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FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF the larger Asian and global balance of forces. • As the most powerful state in India's neighbourhood, directly affecting its security, diplomacy, economy, and politics. Co-operation Versus Confrontation. To the extent Chinese power helps create a stable and peaceful Asian balance of power, to the extent its reforms and large market create new opportunities for regional growth and prosperity; and to the extent the reforms lay the basis for a more co-operative Chinese policy, India is likely to view China's development in positive terms. This would lay the basis for co-operation between the two states on critical global issues that affect the interests of both countries eg, trade, a future multilateral security structure in Asia, and the environment. However, to the extent China poses a security challenge, strengthens India's adversaries, manipulates neighbouring states that are part of the South Asian security environment, or assumes hegemonic tendencies, it would be a major factor of concern. Strategy to Cope with Chinese Challenge The longest stretch of India's border is with China. Beijing disputes large portions of this border. China not only occupies 38,000 sq. km in Ladakh's Aksai Chin plateau, but also claims 90,000 sq. km in Arunachal Pradesh. This claim has not been given up and could be pursued at a future date if Beijing feels India is posing a challenge or is not sufficiently friendly. If India has to maintain its relative conventional edge against China, it needs to invest significantly in force multipliers, deterrence, and communications. This is necessary to ensure that an asymmetry of military power does not adversely affect India's security, diplomacy, and economy. Both Beijing and New Delhi have an interest in enhancing their own security in terms of each other and the region by developing co-operative ties and confidence building measures. However, many of China's activities push towards less co-operative ties and undermine confidence. For India, China strategy in the post-Cold War era calls for a combination of astute diplomacy and rapid development of national power and prestige. The contradictory dynamics of the relationship FFFFFFFFF SEPTEMBER 2010 NAVAL DESPATCH entail a complex four dimensional strategy for coping with the China challenge: cooperation and confidence building, deterrence, support for multilateral security building in Asia, and a stable balance of power in Asia. INDIA’S POLITICO-MILITARY OPTIONS TO COUNTER CHINESE RISE IN ASIA Structural Engagement with China Both India and China face huge domestic tasks related to modernisation as well as external problems. China considers national consolidation - the enhancing of its sovereign control over Taiwan and the South China Sea and overcoming political dissension in Tibet and Xinjiang as among its priority tasks. For India, the ending of terrorism and separatism in Jammu and Kashmir and political consolidation of India's sovereignty over the state and in the Northeast would remain the immediate tasks. These conditions create the grounds for confidence building, co-operation, and reconciliation between the two countries to facilitate the under mentioned possibilities:- • Develop a series of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) that help maintain long-term peace along the Line of Control. This is currently underway and was given formal shape by the 1996 India-China agreement. • Keep up an intensive, high level leadership dialogue so as to understand China's security concerns, strategy, and motives. • Develop all-round relations with China, including border trade and military exercises. • Make best use of the international balance of forces, improved diplomatic relations with China, and India's growing strategic importance to resolve the outstanding boundary problem to mutual satisfaction. Deterrence and Power India's military capability, however, remains the key for ensuring security and stability in relations with China. Defense modernisation suffered during the late FFFFFFFFF 5
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 1980s and first half of the 1990s, owing to cutbacks in defense expenditure and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Military R&D also declined. However, India has remained committed to acquire capabilities to deal with a militarily more robust than China. Work on the Agni missile project, the Light Combat Aircraft project, the main battle tank, and aircraft carrier project have been sustained, though they have suffered from financial constraints and political uncertainty at the centre. The signs are, however, pointing towards greater efforts in higher levels of defense modernisation in the coming years. India needs to enhance its overall national power and deterrence capability through its nuclear weapon and missile programmes and its Naval and air power, while keeping up the modernisation of its conventional forces to ensure its security against an increasingly robust China. Multilateralism A third element of India's strategic options is to support and help create multilateral security structures in Asia that would draw in all countries and create normative and preventive mechanisms. This would involve the following:- • Close multi-layered ties with the United States, Russia, Japan, Europe, ASEAN, the Gulf states, and the states of South Asia to create balance of forces favourable to India. • Support for regional CSBMs, peace structures, and peaceful norms for solving disputes from which all countries could gain. Balance of Power China is expected to become increasingly active and assertive in the IOR. India needs to take necessary steps to match China in techno-military terms, so as to thwart any negative fall-out to its security and wellbeing. The question arises: what if India cannot attain an equal and balanced relationship with China? In such a case, India would clearly need security partners with which to balance China as it previously did with the Soviet Union. India clearly would have to closely nurture its ties with the United States, Japan and Europe in order to create appropriate conditions for future contingencies. However, most Indian decision makers view the country's interests best served not in an alliance with a major power, but in enhancing its own power to thwart coercion and aggression. Therefore, while India attempts to develop a stable engagement strategy, interdependence, and diverse co-operative ties with China, it would need to continue to enhance its power and all round economic, military, political and technological capabilities. Should these efforts not succeed, India would either have to acquiesce to a dominant Chinese role in the region, or build security links with an external power to balance China, which may not be feasible unless India itself is seen as a more robust, purposeful, and rapidly modernising state. The United States, Russia, or Japan would be wary of displeasing China or jeopardising their respective interests vis-avis Beijing if India is perceived as weak. Thus, for India the challenge posed by China can only be met by sustained levels of economic growth, continued modernisation of its military technological base, and restructuring of its military forces. These are also the only options around which a national consensus could be built. A subordinate role to China or a security alliance with the U.S. despite the growing congruence in Indo-U.S. interests, both remain politically unacceptable within India. However, a series of strategic relationships tying India with the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe that strengthen the forces of democracy and rule of law, help build universal norms and structures for peaceful resolution of disputes, promote multilateralism, and create a new Asian balance for peace and security are both possible and desirable. Conclusion The deployment of the PLA Navy ships in the Gulf of Aden is a manifestation of the Chinese desire to shed its image as a ‘brown water’ Navy and signal to the world of its aspiration to assume a role beyond its natural geographic and historic maritime boundaries. In any case China has ambitions to possess a world class and capable Navy, and seems to be on its way faster than expected. With China persisting in its military modernisation and FFFFFFFFF SEPTEMBER 2010 FFFFFFFFF6
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