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FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF Energy Security. Another important motivation behind the decision to deploy a Chinese Naval force off Somalia is the fact that this involves the African continent, where Beijing has substantial economic investments. As a leading importer of crude oil, China depends on Africa for 33 per cent of its oil needs, which is projected to go up to 40 per cent by 2020. It has granted extensive debt packages to Africa on a no strings attached basis and its bilateral trade with the continent is expected to touch US $100 billion by 2010. Suffice it to say that China’s stakes and advantages in Africa are high. China also depends on Saudi Arabia for its crude oil imports and has huge markets in Europe. Chinese merchant ships carrying crude would have to necessarily frequent the waters off the Somali coast and thus, their protection requirements have pushed the Chinese government to deploy warships in the region. Historical Importance. The Chinese deployment at this juncture also holds historical significance for the Chinese people, whose nationalism is on the rise. This is only the third Chinese deployment into the Indian Ocean in more than six centuries. From 1405 to 1433, emperor Yongle and his successor, emperor Hingxi, sent an armada under the eunuch Admiral Zheng He on seven voyages into the Indian Ocean as far as Mombasa, Mecca and Mogadishu, with multiple stops at Aden. Admiral Zheng He proclaimed the power and prestige of the new Ming dynasty, fostered tributary relations with kingdoms around the ocean, nurtured existing trade links, and, as a last resort used force against enemies. But, subsequently, China turned inwards and suffered a “century of humiliation” beginning in 1840, when it was invaded and partially colonised. In recent times, it was only in 2002, that the PLA Navy send the Luhu class guided missile destroyer Qingdao and composite supply ship Taicang on a global circumnavigation trip for the first time, and began taking part in bilateral Naval exercises. Lead Role in Maintaining World Order. The need to demonstrate China's active attitude in maintaining the world's peace and safety, as well as its capacity to accomplish diversified military missions, to deal with multiple threats to national security, is yet another driver for the current deployment of ships. With the major Navies of the world including Russia, FFFFFFFFF SEPTEMBER 2010 NAVAL DESPATCH India, and the first-ever joint European Union Naval operation away from Europe, operating in the Gulf of Aden, the PLA Navy's absence would have been conspicuous, especially since the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) occupies a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, which in no fewer than four resolutions last year, had called upon states interested in the security of maritime activities to take active part in the fight against piracy on the high seas off the coast of Somalia. CHINA’S EMERGENCE AS A WORLD POWER China’s Search for Power Rise in China’s National Power. The growth in China's overall national power, including its military capabilities, and how China's leaders would employ this power would have far reaching implications for India. India would be affected, one way or the other, by Beijing's changing economic and military capabilities, its trade and defense policies, its approach toward resolution of bilateral disputes, and how it would use its power as it grows stronger. Even the United States recognises that following Soviet disintegration, and with Japanese power contained within the U.S.-Japan alliance framework, China would be its leading challenger, its key concern, and the alternative centre of power and influence in the strategically vital Indian Ocean Region. Chinese Military Doctrine. From a national security perspective, China is preparing to meet three key challenges. In an immediate sense, it is building a military force structure that would enable it to use force, if necessary, to pursue its sovereignty and territorial claims on Taiwan, the South China Sea islands, and, if necessary, elsewhere - for example against India, Vietnam, and Japan. Second, its military power must provide it with adequate deterrence against the United States. Finally, in the longer run its power must ensure that China would be an integral part of a new security structure in Asia and the Pacific. China’s current doctrine envisages preparation to face two potential scenarios as follows: - • Border wars, territorial conflicts, and localised partial wars of a limited character FFFFFFFFF 3
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF under increasingly high tech conditions. This is what the PLA expects to face and, therefore, such preparations have direct relevance for India. • A general, modern three-dimensional war, in which the use of nuclear weapons could be threatened. This is seen as very unlikely, but could occur in case Taiwan declares independence leading to a China-U.S. face off. Development of PLA Navy The Chinese military budget for 2008 increased by 17.6 percent to $US58.8 billion. Much of this military expenditure has gone to the Navy. China now possesses 57 attack submarines, half a dozen of which are nuclear-powered, 74 major surface vessels and 55 large and medium sized amphibious ships. A few nuclear-powered strategic submarines are armed with long-range ballistic missiles. A significant portion of this Naval force has been built since 2000. China is now the world's third largest shipbuilder building one fifth of the world's ships and thus has a considerable industrial base for further Naval expansion. Since 1990, China has initiated five submarine programmes and, since 1995, has added 37 submarines to its Navy, including nuclear-powered ones. By adding three new submarines a year, China could have up to 85 submarines in eight years. This would be a remarkable achievement as never, since the period between the two world wars, has a nation undertaken a comparable level of submarine development. A major concern for India has been the recent preparations by China to build aircraft carriers. China has recently ordered 50 Su-33 fighters from Russia, specifically designed for carriers. The planned induction of aircraft carriers signals the PLA Navy’s desire to operate in distant waters towards protecting oil shipments from the Middle East. Chinese Strategy in the Indian Ocean China is increasing its investment in terms of its military presence overseas and ocean going Naval forces to defend its sea lanes for the transport of energy resources, as well as accelerating the expansion of its procurement of natural resources from overseas. To achieve energy security, China has adopted the “string of pearls” strategy i.e. a series of diplomatic and military measures aimed at acquiring access and strategic bases along more than 10,000 km of sea lanes. The important ‘pearls’ of this strategy are the Gwadar port in Pakistan, which has been constructed with Chinese financial support and made operational as a commercial port in Mar 08, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Sitwe in Myanmar. China has also been providing massive aid to Indian Ocean nations, signing friendship treaties and building ports and other maritime related infrastructure projects. There have been reports of Chinese developing a deep water port at Khaukphyu in Myanmar. Speculation is also rife of a deal having been signed in May 01 affording basing rights to the Chinese at Marao islands in Maldives for 25 years. In addition, the first ever visit by a Chinese President to Seychelles took place in Feb 07 citing strategic interest in the island state. INDIA’S RESPONSE TO CHINA’S EMERGING ROLE Sino-Indian Relations. There are competitive elements and co-operative possibilities in the India-China relationship, both with wider political and security consequences. In the short run, both countries are likely to pursue peaceful ties, as this will enhance their security while they engage in modernisation and grapple with internal security and political challenges. However, relations in the medium to longer term are uncertain, and could again become tense. Much will depend on internal developments in China and India, the growth of their respective military capabilities, and the response of the major powers towards both states. Sino-Indian relations have become increasingly competitive and there could be elements of possible confrontation ever since China has openly declared major territorial claims against India. Effect of Chinese Power on India. What does a powerful China imply for India? For India, the growing power and strategic reach of China has implications that it cannot take lightly. In the medium to longer run, the growth of Chinese power would affect India in two ways:- • As an increasingly important element of FFFFFFFFF SEPTEMBER 2010 FFFFFFFFF4
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