Traffic Control Centre for Keretapi Tanah Melayu Behad (KTMB) located at Kuala Lumpur Sentral, taken on Friday 14 October
2011 during Convention Visit . The area of control includes Rawang - Ipoh Double Track (RIDT), Klang Valley Double Track (KVDT)
and Sentul Batu Caves double track sector.
Photo: Ian James Allison

NEWS VIEW 176
Border Challenge
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Back in July 2008, through this same medium of News View (edition 136),
I expressed an aspiration for the Borders Rail Link in Scotland to be signalled
in a manner suitable to its needs and (to use a popular Scottish term) outwith
the constraints of the standards prescribed by the UK’s national infrastructure
owner.
Given the original thrust for the route to be constructed by a third party
with the ability to provide an enlightened solution embracing fresh thinking,
innovation and commensurate technology for this blank canvas was highly
plausible. This would have given us S&T engineers a unique challenge in an
otherwise monotone future. It could have revealed our skills and given our
profession a fillip, raising our profile and gaining us new respect.
Sadly, the procurement competition to finance, design, build and maintain
this line foundered, with the result that it is now to be built by Network Rail.
Refresh your memory of the words contained in News View 136 and join
me in lamenting what will probably now turn out to be a lost opportunity
unless Network Rail has the courage to recognise the potential. So I call on
Network Rail’s S&T engineers to stand up and show how they would relish
this chance they have been given to confound the critics, including myself, by
delivering a solution that does not just “paint by numbers” but which really
looks at the fundamentals in order to match rolling stock, service pattern,
availability and efficiency to this “green field” railway.
J.D. Francis
IN THIS ISSUE
©
NOT FOR RE-PRINTING
Page
From Safety to Security – How Secure is ERTMS? (London March Paper) 2
Dr Robert Stroud and Professor Robin Bloomfield
Wen Zhou: What went wrong? 9
George Nikandros
Industry News 11
IRSE International Convention 2011: Part 2 12
Tuesday 11 October 2011 Trevor Foulkes 12
Wednesday 12 October 2011 Ian Bridges 13
The Guest Perspective Lyn Burkhardt 15
The Future Beckons Nine Younger Members 17
IRSE Matters 19
IRSE Professional Examination: Results 2011 19
London Underground’s Technical Society 20
York Section January Meeting 22
Midland & North Western Section January Meeting 23
Feedback 22
Announcements 24
SIMS Apprenticeships 24
M&NW Section Ninth Annual Luncheon & Technical Visit 24
IRSE Wing Award for Safety: Call for Nominations 2012 25
IRSE Merit Awards: Call for Nominations 2012 25
Younger Members Technical Papers Competition: Call for Papers 25
Membership Matters 26
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012
1

MARCH TECHNICAL PAPER
From Safety to Security – How Secure is ERTMS?
by Dr Robert Stroud and Professor Robin Bloomfield
Both authors are with Adelard LLP. Robin Bloomfield is a Professor in the Centre for Software Reliability at City University, London
Paper to be read in London on 8 March 2012
INTRODUCTION
The European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS) is a
major industrial project that aims at replacing the many different
national train control and command systems in Europe. The
deployment of ERTMS will support the creation of a seamless
European railway system and increase the competitiveness of
European railways.
ERTMS consists of two major components:
ETCS, the European Train Control System, is a train control
and Automatic Train Protection system (ATP) to replace the
existing national systems;
GSM-R is a radio system for providing voice and data
communication between the track and the train, using GSM
technology over frequencies reserved for railway use.
Network Rail is preparing to introduce ETCS and GSM-R as part
of the upgrade of the signalling and communications systems
running on the rail infrastructure in Great Britain. Within the rail
industry safety has always been paramount, but security has not
always been considered. However this upgrade has the
potential to increase the risk of an electronic attack on the rail
infrastructure, as it brings more systems under centralised
control.
This paper reports on the results of a security audit of ERTMS
that was commissioned by the Centre for the Protection of
National Infrastructure (CPNI) on behalf of key railway
stakeholders. We first discuss the ERTMS/ETCS specifications
from a security perspective and then contrast our results with the
safety requirements for ERTMS, highlighting areas where
different assumptions about the threat model lead to different
concerns.
OVERVIEW OF ERTMS
The ERTMS/ETCS System Requirements Specification (SRS)
(Ref. 1) provides a technical specification of the overall system.
Figure 1, which is taken from the SRS, provides a simplified
view of the ERTMS/ETCS reference architecture. The trackside
sub-system consists of balises (track-mounted devices that
communicate with passing trains), the radio communication
system (GSM-R), and Radio Block Centres (RBCs). The RBCs
issue movement authorities to trains on the basis of information
received from external trackside systems and information
exchanged with the on-board systems.
The on-board system receives movement authorities from an
RBC via radio messages, and calculates a speed profile for the
track ahead based on the braking characteristics of the train and
the safe speed limits for the track conditions. Although the
driver remains in control of the train, the system will supervise
the maximum speed of the train, and ensure that the brakes are
applied automatically if the train exceeds the safe speed limit for
a particular section of track, or is in danger of not being able to
2
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IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012
Figure 1: The reference architecture of ERTMS/ETCS
stop before the end of its movement authority. Balises are used
to provide the train with location references, so that it can
correct for any errors in its odometry, and keep the RBC
informed about its current position.
As the train progresses along its allocated route, it keeps the
RBC informed about its current position, and as track becomes
available, the RBC extends the train’s movement authority so
that the train is able to maintain an optimal speed for the traffic
conditions ahead.
THREATS AND HAZARDS
A safety analysis usually starts by identifying the core hazard and
then examining potential failure modes that could cause that
hazard, but a security analysis considers a rather different set of
potential threats and undesirable consequences.
Traditionally, computer security deals with threats to
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but here we are
concerned with train movements rather than information, so our
primary concern is integrity, then availability, and finally
confidentiality. Loss of integrity could result in accidents or
collisions, whereas loss of availability would bring the railway
system to a halt. Loss of confidentiality is less of an immediate
threat, but might result in the leak of sensitive operational
information. Reliability is also important, since an unreliable train
service will result in a loss of public confidence in the railway
operators.

Thus, the hazards or potential failures to be avoided are the
following:
a collision involving multiple trains;
an accident such as derailment involving a single train;
widespread disruption of train service over a large area;
disruption to individual trains, or trains within a local area;
creation of a situation that leads to panic and potential loss of
life (e.g., an emergency stop and uncontrolled evacuation on to
the track);
creation of a situation that leads to passenger discomfort and
dissatisfaction, (e.g., stopping a train indefinitely in a tunnel);
loss of public confidence in the railway system due to
intermittent low-level problems affecting the reliability of the
service;
leak of sensitive information (e.g., movements of hazardous
cargoes or VIPs).
Note that these hazards are concerned with system-wide failures
whereas the safety analysis only deals with the failure of a single
train. Similarly, a safety analysis is only concerned with accidents
resulting from a hazard; reliability and availability are treated
separately, and confidentiality is not usually an issue. However
faults that could result in an accident need to be considered in both
a safety and security analysis, regardless of the underlying cause of
the fault (accidental, deliberate or malicious).
A security analysis also needs to consider the capabilities of the
attacker. It is usual to make a distinction between an insider and an
outsider. An insider is someone with legitimate access to a system
who abuses their position and privileges, either willingly or under
duress; whereas an outsider is someone outside the system with
limited access, who seeks to break into the system out of curiosity,
malice, or for personal gain. Historically, railway systems have
relied on highly specialised, proprietary technology, and there has
been a relatively small community with the necessary knowledge to
exploit vulnerabilities. However the widespread adoption of open
standards like ERTMS, that are designed to promote
interoperability and the commoditisation of technology, could
result in both the necessary knowledge and the necessary tools
becoming more readily available to potential attackers who are
sufficiently motivated to gain the necessary skills.
ERTMS FROM A SECURITY PERSPECTIVE
NOT FOR RE-PRINTING
Our approach to the security analysis has been to consider the
context in which ERTMS operates, and its relationship with other
systems. ERTMS is implemented using a number of trackside and
on-board sub-systems, and the ERTMS/ETCS specifications
describe the interfaces by which these various sub-systems interact,
and how the ETCS application responds to messages via these
interfaces and ensures that trains move safely without exceeding
their movement authority.
It is important to note that the ERTMS/ETCS specifications only
deal with the interoperability requirements of a European Railway
Traffic Management System, and therefore do not cover the
interfaces that are used by each national railway to control and
manage its own infrastructure. This limits the scope of any security
or safety analysis to interactions between the various components
of the ERTMS/ETCS architecture
©
Messages are transmitted between the ERTMS/ETCS subsystems
over various channels, so a security analysis needs to
consider whether these channels can be trusted to deliver the
messages reliably or whether an attacker can interfere with the
delivery channels in some way. Safety measures that guard
against random errors caused by environmental noise are not
robust against deliberate attempts to corrupt the channel,
because errors are then no longer random. A security analysis
also needs to consider what might happen if a particular
component of the system were compromised in some way.
For example, ERTMS is designed to prevent the driver from
exceeding the safe speed limit by accident, but is it possible
for the driver to bypass ERTMS in some way and remove this
protection, and how does the system deal with this possibility?
A security analysis therefore needs to consider:
whether there are safeguards built into the system that
protect against messages being corrupted in transmission
by the input channel;
whether these safeguards protect against all possible
threats to the input channel (e.g., deliberate attacks on the
channel, as opposed to random failures of the channel);
whether the source of the input is trustworthy, or whether
it is possible for the input source to have been
compromised;
whether there is adequate protection at the application
level to guard against malicious messages generated by an
attacker who controls the input source.
The on-board system needs to interact with the driver, the
train, the balises, and the radio block centres. So the on-board
system either needs to trust these components of the ERTMS
system absolutely, which means that it is vulnerable to abuse if
these components are compromised, or else take appropriate
steps to guard against potential failures and compromises of
these components.
Moreover, the ERTMS/ETCS system needs to ensure that
the channels of communication between these components
are trustworthy, or else an outsider could compromise the
system by disrupting communications and either injecting false
messages or modifying or deleting correct messages.
Communication Channels
We start by examining the communication channels from a
security perspective. The ERTMS/ETCS architecture involves
two kinds of communication: on-board and train/trackside.
On-board Communications
The driver and the train itself are part of the on-board train
system, and therefore the security of the channels between the
driver/train and the ETCS application depends on the physical
security of the train (e.g., the use of a special driver’s key to
operate the driver’s console, and the integrity of the traction
equipment). Although it would be possible for an attacker to
tamper with these physical interfaces, this kind of attack falls
outside the scope of an information assurance audit of ERTMS.
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the ERTMS/ETCS
specifications provide no protection for the ETCS/Train
interface and the ETCS/Driver interface. In particular there are
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012 3

MARCH TECHNICAL PAPER
no checks on the integrity or authenticity of the messages
exchanged over these channels, because they are assumed to be
part of a closed system. The driver interacts directly with ETCS
via the driver’s control panel, and ETCS interacts directly with the
train via an electro-mechanical interface, and there is assumed to
be no possibility of intervention or compromise.
The weakness with this approach is the assumption that ETCS
remains a closed system. For various economic and practical
reasons, there is a trend towards integrated control systems
based on commodity components, and towards the use of
shared communication networks between the various on-board
train systems. If ETCS were to be accessible over such a network
without adequate authentication or integrity checking, it would
be possible for any system connected to the network to interfere
with the correct operation of the ERTMS system, either
accidentally or deliberately. For example, a virus on a
passenger’s laptop computer could try to spread itself via the
train’s communication network, which could result in the train
control system malfunctioning.
Train/Trackside Communications
The other channels of communication are between the train and
the trackside, and these therefore have to cross the air gap,
which is assumed to be untrustworthy. One channel is between
the train and the RBC, which is secured using the Euroradio
protocol. The other channel is between the train and the balises,
where the air gap interface is protected by an elaborate
encoding scheme to guard against accidental loss or corruption,
but is assumed to be tamperproof by its very nature.
Trust relationships
We now explore the trust relationships between the various
components of the ERTMS/ETCS architecture.
ETCS – Driver
The driver is trusted to enter correct data about the train’s
braking requirements, and to operate the ETCS system in a
responsible fashion. In particular, although the driver’s actions
are normally supervised by ETCS, it is possible for the driver to
disable the ETCS system completely, and then drive the train in
an unsupervised fashion without any speed restrictions or
interventions if the train exceeds its movement authority.
However, because there is an operational need for this
functionality to be available (e.g., in an emergency or if the
system breaks down), this vulnerability is unavoidable and drivers
have to be trusted not to abuse their privileges. The only
protection that can be provided is a set of operational
procedures that drivers must follow, but these fall outside the
scope of ERTMS and cannot be enforced or policed by an
automated system.
ETCS – Train
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©
The on-board system has detailed knowledge of the train’s
braking characteristics, the track adhesion conditions and the
response time before full braking is enabled, and can therefore
perform an accurate calculation about when to apply the brakes
to bring the train to a halt. The train is trusted to apply the
brakes on demand but the service brake is not required to be
trustworthy; if the train does not respond to the service brake as
expected, the emergency brake will be applied and this is
assumed to be fail-safe. Track-based train detection equipment
linked to the interlocking provides a final safeguard if a train
overruns the end of its movement authority.
To know when to apply the brakes, ETCS needs to keep track
of the train’s current speed and position – this information is
provided by a separate interface from ETCS, to an odometer
device. The odometer is required to supply ETCS with
reasonably accurate information about the distance travelled,
and ETCS can use this information to calculate an estimate of the
train’s current location and speed. However, ETCS does not
trust the odometer to provide completely precise distance
measurements – instead, the odometer is expected to associate
a confidence interval with all its measurements, and re-calibrate
itself using location references received from the balises.
Thus, in principle, ETCS guards against receiving inaccurate
information about the speed and position of the train, but
ultimately depends on an external position reference provided
by the balises and its own internal time reference.
ETCS – RBC
The train interacts with the RBCs via a GSM-R radio link, and
implicitly trusts the movement authorities and the data it
receives from the RBCs about the track conditions ahead.
However, the GSM-R network is not considered to be secure,
and the Euroradio protocol (Ref. 2) is used to ensure that
messages from RBCs cannot be forged or modified in
transmission. This ensures that there is a secure channel of
communication between the RBCs and the train.
Euroradio only provides a basic transport service, with no
error detection or error recovery. Thus protection against lost,
duplicated, or out-of-order messages has to be provided at the
ERTMS application level. In particular, messages are given a
timestamp, and if no messages are received within a given time
window, the safe connection is released and set up again, with
the option of applying the service brake or tripping the system.
Although Euroradio protects the train against attacks from
outside the system, it does not protect the train against attacks
from within the system. In particular, if an attacker was able to
compromise an RBC and cause it to issue false instructions, then
a hazardous situation could arise.
Clearly, the RBCs need to be protected against such attacks
– an uncontrolled external interface to an RBC would be a major
vulnerability. However, this falls outside the scope of the
ERTMS/ETCS specifications, which are only concerned with
interoperability. The specifications only describe the messages
exchanged between the RBCs and the train, and the protocol for
handing on control of trains from one RBC to the next.
The security of the Euroradio protocol depends on the
existence of a secure mechanism for creating and distributing
keys to trains and RBCs but this is not addressed by the
specifications. However, in order to support interoperability
across national borders, it is necessary to exchange keys
between national implementations of ERTMS as a precondition
for trains to be able to travel seamlessly from one country to the
next under the control of ERTMS. Key exchange across national
4
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012

orders is covered by the specification of the off-line key
management system (Ref. 3), which requires a secure
implementation of a national key management centre for each
country; the standard specifies a minimum set of security
requirements that each national key management centre must
meet.
This is important because the security of ERTMS depends on
the security of the key infrastructure – trains can only operate
within a given area if the RBC for that area and the train share a
secret key, since otherwise they would not be able to
communicate via Euroradio. So keys need to be distributed in
advance as part of setting up cross-border train operations, and
each national authority must be prepared to entrust its own keys
to another national authority, which means that it needs to be
satisfied that those keys will be managed securely by the foreign
key management centre.
There is also a requirement that all keys should be sufficiently
strong and that no country should generate weak keys, since, if it
were possible for an attacker to guess a national key, they could
masquerade as a train or an RBC from that country, not only in
the country whose keys had been compromised but also in any
foreign country that had an interoperability agreement with that
country.
ETCS – Balise
Balises are essentially unsecured devices and therefore represent
a potential vulnerability in ERTMS. In particular, there are no
robust authentication or integrity checks on the information
provided by balises. However, some protection is built into the
ETCS application.
Specifically, ETCS distinguishes between linked balises and
unlinked balises. Linked balises provide position references, and
each movement authority contains details about the expected
position of all the linked balises that the train should encounter
during passage through that section of track. Because the
movement authority is sent from the RBC to the train via a secure
channel, this information is considered trustworthy. The ETCS
application is designed to tolerate missing or misplaced balises,
but these are assumed to be due to equipment failure or
maintenance error rather than a deliberate attack.
However, ETCS is also willing to accept information from
balises that are not known to the RBC or that it is not informed
about in advance. Such balises are known as unlinked balises
and represent a major vulnerability to the system because an
attacker can use an unlinked balise to feed malicious and
untrustworthy commands to a train via a channel that the train
implicitly trusts.
The ERTMS/ETCS specifications presumably allow unlinked
balises because there is an operational requirement for balises to
be deployed temporarily, without the need to re-programme the
balise linking information held by RBCs (e.g., during track
maintenance work). Whether this trade-off between risk and
convenience is appropriate is debatable. Unfortunately, even
though a national authority might decide not to deploy unlinked
balises as part of its operational procedures, the potential
vulnerability would remain because ERTMS requires all trains to
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©
recognise unlinked balises and there is no facility for disabling
this mechanism on a national basis.
The list of commands that an ETCS system is willing to accept
from an unlinked balise is not arbitrary; the specification
attempts to make a distinction between information that is safety
critical and should not be provided via an untrusted channel
(e.g., movement authorities and track information), and
information that it may be necessary to send from a balise for
operational reasons (e.g., temporary speed restrictions).
For example, unlinked balises cannot be used to issue an
emergency stop command, although such commands can be
issued via the RBC. This is presumably because there are more
appropriate ways of alerting train drivers to an emergency
situation (e.g., by using the emergency group call facility
provided by GSM-R).
However, almost all of the commands that can be issued by
an unlinked balise could be exploited by an attacker to a greater
or lesser extent. Most of these attacks would result in some
form of denial of service, but some commands can be used to
create a hazardous situation.
Summary
On-board channels of communication between components of
ERTMS/ETCS are assumed not to need protection because the
channels are not exposed to an attacker. Radio communications
between the train and the trackside are protected by encryption,
but the security of the system depends on the security of the
underlying key management infrastructure. Communications
across the air gap between balises and the train are protected
from electromagnetic interference by an elaborate encoding
scheme, but otherwise balises are assumed to be trustworthy
and are not authenticated.
The ETCS application provides some protection at the
application level, but the safeguards are designed to protect
against equipment failure and maintenance errors rather than
deliberate attacks, and unlinked balises represent a particular
threat. However, such an attack would require physical access to
the track and could not be launched remotely or electronically.
ERTMS FROM A SAFETY PERSPECTIVE
The ERTMS safety analysis (Ref. 4) is based on a series of Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis documents that identify “potentially
catastrophic events that could exist at the mandatory boundaries
of the UNISIG reference architecture”. The analysis considers
the impact of these “potentially catastrophic events” on the
overall safety of the ETCS application, and apportions the
tolerable hazard rate to each subsystem accordingly. However,
“failures that do not affect the safety of a passenger on the train
are classed as RAM issues”. Thus, the focus is on safety rather
than security, and events that might affect the availability of the
service are not considered to be a threat to its safety, although
they would be considered relevant from a security perspective.
Nevertheless, a complete set of failure modes is identified for
each interface, so the list of failure modes is still useful, even if
the effects analysis is not always appropriate.
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012 5

MARCH TECHNICAL PAPER
The function of ETCS is specified as follows (all quotations are
from Ref. 4): “To provide the Driver with information to allow
him to drive the train safely and to enforce respect of this
information”.
Thus the core hazard for the reference architecture is defined
as: “Exceedance of the safe speed / distance as advised to ETCS”.
The maximum rate of occurrence for the core hazard, which is
“derived from consideration of the consequences that an
occurrence of the ETCS core hazard would have on a single
passenger travelling on a train for 1 hour”, is required to be:
“2 × 10 -9 per hour per train”.
This is the maximum Tolerable Hazard Rate (THR) for ETCS
and should be interpreted as the rate per hour for a typical
passenger journey. It is “inclusive of both random equipment
failures and any systematic failures that could be introduced as a
result of the design process”.
However, “failures due to operators (e.g., Driver, signalman,
maintenance staff) and operational rules are not included in this
core hazard or THR”.
Given these caveats, it is clear that the THR is solely
concerned with the technical safety of ETCS, and does not
represent the level of operational safety that can be achieved in
practice with ETCS. Moreover, it does not take into account the
effect of deliberate attacks on the security of the system.
Fault Tree
Part 1 of the ERTMS Safety Analysis presents a generic functional
fault tree for ETCS based on the failure modes of the ETCS
macro functions, which are derived from the SRS and arranged in
a hierarchy leading up to the core-level hazard.
“The objective of producing the generic functional fault tree
is to provide a system-wide view of functional interactions so that
the migration of base events that have been identified as being
potentially catastrophic can be analysed. The base events were
identified by the FMEA analyses of the mandatory interfaces.”
The fault tree “provides full traceability to the set of system
macro functions as defined in the SRS, whether or not the failure
leads to a catastrophic event”. Thus the fault trees are neutral
with respect to the underlying causes of the failure, and are
equally valid for a safety or security analysis.
The ETCS system function splits naturally into two parts, and
this is reflected in the structure of the fault tree:
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©
The information function keeps the driver informed of the
speed and distance limits that he must observe in order to
maintain safety;
The enforcement function protects the train from breaching
a safe speed and distance envelope, by intervening with a
request for a pre-emptive application of the brake.
Because of the need to keep both the display and the supervision
parameters consistent, there are some common mode
issues in the system:
“if the information provided to the train carried system is
incorrect in terms of a safe speed and distance, then the driver
will be shown the wrong targets. If he drives to these incorrect
targets he will be allowed to do so without being protected from
making an unsafe move by the ETCS supervision and intervention
functions.”
Moreover, it is important that the ETCS is supplied with
correct train data, since otherwise the calculation of the Most
Restrictive Speed Profile (MRSP) and the braking algorithm
calculation will be incorrect:
“There is nothing that ETCS can do if a driver confidently
enters and acknowledges erroneous data. Thus rigorous checks
outside ETCS will be essential, particularly if data is modified
during a journey or under emergency conditions where an
independent check may be difficult to initiate.”
Other sources of common mode errors include the incorrect
calculation of speed and distance, and mistakes in the placement
of balises or the information supplied to the system about the
track topography.
Fault Tree Analysis
Part 2 of the ERTMS Safety Analysis contains an analysis of the
fault trees from a safety perspective. It enumerates the various
failure modes that have been identified, considers their impact
and criticality on the various ETCS functions in different
operating modes, and suggests possible mitigating conditions.
Although this analysis is from a safety perspective, much of it is
still relevant from a security perspective because the failure
modes and consequences are the same, regardless of whether
the failure is accidental or malicious.
Figure 2, which is taken from Section 8 of Part 2 of Ref. 4,
provides a useful overview of the failure modes and their impact
on the different components of the ERTMS/ETCS reference
architecture.
Many of the failure modes are internal to the on-board ETCS
system and are therefore less relevant to a security analysis, as
noted previously. For example, there are 34 kernel-level failure
events, which would be triggered by faults in the ETCS
Figure 2: Failure modes
6
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012

implementation itself. Although it might be possible for an
attacker to exploit such design faults, this would need to be
determined as part of the security assessment of an actual ETCS
implementation and such failures are therefore out of scope for
an analysis of the security implications of the ERTMS/ETCS
specifications.
However, failure events at the edge of the reference
architecture, particularly those that relate to transmission of
information and commands, or the provision of external data, are
more obvious attack vectors that could compromise the security
implications of ERTMS and therefore need to be adequately
protected.
ENG Events
The first category of such events is the ENG events, which relate
to “engineering data processing and installation procedures”
and are considered to be outside the scope of the safety
analysis. However, this does not consider the possibility of
deliberate sabotage of the trackside data, for example, by
repositioning the balises (ENG-1a). Providing false radio data
(ENG-1b) for transmission by the RBCs would be more tricky, but
might be possible via a proprietary operational interface to the
RBCs that was outside the scope of the ERTMS/ETCS
specifications. Note that this failure mode is distinct from the
various failure modes that can occur during radio transmission
(TRANS-RADIO-X).
EXT events
The second category of such events is the EXT events, which
relate to external systems outside the scope of ETCS. EXT-1
relates to a failure of the interlocking to provide correct route
data, EXT-2 is another failure of engineering data processing,
and EXT-3 is a failure to send an emergency message when
conditions demand it. Again, it might be possible for an attacker
to trigger some of these events by sabotaging the trackside
equipment or exploiting vulnerabilities in proprietary interfaces
to this equipment.
DRV Events
The third category of events is the DRV events, which relate to
driver errors. Clearly, the driver is a trusted component of the
system, and therefore a potential vulnerability that could be
exploited by an attacker. Five driver-related failures are
identified, some of which are classified as safety-related rather
than safety-critical, but in order to cause a system-level failure it
would be necessary for the driver to disable or mislead the
supervisory function of the ETCS by entering false data.
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TRANS Events
©
The fourth category of events is the TRANS events, which relate
to various kinds of transmission errors in either the balise-train air
gap interface, or the RBC-train or RBC-RBC radio interface. The
balises are designed to operate in a hostile physical environment
and telegrams are encoded using a robust encoding scheme,
with further levels of protection provided by balise linking at the
application level.
Because of the physical constraints, it would be very difficult
for an attacker to trigger a TRANS-BALISE event – it is much
easier to insert a malicious unlinked balise or move a linked
balise, which would correspond to an ENG-1 failure event.
In contrast, the various TRANS-RADIO events, which divide
into trackside and train-track transmissions, are protected by the
safety layer of the Euroradio protocol and are therefore
dependent on the integrity of the underlying key management
and crypto protocols, which might be easier to attack.
Furthermore, by jamming the GSM-R radio signal, it would be
possible to cause a denial of service attack, which is considered
to be a RAM issue rather than a safety issue and has therefore
been excluded from the safety analysis.
TI and MMI Events
Finally, the TI events and MMI events relate to failures of the
train interface (braking functions) or driver console. Although it
might be possible for an attacker to sabotage these interfaces
on a particular train, it would require physical access to the train
and therefore the attack cannot be performed remotely and
does not scale (unless the design and manufacturing process of a
widely deployed ERTMS system can be sabotaged or
compromised in some way).
Apportioning the tolerable hazard rate
Part 3 of the ERTMS Safety Analysis is concerned with
apportioning the approved Tolerable Hazard Rate for technical
failures of ETCS (THR ETCS ) to the various components of the
reference architecture. The apportionment is made with respect
to a standard mission profile, and is used to derive a set of safety
requirements for interoperability. Thus, Part 3 is less relevant
from a security perspective, particularly since the analysis is
solely concerned with the technical safety of ETCS and does not
include operational or security issues.
Nevertheless, Part 3 contains several points of interest. For
example, given the standard mission profile and a plausible set
of assumptions about security threats, it might be possible to
calculate a more realistic hazard rate, or at least expose the
sensitivity of the safety analysis to security assumptions.
Also, some of the assumptions that underpin the analysis are
worthy of further consideration. Section 6.2 deals with
transmission events, with section 6.2.2 dealing with the threat
posed by masquerade messages. According to paragraphs
6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2:
“The quantitative safety targets derived in this document are
valid for errors in the communication channels originated by
random events (e.g., corruption due to electromagnetic
interference, abnormal delays or repetitions in the non-trusted
communication system).
“Masqueraded messages, originated by intentional attacks to
the radio transmission system, must be treated separately on the
basis of qualitative considerations, because the rate of malicious
attacks can not be estimated. The protection offered by the
cryptographic safety code defined in the Euroradio specifications
may be considered sufficient provided the organisation
responsible for system operation can demonstrate the
appropriateness of measures to ensure the confidentiality of the
keys.”
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012 7

MARCH TECHNICAL PAPER
In other words, the operational security of the key management
procedures underpins the security of the Euroradio protocol, and
therefore merits careful analysis. Unfortunately, this aspect of
the ERTMS/ETCS specifications is still at the informative stage
and is the subject of some controversy with respect to where
responsibility for key management lies. However, according to
the safety analysis here, compromising key management could
compromise the safety of ERTMS.
Similarly, Section 9.3.4 deals with the transmission of
Emergency Messages by radio and argues that ensuring the
integrity of such messages is outside the scope of ETCS, but that
the use of the Emergency Message Service should not detract
from the technical safety of the system. In particular, paragraph
9.3.4.2 notes that “[…] the Emergency Message shall use the
high priority channel. Therefore it is not protected with the same
safety features as the normal priority channel against corruption
and / or deletion. The ETCS Emergency function is designed for
the shortest possible response time, not for high integrity.”
Whilst this might be appropriate from a safety perspective,
the lack of integrity provides an opportunity for an attacker, who
could abuse the emergency message facility to cause a denial of
service attack.
Finally, in the light of the concerns raised about the security
of unlinked balises, it is interesting to note the following
observation in section 10.2.1 of the conclusions:
“[…] placing total reliance on the detection of un-linked
balises led to requirements on the failure rate for an information
point that is not feasible. This resulted in the requirement for the
use of two separate balise groups each with a minimum of two
balises. This requirement eased the target failure rates on both
the onboard and trackside to figures that are feasible.”
Unfortunately, the use of paired balises only protects against
accidental failures of balises, and not against deliberate attacks.
Moreover, the safety analysis recognizes that the system is
particularly vulnerable to TRANS-BALISE events associated with
unlinked balises, particularly insertion events, which could be
simulated by an attacker placing unlinked balises at strategic
locations.
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DISCUSSION
Safety and security are both forms of dependability and use
similar techniques to assess the impact of possible failure modes
on the overall behaviour of a system. Thus, it is not surprising
that a security analysis and a safety analysis of ERTMS identify
similar points of vulnerability in the system. Where the two
approaches differ is in their assumptions about the likelihood of
these failure modes. In general, a safety assessment assumes
that failures are accidental rather than malicious, which makes it
easier to estimate the probability of a failure, whereas a security
analysis tends to assume a worst-case scenario in which all
failures are possible.
Nevertheless, safe systems need to be secure; if they are not
secure, then they are not safe. A safety analysis that does not
consider hazards that could be caused by underlying security
vulnerabilities is deficient.
In practice there may be conflicts between security
requirements and safety requirements. For example, in an
emergency situation, a timely response may be more important
than a secure response. Moreover, safety concerns are rather
different from security concerns: confidentiality is not usually a
safety concern, neither is availability. Safety is primarily concerned
with integrity – a system should not do something that is
damaging to its environment, and therefore in some circumstances,
doing nothing is the safest option. In contrast, security is traditionally
concerned with confidentiality, integrity and availability.
A failure of confidentiality would not be considered a safety
concern, but would definitely be a security concern. Similarly,
fail-safe behaviour is important from a safety perspective but
conflicts with the security requirement to maintain availability.
CONCLUSIONS
Safety is always paramount in railway systems, and ERTMS is
designed to be a safe system. The general philosophy is ‘if in
doubt, stop the train’, which means that it is very difficult for an
attacker to engineer a train accident. However, it is possible for
an attacker to exploit the ‘fail safe’ behaviour of ERTMS, and
create a situation that causes a train to halt. Thus, denial of
service attacks are possible, and could be launched at a time and
place of the attacker’s choosing, perhaps designed to cause
maximum disruption or passenger discomfort (e.g., causing a
train to halt in a tunnel). Causing an accident is more difficult
but not impossible; however, it is important to remember that
ERTMS does not drive the train, and it is therefore the driver
who is ultimately responsible for the safety of the train.
Subsequent work has explored these issues further, including
the identification of specific vulnerabilities, and our results have
been presented to representatives of the UK rail industry and the
European Railway Agency (ERA). Some of the vulnerabilities we
have identified depend very much on the specific details of the
national implementation of ERTMS and GSM-R. Moreover, some
of the most critical parts of an ERTMS implementation (e.g., the
interface between the control centre and the RBCs) are outside
the scope of the ERTMS/ETCS specifications, which are only
concerned with interoperability and do not address
implementation issues within a national implementation. Thus,
there is a need to extend the scope of our security review to
include the whole of the national railway infrastructure. More
generally, it is important to ensure that security issues are taken
into account when preparing safety cases, and further work in
this area is planned.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was commissioned by CPNI on behalf of the UK rail
industry and was performed by the Centre for Software
Reliability, City University London. The authors would like to
acknowledge the contributions of Dr Ilir Gashi and Richard
Bloomfield.
REFERENCES
Ref 1. UNISIG SUBSET-026, System Requirement Specification,
Version 2.3.0
Ref 2. UNISIG SUBSET-037, Euroradio FIS, Version 2.3.0
Ref 3. UNISIG SUBSET-038, Off-line Key Management FIS,
Version 2.1.9
Ref 4. UNISIG SUBSET 088, ETCS Application Levels 1 & 2 -
Safety Analysis, Version 2.3.0
(See www.era.europa.eu)
8
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012

WEN ZHOU
Wen Zhou: What went wrong?
By George Nikandros, FIRSE
(This article was originally written for the newsletter of the Australian Safety Critical Systems Association and
has been recently updated by the Author. If any member has further information perhaps they could let the
IRSE NEWS know and it will be published for all to read)
THE ACCIDENT
On 22 July 2011 at about 20:37 two high speed trains collided
on a viaduct near Wen Zhou, resulting in 40 deaths and more
than 200 injuries, raising concerns about the safety of high
speed rail in China (Ref 1). In December 2011, an official
report (in Mandarin Chinese) was released; however the cause
of the accident still remains a mystery. The report however
supports the media statements made by Chinese Government
and Railways officials since the accident.
From these media statements, the Wen Zhou accident was
caused by a failure of a safety-critical system; at least that
seems to be the consensus. According to a South China
Morning Post article by Stephen Chen, the December 2012
report about on the investigation into the accident raises
unnerving questions about the safety of the mainland’s highspeed
rail network without supplying any answers. According
to the article a serious software bug in the main computer of
the train control system at a station was pivotal in the accident,
although details are as yet unknown. Since the accident there
has been much speculation even conjecture as to why and how
the signalling system failed so catastrophically. The on-line
Wall Street Journal (3 October 2011) (Ref 2) even suggests that
protection of intellectual property (copyright) was a contributing
factor.
According to a Railway Gazette article (Ref 3), the recentlyappointed
head of the Shanghai Railway Bureau, An Lusheng,
appearing before the independent investigation panel
established by the State Council, said that ‘design flaws’ in the
signalling on the Ningbo – Wen Zhou high speed line led to
the fatal rear-end collision near Wen Zhou on July 22. He
added that having been struck by lightning, the signal system
at Wenzhou South station failed to turn a Green light to Red.
On the same day, the Beijing National Railway Research &
Design Institute of Signal & Communication issued an apology
for the accident.
The railway between Ningbo and Wenzhou South is
equipped with lineside signals overlaid with CTCS-2 (Chinese
Train Control System) to provide automatic train protection
which apparently has a similar functionality to the ETCS
(European Train Control System) Level 1, using balises to
provide intermittent updates to the on-train equipment. The
line is designed for mixed traffic operation with a maximum
speed of 250 km/h.
A link to a timeline of events from the Wen Zhou Control
Centre published by a Chinese newspaper in Mandarin
Chinese was posted to the Safety Critical Mailing List by Oleg
Lisagor on 28 July, 2011. The timeline was considered to be
from a trustworthy source. An interpretation of the translated
timeline of events follows. Figure 2 is provided to aid
understanding:
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©
Figure 1: Chinese rescue workers by the wreckage of train cars in Wen Zhou
7:34 pm Wen Zhou south advised that train D3212 on the 4th road
whilst approaching the starter signal at Proceed, had
passed the station starter signal at Stop. (The signal
appears to have changed to stop as the train D3212
approached it.) Control (Shanghai Control Centre) then
asked the driver if the train was moving. Upon confirmation
from the driver that the train was not moving,
Control cancelled the re-clearing request of this signal.
7:36 pm Because Wen Zhou south 4th road station starter signal
has no way of clearing, Control arranged for Wen Zhou
south station to be transferred to emergency control.
7:39 pm The Yong Jia to Wen Zhou South down line section, three
approach track sections to Wen Zhou south station
showed up as occupied / failed as a result of a lightning
strike. Civil/Signal maintenance staff and traction
overhead maintenance staff were notified.
7:44 pm Control (Shanghai) received the following report from Wen
Zhou south station: Station communication centre screen
showed that three consecutive approach sections in the
down direction were failed/occupied, station (Control)
CTC screen didn’t show anything. After train D3212
departed the 4th road, control arranged for normal station
control to be returned to Wen Zhou South station.
7:45 pm Wen Zhou South station reported to Yong Jia and Ou Hai
station that the approaching and departing sections were
shown as occupied.
7:51 pm Train D3115 arrives at Yong Jia station.
7:53 pm Control (Shanghai) arranged for Wen Zhou south station to
transfer to emergency control.
7:54 pm Yong Jia station was transferred to emergency control.
7:55 pm Control (Shanghai) arranged for Ou Hai to transfer to
emergency control. Wen Zhou south station transferred to
emergency control.
8:06 pm The officers in charge of Yong Jia station made a special
call to the driver of D301 advising Yong Jia station is under
emergency control.
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012 9

WEN ZHOU
8:12 pm Train D301 arrives at Yong Jia station.
8:14 pm Control (Shanghai) arranged for train D3115 to
depart Yong Jia station, informing the driver to
proceed with vigilance On-Sight mode at
20 km/h upon encountering a Red signal
(aspect) within the section.
8:15 pm Train D3115 departs Yong Jia station.
8:20 pm Wen Zhou south station reported that four
approach down line (track) sections had failed
(they showed up as flashing on the screen), but
the section going to Ou Hai was clear.
8:24 pm Train D301 departs Yong Jia station.
8:25 pm Train D3115 stopped at three track sections
from Wen Zhou, and then proceeded on
On-Sight mode.
8:26 pm Control (Shanghai) contacted Wen Zhou south
station. (Wen Zhou south) station reports train
D3115 was approaching and was three signal
sections away. CTC (Control) system showed
that the occupied sections had already cleared.
Because train D3115 train spent a long time in
the section, Southern Wen Zhou station
contacted the driver of D3115 train. The driver
answered saying that the signal aspects within
the section were not stable. The officers in
charge of Wen Zhou south station reported
this to the officers in charge of Yong Jia
station.
8:?? pm When D301 was within 6-7 signal sections away
from D3115, Wen Zhou South station made a
special call to the driver of D301 advising the
driver that “Train D3115 is within this section,
proceed with caution.” The driver of D301
acknowledged this in response. (The precise
time is unknown; however it must some time
after the departure of train D301from Yong Jia.
i.e. after 8:24 pm.)
8:31 pm Driver of train D3115 reported (to Shanghai
Control) that passengers have pressed the
emergency stop button and the train
pantograph has retracted.
8:37 pm Control (Shanghai) arranged for Wen Zhou
South station to contact the driver of D301 to
apply braking
8:39 pm Control (Shanghai) received the following
report from Wen Zhou south station: The train
driver for D3115 reported that the rear
carriages of the train had derailed, and there is
half a section of carriage hanging off the
bridge.
Train D301 and train D3115 collided head to tail
between Yong Jia (@570k680m) and Wen Zhou South
(@588k863m) close to 585k700m, causing train D3115
carriages 13, 14, 15, 16 to derail, and train D301 carriages
1 to 4 to derail (of which carriages 1 and 2 fell off the
bridge, the bridge being approximately 15 metres in the
air).
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Figure 2: Schematic showing location of time line events
WHY DID THE ACCIDENT HAPPEN?
Until the precise cause is identified, one can only speculate as to how the
accident happened. However the timeline of events provides some clues.
From the extent of physical damage to the trains, it is reasonable to
conclude that this was a high speed collision. So what caused the driver
of train D301 to travel at such a high speed knowing that train D3115
being ahead and travelling at slow speed and that there was signalling
problems at Wen Zhou?
The most plausible explanation is that the driver of train D301 must
have got an “all clear” signal despite train D3115 being ahead and
travelling at 20km/h. This can only arise if the signalling system fails in an
unsafe way. A Ministry of Railways official supposedly said (Ref 4) that a
lightning strike damaged a fuse which caused the lights in the lineside
signals to go out; thus there were no signals at RED for the driver of train
D301 to see.
One event that does not seem plausible is the application of the
emergency brake by a passenger on train D3115, particularly as the train
had not long stopped when it encountered a signal at RED and was
10
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012

INDUSTRY NEWS
travelling slowly (20 km/h), assuming that the driver was following the
instructions from Train Control. Also, given that the pantograph retracted
strongly suggests that this was a system response to a signalling violation
i.e. the train passed a signal at RED or some other system failure.
The Red signal encountered by train D3115 aligns with the indications of
failed track sections to the station staff at Wen Zhou and is evidence that
the signalling system was failed in the usual safe mode. The report from the
driver of train D3115 that the “signal aspects were not stable”, suggests
that the maintenance staff were on-site attempting repair; they were
notified at 7:39 pm, well before train D3115 departed Yong Jia for Wen Zhou
at 8:15 pm.
It appears that the part of the signalling system which creates and issues
the movement authority for train D301 contained a state of the track ahead
which was not consistent with state of the track at the local signalling system
at Wen Zhou.
Without knowledge of the particular signalling system technology or its
architecture it is not possible to draw any conclusions as to how such an
inconsistency eventuated. It may be that the data might not have been
refreshed due to equipment damage cased by lightning; there was a storm
at the time.
Hopefully the investigation will identify the cause and that cause(s) be
made public. There is no doubt that there would be important lessons for
the rail industry. It would be a shame if pride and reputation prevents
learning from this accident.
According to a South China Morning Post article, the December 2011
report on the accident investigation adds to the speculation that protection
of intellectual property may have been a contributing factor.
The supplier of the on-board Automatic Train Protection system was
Hollysys Automation Technologies Ltd, a Beijing based company.
According to the on-line Wall Street Journal, the systems supplied by
Hollysys were branded as proprietary to Hollysys and contained tailor-made
components from Hitachi (Japan).
Apparently, Hitachi concealed the inner workings of the tailor-made
components fearing loss of their intellectual property, so as to make it
harder to clone. Whilst one can understand the action to conceal the inner
workings to protect their intellectual property, Hitachi’s view that Hollysys
would not integrate the equipment into a broader safety-signalling system
without Hitachi’s intimate knowledge and know-how appears to have been
a major miscalculation.
It is well known that China does not abide by or support international
laws with respect to copyright and intellectual property.
This however raises ethical issues. In many other countries there are
laws which mandate the disclosure of information on the safe use of your
goods; not only for their intended use, but also with respect to foreseeable
misuse. Purposely hiding information, particularly relating to something that
may not be obvious, that could prevent harm, would be a contravention of
these laws. It would also contravene the ethics of most professional bodies.
Hopefully this article will prompt further IRSE NEWS contributions on
this topic.
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REFERENCES
Ref 1: http://china.org.cn/china/2011-09/16/content_23429796.htm
Ref 2: http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424053111904353504576568983658561372.html
Ref 3: http://www.railwaygazette.com/nc/news/single-view/view/signalfailure-suspected-in-wenzhou-crash.html
Ref 4: http://blog.english.caixin.com/article/361/
Turkish State Railways ERTMS
A joint venture of Invensys Rail and Turkish civil
engineering company Fermak has been awarded a
76 million project from Turkish State Railways (TCDD)
to install advanced European Rail Traffic Management
System (ERTMS) signalling and communications on the
310 km Bandirma-Menemen railway - the main rail
link between the Marmaray and Mediterranean seas.
Invensys Rail’s share of the award, worth 59m,
will see the company design, supply, install, test and
commission its industry leading FUTUR ERTMS
systems both onboard trains and on the lineside.
The whole route will run under the sophisticated and
proven ERTMS Level 2 regime. Invensys Rail will also
install automatic train stop equipment, WESTRACE
electronic interlockings, FS3000 jointless track
circuits, level crossing safety systems, GSM-R voice
and data communications, and a Central Traffic
Control Centre in Balikesir.
Last November, Invensys Rail signed a contract to
supply the signalling and communications for the
high-profile Marmaray link, which will see a new
undersea tunnel link both halves of Istanbul by rail.
This link will see Invensys Rail deploy both its ERTMS
system for conventional rail and its Communications
Based Train Control technology for commuter trains
on the same railway - the first time this has been
done anywhere in the world.
Croatia commissions ERTMS
The first railway line in Croatia to be equipped with
ERTMS / ETCS technology has begun operations.
The Bombardier INTERFLO 250 ERTMS / ETCS
Level 1 system is now operating on the upgraded
33.5 km section of the Pan European Corridor X
between Austria and Greece.
The signalling system was delivered by a consortium
of Bombardier and Site on the 33.5 km section
of the Vinkovci - Tovarnik line to the Serbian border.
As part of the project the company had provided a
next generation Lock 950 computer-based interlocking
system and wayside equipment, certification
of the system allowing trains to run at a speed up to
160 km/h (100 mph).
Monorail System for Delhi
The Delhi Government in India has given an inprinciple
approval for the construction of a 10.8 km
elevated monorail line forming a link between the
Shastri Park Metro station and Trilokpuri through
Laxmi Nagar in east Delhi.
The proposed monorail will be straddle-type and
run on an elevated line built on 9 metre high pillars.
The system is expected to be functional by 2017.
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012 11

IRSE CONVENTION - PART 2
Some individual views of the IRSE International Convention to Singapore and Kuala Lumpur
IRSE International Convention: Tuesday 11 October 2011
By Trevor Foulkes
Photos: Trevor Foulkes and Ian James Allison
On the weekend immediately prior to the convention, the final
section of the Singapore Circle Line came into operation. As a
result, I read in The Straits Times, that Mr Packiam Malayamanar
gets an additional thirty minutes to enjoy his breakfast. This line
was bought into use and is run by SMRT and they were the
focus of the second day of the convention.
The day started with a presentation in the SMRT headquarters
lecture hall by Frank Wong, senior vice president (development)
in which he explained that his company was also helping with
the development and specifications for mass transit rail systems
across the region. He explained in particular that to make a
profit you need to exploit the stations and communications
systems. He referred to the stations as a life style hub and when
you go to them then you see what he means as the shopping
facilities are integrated into the stations.
Pierre Damien Joudain explained that the Circle line control
system is basically the same as that used on the North-East line
in Singapore but that the length of the trains and the different
traction types had to be included in the design process. The
aim is have a system which is 99.9% available. To demonstrate
this, a complete test system had been established in France to
enable all aspects to be checked. In addition he stressed that
keeping configuration under close management and obtaining
input from the staff that operate the system had made the
introduction a success. During the questions it was explained
that the signalling system had been designed with extra
capacity so that as the line got busier, additional trains could be
introduced to meet the demand.
Charles Page then provided a more technical description of
how the control systems work and what is planned for the new
Downtown line, which is due for completion early in 2013 with
most of the civil works being undertaken currently. He
explained that the Sirius on-board computer is connected to the
Westrace interlocking using a Safetrans radio link working in the
unlicensed 2.4 GHz band. He explained how technical
improvements had been made to the radio system to reduce
the chances of interference and blocking from other users of the
band. In addition, he explained that the system had been
developed to include a coded track fall back system. This would
allow trains to restart and run automatically should the
Computer Based Train Control (CBTC) not be available. The
system was primarily to allow trains to, at least, travel to a
station where staff could then access the train. In normal use,
however, the train determines its position from transponders
placed about every 400 m along the line and using odometry
and doppler systems. It then reports its position as it travels
along the track and receives authority to proceed when it is safe
to do so. The system had been optimised to make best use of
the radio system. A formal acceptance strategy has been defined
and test track testing is being undertaken. During Questions it
was clarified that one Westrace interlocking was used per
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station to reduce the effect of loss to a small area.
We then had presentation on platform door systems by
Ramadwammy Muthuramen in which I learnt that they are much
more complicated that I would have expected with data communications
being established with the train to exchange information
on door configuration, door failures and to synchronize opening
and closing. It was explained that platform doors were originally
fitted to allow the air conditioned environment on the platforms to
be maintained but they also has secondary advantages for safety
and to show passengers were to stand to enter the train. During
the convention however a number of members commented on the
slowness of opening and closing doors on the trains and how this
lead to longer dwell times at the stations. Perhaps this is an area
which could benefit from more work.
The group then travelled to the impressive underground SMRT
depot at Kim Chuan. The members were split into different
groups to enable us to see many aspects of the depot. These
included an impressive three-story high automatic stock picking
system which dealt with spares for the trains and the electrical
plant on stations.
The train inspection facility, with safety harnesses for staff
working on the roof, gave the group a chance to examine the
driver’s position (which is not normally used in service) and to see
the train mounted parts of the train control system. I also learnt
how the emergency access door is opened, that the control and
radio units are mounted under the main frame and require their
own fans to keep temperatures acceptable and that a wave guide
is used to provide radio connectivity for the on board surveillance
cameras and signalling.
We visited the control centre equipment room where I saw
SCADA equipment, Synchronous Digital Hierarchy transmission
equipment and the main distribution frame, as well as the main
control room which included a full length display of the route
showing traction equipment status as well as train position and
signal status. It was initially concerning to see two trains become
a single red section but this shows the problem of trying to display
moving block position on a traditional style panel. The display
also showed the status of the platform doors and was surrounded
by many CCTV monitors to allow incidents to be monitored.
The depot control room was like having your very own full size
train set! As all the trains are automatic the operator can move
them around the depot under his direct control and monitor them
on CCTV. A facility had been provided to enable sections of the
depot to be locked out to allow safe access by staff.
I would like to thank SMRT for making their facilities available
and giving us a chance to see what happens behind the scenes to
provide a train system which provides quick and reliable service to
the people of Singapore.
In the evening some colleagues and I went on the night safari
at the zoo during which we found an interlocking failure in the
flying squirrel exhibit!
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IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012

1
2
4
5
3
1. The impressive underground SMRT depot at Kim Chuan
2. The driver’s position, not normally used in service
3. The SMRT Control Centre
4. The SMRT Control Centre
5. The group admire the three-story high automatic stock picking system
IRSE International Convention: Wednesday 12 October 2011
By Ian R Bridges
Photos: Ian James Allison and Keith Walter
NOT FOR RE-PRINTING
train was driven by the Sultan of Johar, which ended 79 years of
©
Members and guests made an early start on Wednesday,
checking out of their Singaporean hotels to travel by bus to the
Woodlands Train Checkpoint (WTCP) in the north of the island.
Despite the very heavy traffic on the city bound routes, good
time was made to the checkpoint. Here each person had to take
their luggage through the immigration procedure, passing easily
into Malaysia before waving goodbye to their suitcases in the
hope that they would be re-united later in the day at their
respective hotels in Kuala Lumpur. WTCP now forms the
southern end of the railway to Malaysia and the point at which
the party joined their train to the north for the second part of the
first ever two centre convention.
Following a short wait, the group joined the 08:45 train to
Butterworth, on which they would travel 250 km (156 miles) as
far as Tampin Pulau Sebang, once a junction for the Melaka Line,
dismantled by the Japanese during World War II. After a kind
member of the train crew had wiped the condensation off the
outside of the carriage windows for the passengers, the diesel
hauled train made a fairly prompt departure, leaving Singapore
behind as it crossed the causeway onto the Malaysian mainland
and Johor Bahru Sentral, the first station on the journey.
Prior to mid 2011, passengers heading north from Singapore
would have gone to Tanjong Pagar station (also known as
Keppel Road) railway station. However, the 26 km track bed
south of WTCP closed with the departure of the 23:00 train on
the 30 June 2011, having previously served as the southern
terminus of the Keretapi Tanah Melayu Berhad (KTMB – Malayan
Railway Limited) line from Malaysia. To mark the occasion the
passenger and freight operation, interrupted only for a short
period during World War II when the Johor–Singapore Causeway
linking Singapore to Malaysia was partially severed in 1942 to
prevent the Japanese army from invading Singapore.
The closure of the line through the centre of the island
formed part of a land swap and development deal between the
two countries. A rapid transit link is planned to enhance the
remaining railway, which will run between Johor Bahru station in
Malaysia and the Republic Polytechnic in Singapore, opening in
2018.
The line to Kuala Lumpur is single track metre gauge (3 ft 3/8
in) with frequent passing loops, stops, twists and turns and much
bouncing around on the way. At the next stop, Kempas Baru,
members temporarily alighted to put their digital photographic
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012 13

IRSE CONVENTION - PART 2
equipment to work, with pictures of couplings and bogies being
captured for posterity, before returning to the train for a hearty
breakfast of sandwiches and spring rolls, pasties and some very,
very sweet tea, all served by an attentive catering staff.
Under the control of a very British style of colour light 3-aspect
signalling, the train moved on to the next stop, Kulai, where after
drawing into the station, the train was propelled backwards and
returned to the adjacent platform to allow the passing of a southbound
sleeper train heading for Johor Bahru. The time by now
was around 10:10 and the intercity train had covered around
40 km (25 miles). After here the train picked up speed and
proceeded on its way through massive areas of uncultivated palm
trees and of dense jungle vegetation along with swampland
interspersed with occasional hamlets, villages and towns, sometimes
with a few railway sidings controlled from a ground frame.
Several brightly coloured Buddhist temples were passed, reminiscent
of last year's visit to India, and providing a contrast to the
many brown muddy rivers we crossed over. Some areas of
vegetation have been cleared to grow bananas. Many lineside
poles, part of a previous pole route, were still in-situ, although
the wires were long gone, presumably replaced by a more
modern method of communication.
Containerised cement traffic heading south passed at Kluang,
the next brief stop before continuing through more vegetation
and deep red soil, which is fed by Malaysia's 2340 mm (92 inches)
of annual rainfall. After further stops at Paloh, Labis and Segamat,
the train arrived at Gemas, where the line to the north-east splits
from that heading to the north-west, Kuala Lumpur and Thailand.
On the approach to Gemas, the railway scenery changed dramatically
as a large new railway development was passed. This is to
be the new southern terminus of the Seremban to Gemas double
tracking electrification project, although there are future plans to
extend the line further south all the way to Johor Bahru. The
project, which is being funded by the Malaysian Government, is
costing MYR3.45 billion (£0.69 billion) and will provide 25 kV
electrification throughout the route from Kuala Lumpur, around
179 km. A number of large new bridges and re-construction of a
number of older ones have been completed to provide the trace
of the new 2 track railway. A massive excavation to the south of
the new station will provide the stabling facilities for the new
station. Some of the new track, OHLE masts and registration
arms are already in place along with some of the new 3 aspect
signals providing bi-directional running capability.
The train finally arrived in Tampin some 45 minutes behind
schedule, following which the party joined a number of buses for
a short 15 minute drive to A’famosa Resort in the state of Melaka
for an unfortunately hasty but nevertheless enjoyable lunch. The
buses once again loaded, the party departed for the capital of
the state and World Heritage Site of Malacca City, around an
hour away, situated on both sides of the Malacca River near to its
mouth where it enters the Strait of Malacca which separates
Malaysia from its neighbour Indonesia. The party was dropped
off in the historic central area of the city adjacent to the oldest
functioning Protestant church in Malaysia, Christ Church of
Malacca, built in 1753 by the Dutch.
In an effort to burn off the aforementioned lunch most people
climbed the hill to the ruin of St. Paul’s Church, the original of
NOT FOR RE-PRINTING
©
which was built in 1521. It was deconsecrated following the
completion of the Christ Church and it became part of the
fortification of the city with only the shell of the building and the
graveyard remaining today. Our final stop in Malacca was on the
western side of the river in the Chinese quarter, where there was
a chance to visit many historic buildings, temples and shops,
including the Cheng Hoon Teng Temple, the oldest Chinese
temple in Malaysia.
To complete a fairly long day of travelling, the party left
Malacca behind to travel the 148 km north to the capital city of
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur (KL), itself a Federal Territory and
governed directly by the Federal Government of Malaysia, but
completely surrounded by the state of Selangor. The second city
in terms of population (the largest being Subang Jaya), KL has a
population of just over 1.4 million people and covers an area of
243 km 2 (94 square miles) and forms part of the Klang Valley
agglomeration, total population of 7.2 million. With its origins in
the 1850s following tin prospecting, both the Parliament of
Malaysia and the official residence of The King, Istana Negara,
are situated within the city and it forms the cultural, financial and
economic centre of Malaysia. Following arrival in the city,
everybody checked into their respective hotels and settled down
for the remaining part of the evening, re-charging their batteries
ready to undertake technical and cultural visits the following day.
6
9
11
7
6 The statue of St. Francis Xavier
welcomes visitors to the ruined
16th-century Church of St. Paul
7 + 8 The young at heart climb the hill to
visit the ruins
9 The A’Famosa Resort Hotel
10 Four old guns
11 Colourful Transport in Malacca
8
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IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012

IRSE International Convention:
The Guest Perspective
By Lynn Burkhardt
Approximately 60 multinational guests and their companions
attended the first two-country IRSE convention this previous
October. The first country was the tropical island of Singapore:
an ultra-clean, well-planned, modern city/country, about the size
of the Isle of Wight in the UK. The ceremonies began on Sunday
at the Swissotel, located in the lively Clarke Quay Entertainment
District. The guests signed in and were treated to goodie bags
full of items helpful in a tropical environment: Kleenex, wet wipes
and umbrellas for protection from rain and sun.
Monday morning, the conference-attendees left for their
technical visits and lectures, while the guests, including myself,
boarded buses to explore the nearby sights. First stop was the
Chettiar Sri Thendayuthapani Hindu Temple, dedicated in 1859
to the six-faced god Muruga. Most striking was the 75-foot-high
Gopuram, a monumental tower above the entryway, elaborately
sculptured with Hindu deities. As we were leaving, the neardaily
Singapore rain began. Undeterred, we boarded charming
bumboats, small wooden water-taxis, and cruised up the
Singapore River through the historical Colonial district to the
stunning Marina Bay. The sun returned as we disembarked for
photos of the sights: the majestic Singapore Flyer Ferris wheel,
the Merlion fountain and the Marina Bay Sands Hotel, composed
of fantastical flower, clamshell and ship-shaped buildings.
Returning to the bus, we enjoyed the hilltop views from
Mount Faber Park with a stop for tea at the quaint Danish
Seamen’s Church. Recharged, we headed to the far side of the
bay for a ride on the Singapore Flyer. In our spacious pod,
slowly rotating to the top of the giant wheel, we could see the
vast sprawl of Singapore’s high-rises and the hundreds of ships
waiting in nearby waters to dock in one of the world’s busiest
ports. Those not wanting to brave the giant wheel enjoyed the
shops underneath, including a unique pedicurist that used tanks
of tiny fish that nibble the hard skin from a person’s feet.
The historic Raffle’s Hotel provided an elegant lunch buffet.
Afterwards, we could choose to catch a bus ride back to our
hotel or strike out on our own. A few decided to stay and enjoy
Raffles peaceful verandas, gardens and shops. A must-see was
the famous Longbar, origin of the Singapore Sling. That evening,
we rejoined our companions for dinner at the opulent Fullerton
hotel, the perfect location for watching the sunset on the
Singapore River and the colourful lights of the city. The evening
was complete with a romantic boat ride back to the hotel.
Tuesday’s travels began with rain as the guests boarded the
Admiral Cheng Ho, a replica of the famous Ming Dynasty
imperial junk boat. We enjoyed cakes, sandwiches and tea in
comfort while touring the port and outlying islands. Back on the
buses, we drove through Little India. The Park Royal Hotel
served us a delightful Dim Sum lunch where the tea master
poured tea in a martial arts style. The skies cleared as we
headed to the National Orchid Garden. Lovely landscaped
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©
16
17
18
Singapore
12. Clarke Quay
13. The freebie umbrellas
proved very useful
14. Singapore Sky Park
15. Spectacular Flyer
16. The 75-foot high
entrance to the Hindu
Temple
17. Admiral Cheng Ho
18. The Merlion, the Symbol of Singapore
19. The Tea-master demonstrates his skill at the Park Royal Hotel
20. Colourful and irresistible to photographers - the National Orchid Garden
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15
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IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012 15

IRSE CONVENTION - PART 2
hillsides boasted an impressive variety of
orchids. The cameras were clicking
furiously here. After an essential stop in the
gift shop, we headed to our hotels for a
free evening with our companions.
There were no technical visits early
Wednesday as the entire conference
boarded the train for Malaysia, the second
host country. Travelling through lush green
palm tree plantations, our final destination
would be Kuala Lumpur, known as KL,
Malaysia’s capital. We stopped for a
diversion in Melaka (Malacca), the historical
state of Malaysia. The Resort Afamosa,
where we lunched, was a tropical retreat
with gardens, fountains and pools of giant
koi. From there we headed into the historic
city centre, a UNESCO World Heritage site.
The imprints of Portuguese, Dutch, and
21 22
British forces were evident in churches, ancient landmarks and
colonial structures. Most delightful were the vibrantly decorated
23
trishaw bicycles encircling the city centre fountain, their drivers
beckoning to show you the town’s sights. Our group visited
Christ’s Church, the hilltop ruins of St Paul’s, and the remnants of
the Portuguese fort. On Jonker’s street in Chinatown, we
explored the magnificent Cheng Hoon Teng temple, believed to be
the oldest Chinese temple in Malaysia. We boarded the buses for
an after-dark arrival in KL, the brightly lit PETRONAS Towers
standing proudly in the distance to welcome us.
Thursday, we, the guests, visited nearby Putrajaya, an
“Intelligent Garden City”. This planned city became the new
federal administrative centre of Malaysia in 1999 to relieve some 24
of the overcrowding and congestion of KL. We started our tour at
the Taman Warisan Pertanian, an agricultural park where we
learned about Malaysia’s traditional crops, like rubber trees, a
huge variety of palms, fruits, herbs and spices. We then drove
around to see the town’s impressive architecture: government
buildings, temples, monuments, and bridges. Putrajaya Seafood
Restaurant served us a Chinese lunch in their pleasant lakeside
location.
The guided portion of the day ended in Kuala Lumpur, to see
the views from the KL Tower, which was recently featured on the
American television show ‘The Amazing Race Asia’. The rest of
the afternoon was free and many guests decided to enjoy the 25
beautiful Hilton Hotel rooftop pool for a refreshing swim. We later
joined our companions for supper at the Royal Selangor Club, a
prestigious social club founded in 1884.
Our last sightseeing day was a brief KL city tour on Friday.
The remainder of the day was open for much desired shopping.
The colourful Central Market offered local crafts and bargains in
cool air conditioning.
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©
Kuala Lumpur
21.
The elegant and
soaring KL Tower
22.
The twin Petronas
Towers dominate the
skyline
23.
The beautiful rooftop
pool at the Hilton
24.
Traditional produce on
view at Taman Warisan
Pertanian
25.
The Putra Mosque
completed in 1999 is
part of the “Intelligent
Garden City” Putrajaya
The final evening gala brought the entire group back together
at the Hilton Hotel. Local artists creating caricatures, Chinese
scripts, and batik style pictures entertained us at the friendly
reception. After a sumptuous meal, cultural dancers performed. Brief speeches from our gracious president, Claire Porter, and others
included accolades and farewells, with a tease of the fantastic plans for the 2012 centenary celebration of the IRSE in London. The
program was concluded with live music and dancing. Afterward, members and guests reminisced, talked of extended travels, made
plans for the next year, and said their goodbyes. Thank you to the coordinators for another informative and enjoyable event.
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IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012

IRSE International Convention: The Future Beckons
Contributors: Stephen Backway (Australia), Ramnesh Bansal (Canada), Stuart Coomer (UK), J.I.D.Jayasundara (Sri Lanka),
Mency Mathew (UK), Shiv Mohan (Dubai), Swati Prusty (UK), Nikhil Swami (India), John Theo (Australia)
The 2011 Hewlett-Fisher Bursary was
awarded to ten Young Members to attend
the IRSE International Convention held in
Singapore and Malaysia from 9-14 October.
This was a great opportunity for the Young
Members to interact with leaders in the
field and further develop a foundation via
technical presentations and site visits.
The two countries, Singapore and Malaysia,
provided a contrast in their railway systems
and modernisation progress. This article is
written by the recipients of the 2011
Hewlett-Fisher Bursary.
We joined Claire Porter, Chair, and
Colin Porter, Chief Executive and
Secretary, for lunch at BREWERKZ on
Clarke Quay on Sunday, 9 October, which
was a great opportunity for everyone to
meet and discuss aspirations for the
convention. Common themes included
interacting with industry leaders, discussing
career direction, understanding different
railway modernisation policies, and site
visits. With the afternoon free of activity,
some of us decided to take in the sites
which included visiting China Town and a
Buddha Temple. The evening allowed for
registration and opportunity to mingle with
the Senior Members. Claire and Roger
Penny, Convention Coordinator, greeted
the members and guests with a welcome
speech and outlined the week’s activities.
The first half of the convention took
place in Singapore where three bodies are
responsible for the transportation system.
The Land Transport Authority (LTA) focuses
on planning the railway network, and the
Singapore Metro Rail Transit (SMRT) and
the Singapore Bus Services (SBS) Transit
operate the transportation systems.
Singapore has a fully integrated transit
system where even the taxis are operated
by the SMRT. On the first day attendees
were presented with the past, present and
future of the Singapore and Malaysia
railways (view side bars) by Charles Page,
Vice President of Business Development
with Invensys. Singapore has one of the
highest metro reliability ratings in the world,
which is strongly set by the government.
Charles outlined an aggressive plan for
Singapore’s expansion in the next 25 years.
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©
Historical Milestones
Malaysia
1885: First steel wheel/steel rail railway
from Taiping to Port Weld,
servicing tin mines
1896: Federated Malay States Railway
created Initial four major lines
built are joined up
1900: The main backbone of railway
tracks linked Penang to
Seremban.
Singapore
1877: Tanjong Pagar Dock Steam Railway
1891: Kranji Electric Tramway experiment
1903: Singapore-Kranji Railway
Extended to the Wharf in 1907
1905: Public electric tram service: -
26 Miles and 60 Trams. Closed in
1927
Singapore and Malaysia
1923: Singapore-Johor causeway
completed - rail journeys to Malaysia
begin from Woodlands on the northern
coast of Singapore
Present and Future
Malaysia
Mainline: KTMB Intercity and Komuter
(1885), Express Rail Link Sdn Bhd (2002)
MRT: Ampang* (1996), Kelana Jaya (1998),
Kelana Jaya and Ampang Extensions
(2013), Klang Valley MRT – Green, Red,
Circle (2020)
Monorail: KL (2003)
Singapore
LRT: Bukit Panjang (1999), Sengkang
(2003) Punggol (2003)
MRT: North-South (1987), East-West
(1987), North East* (2003), Circle (2009),
Downtown (In Progress), Thomson
(2018), Eastern Region (2020), Tuas
Extension (2018)
* Signalling upgrades planned
In contrast, the Railways of Malaysia
consists of a wider range of railway
systems and technologies attributed to
the fact that the geography of Malaysia is
well over 400 times larger than Singapore
in terms of landmass. The operating
bodies are Keretapi Tanah Melayu Berhad
(KTMB) for mainline, rapidKL for metro,
Express Rail Link Sdn Bhd for airport
express, and Kuala Lumpur (KL) Monorail.
Malaysia is advancing the
modernisation of its mainline through
double tracking and electrification of the
North South line. The Ministry of
Transport has planned the next ten years
of railway modernisation and
development, which is challenged by
inconsistent government policy. The
remaining presentations were by signalling
suppliers providing a high level overview
of the application of Communication
Based Train Control (CBTC) with topics
including the Operation Control Centre
(OCC), energy efficiency, and lessons
learned implementing CBTC.
We spent the afternoon visiting site
locations operated by the SBS Transit.
The first stop was the Sengkang LRT,
which is a suburban feeder to the North
East line. This is one of three fully
automated, Unattended Train Operation
(UTO), LRT systems in Singapore.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' Crystal Mover
rolling stock has been supplied with the
application of a Kyosan loop-based CBTC
variant.
The second stop was the Sengkang
depot connecting to the North East line,
which is an Alstom based CBTC signalling
system. It is interesting to note that the
OCC is supplied by Thales. The site tours
provided ample opportunity for us to
interact with Senior Members who
provided insights into industry and site
related topics.
On the second day, Frank Young,
Business Development Director of the
SMRT, stated SMRT`s purpose is to build
communities, not metro systems. Both
the SMRT and SBS Transit are profitable
organisations owned by the government.
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012 17

IRSE CONVENTION - PART 2
Frank openly responded to inquiries on how railway
organisations can create sustainable profits:
1) sale and lease of surrounding property;
2) increasing retail space;
3) installation of fibre optics;
4) increasing advertisements.
The following presentations focused on the application of CBTC
with respect to system architecture, challenges, and best
practices.
A common theme by the CBTC presenters was the emphasis
on teamwork between all parties during and after a project. It is
interesting to note that the Downtown line will consist of full
UTO with the addition of coded track circuits supporting a fall
back solution allowing the train to automatically drive to the next
station.
In the afternoon, we visited the Kim Chuan Depot which is
constructed underground to store trains for the Circle line and
the upcoming Downtown line. Members were amazed with the
Automatic Storage and Retrieval System which is capable of
storing five years of materials and parts to support maintenance.
From the depot we moved on to observe the various electrical
and control rooms associated with the Circle Line: Depot,
Signalling, and OCC. Since all the systems in Singapore are UTO,
train drivers are required to perform a mandatory forty hours of
manual driving annually. For the last night in Singapore, we
headed to Long Bar, Ruffles Hotel to enjoy a few drinks and take
in the live music. The following day, the delegates shifted from
Singapore to Kuala Lumpur, with a stop in Malacca (also Melaka).
The town of Malacca was once a prosperous trading post
that endured centuries of colonisation by the Portuguese, Dutch,
British and Chinese which have influenced the architecture of the
town. The town has been awarded World Heritage City status
by the UNESCO as of July 2008. We toured the religious sites
which were surprisingly located close to one another. We visited
St Paul’s Hills where a church dating back to 1521 AD was
constructed by the Portuguese and later used by the British for
storage of gunpowder. Afterwards, we boarded a bus for the
remainder of the trip to Kuala Lumpur.
The trip to Kuala Lumpur provided ample opportunity for us
to reflect on our time in Singapore and discuss challenges faced
by different bodies of the railway industry: suppliers, customers,
and operators. The Young Members, representing various
bodies, discussed and gained insights into the challenges faced
by each group.
After arriving in Kuala Lumpur, the evening was free of
events, which was a great chance to enjoy the night life. The
Young Members, consisting of a strong Indian contingency,
dined at an Indian restaurant where dishes were shared
providing a great bonding experience.
The next day was the first of the convention in Kuala Lumpur.
This began with a trip aboard the KTMB`s Electric Train Set (ETS)
service which has been in revenue service for a year. The ETS
runs on the recently electrified, high-speed commuter double
track along the west coast of Malaysia. The conference
delegates boarded at KL Sentral and enjoyed services
comparable to the airlines. The onboard service staff provided
beverages and meals for the two hour journey to Batu Gajah,
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IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012
location of the Malaysian Railways Training Academy (MRTA).
The ETS reaches speeds of 140 km/h, where the Automatic
Train Protection (ATP) activates if the actual speed exceeds the
permitted speed by 9 km/h.
Dr. Aminuddin Adnan, MRTA Director, provided insights
into the Malaysian railway industry and explained how the
MRTA represents the hub of Malaysia’s railway vision for the
next twenty years.
Following presentations by the IRSE, members focused on
the application of interlocking technologies, and the complexity
of today’s systems by Wayne McDonald and Brian Smith
respectively. A lively debate ensued between the presenters
and audience regarding the increasing level of complexity of
today’s signalling systems. Discussions also focused on the
different transportation systems in Malaysia and how an
integrated system is necessary. In the afternoon the delegates
toured the Batu Gajah Depot.
On the final day, the morning activities consisted of visiting
the KL Sentral Station Centralised Traffic Control (CTC) for the
Klang Valley, Rawang-Ipoh and Sentul Batu Caves double
tracks. Timetables are produced twice daily and conflicts are
addressed via Automatic Train Regulation (ATR). The afternoon
technical visit took place at the Wisma Monorail Centre.
The KL Monorail currently has an annual ridership of 1.3
million people. The monorail runs using a two car pair which
will be replaced with four cars in 2012. The system is an ATP
System provided by Ansaldo where trains are prohibited to stop
between stations, with the longest station separation being
approximately 500 m. An interesting observation is that the
switch move time, requiring the entire beam to change position,
takes approximately 20-25 seconds as demonstrated by the OCC.
The Convention Gala took place at the KL Hilton and was a
wonderful conclusion to the week. Cultural shows provided the
IRSE members and guests a taste of the Malaysian mix of
ethnicities. The guests presented Claire with a gift as being the
first IRSE female president, helping bring the IRSE towards
centenary in 2012. The 2012 convention will be held in
conjunction with the Aspects Conference in October 2012 in
the United Kingdom in celebration of the centenary. We thank
the IRSE team for the opportunity to attend the 2011 IRSE
International Technical Convention with the support of the
Hewlett-Fisher Bursaries. This experience has become a
foundation for our future careers.
Younger Members, from left to right: John Theo, Stuart Coomer, Shiv Mohan,
Aidan McGrady, Stephen Backway, Swati Prusty, Nikhil Swami, Mency Mathew, and
Ramnesh Bansal.
Photo: Aidan McGrady
A picture of Young Members with Claire Porter at the IRSE International
Convention Gala can be found on page 25 (inside back cover)

IRSE MATTERS
IRSE Professional Examination: Results 2011
148 candidates sat the exam around the world this year, with a total of 290 modules taken. The overall pass
rate was a disappointing 39%, down from a more typical 48% pass rate in recent years.
Surname Forename M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Anandhan Yokesh P
Appunni Sumesh P
Bhasin Rahul P
Brouder Michael P
Brown Martin Philip C C
Brownhill James Christopher C
Buchan Neil P
Cavill William John D
Chaudhary Ruchy P
Cheuk Shun Wai P P P
Chinnaraju Sasikumaran P
Chiu Wang Chi C
Chung Kei Hung P
Clarke Graham James William P
Devaraju Ambika P
Fannon James P
Floyd Graham P
Gadkari Vaibhav P
Garosi Matteo P C P
Garratt Nathan Robin P P C
Hayden Alastair P C
Holmes Nigel Graham Thorpe P
Jones Alud Rhys P
Jones Gethin Rhys P
Kasoju Sridhar P
Kierans Liza P C
Krishnan Lakshmi Narasimhan P
Krishnan Subramanian P
Kunapareddy Pavan Srikanth
P
Lau Wai Shing C P C
Leach Jonathan David D C
Madhukara S P
Mahmoud Jehad P P
McGovern Thomas C D C C
McVea Colin William C P
Mittal Princy P
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©
Surname Forename M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Moorhouse Adrian C
Mumford Jonathan D P
Muriu Charles Kiama P
Murugesan Maruthaiyappan P
Nagarajan Mohan Kumar P P
Nagarajan Sugavanam C
Narasimmalu Yuvaraj P P
Nath Kedar C
Neary Kevin D C P
Newbury Elliott George C
Newman Louise P
Oakes Daniel Stuart C P
O'Connell Joseph Xavier C P P
Osler Laura Jane D C
Papayannakos Panos Robert C P
Paradza Peter P
Paretha Deepak C
Puckrin Ian James P
Raikwar Prashant Sudhakar P
Rajamani Vinoth P P
Richardson Paul P
Sankaran Radha
Krishnan Hari Shankar P
Selvakumaraswamy Azhagappan P
Sharp Ian P P
Smith Gregg Richard P
Speak Jonathan P P
Tandon Harshit C P P
Thomas Bartholomew P
To Ping Man Clara P C P P
Turner Stuart P
Waszkiewicz Artur P
Wilkinson Alan D C P
Wood Steven P P C P
Yates Neil C
Zhao Xi P
P = Pass
C = Credit
D = Distinction
IRSE PROFESSIONAL EXAM 2012 CANDIDATES
If you are planning to sit exam modules in 2012, please note that the exam application deadline is 30 June.
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012 19

LU TECHNICAL SOCIETY
London Underground’s Technical Society
Report by Eddie Goddard
On 17 January 2012, the “TechSoc” celebrated its first 50 years
with a reception and presentation at the London Underground
headquarters at 55 Broadway. Over 60 people attended including
three past presidents of the IRSE (Victor Smith, Leslie Lawrence
and myself). Both Leslie and Victor were able to give some
insights into their past. Leslie described the legacy that Robert
Dell has left in the basic principles that he laid down and that are
still followed today. He emphasised that we should never forget
that lives are at stake when we make decisions and that we should
continually review the decisions made in the light of experience.
THE FIRST YEARS
The Signal and Electrical Engineers Technical Society (known by
all as the TechSoc) was established by Robert Dell (the then Chief
Signal Engineer of London Underground) under the chairmanship
of Victor Smith in 1962. From the outset its aims were to provide
a forum for technical debate and the exchange of information,
opportunities to meet like minded people and most importantly
to give young engineers a chance to develop contacts and their
presentation skills.
It always encouraged everyone in the department to join, and
whilst the papers were by no means lightweight the whole
atmosphere of the meetings was informal, and questions were
encouraged. The membership was very broad including
everyone from the lowest apprentice to the Chief Engineer. As a
measure of how forward thinking they were the membership
included (in no particular order) operators, mechanical engineers,
maintainers, installers, admin staff and even the occasional civil
engineer! All joined in and many of the most penetrating
questions came from the administration staff.
The list of papers reads like an encyclopaedia of London
Transport Signalling. The first paper from Harry Hadaway covered
the remote operation of signalling. This described the remote
operation of signal levers in one cabin by an adjacent one. It
described the air operation of the levers, the principles of route
clearance and the introduction of the delta track circuit as a
secondary means of determining that a train has passed through
the route before it is released; an early application of diversity in
safety signalling. This same principle has held good for over fifty
years.
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Later papers cover the introduction of programme machines
for fully Automatic Route Setting, the introduction of Automatic
Train Operation and Automatic Fare Collection (ARS, ATO and
AFC - all before 1964)!
The papers covered all aspects of signalling including a
definitive work by Alf Thomas on testing a signalling installation,
this became the bible for LU testers for many years, and by
George Kent on the maintenance of signalling equipment.
The presentations were not confined to London
Underground signalling but included papers on Folkestone East
and route setting on the Eastern region in the first year alone.
They were not limited to signalling either – In the first two years
there were papers on Permanent Way and Civil engineering, and
even on Rolling Stock!
From the outset attendance has been around forty to fifty
per meeting with the occasional ones gaining audiences in
excess of a hundred.
VISITS
Whilst not rivalling the IRSE Convention the society arranged a
most impressive programme of technical visits. Indeed this was
my real introduction to the society, and indeed to the signalling
department and to signalling. The visits were informal, but
highly instructive and nowadays would be seen as the ideal
networking opportunity. One of my early memories is of Mr.
Hadaway (when he was Chief Signal Engineer) coming around
during one of the visits and chatting to us, a group of trainees.
In those, rather formal, days this was a bit of a breakthrough.
Although the visits started as UK based, covering oil
refineries, signalling installations and air traffic control, they soon
broadened their wings and spread from Europe, to Moscow,
America and even Hong Kong
1. Diagram taken from H W Hadaway paper
2. The high days of visits
3. Technical Presentation during a visit
4. Visit to Neasden Depot
1 2
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IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012

MANAGEMENT OF THE SOCIETY
The Managing Committee
The TechSoc has always depended on a loyal band of volunteers
to form the management committee, drawn from the membership
as a whole. The role call is like a who’s who of LU signalling.
The first chairman was Victor Smith; Leslie Lawrence, Malcolm
Heaton, Eric Eden and Norman Hurford were among the many
who gave up their time to further the society. Today’s
committee continues this tradition and includes representatives
from suppliers, and consultancies as well as LU employees.
The Membership
The membership has been surprisingly constant over the years at
around 500, of which over 300 are active members.
With the advent of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) and
the progressive effect of budget cuts the society has had to
change. Membership is now open to anyone that is, or has,
carried out work for London Underground. This includes the PPP
partners, suppliers and sub contractors. As a result the TechSoc
represents a healthy cross-section of the railway industry as it has
retained its open door policy and does not restrict membership
to engineers alone.
The generous support that was available from LU in the past
has been replaced by securing industry wide sponsorship,
without which the TechSoc would not be able to survive.
THE SOCIAL SOCIETY
A major feature of the TechSoc has always been its friendly
atmosphere. It provides an opportunity for members to meet
and to exchange knowledge, memories and indeed to develop
friendships that span the companies, generations and sexes! The
local hostelries do a good trade post meetings and the contacts
made serve us all well.
THE LEARNING SOCIETY
From the outset the TechSoc has always encouraged young
engineers to join. As well as providing a means for them to meet
the leaders in the industry in an informal atmosphere it gives an
opportunity to develop presentation skills in a friendly atmosphere.
(Indeed my first professional presentation was given to
the Society when, as a Technical Assistant, I outlined the
potential role of computers in signalling in a paper in 1972, to an
audience that included my peers, my bosses and Harry Hadaway
himself).
THE SOCIETY TODAY
The TechSoc now is as strong as it ever was. The meetings
continue to be well attended, and it attracts a stellar cast of
presenters.
In the past year the presentations have included London
Overground, Benchmarking, Field Metrology (yes measuring not
weather), and Network Rail’s Modular signalling, and over the
past couple of years Rod Muttram, Siv Bhamra and Dave Fenner
have all given presentations to the society.
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Whilst the days of world travel are over the society continues
to arrange technical visits which are generally oversubscribed.
This year the visits were to the East London Line and to Neasden
Depot.
Forthcoming events
The remaining presentations for this season are on Crossrail
stations and communications systems, the new signalling for the
Metropolitan and District Lines, and the Cable car to the O2
arena.
The following season will include the Heathrow T5 people
mover (fully automatic taxis), updates on the Crossrail and LU
Subsurface signalling, the operators’ experience of the upgrades
on the Victoria and Jubilee Lines, and the Olympic experience.
Visits to the T5 people mover and hopefully to the Olympics
after the event!
Library
Members have access to an extensive library and to the back
catalogue of papers, (the early papers have all been scanned and
provide a rich source of information).
HOW TO JOIN
The society’s website (http//www.techsoc.org.uk) gives details
of how to join and more information on upcoming events.
For any queries the society’s email address is
committee@techsoc.org.uk.
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IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012 21

YORK SECTION
Report by Andrew P Smith
Tony Pinkstone, Chairman of the York Section, welcomed 33
members to the first meeting of 2012.
Tony introduced Stephen Cox, Head of Signalling and
Software, Balfour Beatty Rail Technologies and invited him to
present his paper, “Tools to Assist in the Testing of Signalling
Systems”.
Stephen began by outlining his career which has been initially
in electronics and software. After joining BR as a sponsored
student in 1993 he went on to join Eastern IMC at privatisation
and thence to Balfour Beatty Strategic Development Group. This
became BB Rail Technologies in 2002 and he is now Head of
Signalling and Software, BB Rail Technologies.
The current signalling renewals process consists of five major
elements, specify, design, install, test and commission. Of these
elements testing and commissioning comprises, inspection,
preparation testing, set to work, functional testing, control table
testing, principles testing and correspondence testing some of
which can be categorised as either testing or commissioning. If
an error is found during this process then a test log is produced,
which may need further specification, design, installation and
then testing and commissioning. The current testing process can
be very repetitive, it can take place in all weathers and at all
times of day or night, it often takes place during short
possessions increasing pressure. It relies on the experience and
competence of individual testers and it is true to say that testers
are the “last line of defence” with very few tools to assist them.
Tools available to them at present are; personal tools consisting
of multi-meter, insulation tester, test straps, Strength & Polarity
meter and track circuit shunt box. System Tools include test desk
switch box, SSI TFM generator and dummy loads. BB Rail
instigated a project to provide tools to assist in the testing
process with the aim of making tests and results more “visible”
to the tester, carry out repetitive tasks automatically in a
consistent manner and record results for fault investigation and/
or audit purposes. This was to enable as much testing as
possible to be carried out prior to the commissioning possession.
A computer was employed to provide inputs to the signalling
system with the outputs being monitored to confirm the correct
operation of the signalling system.
CATS Mk1 (Computer Aided Testing System) was developed
with the aim of using a standard desk top PC to provide the
inputs to the signalling system, via miniature relays, with the
outputs fed into an event recorder. This system was used at
Stenson Junction to test the interlocking which was a WESTPAC
Mk111 geographical system commissioned in the 1960s. This
involved taking the existing wiring diagrams to determine which
pins on the set plug couplers could be treated as inputs and
outputs. Then it was necessary to write software which could
accept and model the set logic, enter the logic into the software
to allow it to model how the set was designed to operate, write a
sequence of steps to function the set as much as possible from
the plug couplers. The Interface CATS Mk1 was interfaced to the
set plug couplers and software was written which could replay
the sequence of steps in real time against the model and
determine if the actual set was behaving in the same way as the
model. The testing revealed a total of 77 individual faults
identified over the 24 hour testing period. This included, wrong
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relays types (single wound instead of double wound / wrong
contact arrangements), incorrect wiring within the geographical
set (missing wires / wires in the wrong place), faulty wiring within
the geographical set (badly crimped / soldered wires), poor
electrical contact between the relay base and the relay (bent
crimps / relay contacts), and out of specification relays (open
circuit / short circuit faults within the relay). Following the
commissioning lessons were learnt such as, the front end did not
provide sufficient information to diagnose the cause of a fault,
communication problems occurred between the CATS operator
and the person in the relay room, it’s cold and damp in a tent at
4am and electronics and operators don’t like it !! CATS Mk11
was developed which had a specifically designed card which can
feed out +50V, 0V or switched contact AND detect +50V or 0V
(also built in short circuit detection). These cards fit into a
standard 19” rack mountable case (up 14 cards per rack) and
standard 25 way connectors allow access to the channels from
each card. Each card has a unique address within the system
taken from its case and position within the case. Power supply
provides low voltage to drive card electronics and 50V to drive
the signalling system. The software was re-designed to simplify
operation and feedback to user. CATS Mk11 has been
successfully used on WESTPAC geographical, GEC geographical,
free wired systems and level crossings. The future of CATS is
provide automated measurement of relay contact resistances,
automated set to work of interlocking, automated routineing of
locations, Relocatable Equipment Buildings and level crossings
and Automated control table testing.
In conclusion Stephen has shown that it is possible to
produce tools which assist the tester in their task and there is a
need to think about the methods of testing when designing new
systems. However many systems are now becoming too
complex for traditional manual testing methods (ERTMS, Traffic
Management) and so Computer Aided Testing is necessary.
Two questions remain:
how do we test train and track based systems?
how do we test “intelligent” systems?
Those taking part in the discussion were Bruce MacDougall,
Quentin Macdonald, John Maw, Tony Pinkstone, Kevin
Williamson and Colin Ward. The vote of thanks for an
entertaining and informative evening was given by Grace Nodes.
FEEDBACK
RE: ETCS Level 2 Application on the Cambrian
In my 52 years of messing about with signalling schemes, I had
on numerous occasions reason to thank Peter Woodbridge for
his efforts on my behalf. There was Exeter, Paddington and
Great Eastern Resignalling to name just a few.
Having read Peter’s marvellous reply (twice and still
pondering) to Phil Hingley’s letter in the December issue, I must
thank Peter yet again. He has convinced me that I retired not a
day too soon.
Tim Oakes MIRSE (Retired)
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IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012

MIDLAND & NORTH WESTERN SECTION
Report by Ian Bridges
The Section opened 2012 with a talk at by Nick Rushby of
Conation Technologies at Network Rail’s Walsall training centre.
Nick’s talk entitled Technology Based Training for the 21 st
Century Railway considered modern training techniques and how
they can be best used. Starting with a bit of history he discussed
how there has been a very conservative approach to training in
the railway industry, where apart from driver training, there has
been very little use of simulator based training, instead the
traditional teach, multiple choice question, pass/fail process is
still very much in evidence.
Often training is one of the first items that is cut from a
company budget when times get hard, and yet in 2008 it is
believed there was a cost of around £1bn to the UK economy
caused by late trains. Although delay minutes have continued to
drop since then, the cost per minute has risen, so it is likely that a
similar cost is still incurred today. It is, therefore, essential that
the time to repair equipment falls in order to reduce the delays
further, which often means more extensive and better training.
Nick continued by talking about record keeping. Prior to
privatisation, around 1995, there was one company that managed
most industry training and kept almost all of the records. Now,
in a fragmented industry, this has become very much more
difficult with many hundreds of companies participating in the
delivery of projects and services to Network Rail. Indeed,
storage of records is a big part of the business overhead for
small companies. A product called NovaRail is at hand and may
be used to resolve some of these issues. Sitting at the centre of
a hub, the system can be used to hold on-line records, provide
discussion forums, e-assessments and manage Continuing
Professional Development (CPD).
The Clapham railway accident on the 12 December 1988
changed the face of training. Anthony Hidden QC said that the
railway industry training needed a complete overhaul, following
which British rail spent £13m over three years to develop
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2000 hours of training materials. Some of this material came into
everyday use, such as signalling tester training modules, but the
majority of it was ‘lost’ due to the privatisation process. Some of
this material has been found and is now being resurrected and
may once again provide a future watershed.
Nick finished his talk by discussing projects he had helped
the Railway Safety and Standards Board with and an example of how
trainers working with product developers can reduce the future
training burden. The example centred on the Park Signalling
manufactured Trackside Radio Control Unit. Once introduced,
the client wanted a 5-day training course to be written in order
to train technicians how to maintain the equipment.
Following a meeting on how the course would be developed,
it was decided that by spending a little more money to achieve
more on-board analysis within the system, the diagnostics would
make it a lot easier to identify any faults that may occur. As a
result the need for a five day training course was cut to a three
day requirement.
This provides a good example of training organisations and
manufacturers working in perfect harmony.
The Section’s thanks go to Nick for his talk and to Network
Rail for providing the facilities for the evening.
Photos: M&NW committee meeting at Walsall Training Centre, and the Centre itself
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012 23

ANNOUNCEMENTS
SIMS signals the go ahead for more apprenticeships
SIMS – experts in railway signalling, installation & maintenance
services – has launched a search for two new apprentices.
Despite mass youth unemployment the industry is failing to
attract new recruits and as a result the pool of licensed signalling
staff is limited and falling.
SIMS Managing Director, Tony Steer - having been a London
Underground apprentice himself - is looking to reverse this trend
“With only eight per cent of British employers now offering
apprenticeships, we decided to buck this trend and increase the
pool of licensed signalling engineers”.
But a railway apprenticeship might not be everyone’s cup of
tea. “Carrying out a highly skilled job on railways is very
demanding”, said Matthew Hill and Jordan Philip, last year’s
apprentices. “The hours are long and often anti-social and it is
very different from a regular office job, being predominately
outside in all weather conditions. The job is very technical and
there’s no room for error. But it’s a brilliant opportunity to build
a steady career in the railway industry”.
The SIMS Apprenticeship Scheme – which takes between two
and three years to complete – combines classroom study, practical
on-the-job mentoring from senior engineers and a comprehensive
education in the various aspects of railway signalling. At the end
of the scheme the apprentices will possess qualifications in
installing, testing signalling systems, construction skills, London
Underground track competence as well as City & Guilds Level 3
Certificate in Engineering, Installation Commissioning and
Maintenance. They will leave with an IRSE licence, enabling them
to work on the railway from the day they qualify.
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MIDLAND & NORTH WESTERN SECTION
Ninth Annual Luncheon & Technical Visit
Saturday 30 June 2012
Great Central Railway
The scheme’s classroom study includes formal education at
Newham College, on a block release arrangement for the first
year, and then on day-release. To ensure the right course is
chosen to meet the apprentices’ needs, the College carries out a
test of academic abilities. The SIMS Apprenticeship Scheme is
very hands-on and candidates gain experience of installation and
T&C work within the industry, gaining familiarity with new and
existing systems and assets, both in equipment rooms and
trackside. They also get the opportunity to carry out some work
themselves, checked by the on-site supervisor.
Tony Steer commented on the recent SIMS Apprenticeship
Scheme Graduates “In just over two years we turned out two
railway technicians with the skills and foundations to immediately
contribute to the industry. They have achieved a good entry
level in an industry that is moving forward. We have a continued
commitment to our apprentices and look forward to recruiting
another intake for 2012. The scheme has greatly improved
company morale and has proven a positive experience for all
involved. The whole team were pleased to pass on their
knowledge to the next generation of technicians. We now have
new human resources available to the industry, only two so far
but it’s a great start.”
To find out more information about how to apply for the
2012 SIMS Apprenticeship Scheme, potential candidates should
contact:
Kay Richmond, kay.richmond@sims-uk.com
Deadline for applications is 31 March 2012 and applicants
should be 18 or over.
Photo: Ian James Allison
The committee of the Midland & North Western Section have
again agreed this year to return to a previous venue of our
successful Luncheons, located in the East Midlands of the UK.
We have secured places for up to 84 guests and seek the support
from the whole of the Institution world-wide, to make this yet
another successful and enjoyable family event. This event will
celebrate the commissioning of Swithland Sidings Signal Box
upon this railway and see some unique activity of our luncheon
train on a busy main line!
Voted number 12 on the list of the 50 greatest railway
journeys in the world, the Great Central Railway is the UK's only
double-track main line heritage railway. It is the only place in the
world where full size steam engines can be seen passing each
other – just as it was when steam ruled the rails. Trains run every
weekend of the year, bank holidays and selected week days
through the summer. In addition, First Class Restaurant Car
Services provide five course meals, whilst travelling between
Loughborough and Leicester. For further details, please go to
www.gcrailway.co.uk.
The cost of the visit to attend, including train tickets and
luncheon (excluding beverages) is currently being reviewed and
we are also seeking a sponsor for this event. To confirm your
attendance and for further details, please send an email including
individual names of those planning to attend to
irsenews@btinternet.com. If your company wishes to sponsor
this event, please also contact irsenews@btinternet.com.
Please note that the Institution and administrations whose
sites are visited on technical visits cannot accept responsibility for
any injury, damage or other difficulty which may arise.
Participants are therefore advised to ensure that their own
insurance covers all appropriate eventualities.
Ian James Allison, Visits Secretary
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IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012

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THE WING AWARD FOR SAFETY
CALL FOR NOMINATIONS 2012
The "Wing Award for Safety" was introduced in 1994 to commemorate the life and work of the late Peter Wing, a Fellow of this
Institution and an employee of British Rail, who during his career made a major contribution to the cause of lineside safety.
Peter Wing, whose career in BR spanned 31years, spent much of his working life dedicated to the safety his colleagues. It was
his care and concern that became the driving force behind the national campaign in 1992/3 that was entitled “Dead Serious
About Safety” and which had such a major impact in reducing the numbers of lineside fatalities in subsequent years.
The Institution of Railway Signal Engineers administers the award scheme on behalf of Members of the Railway Group, the
Railway Supply Industry and the Health & Safety Executive, who amongst others supported the formation of the Wing Award
for Safety.
Recent winners of the Wing Award have been:-
The award takes the form of a certificate and an amount of £600 to be devoted to personal development and will be made
to an individual who has made an outstanding personal contribution to railway lineside track safety by, for example, coming
forward with a novel idea for improving safety at the lineside, is a long term champion of improving track safety standards or
has made a significant contribution to the awareness of track safety in his business.
2002 A Swann Safety Consultant
2003 A Nelson Railway Safety
2004 B West Amey Rail
2005 P Broad Network Rail
2006 C Wheeler Railstaff
2007 G Bickerdike 4x3
2008 S Cassidy Network Rail
2009 M Wild Westinghouse Rail
2010 D Deeley & J Mawby Network Rail
2011 J Camp & S Henser Cleshar & MPI
Any employee in a railway business or an associated industry is eligible for consideration for the Award and nominations are
now invited for the 2012 Award. Nominations should be sent to me at
IRSE, 4 th Floor, 1 Birdcage Walk, Westminster, London, SW1H 9JJ, United Kingdom or hq@irse.org
by not later than 18 March 2012, together with information not exceeding 250 words in support of the nomination.
The award will be presented to the successful nominee at an industry function later in 2012.
Colin Porter, Chief Executive
IRSE Merit Awards
, introduced in 2006, are awarded by the Council to a volunteer or staff member anywhere in
the world to recognise meritorious service to the Institution. Nominations can be made by any member. Meritorious service is
defined as making a substantial contribution to the Institution’s work over a period of time by organising activities, or carrying
out specific tasks which have furthered the Institution’s aims and objectives. The award consists of a suitably engraved plaque.
If you think of someone who should be considered for such an award, please contact the Chief Executive at hq@irse.org
with details of why they should be considered.
Younger Members Technical Papers Competition
There is also to be a
run in
conjunction with ASPECT 2012 later this year. Full details have been circulated to all younger members and are available on
the Younger Members section of the web-site at http://www.irse.org/nearyou/default.aspx.
“Older members” are asked to encourage their younger colleagues to enter the competition.
Completed papers of 1000-2000 words have to be submitted to hq@irse.org by 30 April 2012.
Colin Porter, Chief Executive
Young Members with Claire Porter at the IRSE International Convention Gala (see article on Page 17) from left to right:
Photo: Colin Porter
Mency Mathew, Stuart Coomer, Stephen Backway, Lynsey Hunter, Claire Porter, Swati Prusty, Nikhil Swami, J.I.D.Jayasundara, John Theo, and Ramnesh Bansal.
IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012 25

MEMBERSHIP MATTERS
ELECTIONS
We extend a warm welcome to the following newly-elected members:
Fellow
Gao C H Beijing Traffic Control China
Laube F Emch + Berger Bern Switzerland
Liu C Ministry of Railway China
Niu Y M Beijing Traffic Control China
Tang T Beijing Jiaotong University China
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Member
Adeosun A I Irish Rail Eire
Cleary P A Parsons Brinckerhoff Int. India
Currens J F Contractor
Goodey N Sinclair Knight Merz Australia
Hayes I P Ansaldo STS Australia
Ho T K ORION Engineering Hong Kong
Huang W Beijing Traffic Control China
Huber B Projekthaus Herisau Switzerland
Kiestra B H ProRail Netherlands
Koch D Siemens Schweiz Switzerland
Künneman G Siemens Switzerland
Law S H K MTR Corporation Hong Kong
Li L K H UGL Hong Kong
Meijer J ProRail Netherlands
Nipariyai N Ansaldo STS Australia
Associate Member
Burge G P Network Rail
Echter J Strukton Rail Netherlands
Gupta A K SRDSTE Central Rly. Office India
Han Y Lloyd's Register Rail China
Li J Lloyd's Register Rail China
Liang J Lloyd's Register Rail China
Sharma D K Infotech Enterprises India
van Houten F J ProRail BV Netherlands
Wang H Lloyd's Register Rail China
Accredited Technician
Matata T Network Rail
Associate
Aalbers M ARCADIS Netherlands
Balla N R GE Trans Global Signaling USA
Cross P D Rail Tech Group RSE
Deacon S CWR Australia
Dobson L W Ansaldo STS Malaysia
Hughes D T W Balfour Beatty Rail Technologies
Konelka A Network Rail
Roubekas A TPG Systems
Rymell J L Great Central Railway
Welti S Sigdata Switzerland
©
Student
McSorley C Parsons Brinckerhoff
TRANSFERS
Member to Fellow
Knight A Signet Solutions
Associate Member to Member
Lau S P MTR Corporation Hong Kong
Associate to Member
Brown S J Network Rail
Puckrin I J Network Rail Maintenance
Student to Member
Ingram P A Network Rail
Thomas B Network Rail
Accredited Technician to Associate Member
Singh S B SERCO Middle East UAE
Associate to Associate Member
Chung K H Parsons Brinckerhoff Hong Kong
Student to Associate Member
Mackie A Parsons Brinckerhoff
RE-INSTATEMENTS
Bird
Marques
Reddy
Salisbury
Simtheam
DEATHS
A J
R L
N
J M E
A
It is with great regret that we have to announce the death of the
following member, who’s obituary was published in IRSE NEWS
last month:
Fell D H Associate
Current Membership Total is 4805
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IRSE NEWS | ISSUE 176 | MARCH 2012