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FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF force a necessary prerequisite for undertaking the operations. Some of the examples where the IN carried out this operations recently include the Tsunami Ops 2004, the Lebanon Ops 2006 etc. LIKELY MARITIME OPERATIONS - NEXT DECADE The likely scenario for maritime operations over the coming decade could be :- • Conflict with a state in our immediate neighbourhood. • Operations in the extended neighbourhood in response to a request for assistance from a friendly nation. • Clash of interest or conflict with an extra – regional power. • Anti-terrorist operations, multilaterally or unilaterally, openly or clandestinely. • Actions to fulfill international bi-lateral strategic partnership obligations. • Ensuring safety and security of ISLs through the Indian Ocean. • Actions to assist the Indian Diaspora and Indian interests abroad. • Peacekeeping operations, either under the aegis of the UN, or as part of a multinational force. • Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in our extended neighbourhood, or in response to a request for assistance from a friendly nation. STRATEGIES FOR FORCE BUILD UP The strategy for force build-up should drive the long term plans for induction of capabilities in synergy with the Maritime Strategy. The primary aim of this strategy of force build-up is, therefore, to provide direction to the process of capability creation by identifying critical capabilities, that would aid the FFFFFFFFF SEPTEMBER 2010 NAVAL DESPATCH planners to review the inter se priority and make decisions to allocate appropriate resources between competing budgetary demands. Force Structuring Transformation in Maritime Operations. In the IN’s perspective, induction of new platforms, capabilities and facilities would require drastic changes in the way we conduct war fighting or peacetime missions. The IN road map for transformation clearly enunciates that the IN is committed to creating and sustaining a combat ready, technology enabled and networked force capable of safeguarding our maritime interests and projecting power across the littorals. Further, it is aimed to acquire the war fighting capabilities to operate across the full spectrum of conflict on a sustained basis . Budgetary Constraints. Whilst technology ushers in new weapon systems for war fighting, however, these would cost a lot of money and therefore, budget would always be a constraint for defence procurements. In order to maximize all available resources within the allocated budget ‘pooling in’ of resources, for their optimal exploitation could be resorted to. It would prevent duplicity of efforts and better Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Integration of Maritime Agencies. With the prevailing 14 maritime agencies operating in India, it is a Herculean task coordinating security activities with these agencies. One suggested step would be to reduce the number of such agencies by merging maritime organizations carrying out common / similar functions (for example merging the Coastal Marine Police and the Coast Guard into one; merging the DRI with the Customs, integrating the Fisheries dept completely with the Ministry of Shipping rather than existing arrangement of being clubbed with Min of Agriculture etc). This task would be required to be undertaken by the Maritime Security Advisory Board (MSAB). Lightly Armed High Endurance Surface Platforms. The anti –piracy Operations undertaken off Somalia certainly brought kudos to the IN, however, a very high value unit such as the Talwar class, perhaps could at best be considered an ‘over-kill’ for an antipiracy/LIMO ops. With India’s interests stretching to the Sakhalin Oil Fields and possibly to the Latin American FFFFFFFFF 17
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF countries, perhaps, there is a need to examine surface platforms which could be lightly armed with fairly long legs to undertake missions of this nature without having the requirement to carry out an enroute OTR or tag along a replenishment ship. RECOMMENDATIONS Today the enemy is slowly and steadily resorting to ‘asymmetric’ warfare as against a full fledged war. Therefore, the ‘Armed Forces’ in general and the Navies in particular will have to build capabilities and hone skills to take on challenges from the lowest end of conflict spectrum viz Low Intensity Maritime Operations (LIMO) to the highest end of conflict such as Nuclear warfare. Therefore, whilst there has been an increase in the asymmetric threats, the threat of a conventional warfare hasn’t diminished either, what with each nation still jostling for ‘strategic space’ for its independent growth and development. If anything, influx of extra regional navies in the Indian Ocean has been on the rise be it Op Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan and GWOT, Energy security , anti piracy ops off Somalia, etc. The Indian Navy of 2020 would accordingly need to gear itself towards this direction. Some recommended roles of the Indian Navy for the coming decade is given in the succeeding paragraphs. Conventional Roles of IN – Strategic Level Deterrence by Perception Management. As Sun Tzu had said ‘the true art of war fighting lies in winning wars without fighting and this can be achieved by attacking the enemy’s mind’. India needs to exploit all resources for proper and effective ‘perception management’ of our likely adversaries. This could probably be possible by continuous monitoring of the prevailing geo-strategic, geoeconomic and geo-political environment. Based on a detailed study, the prevailing geo-strategic environment would need to be ‘shaped’ so as to achieve credible deterrence. Nuclear Deterrence. Nuclear Deterrence is a sub-set of strategic deterrence, whose long term goal is to ensure stability. Our ‘No First Use ‘(NFU) policy amply illustrates India’s intentions of using the nuclear deterrence only as a retaliatory measure of last resort. The sea – based leg of the nuclear triad enables a survivable second strike capability and is, therefore, a critical enabler for the nuclear doctrine of NFU to attain credibility. The nuclear armed missile submarine is the preferred arsenal for small nuclear forces. Co-operative Engagement. There is a need to constructively engage the regional as well as extraregional powers both at the national (diplomatic) level as well as at the levels of the respective Navies. The conduct of the IONS (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium) in 2008 as well as conduct of regular exercises with the US, French, Japanese as well as other region navies are perhaps roles which the Indian Navy would have to continue for the next decade to achieve its desired effect in the region as well as at the global level. Conventional Roles of IN – Operational Level Ship Borne Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Capability. In Dec 2007, after some joint tests, Japanese warship JS ‘Kongo’ (DDG 173) successfully intercepted a Ballistic Missile. In 2010, the JSDMF will achieve the operational capability: with four ‘Kongo’ class destroyers fitted with block 2004 AEGI BMD 3.6, and SM-3 Block 1A missiles (nine interceptors per ship). After 2012 two ‘Atago Class destroyers will be declared BMD capable. This capability would enable JSDMF ships to protect the entire Japanese territory against Korean launched BMD threats. In the Pacific area, South Korea and Australia too have vested interests on BMD. Whilst South Korea is likely to fit SM- 6 FT-SBT on the new three KDX-3 destroyers, Australia is likely to fit BMD capability on the future ‘Hobart’ Class AEGIS air defence destroyers. The other countries involved in the BMD fitment onboard their warships include Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, UK and US. BMD and Anti-Satellite Capability. On 20 Feb 2008, USS ‘Lake Erie’ (CG 70) performed one of the most exotic and unexpected missions a naval vessel was ever entrusted with. In this mission ‘Lake Erie’ successfully shot down an old US spy satellite which due to some technical reason was spiraling out of control and was likely to re-enter the earth’s atmosphere. The satellite contained 500 Kg of hydrazine, a highly toxic material, which could have caused high level of death and destruction to human lives. The satellite was engaged by a modified anti- FFFFFFFFF SEPTEMBER 2010 FFFFFFFFF18
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