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NAVAL DESPATCH FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF Cdr KM Ramakrishnan Introduction Though war is still possible in the presence of Nuclear Weapons, victory in war is too dangerous to fight for since the closer one state gets to victory; the greater is the risk of nuclear retaliation by loosing side'. - Kenneth Waltz Nuclear Weapon delivery and platform selection is a complex task. In the nuclear age victory lies with the side that can better arm wrestle the opposite to concede to pressure rather than actual firing of weapons. The changing face of international order, erosion of the concept of nation-states, scarcity of resources and rise of non state actors is directly affecting the context in which wars will be fought. It is believed that introduction of armed nuclear weapons, ideologically opposed major powers with conflicting interests, away from direct armed conflict during the Cold War period. FFFFFFFFF SEPTEMBER 2010 FFFFFFFFF33
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF Indian Historical Overview. With the successful conduct of Shakti tests in 1974 and Pokharan tests in 1998 Indian nuclear weaponisation program started by Dr Homi Bhabha in 1965 reached final fruition. It prompted none other than the Prime Minister to proclaim "India is now a Nuclear weapon state", a motto which has acquired international acceptance. In the recent years development of Indian missile programme with Prithvi, Sagarika, Dhanush and Agni has added credibility to India's nuclear weapons delivery capability. Aim The aim of this paper is to examine assured Second Strike capability alongwith analysis of vulnerability of the three Vectors viz. I and, Air and Sea India's Nuclear Doctrine India's Nuclear doctrine was put forth by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) in 1999 and subsequently in the CCS statement issued on 04 Jan 03. It conceptualises that Indian nuclear weapons would be political instruments for enforcing deterrence rather than military weapons. The salient ingredients of the doctrine are highlighted below. • The doctrine envisages the build up of a "credible minimum deterrence", based on a triad of enduring, diverse, flexible and responsive nuclear delivery means. • No First Use. The deterrence factor is further emphasised by the clause of No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons against Nuclear Weapon States. It further states that nuclear weapons will not be used against States that do not possess nuclear weapons or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers. However, India has retained the option of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states resorting to use of Biological or Chemical weapons. The declared Indian stand of No First Use is debatable and beyond the purview of this paper. • Massive Retaliation. The doctrine also espouses massive retaliation designed to inflict unacceptable damage in case of a First Strike on Indian territory or Indian forces anywhere. From this declared stance one could infer that an FFFFFFFFF SEPTEMBER 2010 adversary's First Strike would be a massive multiple serial nuclear attack (greater than what the enemy may have otherwise factored into its calculations) to offset an effective Second Strike by India. First Strike Technically 'First strike' is an attack so powerful so as to leave one's adversary with insufficient forces to inflict substantial damage on the attacker. Since the Cold War USA, NATO and USSR built large number of nuclear weapons, delivery platforms and associated C3I infrastructure with the primary task of First Strike. This was required to undertake pre-emptive/ surprise First Strikes to sufficiently reduce if not completely eliminate the enemy's "Second Strike' capability. The USA subscribes to Launch on Warning (LOW) and Launch under Attack (LUA) postures. This was done as the country believes that unless it was able to undertake a pre-emptive/ surprise strike, it stood little chance of destroying all Soviet targets as required by its war plans. Similarly, NATO and Russia also believe in retaining the initiative and hence undertaking First Strike if required. Pakistan does not have a stated nuclear doctrine, but based on statements and articles written by authoritative Pakistan dignitaries, Pakistan retains the option of First Strike against overwhelming conventional force. China on the other hand has adopted a 'No First Use' policy but crucially this does not apply to conflicts over territories claimed by China and hence remains a potent threat to countries not only in the subcontinent but also in South China Sea. Second Strike Other than India and China (with the caveat of territorial conflicts), no other nation has a declared No First Use doctrine. India's stand on No First Use is the bedrock for establishing a credible Second Strike capability. This capability could be rightly defined as second in order of utilisation but not inferior in capability to first strike. In fact the ability of establishing a credible Second Strike capability is more challenging than a First Strike. In a First Strike the initiative is with the attacker giving him the freedom to choose the time, place and quantum of attack. Whereas Second Strike is retaliatory and would require careful planning and innovation to achieve the desired punitive results. FFFFFFFFF 34
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NAVAL DESPATCH<br />
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Cdr KM Ramakrishnan<br />
Introduction<br />
Though war is still possible <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong><br />
Nuclear Weapons, victory <strong>in</strong> war is too dangerous to<br />
fight for s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> closer one state gets to victory; <strong>the</strong><br />
greater is <strong>the</strong> risk <strong>of</strong> nuclear retaliation by loos<strong>in</strong>g side'.<br />
- Kenneth Waltz<br />
Nuclear Weapon delivery and platform<br />
selection is a complex task. In <strong>the</strong> nuclear age victory<br />
lies with <strong>the</strong> side that can better arm wrestle <strong>the</strong><br />
opposite to concede to pressure ra<strong>the</strong>r than actual<br />
fir<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> weapons. The chang<strong>in</strong>g face <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
order, erosion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> nation-states, scarcity<br />
<strong>of</strong> resources and rise <strong>of</strong> non state actors is directly<br />
affect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> context <strong>in</strong> which wars will be fought. It is<br />
believed that <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong> armed nuclear weapons,<br />
ideologically opposed major powers with conflict<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>terests, away from direct armed conflict dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
Cold War period.<br />
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