deployment of the PLA Navy ships in the - Information Resource ...

NAVAL DESPATCH
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Second Strike Factors. The backbone of any
Second Strike capability would be the Survivability of
a nation's nuclear forces and its Command and
Control structure. The absence of a credible Ballistic
Missile Defence severely limits defence against
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivered
through ballistic missiles. Ensuring survivability and
establishing effective Second Strike capability is a
complex national task. A few salient factors deciding
Second Strike effectiveness are covered in the
following sub paragraphs:-
• Intelligence and Early Warning. This
would be a prerequisite to appropriately raise
the level of readiness, locate adversary's strategic
assets, identify weak links in C3I2 (Command,
Control, Communication, Information and
Intelligence) infrastructure and preempt a First
Strike. Based on this, Second Strike nuclear forces
and C3I would have to be deceptively
positioned/ moved to ensure maximum
survivability, although considering the
availability of modern technology including
space based surveillance and human
intelligence with adversaries; this is going to be
an uphill task. It can therefore be fairly assumed
that the broad location of primary and alternate
centers housing nuclear weapons, delivery
platforms and associated infrastructure would
be known to the enemy.
• OR Ready Units. To ensure credible and
assured Second Strike, there would be the need
to have sufficient number of operationally ready
units. Unlike many who espouse that a NFU
option provides more time, this author is of the
view that since First Strike could be a multiple all
out attack, the ability of our Second Strike units
to rapidly retaliate, could limit the effectiveness
of a First Strike. Considering the requirements of
transportation, communication and technical
expertise (many of which maybe neutralised in
the First Strike), it is opined that Second Strike
nuclear weapons need to be ready for mating
or already mated in Precautionary Stage/ just
prior hostilities.
• C3 Infrastructure. Besides the nuclear
weapons and the delivery platforms themselves
surviving the First Strike; there is also the crucial
need for the Command and Control chain and
the Communication infrastructure to survive the
First Strike along with pre-designated political
and executive personnel for decision making.
A First Strike in future may also comprise
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and Directed
Energy (DE) weapons, these could then destroy
digital signal processors, electronic flight
controls, telecommunication sets and EW
equipment crippling the C3 infrastructure.
Therefore this infrastructure would require
multiple back ups to ensure assured flow of
information and delivery of time critical
commands.
• Range of Weapons. The positioning of
Second Strike forces would also be determined
by the ranges of delivery platforms available with
them as also that available with the adversaries.
Theoretically if the range advantage is with First
Strike force and the Second Strike units are kept
beyond reach then there would be a time lag
for the Second Strike units to move into position
to launch the punitive attack. In this regard SSBNs
due to their freedom of maneuverability and
stealth provide the flexibility to launch their
weapons close to an adversary's shore.
• Dispersion. Dispersal is another factor
that could enable better survivability of Second
Strike units. WMD are known for their large
dispersion. However, unlike against
conventional weapons, against WMD the
separation of units would have to be large
enough so as not to be affected by the wide
dispersion inherent to WMD. Hence knowledge
on accurate location of assets is not a prerequisite
for WMD to be effective.
• Training. To ensure better survivability
and robust primary and alternate means of
Command and Control (C2), conducting of
periodic scenario building exercises including
mobilisation would be essential. These exercises
could involve actual shifting of vectors and C2
infrastructure including alternate options. This
will result in better confidence levels and ensure
all channels/ assets are kept alive for an effective
Second Strike.
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