deployment of the PLA Navy ships in the - Information Resource ...

VOLUME 70 SEPTEMBER 2010

NAVAL DESPATCH 

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Capt Antony George 

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SEPTEMBER 2010 

Naval power, economic development, and 

international relations are inextricably linked and sea 

lanes, as avenues for commerce and trade, would 

become increasingly critical as economic competition 

intensifies. 

- Alfred Thayer Mahan 

Introduction 

Since 2005, the ‘centre of gravity’ of Asian piracy 

has clearly shifted westwards from Southeast Asia to 

the Western Indian Ocean. The Somalia-based pirates 

are on the rampage, capturing vessels of all sizes 

ranging from yachts to super tankers and their crew 

for ransom. Maritime piracy is growing at an alarming 

rate and threatens to drastically disrupt international 

trade. 

After the Japanese-owned chemical tanker MV 

Stolt Valor was hijacked on15 Sep 08, which had 18 

Indian sailors onboard, the Indian Navy was the first 

to respond by deploying INS Tabar, which sank a 

pirate vessel and in another incident rescued two 

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merchant vessels , and INS Mysore, on subsequent 

deployment, rescued two ships from being captured 

by pirates. Currently, warships from various countries 

are operating in the area. But, what has been of 

significance is the Chinese deployment of two 

destroyers and a supply ship 4000 Nm away from her 

shores to fight Somali piracy, which is the maiden 

operational out-of-area deployment in the history of 

the PLA Navy. The deployment is likely to have geopolitical 

repercussions in the Indian Ocean, which 

strategist Mahan had predicted would take centre 

stage in the 21st century, and the destiny of the world 

would be decided on these waters. 

AIM 

The aim of this paper is to analyse the reasons 

for the PLA Navy’s first ever operational foray into the 

Indian Ocean Region (IOR), its ramifications for India, 

and suggest a way ahead to counter the rise of Chinese 

power in South Asia. 

PLA NAVY’S FORAY INTO THE INDIAN 

OCEAN REGION (IOR) 

Why has PLA Navy Deployed Warships in the 

Gulf of Aden? 

Last year, 1,265 merchant vessels flying the 

Chinese Flag or those bound for China transited 

through the waters off Aden and nineteen of them 

encountered attacks by pirates and seven were 

hijacked. The matter was serious enough to warrant 

action by the Chinese, to safe guard the interests of its 

ships passing through the 500 km long Horn of Africa. 

Trade Protection. All Navies are mandated 

to maintain good order at sea and protect its national 

trade and energy lifelines, while projecting its national 

diplomatic policy, both benign and coercive. 

Therefore, it was no surprise that a Chinese Naval fleet 

comprising its latest guided missile destroyers, the 

5,850-tonne Luhai class Wuhan and the 6,100-tonne 

Luyang class Haikou and its largest 23,000 ton fleet 

replenishment ship Weishanhu arrived in the Gulf of 

Aden off the Somalian coast, on 06 Jan 09, to carry out 

the first escort mission against pirates. On 18 Feb 09, 

in an efficient display of its growing Naval capabilities, 

the fleet completed its twenty first mission (the largest 

held so far in the series) of escorting merchant ships 

in the region. Ten Chinese merchant ships were part 

of the convoy while three foreign ones, including 

Hermione from Germany, Viking Crux from Singapore 

and Princess Nataly from Cyprus requested protection 

and were escorted by the Chinese fleet. 

Force Projection. The Chinese motivation for 

conducting Naval operations far away from the 

mainland for the first time stems from the fact that 

circumstances were favourable for projecting force at 

such a distance. China had gained enough 

experience in long distance Naval force deployment 

due to its frequent military exchanges with other 

countries. The logistics problem of supply and 

refuelling is no longer seen as a constraint. The 

significant capability of the supply ship Weishanhu, to 

support the ships operating in the area, is clearly 

evident from the fact that the ships on deployment 

have not entered any ports in the region during the 

last three months. The deployment is a demonstration 

to the world of how far China has come in meeting 

her main objective to improve in an all round way its 

capabilities of force projection, strategic deterrence, 

and conducting operations in distant waters. 

Participation in UN Mandated 

Operations. China, which became a permanent 

member of the UN Security Council only in 1971, did 

not engage in peace keeping operations until 1989. 

In 1989, it began its first exploratory foray into UN 

peacekeeping missions, sending non-military 

observers to join the "UN Namibia Transitional Period 

Aid Group" overseeing a general election. In 1990, 

China dispatched military observers to the Middle East 

in support of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation 

(UNTSO). One reason for this transition was the 

Tiananmen Square incident, when the People’s 

Liberation Army was caught on the wrong foot with 

its own people. This incident stimulated the need for 

the PLA to conduct more people-oriented activities 

such as disaster relief, domestic security, and other 

measures, but also, very importantly, participation in 

UN peacekeeping operations. This transition has now 

made China the largest contributor by a permanent 

member of the UN Security Council. It is in this context 

that the deployment of Naval ships to the Gulf of Aden 

assumes significance because it projects the 

continued Chinese contribution to UN mandated 

operations, which the Chinese feel is an essential 

requirement for gaining recognition as a ‘world 

power’ in the emerging new world order. 

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Energy Security. Another important 

motivation behind the decision to deploy a Chinese 

Naval force off Somalia is the fact that this involves the 

African continent, where Beijing has substantial 

economic investments. As a leading importer of crude 

oil, China depends on Africa for 33 per cent of its oil 

needs, which is projected to go up to 40 per cent by 

2020. It has granted extensive debt packages to Africa 

on a no strings attached basis and its bilateral trade 

with the continent is expected to touch US $100 billion 

by 2010. Suffice it to say that China’s stakes and 

advantages in Africa are high. China also depends on 

Saudi Arabia for its crude oil imports and has huge 

markets in Europe. Chinese merchant ships carrying 

crude would have to necessarily frequent the waters 

off the Somali coast and thus, their protection 

requirements have pushed the Chinese government 

to deploy warships in the region. 

Historical Importance. The Chinese 

deployment at this juncture also holds historical 

significance for the Chinese people, whose 

nationalism is on the rise. This is only the third Chinese 

deployment into the Indian Ocean in more than six 

centuries. From 1405 to 1433, emperor Yongle and 

his successor, emperor Hingxi, sent an armada under 

the eunuch Admiral Zheng He on seven voyages into 

the Indian Ocean as far as Mombasa, Mecca and 

Mogadishu, with multiple stops at Aden. Admiral 

Zheng He proclaimed the power and prestige of the 

new Ming dynasty, fostered tributary relations with 

kingdoms around the ocean, nurtured existing trade 

links, and, as a last resort used force against enemies. 

But, subsequently, China turned inwards and suffered 

a “century of humiliation” beginning in 1840, when it 

was invaded and partially colonised. In recent times, 

it was only in 2002, that the PLA Navy send the Luhu 

class guided missile destroyer Qingdao and 

composite supply ship Taicang on a global 

circumnavigation trip for the first time, and began 

taking part in bilateral Naval exercises. 

Lead Role in Maintaining World Order. 

The need to demonstrate China's active attitude in 

maintaining the world's peace and safety, as well as 

its capacity to accomplish diversified military missions, 

to deal with multiple threats to national security, is yet 

another driver for the current deployment of ships. 

With the major Navies of the world including Russia, 

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India, and the first-ever joint European Union Naval 

operation away from Europe, operating in the Gulf 

of Aden, the PLA Navy's absence would have been 

conspicuous, especially since the Peoples Republic of 

China (PRC) occupies a permanent seat in the United 

Nations Security Council, which in no fewer than four 

resolutions last year, had called upon states interested 

in the security of maritime activities to take active part 

in the fight against piracy on the high seas off the coast 

of Somalia. 

CHINA’S EMERGENCE AS A WORLD POWER 

China’s Search for Power 

Rise in China’s National Power. The growth 

in China's overall national power, including its military 

capabilities, and how China's leaders would employ 

this power would have far reaching implications for 

India. India would be affected, one way or the other, 

by Beijing's changing economic and military 

capabilities, its trade and defense policies, its approach 

toward resolution of bilateral disputes, and how it 

would use its power as it grows stronger. Even the 

United States recognises that following Soviet 

disintegration, and with Japanese power contained 

within the U.S.-Japan alliance framework, China 

would be its leading challenger, its key concern, and 

the alternative centre of power and influence in the 

strategically vital Indian Ocean Region. 

Chinese Military Doctrine. From a national 

security perspective, China is preparing to meet three 

key challenges. In an immediate sense, it is building a 

military force structure that would enable it to use 

force, if necessary, to pursue its sovereignty and 

territorial claims on Taiwan, the South China Sea 

islands, and, if necessary, elsewhere - for example 

against India, Vietnam, and Japan. Second, its military 

power must provide it with adequate deterrence 

against the United States. Finally, in the longer run its 

power must ensure that China would be an integral 

part of a new security structure in Asia and the Pacific. 

China’s current doctrine envisages preparation 

to face two potential scenarios as follows: - 

• Border wars, territorial conflicts, and 

localised partial wars of a limited character 

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under increasingly high tech conditions. This is 

what the PLA expects to face and, therefore, such 

preparations have direct relevance for India. 

• A general, modern three-dimensional 

war, in which the use of nuclear weapons could 

be threatened. This is seen as very unlikely, but 

could occur in case Taiwan declares 

independence leading to a China-U.S. face off. 

Development of PLA Navy 

The Chinese military budget for 2008 increased 

by 17.6 percent to $US58.8 billion. Much of this military 

expenditure has gone to the Navy. China now 

possesses 57 attack submarines, half a dozen of which 

are nuclear-powered, 74 major surface vessels and 55 

large and medium sized amphibious ships. A few 

nuclear-powered strategic submarines are armed 

with long-range ballistic missiles. A significant portion 

of this Naval force has been built since 2000. China is 

now the world's third largest shipbuilder building one 

fifth of the world's ships and thus has a considerable 

industrial base for further Naval expansion. 

Since 1990, China has initiated five submarine 

programmes and, since 1995, has added 37 

submarines to its Navy, including nuclear-powered 

ones. By adding three new submarines a year, China 

could have up to 85 submarines in eight years. This 

would be a remarkable achievement as never, since 

the period between the two world wars, has a nation 

undertaken a comparable level of submarine 

development. 

A major concern for India has been the recent 

preparations by China to build aircraft carriers. China 

has recently ordered 50 Su-33 fighters from Russia, 

specifically designed for carriers. The planned 

induction of aircraft carriers signals the PLA Navy’s 

desire to operate in distant waters towards protecting 

oil shipments from the Middle East. 

Chinese Strategy in the Indian Ocean 

China is increasing its investment in terms of its 

military presence overseas and ocean going Naval 

forces to defend its sea lanes for the transport of energy 

resources, as well as accelerating the expansion of its 

procurement of natural resources from overseas. To 

achieve energy security, China has adopted the “string 

of pearls” strategy i.e. a series of diplomatic and military 

measures aimed at acquiring access and strategic 

bases along more than 10,000 km of sea lanes. The 

important ‘pearls’ of this strategy are the Gwadar port 

in Pakistan, which has been constructed with Chinese 

financial support and made operational as a 

commercial port in Mar 08, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, 

Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Sitwe in Myanmar. 

China has also been providing massive aid to 

Indian Ocean nations, signing friendship treaties and 

building ports and other maritime related 

infrastructure projects. There have been reports of 

Chinese developing a deep water port at Khaukphyu 

in Myanmar. Speculation is also rife of a deal having 

been signed in May 01 affording basing rights to the 

Chinese at Marao islands in Maldives for 25 years. In 

addition, the first ever visit by a Chinese President to 

Seychelles took place in Feb 07 citing strategic interest 

in the island state. 

INDIA’S RESPONSE TO CHINA’S EMERGING 

ROLE 

Sino-Indian Relations. There are 

competitive elements and co-operative possibilities in 

the India-China relationship, both with wider political 

and security consequences. In the short run, both 

countries are likely to pursue peaceful ties, as this will 

enhance their security while they engage in 

modernisation and grapple with internal security and 

political challenges. However, relations in the medium 

to longer term are uncertain, and could again become 

tense. Much will depend on internal developments 

in China and India, the growth of their respective 

military capabilities, and the response of the major 

powers towards both states. Sino-Indian relations 

have become increasingly competitive and there 

could be elements of possible confrontation ever since 

China has openly declared major territorial claims 

against India. 

Effect of Chinese Power on India. What 

does a powerful China imply for India? For India, the 

growing power and strategic reach of China has 

implications that it cannot take lightly. In the medium 

to longer run, the growth of Chinese power would 

affect India in two ways:- 

• As an increasingly important element of 


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the larger Asian and global balance of forces. 

• As the most powerful state in India's 

neighbourhood, directly affecting its security, 

diplomacy, economy, and politics. 

Co-operation Versus Confrontation. To 

the extent Chinese power helps create a stable and 

peaceful Asian balance of power, to the extent its 

reforms and large market create new opportunities 

for regional growth and prosperity; and to the extent 

the reforms lay the basis for a more co-operative 

Chinese policy, India is likely to view China's 

development in positive terms. This would lay the basis 

for co-operation between the two states on critical 

global issues that affect the interests of both countries 

eg, trade, a future multilateral security structure in Asia, 

and the environment. However, to the extent China 

poses a security challenge, strengthens India's 

adversaries, manipulates neighbouring states that are 

part of the South Asian security environment, or 

assumes hegemonic tendencies, it would be a major 

factor of concern. 

Strategy to Cope with Chinese Challenge 

The longest stretch of India's border is with 

China. Beijing disputes large portions of this border. 

China not only occupies 38,000 sq. km in Ladakh's 

Aksai Chin plateau, but also claims 90,000 sq. km in 

Arunachal Pradesh. This claim has not been given up 

and could be pursued at a future date if Beijing feels 

India is posing a challenge or is not sufficiently friendly. 

If India has to maintain its relative conventional 

edge against China, it needs to invest significantly in 

force multipliers, deterrence, and communications. 

This is necessary to ensure that an asymmetry of 

military power does not adversely affect India's 

security, diplomacy, and economy. 

Both Beijing and New Delhi have an interest in 

enhancing their own security in terms of each other 

and the region by developing co-operative ties and 

confidence building measures. However, many of 

China's activities push towards less co-operative ties 

and undermine confidence. For India, China strategy 

in the post-Cold War era calls for a combination of 

astute diplomacy and rapid development of national 

power and prestige. 

The contradictory dynamics of the relationship 

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entail a complex four dimensional strategy for coping 

with the China challenge: cooperation and 

confidence building, deterrence, support for 

multilateral security building in Asia, and a stable 

balance of power in Asia. 

INDIA’S POLITICO-MILITARY OPTIONS TO 

COUNTER CHINESE RISE IN ASIA 

Structural Engagement with China 

Both India and China face huge domestic tasks 

related to modernisation as well as external problems. 

China considers national consolidation - the 

enhancing of its sovereign control over Taiwan and 

the South China Sea and overcoming political 

dissension in Tibet and Xinjiang as among its priority 

tasks. For India, the ending of terrorism and 

separatism in Jammu and Kashmir and political 

consolidation of India's sovereignty over the state and 

in the Northeast would remain the immediate tasks. 

These conditions create the grounds for confidence 

building, co-operation, and reconciliation between 

the two countries to facilitate the under mentioned 

possibilities:- 

• Develop a series of Confidence and 

Security Building Measures (CSBMs) that help 

maintain long-term peace along the Line of 

Control. This is currently underway and was 

given formal shape by the 1996 India-China 

agreement. 

• Keep up an intensive, high level 

leadership dialogue so as to understand China's 

security concerns, strategy, and motives. 

• Develop all-round relations with China, 

including border trade and military exercises. 

• Make best use of the international balance 

of forces, improved diplomatic relations with 

China, and India's growing strategic importance 

to resolve the outstanding boundary problem 

to mutual satisfaction. 

Deterrence and Power 

India's military capability, however, remains the 

key for ensuring security and stability in relations with 

China. Defense modernisation suffered during the late 

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1980s and first half of the 1990s, owing to cutbacks in 

defense expenditure and the collapse of the Soviet 

Union. Military R&D also declined. However, India has 

remained committed to acquire capabilities to deal 

with a militarily more robust than China. Work on the 

Agni missile project, the Light Combat Aircraft project, 

the main battle tank, and aircraft carrier project have 

been sustained, though they have suffered from 

financial constraints and political uncertainty at the 

centre. The signs are, however, pointing towards 

greater efforts in higher levels of defense 

modernisation in the coming years. 

India needs to enhance its overall national 

power and deterrence capability through its nuclear 

weapon and missile programmes and its Naval and 

air power, while keeping up the modernisation of its 

conventional forces to ensure its security against an 

increasingly robust China. 

Multilateralism 

A third element of India's strategic options is to 

support and help create multilateral security structures 

in Asia that would draw in all countries and create 

normative and preventive mechanisms. This would 

involve the following:- 

• Close multi-layered ties with the United 

States, Russia, Japan, Europe, ASEAN, the Gulf 

states, and the states of South Asia to create 

balance of forces favourable to India. 

• Support for regional CSBMs, peace 

structures, and peaceful norms for solving 

disputes from which all countries could gain. 

Balance of Power 

China is expected to become increasingly active 

and assertive in the IOR. India needs to take necessary 

steps to match China in techno-military terms, so as 

to thwart any negative fall-out to its security and wellbeing. 

The question arises: what if India cannot attain 

an equal and balanced relationship with China? In 

such a case, India would clearly need security partners 

with which to balance China as it previously did with 

the Soviet Union. India clearly would have to closely 

nurture its ties with the United States, Japan and 

Europe in order to create appropriate conditions for 

future contingencies. However, most Indian decision 

makers view the country's interests best served not in 

an alliance with a major power, but in enhancing its 

own power to thwart coercion and aggression. 

Therefore, while India attempts to develop a 

stable engagement strategy, interdependence, and 

diverse co-operative ties with China, it would need to 

continue to enhance its power and all round 

economic, military, political and technological 

capabilities. Should these efforts not succeed, India 

would either have to acquiesce to a dominant 

Chinese role in the region, or build security links with 

an external power to balance China, which may not 

be feasible unless India itself is seen as a more robust, 

purposeful, and rapidly modernising state. The United 

States, Russia, or Japan would be wary of displeasing 

China or jeopardising their respective interests vis-avis 

Beijing if India is perceived as weak. Thus, for India 

the challenge posed by China can only be met by 

sustained levels of economic growth, continued 

modernisation of its military technological base, and 

restructuring of its military forces. These are also the 

only options around which a national consensus 

could be built. A subordinate role to China or a security 

alliance with the U.S. despite the growing congruence 

in Indo-U.S. interests, both remain politically 

unacceptable within India. However, a series of 

strategic relationships tying India with the United 

States, Japan, Russia, and Europe that strengthen the 

forces of democracy and rule of law, help build 

universal norms and structures for peaceful resolution 

of disputes, promote multilateralism, and create a 

new Asian balance for peace and security are both 

possible and desirable. 

Conclusion 

The deployment of the PLA Navy ships in the Gulf 

of Aden is a manifestation of the Chinese desire to 

shed its image as a ‘brown water’ Navy and signal to 

the world of its aspiration to assume a role beyond its 

natural geographic and historic maritime boundaries. 

In any case China has ambitions to possess a world 

class and capable Navy, and seems to be on its way 

faster than expected. 

With China persisting in its military modernisation and 


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build-up, India needs to maintain her defense 

modernisation so as not to create any serious 

imbalance in conventional power. A powerful and 

prosperous India would serve as the engine of 

change for the largest population concentration in the 

world in South Asia. A weak India and a strong China 

may serve the interests of Pakistan, but not very many 

other countries. 

The need of the hour is not a containment of China 

but a realistic engagement strategy comprising cooperation 

and confidence building, deterrence, 

multilateral security arrangements and a stable 

balance of power in the region that takes the interests 

of all countries into account. 

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

Captain Antony George, NM was commissioned into the Indian Navy in 1987. An Anti-Submarine Warfare 

specialist, he has commanded a Missile Corvette INS Khanjar and has held various staff and operational 

appointments including Fleet ASW Officer of the Western Fleet and Directing Staff at Defence Services Staff 

College, Wellington. Currently, he is serving as the Command ASW Officer of the Eastern Naval Command. 

************ 

"Working on nuclear submarines is not hazardous," a military lecturer insisted. The Soldiers in the audience 

were skeptical, but he persisted. 

"for example," he said, "some seamen stay on board for three to four years. And at the same time, their wives 

give birth to perfectly healthy babies." 

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Cmde (Dr) R K Rana 

INTRODUCTION 

The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium 

(IONS)2008 set in motion, an initiative, bringing 

together host of nations of the Indian Ocean Region 

(IOR), to meet the common challenges of the twenty 

first century that affects everyone equally at sea. The 

challenges - responding to the humanitarian needs 

of the people during natural calamities; effectively 

warding of threats from non state actors who choose 

to become pirates and marine pollution are but a few 

examples. 

Navies are well trained to operate in hostile 

environments and have risen to the occasions 

whenever situations demand, as have been 

demonstrated by the recent requirements either to 

provide humanitarian needs or facing up to pirates 

in rescuing merchant ships and their crew. 

The threat and the challenges that are faced by 

one and all in the Indian Ocean Region demand a 


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collective, cooperative and multinational solution. The 

synergy required in such an endeavour calls for 

interoperability at all levels, be it operational, technical 

or political/cultural [1]. It is this synergy that would 

build capacity and enhance capability amongst the 

individual States of the region, thereby strengthening 

the collective Indian Ocean Region. 

The assets available to the Navies to meet the 

above challenges are ships, submarines and aircrafts, 

who may be required to operate far from their base 

ports, for extended periods of time. The Indian Ocean 

Region Navies, through these assets, have to talk to 

each other, respond quickly to the stimulus and 

operate in unison for the common cause that can 

happen only by having seamless interoperability. The 

Naval assets being complex and technologically 

intensive can therefore be kept operated and 

maintained effectively in a multinational environment, 

far away from their base ports only through technical 

cooperation. 

This paper is an attempt to understand and 

share some of the thoughts on interoperability and 

technical cooperation amongst IONS countries 

through judicious selection and adaptation of 

methodologies and Standards. The challenges likely 

to be encountered whilst ensuring technical 

cooperation are discussed, followed by briefly 

describing the experiences of the merchant marine 

and NATO and finally proposing a way ahead to 

enable technical interoperability to ensure Naval assets 

are able to perform their intended roles and deliver 

the ordnance when and where due. 

UNDERSTANDING INTEROPERABILITY 

In today’s world, naval operations combining 

the navies of more than one State is the rule, rather 

than exception. Thus it is important that the navies join 

together with an open mind and develop professional 

interests in learning what will make them effective in 

combined operations. Success and failure of the 

mission is likely to depend on it. It is therefore 

important to understand what interoperability is. 

In layman’s terminology, Interoperability is the 

ability of information and communication systems 

and processes to support data flow and to enable the 

exchange of information and knowledge. Most apt 

definition of interoperability in the context of the 

combined naval operations is provided by the US DoD 

and NATO, who define interoperability as: 

“The ability of systems, units or forces to provide 

services to and accept services from other systems, 

units or forces, and to use the services so exchanged 

to enable them to operate effectively together” 

An alternative US DoD definition is:- 

“The condition achieved among 

communications electronics systems or items of 

communications electronics equipment when 

information and services can be exchanged directly 

and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The 

degree of interoperability should be defined when 

referring to specific cases" 

Both these definitions are similar, in that they 

include the systems aspects of interoperability. 

However, the first definition is broader and higher 

level, in that it encapsulates the high-level “business” 

aspects of interoperability. For example, there is little 

point in having interoperable communications 

systems if the semantic meaning of the information 

passed is different for the forces at either end of a link. 

One benefit of the latter definition, however, is the 

implication of the case by-case nature of 

interoperability requirements. 

Interoperability can be achieved by adopting 

national and international technical norms. For the 

purpose of this paper, interoperability will be restricted 

to technical aspects of the equipment and systems, 

their maintenance and onboard ships and 

submarines of the navies of the IOR, to ensure that 

these ships feel at home anywhere in the IOR ports 

and harbours. 

TECHNICAL COOPERATION 

Technical cooperation is the provision of advice 

and/or skills in the form of specialist personnel, 

training, scholarships and grants for research and 

associated costs. Technical cooperation (TC) should 

not be equated with capacity development which is 

a much wider concept. TC is one input to the capacity 

development process. 

The navies, unlike their sister services in the 

military are highly technology oriented, by virtue of 

the complex and critical systems that they operate on 

daily basis. Therefore technical cooperation is the 

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fundamental requirement around which the success 

of the combined operations by IOR navies hinges. It 

is therefore important to see that technical 

cooperation at all levels of ship design, build, operation 

and maintenance, is adequately addressed. 

Being far away from the base port for an 

extended time period would require open and 

unlimited access to the repair facilities of all the navies 

of IOR, including dry docks, to ensure that the 

platforms dedicated to the combined operations are 

sea worthy all the time. Demand for machinery and 

naval stores to take care of the exigencies arising at 

sea can be met only through standard codification. 

NEED FOR STANDARDS 

Interoperability and technical cooperation 

amongst the countries of IOR can be successful for the 

combined operations by ensuring large scale 

standardisation in procedures, methods, design and 

building of ships and equipment. This will not only 

increase the combined operational effectiveness of 

the naval forces to achieve the common goals, but also 

increase overall efficiency in the use of available naval 

resources. This includes, among other things, 

increasing co-operation and eliminating unnecessary 

duplication among IOR navies in research, 

development, production, procurement and support 

of defence systems and equipment. The collective 

naval capability then enhances manifolds and carries 

additional political value as on outward 

demonstration of the cooperation and solidarity. This 

can be achieved only by the process of formulating, 

agreeing, implementing and updating Standards for 

use within IOR navies and can classified into three main 

groups as has been done by NATO countries [2] – 

Operational, Materiel and Administration. It may be 

preferable to maximise the use of NATO standards to 

ensure worldwide supportability. 

It is a well known fact that Standards promote 

consistent quality, reliability and maintainability, whilst 

offering the potential for variety control and economic 

production, by providing technical criteria accepted 

by consensus. They also encourage both interchange 

ability and interoperability, and rationalize processes 

and methods of operation making communication 

and the exchange of materiel and services easier. Their 

use gives confidence to manufacturers and to users 

alike. Hence, the need to have common Standards, 

as early as possible, to make the IOR navies 

cooperation more robust. 

Levels of Standardisation. Standardized 

equipment belonging to different navies may be 

compatible, interoperable, interchangeable or 

common. They may be none of these, yet their 

components may be standardized, i.e. 

interchangeable or common, an important 

advantage in maintenance and repair. In ascending 

order, the four levels of standardization has been 

defined by NATO as: 

• Compatibility is the capability of two or 

more items or components of equipment or 

materiel to exist or function in the same system 

or environment without mutual interference; 

• Interoperability is the ability of systems, 

units or forces to provide services to, and accept 

services from, other systems, units or forces and 

to use the services so exchanged to enable 

them to operate effectively together; 

• Interchangeability is a condition which 

exists when two or more items possess such 

functional and physical characteristics as to be 

equivalent in performance and durability, and 

are capable of being exchanged one for the 

other without alteration of the items themselves, 

or of adjoining items, except for adjustments, 

and without selection for fit and performance; 

• Commonality is a state achieved when 

groups of individuals, organizations or nations 

use common doctrines, procedures or 

equipment. 

There is a school of thought that where it is 

possible to do so, maximum procurement should be 

of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) equipment for 

naval platforms. NATO and the America, Britain, 

Canada and Australia (ABCA) Group of countries are 

therefore placing an increased emphasis on the use 

of civil standards for military materiel standardization, 

a concept that is being implemented successfully. 

LIKELY CHALLENGES 

Networked Operations. The challenge that 

will confront all the Navies of IOR initially would be in 


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finding the balance between efficiency, security and 

influence in networked combined operations. 

Efficient networks require the free exchange of 

information on them. Moving information from one 

independent network to another is like the ponderous 

movement of a train from one rail gauge to another. 

The price for such efficiency, however, is not just 

technical cooperation in developing common data 

models and technical standards, but also deep 

political trust between co-operating partners. National 

security, however, is about protecting vulnerable 

resources. Information release policies are specifically 

designed to be inefficient in order to prevent 

inadvertent exchange. High levels of network 

efficiency will require a great deal of political and 

operational trust amongst partners. Similar levels of 

co-operation are not found even in NATO’s alliance 

networks . 

Common Interoperability Challenges 

Language. Language difference across the 

IOR nations is a challenge that needs to be addressed. 

Without a common language, naval forces cannot 

co-operate effectively. Two units with a common 

mission but without common language will have to 

divide the tasks between them in a way that makes 

interaction unnecessary. They must then hope that 

nothing and nobody will interfere with the line of 

division. However, no military operation can be safely 

built on such a premise. Any competent military 

opponent will seek these divisions of responsibility and 

exploit them. Therefore it would desirable for the IOR 

navies to master the English language. The better the 

knowledge of English by the forces involved the better 

the basis for co-operation. The deeper the key staff 

officers know this common language and the more 

familiar they are with the different accents, nuances 

and dialects, the less scope for misunderstanding. 

Procedures and Basic Formats. Common 

knowledge of language only creates the most basic 

foundation for co-operation. In itself, however, it does 

not remove the likelihood of misunderstanding, 

friction, and accidents. In order to increase the 

probability of co-operation being smooth, all involved 

sides will have to accept, absorb, and use, a common, 

standardised terminology. This includes standardised 

order and reporting formats, communications 

procedures and forms, as well as similarities in staff 

structures and working and planning formats. The 

cooperating parties must also have an agreed normal 

division of responsibilities and procedures in situations 

that will occur in the field during the operation: e.g. 

passing of each other's lines during underway 

replenishment. However, the silver lining is that most 

of the countries have a standard NATO probe and the 

procedures for fuelling. 

Technological Interface. Common 

language and routine in using common procedures 

have to be backed-up by compatible technology. The 

key element in making the common language and 

procedures effective is to have compatible 

communications equipment (and encryption 

systems) at the command levels where timely 

information must be available and direct co-ordination 

is essential. If combined operations are likely to be 

interwoven to a very high extent efficiency will also 

depend on the compatibility of the equipment and 

systems. At the low level, one could mention common 

standardised fittings on equipment and common 

terminology for spares. At the medium level, have 

common types of fuel and ammunition. At the high 

end of interoperability forces are using very much the 

same types of key equipment allowing use of the 

same spare parts and maintenance organisations. 

The equipment and the support of the larger 

participating states have dominated all efficient 

international forces involved in multinational 

operations throughout history and is likely be the case 

in future combined operations of some duration and 

intensity. The higher the level of initial standardisation 

or at least compatibility between the naval assets, the 

higher the degree of interoperability. IOR navies must 

strive to obtain it. 

Cultures. Each nation possesses a unique 

identity, based on language, values, cultural identity, 

and social outlook. Navies are very much influenced 

by their national military experience and history, as 

well as the educational system, norms, social and 

political system, etc. of the society, the part of which it 

is. Differences between navies resulting from the 

diverse national background can influence 

interoperability to a very high degree. Even minor 

factors can have considerable impact. Different 

cultures mean that naval forces vary in the way they 

do even the simplest things. They differ in the will to 

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delegate authority and the level of trust they are willing 

to show in co-operation partners not firmly under their 

control. These differences are much less pronounced 

in navies and air forces, compared to armies that are 

much more dominated by the medium in which they 

work and the technology they have to use to be 

effective. 

EXPERIENCES OF COMMERCIAL SHIPS AND 

NATO 

Commercial Practice 

The design, operation and maintenance of 

naval assets are generally shrouded in different levels 

of secrecy, and therefore to maintain certain unique 

characteristics, standards followed for procuring 

various equipment and systems are not very open. 

The designers, operators and maintainers are required 

to be specifically trained in all the ship borne 

equipment, thereby increasing the time and costs. The 

equipment manufacturers are also take advantage of 

such a situation by marking up the prices. 

On the other hand commercial ship owners 

follow very different procedures from those historically 

followed by the Navies to ensure that when they 

procure new vessels and equipment that is delivered 

is precisely what is required. There are many reasons 

for this: commercial shipping is generally simpler; the 

legislative framework is different, and there are many 

more shipyards worldwide with the necessary skills for 

building these ships. To ensure that commercial 

shipping is designed, built and maintained to an 

acceptable level of safety, whilst meeting the specific 

requirements of the owner, there are a number of 

rules and regulations that apply, that do not apply to 

the naval ships and submarines. 

Statutory Regulation. Commercial shipping 

is subject to external regulation from much of which 

warships are exempt. These regulations are produced 

under the auspices of the International Maritime 

Organisation (IMO). They include a large number of 

conventions such as the International Convention for 

the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), and the International 

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 

1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating 

thereto (MARPOL 73/78). 

Classification Societies. Classification 

societies such as Lloyds Register (LR), Germanischer 

Lloyd (GL), and the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) 

are organisations that establish and apply technical 

standards in relation to the design, construction and 

survey of ships (and offshore structures). Commercial 

shipping will either be ‘in’ or ‘out’ of ‘class’ and it is a 

requirement of ‘flag’ administrations that all shipping 

so ‘flagged’ must be ‘in class.’ The design and 

construction components of a classification society’s 

rules contribute to the structural strength and integrity 

of essential parts of a ship’s hull and its appendages, 

and the reliability and function of the propulsion and 

steering systems, power generation and essential 

services. They are not, and cannot be used as, a design 

code, nor do they generally specify how the 

shipbuilder has to design his systems to meet the 

classification society’s rules. For warships, a number 

of the classification societies have developed sets of 

Naval Ship Rules which can be used to specify stricter 

standards, particularly in the area of survivability. 

Where they differ from the equivalent commercial 

rules is that they are not mandated and ships can be 

assessed as ‘in class’ for some components but not for 

others. 

Owner’s Requirements. Commercial ship 

owners will require the shipbuilder to build and 

operate new vessels to the rules of one of the 

Classification Societies to meet the requirements of the 

relevant Flag State. They will also have a number of 

their own requirements covering issues ranging from 

paint scheme to domestic facilities, specifics for cargo 

or passenger handling to bunker capacity. They may 

also detail specific equipments to be fitted, use of 

designated sub-contractors to ensure commonality 

with vessels already in service, and may call up specific 

standards for the individual systems and equipments. 

Across the ship owner’s fleet, characteristics that all 

vessels must exhibit may be included within the 

Owner’s Ship Specification whilst requirements for an 

individual platform will be the subject of a set of shipspecific 

Owner’s Requirements. Whilst essential 

systems must meet the Classification Society rules, the 

owner has considerable scope in specifying what he 

actually requires in his new vessel. 

The approach described in the preceding 

paragraphs, followed by the commercial ship owners, 

thus enables them to seek technical assistance 

anywhere in the world, at whatever time, whenever 


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they want and also at competitive prices. This is 

because they follow open standards, be it design, 

build, operate, maintain and disposal. 

Further, the crew has to take one set of courses, 

as defined by International Maritime Organisation, in 

STCW 95. They follow the common syllabus, but still 

are able to operate and maintain variety of ship’s and 

equipment. Though one may argue that naval 

platforms role viz a viz commercial ships are different, 

it is opinion of the author that as far as the equipment 

and systems supporting the ships ability to float and 

move are concerned, there is a lot of commonality. It 

may therefore be advisable for the IOR navies, some 

of them are not very advanced, to follow commercial 

ship practices. 

International Maritime Organisation. The 

International Maritime Organisation (IMO) formed in 

Geneva 1948 had its Convention entered into force 

in 1958. The purposes of IMO as summarize by Article 

1(a) of the Convention are among others ”to provide 

machinery for cooperation among governments in 

the field of regulation and practices relating to 

technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping 

engaged in international trade. 

IMO’s first task was to adopt a new version of the 

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 

(SOLAS), the most important of all treaties dealing with 

maritime safety. Although safety was and remains 

IMO’s most important responsibility, newer problems 

have began to emerge mainly related to pollution and 

security. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 

1949 by the Foreign Ministers of twelve nations. The 

twelve being Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 

Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 

Portugal, United Kingdom and United States of 

America. Greece and Turkey acceded to the Treaty in 

1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, Spain 

in 1982 and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 

became full members in 1999. 

NATO functions through large number of both 

high level and working level committees and groups. 

One of them high level committee at the strategic level 

is dedicated to Standardization, called Military Agency 

for Standardization (MAS) addresses operational and 

procedural standardization, and NATO Terminology 

through four Service Boards (Navy, Army, Air and 

Joint) and their related working groups. The MAS 

monitors the production and updating of operational 

Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) and Allied 

Publications (APs). expand is the UK authority for 

ratification of Operational STANAGs and co-ordinates 

the national staffing of theses STANAGs, as well as 

overseeing the activities of UK delegations to the many 

working parties supporting the MAS boards. 

WAY AHEAD AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

• Create Interoperability Framework. 

A set of norms, standards, and references which 

describe an accomplished or desired 

agreement of interested parties on ways of 

interconnectivity should be created. 

Interoperability framework should be a living 

document which must keep up to date with the 

changes in technology, norms and business. 

The main requirements, which each standard 

for equipment and systems and the interfaces 

between various naval assets within the 

individual navy and across the navies, must 

meet, should be well defined. 

• Secure Interoperability. 

Interoperability must be secured at the technical 

(norms and standards for equipment and 

systems), semantic (meaning of data) and 

process levels (defining processes and 

actualizing cooperation between various naval 

units). 

• Interoperability should not be treated as 

selling equipment or systems; rather it should be 

about building trust through relationships. 

• Common Technical Training. The only 

way to reach effective interoperability in spite of 

the effects of the “cultural” differences is by living 

and training together, and by gaining 

understanding and knowledge - as well as 

acceptance - of the other’s ways of seeing and 

doing things. There is no substitute for wellplanned 

and rigorous training programs for all 

military forces, especially multinational ones. 

The mission effectiveness of the combined 

operations depends on it. 

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• Common Platform Design. Build large 

number of support ships for the purpose of 

combined operations that would have 

interoperability well entrenched into their 

designs. This would especially benefit of small 

navies, as these platforms would be much more 

cost effective having been built in large 

numbers. Whilst smaller navies may provide 

small and fast platforms, the developed navies 

could have platforms with many roles combined 

into one, thereby effectively supporting the 

combined operations group. These large ships 

could have various essential capabilities 

embedded in them such as Replenishment; 

Aviation; Medical Support; Sealift; Self Defence; 

Combined Forces Headquarters; Command 

and Surveillance and Communications, to have 

full interoperability. The common platforms 

should have: 

• A common set of baseline 

characteristics to enable interoperability of 

all maritime platforms; 

• Commonality, where appropriate, in 

capability solution and particularly where 

there are benefits in cost of ownership; 

• A framework for design assurance; 

• Priorities to support the development 

of concepts and enabling technologies; 

• Support to the management of 

supporting technical documentation 

• Acquiring platforms and mission systems 

that have the flexibility to integrate and 

interoperate with the hardware of more or less 

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sophisticated navies of the IOR should be only 

part of the vision of mutual technical 

cooperation. 

• Sub-Committee to Build, Adopt and 

Maintain Common Standards. A subcommittee, 

with specialists drawn from various 

disciplines would have to be set up, who could 

be tasked to build, adopt and maintain 

common Standards. 

• Whilst NATO countries have primarily 

come together to fight the common enemy, IOR 

navies would be more on the lines of 

cooperative engagements for more common 

goals such as pollution control, humanitarian 

assistance during natural calamities etc and 

hence in the first instance interoperability and 

technical cooperation could be limited to the 

equipment and systems supporting the 

platforms ability to float and move. Its ability to 

fight can then be progressively added as the 

mutual trust and confidence builds up. 

• Technical Cooperation at Laboratory 

Level. Effective technical cooperation at the 

laboratory level that offers the promise of 

technical solutions endorsed by all nations and 

adopted by the respective acquisition 

communities of IOR navies. 

• Technical Cooperation at Dockyard Level. 

All warships are highly maintenance intensive 

and every nation has its own infrastructures and 

maintenance philosophy. It is therefore 

important that interaction between IOR navies 

at dockyard level is encouraged so as to have 

better understanding of each other’s strengths 

and experiences in maintaining sophisticated 

weapon platforms. 

Cmde(Dr) RK Rana was commissioned in Indian Navy on 01 Aug 79. He is a post graduate from the Royal Naval 

Engineering College, UK and attained his PhD from IIT, Madras. Cmde Rana has served in a variety of organisations 

in the Navy emcompassing training, research, dockyard, staff, ship design and onboard ships. He is presently 

serving as PDOI at IHQMOD(N). 


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Capt Ashok Rai 

"You fight your way and I fight my way" 

- Mao Zedong 

The term “Maritime Security” represents the 

broadest approach to issues and aspects which 

pertain to the sea and have an important bearing on 

the country’s security. This goes far beyond the military 

aspect although the military power and security 

remains the final arbiter of national security. This 

concept therefore, includes aspects such as seaborne 

trade and commerce and the facilities/infrastructure 

required for sustaining their effort pursuit, the 

management of living and non-living resources of the 

seas, maritime environmental issues and the 

delimitation of international seaward boundaries, 

along with the deployment and employment of Indian 

and foreign military forces in the Indian Ocean.


Transnational crime has been increasing in 

scope and intensity across the globe. The maritime 

threats today have dimensions ranging from maritime 

terrorism, asymmetric threats, piracy , gun running to 

name a few to a full scale war. The 26/11 Mumbai 

terrorist attack is indicative of our neighbour’s modus 

operandi of use of sea-route to disrupt the very social 

fabric of our nation’s integrity, peace and harmony. 

As the varied dimensions of India’s maritime 

security – economic, political, military, scientific, 

technological, and environmental – are becoming 

increasingly important for the development and 

stability of the country, it is imperative to deal with them 

in a comprehensive manner. Today, there is no single 

government ministry or agency exclusively 

responsible for India’s maritime activities and interests. 

As many as fourteen Ministries of the central 

government, in addition to the departments and 

organizations of both central and state governments, 

are currently involved in various aspects of the country’s 

maritime affairs, leading to considerable confusion 

and overlapping of jurisdiction . Even co-ordination 

among these agencies is beset with difficulties at the 

best of times. 

AIM 

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of 

the Indian Navy for the next decade against the 

backdrop of the prevailing maritime security 

environment post 26/11 Mumbai attack. 

EXISTING ROLES OF THE INDIAN NAVY 

The roles of the Navies are formulated based on 

the missions envisaged for it. Let us therefore begin 

by examining the existing roles of the Indian Navy. As 

per Indian Maritime Doctrine (INBR 8), the existing roles 

of Indian navy are as enumerated in the succeeding 

paragraphs. 

Military Role. Some of the Indian Navy’s 

Military roles include Sea Control, Sea Denial, Sea 

Based Deterrence, Operations in support of Land 

Battle, Interdiction of the Enemy’s Maritime Forces, 

Blockade of Enemy’s Ports and Harbours etc. 

Diplomatic Role. Military forces at sea 

contribute to what has traditionally been known as 

‘Naval Diplomacy’. Indian Naval ships today are 

deployed overseas for demonstrating to local 

populations India’s interests and involvement in the 

region as also for show casing India’s industrial 

capability which becomes evident when our 

indigenously built ships are seen around the world. 

Naval diplomacy also takes the form of assistance to 

foreign countries as seen during Op Cactus in Nov 

1988, assistance to Sri Lanka during floods in May 2003 

as well as seaward security provided by two IN Ships 

to the African Union Summit in Maputo, Mozambique 

in Jul 2003. 

Maritime forces can also be used symbolically to 

send calibrated messages to a government by 

incrementally increasing the offensive capability . This 

in turn can be used to influence events, particularly in 

the early stages of a crisis, resulting in a potential 

aggressor backing down or defusing the situation. At 

the higher end, naval diplomacy takes the form of 

power projection forces, with the ultimate being the 

submarine nuclear deterrent – universally 

acknowledged as the most survivable leg of the 

nuclear triad. 

Constabulary Role. In this, forces are 

employed to enforce law or to implement some 

regime established by an international mandate. 

Violence is only employed for self-defence or as a last 

resort in execution of the task. The incidents of the 

pirated ship Alondra Rainbow captured in Nov 99 and 

the interdiction of the armed pirate ship off Somalia in 

Nov 2008 are examples where the international 

community has taken note of the Indian Navy’s positive 

contribution towards this role. With the establishment 

of the Coast Guard, the law enforcement aspects of 

the constabulary role within the MZI have been 

transferred to it. Thus whilst the Navy continues to look 

after all constabulary functions connected with the 

defence and security of the country, both within and 

outside the MZI, the Coast Guard looks after all law 

enforcement activities within the MZI. 

Benign Role. Benign tasks are those such as 

humanitarian aid, disaster relief, Search and Rescue 

(SAR), ordinance disposal, pollution control, diving 

assistance, salvage operations, hydrography etc. The 

role is termed as benign because violence has no part 

to play in its execution, nor is the potential to apply 


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force a necessary prerequisite for undertaking the 

operations. 

Some of the examples where the IN carried out 

this operations recently include the Tsunami Ops 2004, 

the Lebanon Ops 2006 etc. 

LIKELY MARITIME OPERATIONS - NEXT 

DECADE 

The likely scenario for maritime operations over 

the coming decade could be :- 

• Conflict with a state in our immediate 

neighbourhood. 

• Operations in the extended 

neighbourhood in response to a request for 

assistance from a friendly nation. 

• Clash of interest or conflict with an extra – 

regional power. 

• Anti-terrorist operations, multilaterally or 

unilaterally, openly or clandestinely. 

• Actions to fulfill international bi-lateral 

strategic partnership obligations. 

• Ensuring safety and security of ISLs through 

the Indian Ocean. 

• Actions to assist the Indian Diaspora and 

Indian interests abroad. 

• Peacekeeping operations, either under 

the aegis of the UN, or as part of a multinational 

force. 

• Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 

Relief (HADR) in our extended neighbourhood, 

or in response to a request for assistance from a 

friendly nation. 

STRATEGIES FOR FORCE BUILD UP 

The strategy for force build-up should drive the 

long term plans for induction of capabilities in synergy 

with the Maritime Strategy. The primary aim of this 

strategy of force build-up is, therefore, to provide 

direction to the process of capability creation by 

identifying critical capabilities, that would aid the 

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planners to review the inter se priority and make 

decisions to allocate appropriate resources between 

competing budgetary demands. 

Force Structuring 

Transformation in Maritime Operations. 

In the IN’s perspective, induction of new platforms, 

capabilities and facilities would require drastic 

changes in the way we conduct war fighting or 

peacetime missions. The IN road map for 

transformation clearly enunciates that the IN is 

committed to creating and sustaining a combat ready, 

technology enabled and networked force capable of 

safeguarding our maritime interests and projecting 

power across the littorals. Further, it is aimed to acquire 

the war fighting capabilities to operate across the full 

spectrum of conflict on a sustained basis . 

Budgetary Constraints. Whilst technology 

ushers in new weapon systems for war fighting, 

however, these would cost a lot of money and 

therefore, budget would always be a constraint for 

defence procurements. In order to maximize all 

available resources within the allocated budget 

‘pooling in’ of resources, for their optimal exploitation 

could be resorted to. It would prevent duplicity of 

efforts and better Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). 

Integration of Maritime Agencies. With the 

prevailing 14 maritime agencies operating in India, it 

is a Herculean task coordinating security activities with 

these agencies. One suggested step would be to 

reduce the number of such agencies by merging 

maritime organizations carrying out common / similar 

functions (for example merging the Coastal Marine 

Police and the Coast Guard into one; merging the DRI 

with the Customs, integrating the Fisheries dept 

completely with the Ministry of Shipping rather than 

existing arrangement of being clubbed with Min of 

Agriculture etc). This task would be required to be 

undertaken by the Maritime Security Advisory Board 

(MSAB). 

Lightly Armed High Endurance Surface 

Platforms. The anti –piracy Operations undertaken 

off Somalia certainly brought kudos to the IN, however, 

a very high value unit such as the Talwar class, perhaps 

could at best be considered an ‘over-kill’ for an antipiracy/LIMO 

ops. With India’s interests stretching to the 

Sakhalin Oil Fields and possibly to the Latin American 

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countries, perhaps, there is a need to examine surface 

platforms which could be lightly armed with fairly long 

legs to undertake missions of this nature without 

having the requirement to carry out an enroute OTR 

or tag along a replenishment ship. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Today the enemy is slowly and steadily resorting 

to ‘asymmetric’ warfare as against a full fledged war. 

Therefore, the ‘Armed Forces’ in general and the 

Navies in particular will have to build capabilities and 

hone skills to take on challenges from the lowest end 

of conflict spectrum viz Low Intensity Maritime 

Operations (LIMO) to the highest end of conflict such 

as Nuclear warfare. Therefore, whilst there has been 

an increase in the asymmetric threats, the threat of a 

conventional warfare hasn’t diminished either, what 

with each nation still jostling for ‘strategic space’ for its 

independent growth and development. If anything, 

influx of extra regional navies in the Indian Ocean has 

been on the rise be it Op Enduring Freedom, 

Afghanistan and GWOT, Energy security , anti piracy 

ops off Somalia, etc. The Indian Navy of 2020 would 

accordingly need to gear itself towards this direction. 

Some recommended roles of the Indian Navy for the 

coming decade is given in the succeeding 

paragraphs. 

Conventional Roles of IN – Strategic Level 

Deterrence by Perception Management. 

As Sun Tzu had said ‘the true art of war fighting lies in 

winning wars without fighting and this can be 

achieved by attacking the enemy’s mind’. India needs 

to exploit all resources for proper and effective 

‘perception management’ of our likely adversaries. 

This could probably be possible by continuous 

monitoring of the prevailing geo-strategic, geoeconomic 

and geo-political environment. Based on 

a detailed study, the prevailing geo-strategic 

environment would need to be ‘shaped’ so as to 

achieve credible deterrence. 

Nuclear Deterrence. Nuclear Deterrence is 

a sub-set of strategic deterrence, whose long term 

goal is to ensure stability. Our ‘No First Use ‘(NFU) policy 

amply illustrates India’s intentions of using the nuclear 

deterrence only as a retaliatory measure of last resort. 

The sea – based leg of the nuclear triad enables a 

survivable second strike capability and is, therefore, a 

critical enabler for the nuclear doctrine of NFU to attain 

credibility. The nuclear armed missile submarine is the 

preferred arsenal for small nuclear forces. 

Co-operative Engagement. There is a need 

to constructively engage the regional as well as extraregional 

powers both at the national (diplomatic) level 

as well as at the levels of the respective Navies. The 

conduct of the IONS (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium) 

in 2008 as well as conduct of regular exercises with 

the US, French, Japanese as well as other region 

navies are perhaps roles which the Indian Navy would 

have to continue for the next decade to achieve its 

desired effect in the region as well as at the global level. 

Conventional Roles of IN – Operational Level 

Ship Borne Ballistic Missile Defence 

(BMD) Capability. In Dec 2007, after some joint 

tests, Japanese warship JS ‘Kongo’ (DDG 173) 

successfully intercepted a Ballistic Missile. In 2010, the 

JSDMF will achieve the operational capability: with four 

‘Kongo’ class destroyers fitted with block 2004 AEGI 

BMD 3.6, and SM-3 Block 1A missiles (nine interceptors 

per ship). After 2012 two ‘Atago Class destroyers will 

be declared BMD capable. This capability would 

enable JSDMF ships to protect the entire Japanese 

territory against Korean launched BMD threats. In the 

Pacific area, South Korea and Australia too have vested 

interests on BMD. Whilst South Korea is likely to fit SM- 

6 FT-SBT on the new three KDX-3 destroyers, Australia 

is likely to fit BMD capability on the future ‘Hobart’ Class 

AEGIS air defence destroyers. The other countries 

involved in the BMD fitment onboard their warships 

include Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 

Spain, UK and US. 

BMD and Anti-Satellite Capability. On 20 

Feb 2008, USS ‘Lake Erie’ (CG 70) performed one of 

the most exotic and unexpected missions a naval 

vessel was ever entrusted with. In this mission ‘Lake 

Erie’ successfully shot down an old US spy satellite 

which due to some technical reason was spiraling out 

of control and was likely to re-enter the earth’s 

atmosphere. The satellite contained 500 Kg of 

hydrazine, a highly toxic material, which could have 

caused high level of death and destruction to human 

lives. The satellite was engaged by a modified anti- 


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BMD Missile SM-3, at an altitude of 250 Km proceeding 

at a speed of 11,000 Km/hr. This engagement also 

demonstrated a naval warship’s anti-Satellite 

capability. 

Inference. India has already made 

considerable progress in the field of Ballistic Missile 

Defence (BMD) as reported in the media. Though 

there is no doubt that these weapon systems are 

extremely expensive, however, in prevailing security 

matrix where some nations in our neighbourhood 

are in possession of Long Range Missiles, there is 

certainly a need to commence planning induction of 

these weapon systems on our future naval platforms 

as these are going to be the order of the day by 2020. 

Therefore, one of the roles of the IN of 2020 or thereof, 

should be either neutralizing or rendering ineffective 

the enemy’s satellite (could be by Jamming the 

adversary’s satellites using Directed Energy) as well as 

providing protection to main land India as well as her 

Island territories against enemy Long range missiles. 

Ability to Influence Land Battle. It is no 

secret that the raison-de- etre of the maritime forces is 

to support the conduct of the battle on land. This could 

either be by delivery of ordinance from the sea or by 

forces at the Objective Area (AO). In either case we will 

require expeditionary capability with platforms 

capable of heavy air-lift for vertical envelopment as well 

as missiles with land attack capability. The IN of 2020 

needs to accordingly prepare its force structuring for 

meeting this role. 

Capability Development – to Meet 

Asymmetric Threats 

Creation of a Maritime Security Advisor. 

One important role of the Indian Navy for the next 

decade would be to co-ordinate the functioning of 

various maritime agencies till such time that the nation 

develops a truly ’Maritime Culture’. The creation of 

Maritime Security Advisor (MSA) (though presently 

turned down by the Govt) needs to be taken up again. 

The MSA , a serving three star admiral would be the 

one point maritime advisor to the PMO through the 

National Security Advisor (NSA). This way indirectly, the 

Indian Navy could co-ordinate with various maritime 

agencies and synergise maritime security. 

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). A 

key national security requirement (be it from 

conventional threats as well as from asymmetric 

threats) is "Domain Awareness". Domain Awareness 

is the effective understanding of all activities, events, 

and trends within any relevant domain – air, land, sea, 

space and cyberspace. Effective surveillance of our 

area of interest and situational awareness in the 

maritime domain will require integration of inputs from 

the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard, DG Shipping, DG 

Light House Authorities, Customs, Intelligence 

agencies, Marine/Coastal police, fishing communities 

and most important of all the citizens of India itself. 

There would also be a need to exchange information 

with friendly countries with shared perceptions and 

interests. 

Presently, the weakest link in our MDA capability 

is lack of adequate surveillance platforms. Apart from 

Long and Short range Maritime Patrol Aircraft and less 

expensive UAVs, we also need to acquire strategic as 

well as maritime satellite surveillance capability. In the 

interim, innovative use of available technologies viz AIS, 

VTMS etc needs to be factored to generate domain 

awareness. One important role of IN for the next 

decade would be to build upon this capability and 

enhance the MDA to the optimum. 

Driver for Maritime Cooperation 

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Diplomatic Role 

The main business of major navies in the 21st 

century is to use warships to support foreign policy by 

less violent methods. Maritime Cooperation 

comprises those actions undertaken after mutual 

consent. This cooperation could be further subdivided 

into ‘strategic defence security cooperation’, 

‘defence industry and technology cooperation’, and 

‘navy to navy cooperation’. The various drivers that 

could influence the progress of our Maritime 

Cooperation Initiative are depicted in the above 

diagram. 

The IN would have to play a very active role in 

the field of diplomacy as a resurgent India would 

certainly lobby for a better world order in the coming 

decade. 

Constabulary Role 

Currently, the constabulary role of the Indian 

Navy can be divided into two broad tasks: Low Intensity 

Maritime Operations (LIMO); and Maritime Good 

Order at Sea. The diagram below depicts the 

Constabulary Role of the Indian Navy which in the 

coming years will only increase with the increasing 

asymmetric threats:- 

Constabulary Role 

Benign Role 

Benign tasks such as humanitarian aid, disaster 

relief, diving assistance, hydrography, etc will continue 

to occupy the attention of the Indian Navy in the 

foreseeable future. The ambit of operations envisaged 

to be undertaken under the benign role is depicted 

below:- 

Benign Role 

Spectrum of Naval Missions and Individual 

Mission Capability 

Whilst the IN would continue to concentrate 

towards it main four roles however, there is a need for 

the IN to continue to re-check its roles and capabilities 

vis-a vis Navies of the developed nations to ensure 

relevance at the international fora. Table appended 

at the end of this paper depicts the types of Naval 

Missions that can be carried out world wide by various 

navies of the world. 

Conclusion 

The 26 Nov 08 terrorist attack on Mumbai did 

make the nation sit-up and take note of infiltrations of 

terrorists through the sea route, so much so that some 

critics remarked whether the Indian Navy was 

investing in the correct platforms and whether it was 

time for Indian Navy to revert back to ‘Brown Water’ 

operations instead of the ‘Blue water Navy’ which the 

IN had been harping on even whilst the Indian coast 

itself had been left undefended? It is to be borne in 

mind that conceptually the roles and missions of the 

Indian Navy have been clearly defined in the Indian 

Maritime Doctrine (INBR 8) and India’s Maritime 

Strategy. However, in addition to meeting challenges 

of LIMO, Navies have much bigger roles and our naval 

leadership of yester years had a lot of difficulty trying 

to convince our political leadership (who invariably 


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had a continental mindset) on this issue. A lot of effort 

was spent to break free from the mould of British 

dominion "Brown Water Coastal Navy" and progress 

towards a balanced ‘Blue Water Navy’. The Navies are 

national instruments for enforcing a nation’s political 

objectives and furthering national interests. In our 

endeavour to combat asymmetric threats we should 

not lose focus on this issue! 

The 26/11 Mumbai attack however, did draw 

attention to the fact that there is a need for the Indian 

Navy, as the lead Maritime agency, to don the mantle 

of a ‘headmaster’ and coordinate maritime security 

with all other maritime agencies of the nation. 

Therefore, to put it succinctly, the possible future roles 

of the IN of 2020 could be broadly grouped into two 

categories, the first being the Roles for conventional 

operations of war fighting and the second as Roles 

towards thwarting non-conventional/asymmetric 

warfare waged by the enemy. Towards developing 

capabilities to meet conventional warfare challenges, 

the IN of 2020 would need to keep pace with the RMA 

and focus towards achieving the following: 

• A true three dimensional balanced ‘Blue 

Water’ capability 

• Network centric capability as against 

existing network enabled capability. 

• Capability to take on Ballistic Missile Defence. 

• Capability to take on enemy satellites using 

soft kill/ hard kill measures. To quote Dr. Sandeep 

Waslekar “ Future wars would be fought in space 

as with more and more reliance on satellites and 

satellite based applications such as building up 

of MDA picture, navigation applications, 

strategic communications, Cooperative 

Engagement (CEC), targeting data etc, who 

ever controls the space eventually shall be the 

victor at sea”. 

Having discussed the need to develop a ‘Blue 

Water‘ navy, the IN however, cannot ‘shy’ away from 

involving itself in ‘Brown Water‘ or Coastal Operations. 

In the maintenance of coastal security, the IN would 

need to coordinate with various other Maritime Central 

and State agencies since asymmetric threat is likely to 

stay for years to come and in order to ensure a stable 

environment in the region there is a need for all organs 

of the Govt to ‘pull’ together starting from the 

Intelligence set up, the police forces, the para-military 

forces and most import the citizens of India. By 

reducing the role of the Indian Navy to that of ‘Brown 

Water Coastal patrol navy’, the biggest dis-service to 

the nation would be committed. On other hand 

permitting the IN to take on the lead role would be a 

step in the right direction. 

************ 


Capt Ashok Rai, is an alumni of the National Defence Academy and was commissioned in Indian Navy on 01 

Jul 86. He is a Navigation & Direction specialist and has held various important Command and Staff 

appointments. He is a graduate of DSSC Wellington. The officer is presently DMPR at IHQMoD (Navy). 

************ 

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Table: Spectrum of Naval Missions and Individual Mission Capability 

Source: Adapted from a thesis on ‘Role of Indian Navy as an Instrument of India’s Foreign Policy in the Asia- 

Pacific Region’s by Capt AK Chawla, IN. 


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Lt Cdr Akash Chaturvedi 

Introduction 

Over the last few years, Piracy has become a 

cause of serious concern due to its threat to global 

commerce, human safety at sea and use of sea routes 

for spread of terrorism. A thread that connects piracy, 

the Mumbai attacks and the emergence of selfpropelled 

semi-submersibles for drug smuggling is 

use of sea routes and unregulated small boats for 

terrorist and illegal activities. In 2009, maritime piracy 

in this region has gone up by one hundred and 

twenty six percent. This increase has occurred despite 

a host of measures including the passage of four 

resolutions by the United Nations in 2008, the 

deployment of multinational naval forces by more 

than a dozen countries (CTF 151, India, Russia and 

China), improvements in reporting systems of 

merchantmen and establishing of a safety corridor for 

safe transit of merchant ships.


To put an end to piracy, the international 

community should not only address the source 

country or organization but firstly and more 

importantly accept piracy as a new brand of terrorism. 

Terrorists have already proven their capability to 

achieve devastating effects on land and via a air (Iraq, 

Afghanistan, North Africa and the World Trade Center). 

Their next potential target will be to terrorize large 

civilian populations at/from the sea. Piracy needs to 

be accepted as maritime terrorism and the 

international community needs to look for solutions 

beyond joint patrolling at SLOCS to tackle this growing 

problem prior another 9/11 at sea. 

Scrutinizing Piracy and Maritime Terrorism 

Terrorism at sea needs to be accepted and 

addressed as a problem intertwined with piracy. This 

is primarily due to the fact that many of today’s pirates, 

like terrorists, have an ideological mindset and a broad 

political agenda. This is contrary to the belief that 

pirates operate with the sole objective of financial 

gain. The reverse has also been observed wherein 

many known terrorist organizations have sought to 

develop maritime capabilities to use the sea as their 

extension for the spread of terrorism. Known terrorist 

groups that operate at sea using pirates’ techniques 

are Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Palestine 

Liberation Organization, Free Aceh movement of 

Indonesia, Islamist groups like The Moro Islamic 

Liberation Front, Moro Liberation Front, Jemaah 

Islamiyah in Philippines, Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah. 

Further examination of the similarities and differences 

between piracy and terrorism help understand the 

complexity of solving both problems. 

Similarities. Close similarities exist between 

piracy and terrorism, namely their methods of 

deployment and choice of targets with both groups 

threatening life and economic activities at sea and 

ports. According to Stephanie Hanson in her article 

“Combating Maritime Piracy” there are two areas in 

which piracy and terrorism overlap. The first is legal 

wherein both groups being non-state actors divorce 

themselves from their nation-states and form 

extraterritorial enclaves. They conduct acts of 

homicide and destruction against civilians for private 

ends. The second area of overlap is financial with 

some pirates are known to fund Islamic terrorist 

organizations specifically in Somalia and Indonesia. 

(Refer diagram placed at end of this chapter) 

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Differences. Piracy and terrorism are 

traditionally differentiated by their motive. Piracy is 

mostly undertaken for financial reasons whereas 

terrorism is undertaken for political or religious 

reasons. Whereas pirates prefer to avoid publicity and 

use violence as a last resort, maritime terrorists typically 

aim for maximum publicity and violence. 

Links. The sources of piracy and terrorism are 

getting more entangled and there exists links 

between pirate and terrorist groups especially within 

Somalia. The disturbing trend is that many of these 

pirates and Islamist terrorist groups are operating in 

the common areas of expand, the Arabian Sea and 

South China Sea which have become lucrative 

grounds for exploitation by terrorist organizations. 

Piracy at high sea is now becoming a key tactic of 

terrorist groups and radical Islamic groups with these 

groups now focusing on extending Jihad to sea. 

Today’s pirates are trained fighters. They are 

more violent, aggressive, and operate at high seas 

using mother ships and speedboats equipped with 

satellite phones, GPS, and advanced weaponry (AK- 

47, anti-tank missiles, RPG and grenades) use of which 

hint/indicate towards shared training with terrorists. 

Major terrorists groups are now feeling the crunch of 

funds which have stopped post Cold War and freezing 

of bank accounts linked to terror groups as part of 

expand. Therefore, terrorists are now relying on 

alternate ways to get funding by either themselves 

engaging in acts of piracy or outsourcing hijackings 

to pirates. In Somalia, Al-Shabab militia, is now 

working with the pirates and local warlords to 

smuggle arms and ammunition. In the face of massive 

international efforts against both pirates and terrorists, 

the two have joined hands seeking weapons and 

training incentives in return for cash. 

Outlook of Radical Islamic Groups Towards 

Extending Jihad at Sea 

“…Somalia is one of the three main theaters for 

Al-Qaeda’s mujahedeen, along with Iraq and 

Afghanistan …” Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri 

80 % of world’s cargo trade and 60% of the 

world’s oil and gas are shipped by sea, making ships 

high value and lucrative targets. 

Also, with the increased security arrangements 

on land and no major corresponding developments 

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at sea, these ships are drawing more attention by 

terrorist groups. The vulnerability of the Sea Lines of 

Communications is well known to terrorists. Osama 

bin Ladin’s audio tape warning of attacks on oil 

supplies and energy infrastructures clearly indicates 

that Al-Qaeda is now aiming to target this critical 

vulnerability. Al-Qaeda has trained with LTTE in the past 

and has shared training techniques/expertise to 

conduct acts of maritime terrorism. According to 

Martin N. Murphy in his article “The Unwanted 

Challenge”, Al-Suri, 

Al-Qaeda strategist, 

writes about 

• • • 

carrying out attacks "...the sea remains the next 

in the Straits of strategic step towards ruling the 

Hormuz and at Bar world... This region [HOA] 

el-Mandeb by 

represents a strategic point to 

scuttling ships at 

expel the enemy from the most 

choke points. In 

addition, Al-Qaeda important pillars of its battle,,," 

has been closely Maritime Terrorism a Strategic 

monitoring the Necessity-posted on a Jihad 

success of the 

website. 

Somali pirates, 

• • • 

showing their 

appreciation of the 

pirate’s achievements on their web sites. 

Somali Terror Triangle (Failed State-Piracy- 

Terrorism) and Implications for International 

Security 

Failed State. International security threat 

perception and policy have changed dramatically 

since 9/11, with failed states meriting strategic rather 

than simply political importance. As a failed and 

ungoverned state since 1991, Somalia poses a threat 

to international security with a host of associated 

problems. Lawlessness in Somalia has affected the 

entire region and created problems such as arms flow, 

black market in Kenya by Somali refugees, an 

environmental threat with toxic waste dumping along 

the coastline, illegal immigrants, illegal fishing by 

foreign vessels and, of course, piracy. 

Piracy. Somalia has emerged as a strong base 

for pirates operating from its shores. Piracy off HOA 

(Somalia and Gulf of Aden) accounts for 48% of the 

total number of attacks reported in 2009. 

Terrorism. Somalia has radical Islam 

movements, like the Union of Islamic Courts(IC), Al- 

Ittihad al-Islamiyya (AIAI) and Al-Shabab, which share 

parallel jihad ideologies and have known links with 

Al Qaeda. These groups are known to provide 

assistance to transnational Islamic terrorists. According 

to Ken Menkhaus in his article ‘Somalia: State Collapse 

and the Threat of Terrorism’, due to denial of reliable 

bases in Afghanistan and elsewhere with GWOT, Al- 

Qaeda has used Somalia not only as a transit or entry 

port for a safe haven, but also to spread terrorism. He 

adds that even non-AIAI & IC Somali personnel in 

Somalia have financial dealings with Al-Qaeda. 

Implications for International Security. 

Somalia offers an ideal location for Al-Qaeda and 

insurgents in maritime terrorism to join hands with the 

pirates or local Jihad groups like Al-Shabab. As these 

existing links become stronger, Al-Qaeda, using the 

expertise and training of these pirates could extend 

terrorism to the sea, generate money and strengthen 

into a pirate warlord confederacy. These jihadist 

groups pose the greatest maritime terror challenge 

in the near future due to their global reach and 

viewpoint on Jihad. 

Understanding & Defining Maritime 

Terrorism 

A major factor causing debate regarding the 

similarities and differences between piracy and 

terrorism is the lack of a comprehensive definition that 

captures their overlap and links. The definition of 

terrorism limits its scope to political objectives, however 

it can also have economic, religious, psychological 

and/or social objectives. The definition also does not 

cover the term “illegal use of violence”, attacks on 

combatants and military targets (USS Cole) or 

destruction of property. For example the 9/11 World 

Trade Center attack was destruction of a ‘symbolic US 

property’. The definition of piracy does not include acts 

of maritime crime undertaken within the territorial 

waters (boundaries of 12 nautical miles) though a 

majority of these acts are undertaken within this 

region. These anomalies can be addressed by 

defining Maritime Terrorism. This would improve 

counter terrorism and counter piracy actions by 

preventing any breach of sovereignty, ensure 

concerted efforts and legalize these actions. 


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been synchronized. It should be understood that 

Proposed Definition. Any act of piracy or 

terrorism undertaken in territorial waters or high seas 

for personal, financial or political motive against military 

or civilian targets by non state actors. It also includes 

acts of piracy conducted with the motive of passing 

the monetary benefits to support terrorist 

organization. 

Proposed Solutions 

The implications of resolving maritime terrorism 

piracy and terrorism are no longer two different 

problems and need to be addressed together by 

accepting this merger and legally defining it as 

Maritime Terrorism. Thus, despite increased efforts by 

the UN and many nations, the international 

community has not been successful in controlling or 

eradicating either of this menace. In the near future, 

pirates and terrorists will either pool their resources or 

terror groups will hire local pirates for their financial 

and piracy off the coast of Somalia and throughout resources and 

the world involves a multi directional approach that maritime extension 

begins with addressing the problems on land. This of their war on jihad. 

was evident by the decrease in the piracy attacks in Whatever the 

• • • 

the year 2006 when the IC controlled the region for a 

for motivation this "Assisting Somalia to 

short period. This approach entails monitoring and merger, ideology, 

surveillance of Somalia as part of the GWOT, with poverty or 

rebuild its central 

emphasis on beaches, ports and cross-border criminality, this government and reestablish 

the rule of law 

smuggling points. It may even require landing an nexus of piracy and 

international military coalition force ashore at those terrorism will be 

regions which foster piracy. Parallel initiatives already dangerous for both could help prevent and 

being undertaken by maritime naval forces (CTF 151 the world economy combat piracy." - Bruno 

etc) need to continue along with these land efforts to and security. 

eradicate piracy. The aim being to ensure that the 

Mpondo-Epo 

The primary reason 

piracy terrorism link is not established and/or 

for the alarming rise 

• • • 

strengthened, and that it does not become a platform 

in piracy off Somalia 

for terrorists in the immediate future. 

is due to 

Conclusion 

overlooking of the emerging alliance between piracy 

Post 9/11, the international community is faced and terrorism. To win this battle against piracy and 

with many new challenges, prominent among them 

terrorism, they need to be resolved as a unified effort 

being failed states, terrorism and piracy. Though the by extending GWOT to Maritime Terrorism in Somalia 

efforts are on to curb these problems, they have not to prevent another ‘9/11’, this time at sea. 

UNDERSTANDING PIRACY, TERRORISM & MARITIME TERRORISM 

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************ 


Lt Cdr Akash Chaturvedi was commissioned in Indian Navy on 01 Jan 98. He is a Gunnery Specialist and is 

presently serving as FAMPHO, Eastern fleet. 

************ 

• The new ensign was trying to impress everybody with what he'd learned in submarine school when 

the master chief cut him off. "Listen, sir, it's simple," he said. "Add the number of times we dive to the number 

of times we surface. Divide by two. If it doesn't come out even, don't open the hatch." 

• A phone call in the middle of the night is no surprise when you're in the military. I had just got one 

and was on my way out the door when my mother, who was living with me, woke up and asked, "Where are 

you going?" 

"I have to report to base," I said. "We have an exercise." Puzzled, she responded, "You exercise in the middle 

of the night?" 

HUMOUR IN UNIFORM - COME ON SNOTTY, GIVE A SHOT 

Lt Cdr Amit V Patil 

While patrolling in the Andamans during my midshipman days, I was keeping a watch when 

my C.O. decided to quiz me and my coursemate. After being quizzed for a while, I was directed to 

revert back to watchkeeping duties. Then, it was the turn of my coursemate, Mid James to get quizzed. 

I was busy keeping a watch on a fishing boat when James missed one question. “ Give a shot, Patil” 

said the C.O. I hesitated as my attention was on the fishing boat. “Come on snotty, give a shot” boomed 

the voice of the Commanding Officer. Promptly, I landed a blow on the head of my coursemate. “ 

Oh no, I meant "take a guess” sighed the C.O. 


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Late Cmde (Retd) MK Banger 

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Introduction 

HMIS Shivaji, a premiere marine engineering 

establishment was formally commissioned on 25th 

Feb 1945 with Commander Coverdale Smith as its 

Commanding Officer. 

The training establishment set up at a height of 

2200 Ft. above MSL on the lap of the Sahyadri 

mountains at Lonavala (100 Kms from Mumbai), 

primarily to train sailors of the Engineering Branch has 

now grown to a mammoth multi-dimensional 

training establishment imparting training in all facets 

of Marine Engineering covering steam, diesel, gas 

turbines and NBCD training. 

It is to the credit of Britishers to have very aptly 

chosen the name for the establishment to 

commemorate the memory of the great Maratha 

leader, Chatrapati Shivaji Bhosle. The brass bust of 

Chatrapati Shivaji presented to the Commanding 

Officer, HMIS Shivaji on 25 th Feb 1945 by the Maharaja 

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of Kolhapur (a descendent of Chatrapati Shivaji) still 

stands proudly aloft and adorns themain entrance to 

the Administrative Block. The establishment celebrated 

its Diamond Jubilee (60 years) in Feb 2005 with great 

fanfare and with the added attraction of many of its 

former Commanding Officers present. 

Some of the historical landmarks in the growth 

of INS Shivaji from 1945 till to date are highlighted in 

the subsequent paragraphs. 

titled “The Birth of a Naval Engineering Museum” and 

published in the JNE (UK) June-1966. 

The training imparted was based on similar lines 

as at HMS Fisgard (artificer training establishment). The 

SDR which served as the cradle of the marine engineer 

of the Indian Navy evoked a remark from Admiral 

Sergei Gorshkov, Admiral of the Soviet Navy during 

his visit to INS Shivaji in May 1968 with the author as 

his Liaison Officer, viz. “You (addressed to the C.O) are 

overtraining your men”. This snap remark came after 

being shown the prizewinning test jobs of the passing 

out artificers on completion of the 4 years’ course. It is 

earnestly hoped that this observation made by the 

Admiral of the Soviet Navy would be taken due note 

of by our naval planners when acquiring the Soviet 

carrier, Gorshkov. 

TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH 

The technological growth broadly covers the 

setting up of steam, diesel and gas turbine training 

wings to cope up with the various acquisitions of ships, 

both from western and far eastern sources as outlined 

below. 

Steam Demonstration Room (1949) 

It was the first marine facility to have been set up 

in 1949. It served as a focal point of Marine 

Engineering practical hands-on training. The 

Britishers took considerable efforts to transport heavy 

equipments and machinery such as 3 drum Admiralty 

Boiler (ex-HMIS Baluchistan), Steam reciprocating 

engine, 2500 HP (ex-HMS Bethrust), Steam turbine 

with reduction gearing, 2500 HP (ex-HMS Protector) 

and other steam-driven auxiliary machineries from 

Mumbai up the ghats to Lonavala at a height of 2200 

feet above MSL. The old machineries of the SDR are 

still there for one to see, thanks to the author who as 

the C.O. then, had the vision and courage to prevent 

it from demolition/auction by a government order 

and salvaged it by transforming it into a Naval 

Engineering Museum. The story of this transformation 

has been vividly covered by the author under an article 

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Nuclear (Atomic), Biological, Chemical and 

Damage Control School (1955) 

The ABCD (later NBCD) school was set up in 

1955. It is to the credit of our naval planners to have 

foreseen the need of NBCD training and were indeed 

the first to do so amongst its sister services. It has now 

grown to a school of eminence, perhaps, the only one 

of its kind east of Suez. The training in NBCD school 

has gained priority in view of the terrorist attack on 

USA. 

College of Naval Engineering (1957) 

Till 1957, the training of all engineer officers of 

the Indian Navy was undertaken at RNEC, Manadon. 

The setting up of the College in 1957 marked a 

significant milestone in the history of Marine 

Engineering Training indicating thereby its total 

independence from outside countries and relying on 

its own indigenous resources. However, the 

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Advanced Marine Engineering Course, popularly 

called the Dagger “E” continued to be availed of in U.K. 

till 1972, when a specialized facility was set up at the 

Institute of Armament Technology, Pune, some 40 

miles off Lonavala. 

From the above, it becomes amply clear that 

both the basic and the advanced Marine Engineering 

Courses have been completed and successfully 

established in India even to the extent of attracting 

foreign students from the Navies of the developing 

countries. A few engineer officers, however, 

continued to be sent to UK for Dagger “E” and RCDS 

as a matter of goodwill. 

ICE Training Complex (1964) 

The acquisition of the Type 41 Leopard class 

A/A frigates fitted with ASR 1 and ASR 2 diesel engines 

with block tube control and hydraulic fluid couplings 

by the Indian Navy in 1961, led to the setting up of 

diesel engine facility complex in 1964. This led to the 

classification of engine-room sailors into the IC stream 

and steam stream depending upon the specialization. 

Leander (Steam) Training Complex (1978) 

This complex came up in 1978 with the exact 

replica of the entire range of main and auxiliary 

machinery as fitted on a Leander frigate. Though the 

first indigenously built Leander INS Nilgiri was 

commissioned in Dec 1971, it can be seen that the 

shore training facility came up only 7 years later, 

thereby indicating a major mismatch between the 

time of acquisition of ship and the setting up of the 

training facilities ashore. The Leander project was 

made feasible mainly due to the support and 

cooperation extended by the Admiralty by way of 

supply of manufacturing drawings, exquipment, test 

FFFFFFFFF 


equipments and training of personnel. This served 

as an excellent example of cooperation between the 

two navies. The Leanders brought in its wake the entry 

of Dieso-burning with steam atomization and a 

pneumatic control machinery room – big leap from 

FFO burning. 

Gas Turbine Training Wing (1986) 

The early 70’s saw a turning point in the policy 

of acquisition of ships. Most of the acquisitions that 

followed in 70’s and thereafter, mainly came from the 

far East (USSR); heralded by the OSA class of fast patrol 

boats which were effectively put in action in the Indo- 

Pak 1971 war. The 80’s saw the acquisition of Kashin 

class of destroyers which led to the setting up of the 

Gas Turbine training wing in 1986. This is regarded 

as a big leap in the propulsion field from steam to diesel 

and now to gas. It, at once, became clear that the 

Indian Navy has matured and grown to stature so as 

to be a force to reckon with. The gas turbine driven 

vessel added extra teeth and punch to our Navy. It 

also introduced a different type of training philosophy 

namely, the vertical type of training as practiced by the 

Soviet Navy. The philosophy of the Soviet type of 

training is distinct from the generalized type of training 

as acquired by us from the Royal Navy. Both have its 

merits and demerits. One cannot help recalling the 

words of Lord Haldane at this stage to put the above 

matter in a better perspective “It is only by the 

possession of a trained and developed mind that the 

fullest capacity can as a rule be obtained. There are, 

of course, exceptional individuals with rare natural 

gifts which make up for deficiencies. But such gifts are 

indeed rare. We are coming more and more to 

recognize that the best specialist can be produced only 

after a long training in general learning. The grasp of 

principle which makes detail easy can only come 

when inate capacity has been evoked and moulded 

by high training” 

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10+2 Technical Cadets Training Scheme 

(1985) 

This scheme based on the policy “Catch them 

young at college” was initiated in May –1985 to 

overcome the acute shortage of technical officers. The 

course was of 4 years duration. The first batch passed 

out on 06th August 1989 when the author was the 

Commanding Officer, then. The scheme has proved 

a great success both in terms of quality and quantity. 

Shifting the entire officers’ training to Ezhimala 

in Kerala along with the training of ‘X’ officers in my 

humble opinion, does not appear to be a step in the 

right direction and not considered as a healthy move 

for the Engineering Branch. The entire infrastructural 

facilities by way of college, separate mess and 

accommodation already set up shall be rendered 

redundant. However, time alone will tell. 

Computer and Control Engineering 

Laboratory. Set up in 1988. 

Simulator training for certain classes of 

ships. Set up in 1990. 

Air Conditioning and Refrigeration shop. 

set up in 1991. 

Damage Control Simulator. Commissioned in 

2001. The unique feature of this simulator which 

provides rolling of the ship to 15 degrees either side 

has been entirely designed and built by Goa 

Shipyard Ltd. At a cost of Rs.16 crores only. This 

simulator has been designed to create live flooding 

situation as if out at sea. 

Naval Engineering Museum. Set up 23rd Jan 

1990. 

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GROWTH OF LOGISTIC FACILITIES 

Swimming Pool in 1988. This enabled 

trainees to pass the compulsory swimming test in 

house instead of going to Mumbai. 

Officers Mess commissioned in May, 

1989. (The old mess was converted into an Officers 

Institute) 

Cadets Mess and Accommodation. Was set up 

for 150 cadets in May, 1989. 

Indoor Basket Ball Court. The basketball 

with computer controlled scoreboard set up in 

August, 1989 and inaugurated by staging the interservices 

basket ball championship. This indoor facility 

FFFFFFFFF 31


provided the much needed physical activity for the 

young trainees during four months of monsoon 

period. 

Electronic Telephone Exchange. Was 

commissioned in May, 1990. 

Shivsagar Dam (400 Million Gallon 

Capacity). The dam was commissioned In May, 1990 

to replace the old dam set up by the Britishers in 1945. 

The new dam which has a capacity of 400 million 

gallons as against the old dam with a capacity of mere 

105 million gallons has proved an invaluable asset for 

the establishment. This has met the growing demands 

of the ever increasing population of the trainees and 

staff with their families. Besides, it has changed the 

entire life style of the establishment due to the 

following : 

• Water routine abolished. (The 

establishment was near to shutting down in 

1987 due to low waterlevel in the dam). 

• Water was made available for gardening 

which improved the entire greenery of the 

campus. 

• Swimming pool available throughout the 

year. 

• Improved personnel hygiene (Lower rate 

of sick parade) 

• Boat pulling and sailing made available. 

CONCLUSION 

The seeds of “Training” sown by the Britisher on 

the soil of Sahyadris has reaped a rich harvest of 

budding Marine Engineers and Artificers. The campus 

has graduated from steam to diesel and then to gas 

and may be “nuclear” too in days to come. The 

establishment has done its utmost to keep abreast with 

the acquisition/induction of the new breed of ships 

from time to time. 

Many C.O.’s privileged to command this unique 

establishment have sacrificed their personal life for the 

well being of the establishment only with the sole aim 

of having a competent and efficient navy. I wonder 

when the platinum jubilee of INS Shivaji is due in Feb 

2020, how many of the C.O.’s would be able to make 

it ? Time will tell. As for me, I am quite satisfied having 

already participated in the Silver (1970), Golden (1995) 

and Diamond (2005) Jubilee celebrations. Long Live 

Shivaji ! 

************ 


Late Cmde (Retd) MK Banger was an alumini of NDA and was commissioned in the Indian Navy on 01 Jan 

61. He was a marine egnineer of international standing. He held many prestigious appointments while in 

service viz. General manager at ND(V), Commanding officer INS Shivaji and Director INSMA. He was a highly 

decorated officer and a recipient of the Vishweshwarya Award and Gold Medal from the Institute of Engineers, 

India. 

************ 

During a review of radar basics, I asked some Coast Guard sailors, "What's the difference between 

a 2D radar and a 3D radar?" 

The genius in the front row answered, "1D." 

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Cdr KM Ramakrishnan 

Introduction 

Though war is still possible in the presence of 

Nuclear Weapons, victory in war is too dangerous to 

fight for since the closer one state gets to victory; the 

greater is the risk of nuclear retaliation by loosing side'. 

- Kenneth Waltz 

Nuclear Weapon delivery and platform 

selection is a complex task. In the nuclear age victory 

lies with the side that can better arm wrestle the 

opposite to concede to pressure rather than actual 

firing of weapons. The changing face of international 

order, erosion of the concept of nation-states, scarcity 

of resources and rise of non state actors is directly 

affecting the context in which wars will be fought. It is 

believed that introduction of armed nuclear weapons, 

ideologically opposed major powers with conflicting 

interests, away from direct armed conflict during the 

Cold War period. 


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Indian Historical Overview. With the 

successful conduct of Shakti tests in 1974 and 

Pokharan tests in 1998 Indian nuclear weaponisation 

program started by Dr Homi Bhabha in 1965 reached 

final fruition. It prompted none other than the Prime 

Minister to proclaim "India is now a Nuclear weapon 

state", a motto which has acquired international 

acceptance. In the recent years development of Indian 

missile programme with Prithvi, Sagarika, Dhanush 

and Agni has added credibility to India's nuclear 

weapons delivery capability. 

Aim 

The aim of this paper is to examine assured 

Second Strike capability alongwith analysis of 

vulnerability of the three Vectors viz. I and, Air and Sea 

India's Nuclear Doctrine 

India's Nuclear doctrine was put forth by the 

National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) in 1999 and 

subsequently in the CCS statement issued on 04 Jan 

03. It conceptualises that Indian nuclear weapons 

would be political instruments for enforcing 

deterrence rather than military weapons. The salient 

ingredients of the doctrine are highlighted below. 

• The doctrine envisages the build up of a 

"credible minimum deterrence", based on a 

triad of enduring, diverse, flexible and 

responsive nuclear delivery means. 

• No First Use. The deterrence factor is 

further emphasised by the clause of No First Use 

(NFU) of nuclear weapons against Nuclear 

Weapon States. It further states that nuclear 

weapons will not be used against States that do 

not possess nuclear weapons or are not aligned 

with nuclear weapon powers. However, India 

has retained the option of use of nuclear 

weapons against non-nuclear weapon states 

resorting to use of Biological or Chemical 

weapons. The declared Indian stand of No First 

Use is debatable and beyond the purview of this 

paper. 

• Massive Retaliation. The doctrine also 

espouses massive retaliation designed to inflict 

unacceptable damage in case of a First Strike on 

Indian territory or Indian forces anywhere. From 

this declared stance one could infer that an 

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adversary's First Strike would be a massive 

multiple serial nuclear attack (greater than what 

the enemy may have otherwise factored into its 

calculations) to offset an effective Second Strike 

by India. 

First Strike 

Technically 'First strike' is an attack so powerful 

so as to leave one's adversary with insufficient forces 

to inflict substantial damage on the attacker. Since the 

Cold War USA, NATO and USSR built large number of 

nuclear weapons, delivery platforms and associated 

C3I infrastructure with the primary task of First Strike. 

This was required to undertake pre-emptive/ surprise 

First Strikes to sufficiently reduce if not completely 

eliminate the enemy's "Second Strike' capability. 

The USA subscribes to Launch on Warning 

(LOW) and Launch under Attack (LUA) postures. This 

was done as the country believes that unless it was 

able to undertake a pre-emptive/ surprise strike, it 

stood little chance of destroying all Soviet targets as 

required by its war plans. Similarly, NATO and Russia 

also believe in retaining the initiative and hence 

undertaking First Strike if required. Pakistan does not 

have a stated nuclear doctrine, but based on 

statements and articles written by authoritative 

Pakistan dignitaries, Pakistan retains the option of First 

Strike against overwhelming conventional force. 

China on the other hand has adopted a 'No First Use' 

policy but crucially this does not apply to conflicts over 

territories claimed by China and hence remains a 

potent threat to countries not only in the subcontinent 

but also in South China Sea. 

Second Strike 

Other than India and China (with the caveat of 

territorial conflicts), no other nation has a declared No 

First Use doctrine. India's stand on No First Use is the 

bedrock for establishing a credible Second Strike 

capability. This capability could be rightly defined as 

second in order of utilisation but not inferior in 

capability to first strike. In fact the ability of establishing 

a credible Second Strike capability is more challenging 

than a First Strike. In a First Strike the initiative is with 

the attacker giving him the freedom to choose the 

time, place and quantum of attack. Whereas Second 

Strike is retaliatory and would require careful planning 

and innovation to achieve the desired punitive results. 

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Second Strike Factors. The backbone of any 

Second Strike capability would be the Survivability of 

a nation's nuclear forces and its Command and 

Control structure. The absence of a credible Ballistic 

Missile Defence severely limits defence against 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivered 

through ballistic missiles. Ensuring survivability and 

establishing effective Second Strike capability is a 

complex national task. A few salient factors deciding 

Second Strike effectiveness are covered in the 

following sub paragraphs:- 

• Intelligence and Early Warning. This 

would be a prerequisite to appropriately raise 

the level of readiness, locate adversary's strategic 

assets, identify weak links in C3I2 (Command, 

Control, Communication, Information and 

Intelligence) infrastructure and preempt a First 

Strike. Based on this, Second Strike nuclear forces 

and C3I would have to be deceptively 

positioned/ moved to ensure maximum 

survivability, although considering the 

availability of modern technology including 

space based surveillance and human 

intelligence with adversaries; this is going to be 

an uphill task. It can therefore be fairly assumed 

that the broad location of primary and alternate 

centers housing nuclear weapons, delivery 

platforms and associated infrastructure would 

be known to the enemy. 

• OR Ready Units. To ensure credible and 

assured Second Strike, there would be the need 

to have sufficient number of operationally ready 

units. Unlike many who espouse that a NFU 

option provides more time, this author is of the 

view that since First Strike could be a multiple all 

out attack, the ability of our Second Strike units 

to rapidly retaliate, could limit the effectiveness 

of a First Strike. Considering the requirements of 

transportation, communication and technical 

expertise (many of which maybe neutralised in 

the First Strike), it is opined that Second Strike 

nuclear weapons need to be ready for mating 

or already mated in Precautionary Stage/ just 

prior hostilities. 

• C3 Infrastructure. Besides the nuclear 

weapons and the delivery platforms themselves 

surviving the First Strike; there is also the crucial 

need for the Command and Control chain and 

the Communication infrastructure to survive the 

First Strike along with pre-designated political 

and executive personnel for decision making. 

A First Strike in future may also comprise 

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and Directed 

Energy (DE) weapons, these could then destroy 

digital signal processors, electronic flight 

controls, telecommunication sets and EW 

equipment crippling the C3 infrastructure. 

Therefore this infrastructure would require 

multiple back ups to ensure assured flow of 

information and delivery of time critical 

commands. 

• Range of Weapons. The positioning of 

Second Strike forces would also be determined 

by the ranges of delivery platforms available with 

them as also that available with the adversaries. 

Theoretically if the range advantage is with First 

Strike force and the Second Strike units are kept 

beyond reach then there would be a time lag 

for the Second Strike units to move into position 

to launch the punitive attack. In this regard SSBNs 

due to their freedom of maneuverability and 

stealth provide the flexibility to launch their 

weapons close to an adversary's shore. 

• Dispersion. Dispersal is another factor 

that could enable better survivability of Second 

Strike units. WMD are known for their large 

dispersion. However, unlike against 

conventional weapons, against WMD the 

separation of units would have to be large 

enough so as not to be affected by the wide 

dispersion inherent to WMD. Hence knowledge 

on accurate location of assets is not a prerequisite 

for WMD to be effective. 

• Training. To ensure better survivability 

and robust primary and alternate means of 

Command and Control (C2), conducting of 

periodic scenario building exercises including 

mobilisation would be essential. These exercises 

could involve actual shifting of vectors and C2 

infrastructure including alternate options. This 

will result in better confidence levels and ensure 

all channels/ assets are kept alive for an effective 

Second Strike. 


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Vulnerability Analysis of Second Strike 

Based on the factors considered above the 

vulnerability analysis of the three Vectors has been 

carried out in the succeeding paragraphs. To narrow 

down the scope of the analysis, the author has 

assumed that the First Strike force to be China/ 

Pakistan and the Second Strike force to be India. 

Though China has also declared a NFU policy, 

however, it is not applicable against countries with 

territorial disputes and hence is considered as a First 

Strike force. A table of known nuclear arsenal of China, 

Pakistan and India as published by Mr Robert S Norris 

of the Natural Resources Defense Council of USA and 

Mr Hans M Kristensen of the Federation of American 

Scientists is placed at the end of the paper for reference. 

• Deception. Land and Air vectors per 

force have to be located within the mainland 

due non availability of defence pact with any 

other nation. Positioning these vectors on 

islands is likely to ease identification problems for 

the enemy. Therefore it can be fairly assumed 

that considering the elaborate intelligence 

network and the technology available, the 

primary and some of the alternate locations of 

our strategic assets on land would be known to 

the enemy. However, Sea vectors comprising 

surface ships and submarines could be put to 

sea. Ships at sea are free to manoeuvre in 

international waters and hence identification 

and subsequent targeting would be difficult. 

Submarines due to their inherent characteristic 

of operations are the stealthiest and would be 

the most difficult to neutralise. 

• Mobility. 

• Land Vectors. Land vectors within 

weapon range are limited by their speed 

and restricted by availability of road/ rail 

network. Moreover, considering the large 

area of dispersion of WMD, Land vectors 

may not be able to escape once the First 

Strike has been launched. Hence unless 

pre-positioned beyond adversary's 

weapon range, the redundancy may not 

be significant. These far out surviving units 

would then take a finite amount to close 

distance to enemy land to launch the 

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Second Strike weapons which may not be 

acceptable. This could be overcome by 

having longer range weapons with the 

Second Strike force. 

• Air Vectors. Air vectors on the other 

hand enjoy .the highest mobility, however, 

would remain limited to territorial limits 

unless Carrier based. Movement of land 

based Air vectors are subject to various 

enemy intelligence gathering sources at 

the primary/ alternate air bases, hence 

could be compromised and targeted. 

Moreover, the effect of wide area 

dispersion of WMD on these vectors on 

ground would be similar to Land vectors. 

• Sea Vectors. Sea based surface 

vectors have the freedom of 

maneuverability in international waters 

keeping beyond range of enemy 

weapons. These vectors could be 

deployed well in advance and could 

launch their long range nuclear weapons 

or move in to deliver the shorter range 

weapons. Conventional submarines 

though limited by speed could be prepositioned 

in international waters close to 

adversary's shore thus enabling delivery 

of even short range weapons. On the 

other hand SSBNs would have the 

combined advantage of speed and stealth 

provided by ships and conventional 

submarines respectively. Further the 

effects of WMD at sea are not as grave as 

on land due atmospheric conditions and 

absence of collateral damage. 

• Range. China has tested ballistic missiles 

which could cover the entire Indian mainland. 

Pakistan on the other hand has ballistic missiles 

that could cover most of North, West and Central 

India. Moreover, China presently and Pakistan 

in future could have sea based vectors including 

ships enabling them to target strategic assets in 

south India and the littorals. Hence, in case of a 

First Strike, targeting land and air vectors could 

be effective ensuring deterioration in the 

Second Strike capability. Whereas for the Second 

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Strike force, ships with long range weapons 

could launch standoff weapons or use the 

tactical mobility to close adversary's shore to 

launch their weapons, and submarines could 

be deployed based on their weapon range to 

ensure assured retaliation. 

• Number of Platforms. Considering the 

factors of limited mobility incase of land vectors 

and availability of intelligence on land and air 

vectors; the dispersion and the number of land/ 

air vectors required to ensure sufficient 

survivability would be large. However, incase of 

sea vectors the inherent advantages of 

identification problems in international waters 

and stealth provided by submarines due 

submerged capability would require fewer units 

to ensure the same degree of survivability. 

• Command & Control Network. For 

C2 networking Land and Air vectors have the 

advantage of secure land lines/ physical 

connectivity in addition to wireless and satellite 

communications. Land based vectors are more 

susceptible to EMP and DE weapons than Sea 

vectors due to their lack of mobility. Sea Vectors 

are restricted to established satellite 

communication and other traditional wireless 

communication networks with limited security. 

In the case of submarines, due their inherent 

submerged operations passing of info/ 

commands after a First Strike could be severely 

limited considering that land based VLF stations 

would also be a part of adversary's First Strike 

target list. A few ways to obviate this severe 

handicap could be to decentralise development 

of airborne VLF assets. 

• Escort Requirements. Considering their 

strategic nature, all three vectors would require 

a certain amount of escorting. This would mean 

anti-air and anti-missile protection for all three 

vectors and additionally anti-submarine 

protection for ships at sea. However, in case of 

availability of a large number of nuclear assets, 

the option of some of them especially ships being 

deployed unescorted for tactical reasons such 

as availability of integral anti-air, anti-missile and 

even anti-submarine defence systems could be 

considered. These unescorted ships would then 

prove difficult to identify and target, however, 

chance encounters should be factored into the 

survivability calculations. 

• Logistic Requirements. The logistical 

infrastructure requirements for basing and 

relocating of Land vectors including the need 

for integral C3 infrastructure would require 

significant noticeable build up at all primary/ 

alternate sites. Similarly, for operation of Air 

vectors, significant logistics build up would be 

necessary to sustain operations at the primary 

and alternate air bases. These would then assist 

adversary's identification and targeting 

problems. However, sea vectors are designed 

to be self contained/ independent and can 

sustain at sea for prolonged durations, sufficient 

to ensure an assured Second Strike. 

Summation of Vector Analysis 

Land vectors have the advantage of secured 

lines of communication and physical proximity to C2 

infrastructure. However, they are limited to land 

boundaries, subject to easier identification and 

restricted in mobility due requirement of road/ rail 

network. 

Air vectors enjoy the advantage of high speed 

and less reaction time. However, they are subject to 

targeting on ground during a First Strike and over 

enemy airspace during the Second Strike. Moreover, 

Air vectors need significant logistic support for 

sustained ops from primary/ alternate bases. 

Sea vectors on the other hand are independent, 

difficult to identify, less susceptible to WMD, offer high 

mobility, can close enemy shore for weapon launch 

remaining in international waters and can sustain ops 

for long durations. Carrier borne aircraft could be 

deployed to deliver Second Strike weapons swiftly 

while keeping the Carrier Task Force beyond 

adversary's weapon range. However, ships rely on 

Satellite Communication for vital C2 information and 

submarines are further restricted in ability to exchange 

information while remaining submerged. 

Additionally ships would require protection in all three 

dimensions to ensure assured delivery of the weapons 


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unless deliberately deployed as single unit with integral 

self defence capabilities. 

Conclusion 

While Indian's nuclear diplomacy exhorts for a 

Nuclear Weapons Free World, it also espouses a 

massive Second Strike retaliation. Hence the Indian 

Second Strike forces would need to be prepared for 

an all out multiple First Strike. All vectors have their own 

pros and cons; a large, dispersed and op ready triad 

deployed with assured alternate Command and 

Control network would be the way ahead to achieve 

the desired punitive retaliation envisaged in India's 

nuclear doctrine. 

************ 


Cdr KM Ramakrishnan (03707-Z) is a specialist in Navigation and Direction and an alumnus of NDA and DSSC. 

The officer's sea appointments include Navigating Officer of IN Ships Sharda, Kuthar, Rana, Krishna and Talwar. 

The officer has commanded INS Nirbhik and INS Subhadra. He is presently serving as Directing Staff at DSSC 

(Wellington) 

************ 

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Nuclear Arsenal of China, Pakistan and India 


Note: - Courtesy: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 

Note Courtesy: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 

Note Courtesy: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 


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Cdr T Sugreev 

Introduction 

Much has been said, discussed and written 

about the way we are pushing the Earth astutely to 

the brink of destruction under the garb of ‘Nation 

Building’, ‘Security’ and ‘Poverty Alleviation’. It is 

fashionable and suave to sound concerned about the 

irredeemable damage being done to the planet and 

the ruthless uprooting of its fragile ecology. Earth Day, 

Coastal Cleanship Day and Environment Day are 

observed with absolute gusto, men and resources are 

rallied with banners and placards under the full glare 

of media. Summits and brain storming sessions are 

organized and end up with a customary coffee. Alas, 

across the board all parties are unwilling to budge 

from their single minded pursuit, no consensus is 

reached on a joint mechanism to tackle the 

emergency. Business is as usual with intent reigning 

supreme over actions and consequences. Is the 

required being done? As various regulatory bodies 

responsible for safeguarding environment are 


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weighed down with protracted procedures and are 

busy pursuing policies that are yet to yield results, the 

initiative to stall further deterioration of the 

environment starts and ends, with a mere initiation of 

correspondence. 

The aim of the article is to highlight the grim 

condition of water in our immediate environment, the 

‘Harbours and Seas; and explore for solutions that 

could possibly be implemented to fruition. The core 

of the article would attempt to underscore the issue 

of raw garbage disposal and pumping of untreated 

sewage into harbour and at sea. 

Clear and Present Hazard 

Large portion of the allocated budget is spent 

by various agencies like the Municipal wards, 

conservancy staff of a plethora of organizations and 

industries to grapple with the issue of garbage and 

sewage disposal. However they remain way off the 

mark as regards to its effective implementation. A 

considerable part of this waste finds its way into the 

water bodies, harbours and adjoining sea. Worse, 

toxic chemicals used for a number of chemical 

processes are emptied into these water bodies without 

compunction, leading to large scale death of marine 

species. Trail of garbage neatly packed in black ‘gash 

bags’ and free floating rubbish emptied straight from 

trash bins is not an uncommon sight for seafarers. A 

large percentage of our fraternity serve onboard ships 

and on a conservative scale we produce plastic, 

domestic and food waste to the tune of 1.1-2.6 kg/ 

person/day, implying we hold great potential to ‘litter’ 

our water bodies and sea. Contrary to the 

‘conventional’ wisdom, the sea has very limited 

capacity to assimilate the garbage that is emptied into 

it. In fact, most of it is belched out and deposited all 

along the shore and harbours in its original form. 

The time taken by the marine environment to 

disintegrate various materials is indicated in the 

following take:- 

Time taken for objects to dissolve 

Paper 

2-4 weeks 

Cotton cloth 

1-5 months 

Natural Rope 

3-14 months 

Woollen cloth 1 year 

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Painted wood 

Tin can 

Aluminum can 

Plastics 

13 years 

100 years 

200-500 years 

450 years 


Source: www.helmepa.org (Hellenic Marine 

Environment Protection Association ) 

Apart from being an environmentalist’s 

nightmare, the litter is an aesthetic nuisance and stirs 

up repulsion in our esteemed tourists . The floating 

debris at sea and on beaches enfeebles the fragile 

marine ecology, while the greatest danger comes 

from the plastics which the fish and marine mammals 

mistake for food and eventually get entangled 

inextricably. Large fish have been discovered with 

plastic material lodged in their stomach. 

Collective Responsibility 

The Defence Services have been traditionally 

environment friendly and are known to be pioneers 

in pursuing practices that have protected and 

preserved local flora and fauna to a large extent. A 

cursory glance at the cantonments and defence 

residential areas corroborates this fact well enough. 

In addition, services are closely intertwined with the 

nature due to obvious reasons. Taking this axiom 

forward, aligning our practices with regards to 

garbage and sewage disposal as closely as possible 

to the accepted norms (MARPOL 73/78) may set the 

motion for others to follow suit. 

Garbage Disposal Onboard Ships and 

MARPOL 73/78 

International Convention for Prevention of 

Pollution from Ships, 1973 and modified by the 

Protocol of 1978 or in short MARPOL 73/78 lays down 

stipulation for dealing with waste generated by ships 

so as to minimize its effect on marine ecology. 

Annexure-V of this protocol which entered into force 

on 31 Dec 1998 prescribes methods of garbage 

disposal in Special areas and, areas outside special 

areas. Special areas like the Baltic and Mediterranean 

sea are designated owing to their delicate ecology 

and oceanography. Most of our ships operate in 

outside special areas with the exception to those on 

Over Seas Deployment. 

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Regulations 

Studying the extant regulations of MARPOL 

73/78 Annexure V would serve the readers well and 

substantiate the fact that these stipulations are not very 

stringent to emulate and with a little stimulus by the 

institution and commitment by personnel, the desired 

standards can be achieved. 

• Disposal of all plastics, synthetic ropes, 

plastic garbage bags and heavy metal residues 

is prohibited. 

• Disposal of garbage like packing material 

that can float is prohibited in areas less than 25 

Nm from nearest land. 

• Disposal of food waste, paper products , 

rags , glass, metal , bottles is prohibited in areas 

less than 12 Nm from nearest land. 

• Garbage like packing material, food 

waste, paper products , rags , glass, metal and 

bottles can be discharged in to sea in areas 

more than 3 Nm from nearest land provided the 

trash has been pulverized in a grinder and can 

pass through an overboard discharge of 

diameter not more 25 mm. 

• Every ship more than 12 meter in length 

shall display placards notifying and educating 

the crew about the garbage handling 

methodology onboard. 

• Every ship more than 400 tons and every 

ship certified to carry more than 15 persons shall 

have a garbage management plan for 

collecting, storing , processing and disposing 

garbage. The ship shall designate a responsible 

person to execute the plan and shall have a 

Garbage Record Book. 

Possible Solutions 

The enormous amount of floating debris in 

harbours and in contiguous sea should have 

instigated positive and stern measures by the 

stakeholders to enforce urgent remedial steps to 

resuscitate the already grim situation. The present state 

does not bode well for the health of our men, 

machinery and the living species dependent on these 

waters. Clogging of sea water suction inlets of critical 

machinery by floating debris predominantly by 

plastics, accumulation of sludge and putrefied water 

in sea water lines of fire hydrants is more than a 

common phenomena which can gravely upset the 

‘overall scheme of things’. The following are the 

suggested remedial measures :- 

• Segregation of Bio and Non-Bio 

degradable waste at source and allocating 

separate stowage containers both at sea and 

in harbour. 

• Sequestering hazardous material like 

glass wool (extensively used onboard ships as 

insulators), discarded dry cells and electrical 

equipment, lubes and oils , Printed Circuit 

Boards (PCBs) , materials likely to contain toxic 

metals like Arsenic, lead , mercury, copper etc . 

• Dry and non biodegradable garbage 

should be disposed off at shore reception facility 

only. 

• Large amount of waste paper is 

generated by shredding of classified 

publications and routine correspondence. It is 

an environmental hazard to burn them in the 

open, instead we could recycle the shredded 

mass, if no serious compromise of security is 

envisaged. 

• Ships that routinely spend number of days 

at sea practically cannot accumulate large 

amount of garbage waiting for disposal in the 

next port of call. Installing incinerators and 

grinders (for pulverising solid waste) onboard 

ships of all types to dispose solid trash and food 

material that can putrefy is a viable solution. 

Equipment commercially known as 'Crushers' , 

that can compress the volume of recyclable 

waste like metals, paper boards, packing 

material provide an ideal solution to circumvent 

the problem of voluminous solid waste. 

Garbage Management Plan 

The operating premise onboard ships for 

handling garbage should be “nothing leaves the ship 

untreated and without passing the scrutiny of garbage 


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handler”. The details of garbage discharged into the 

sea, to shore reception facility and incinerated could 

be recorded in the ‘Garbage Record Book’ (sample 

page is appended at the end of this paper). 

Sewage Disposal and MARPOL 73/78 

Annexure IV of the protocol entered into force 

on 27 Sep 2003 and stipulates regulations for 

discharge of sewage by ships. A gist of these 

regulations is appended. 

• It is prohibited to discharge sewage into 

sea except when it is disinfected and discharged 

at a distance of more than 4 Nm from nearest 

land. 

• Sewage which is not disinfected could be 

discharged in to sea at a moderate rate at a 

distance of more than 12 Nm from the nearest 

land when the ship is enroute and proceeding 

at not less than 4 knots. 

Sewage Disposal in Water Bodies and 

Harbours 

The current practice of discharging raw 

untreated sewage into water bodies and harbours 

has ominous outcome for us in future. By far, the 

greatest volume of waste discharged into harbours 

and seas is raw and untreated sewage, which is 

primarily organic in nature and subject to bacterial 

decay and dilution to harmless concentrations over 

a period of time. Aerobic bacterial degradation of 

sewage (bacteria that uses oxygen to act upon organic 

matter) results in oxidation of faecal matter to stable 

inorganic compounds like H 2 

O and CO 2 

at the cost of 

dissolved oxygen in water. However, the sheer 

volume and concentration of sewage discharged in 

to harbours overwhelms the natural regenerative 

capacity of the water and renders it septic (severely 

deprived of O 2 

). The enmasse death of fish and 

absence of life in harbours is a testimony of our 

misdoings and a direct consequence of extremely low 

levels of dissolved O 2 

in water. There is yet another 

process, the anaerobic oxidation in which anaerobic 

bacteria decomposes the organic (faecal) matter 

without using oxygen resulting in release of Hydrogen 

sulphide H2S and Methane CH 4 

. These gases in higher 

concentration have potential to wreak havoc as H 2 

s 

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with an offensive rotten egg smell severely impairs 

central nervous system of its victim and causes instant 

death whereas CH 4 

is one of the most powerful Green 

House Gas with an ‘atmospheric persistence time of 

12 years and having 21 times the potential of CO 2 

to 

warm the globe’. 

Public Health Hazards 

Human sewage contains enteric bacteria, 

pathogens and viruses of varied and complex nature 

and has enormous potential to contaminate food and 

water sources. The chief health hazard is associated 

with inadvertent ingestion by personnel carrying out 

diving and sea bathing. Food contamination also 

takes place by way of consuming sea food infected 

with such pathogens while water contamination takes 

place due to percolation of infected water into 

ground water. As of now, there is no known natural 

phenomena that can churn these super saturated 

waters (with faecal matter) and result in a thorough 

purging. Its a matter of time when their concentration 

rises to an unmanageable level and cause wide 

spread deleterious consequences, both to humanity 

and other living beings. 

Possible Solutions 

As brought out, we need to urgently resuscitate 

our water bodies and harbours . While discharging 

raw sewage is a definitive No – No, partial treatment 

by passing it through STPs is not a viable option either, 

as the sheer volume of sewage impairs the self repair 

capability of water. The other possible solutions could 

be :- 

• Sewage from ships could be collected into 

large holding tanks ashore through a grid of 

under ground pipe system where it is disinfected 

and diluted before discharging deep into sea. 

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Yes, the suggestion has relatively large gestation 

period and is capital intensive but rich in 

dividends and less maintenance intensive. 

• Collection of sewage using a network of 

a smaller sullage barge, which would finally 

empty the contents into a large one, which 

would then discharge it into sea (more than 12 

Nm ) as stipulated by MARPOL 73/78. 

Where Do We Go From here? 

Ruefully, there is no singular agency that is solely 

responsible to enforce better quality of waters in 

harbours. As of now, there is no known yardstick to 

assess the quality of water in harbours but for regular 

clinical sampling of the water which would give us a 

true reflection of its quality and life supportability. The 

key factor towards achieving vibrant harbours would 

be enlightening personnel regarding their (mal) 

practices of dumping garbage and sewage into 

harbour /sea and implement a complete clamp down 

on it. As we continue to be woefully short of what is 

required to be done to rejuvenate the state of waters 

in our harbours , it is time we wrestle / circumvent with 

the existing procedural road blocks to set into motion 

what is required, on a war footing. 

************ 


Commander T Sugreev is an alumni of National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla. He was commissioned in 

Jul 1996. He is a Gunnery Specialist. His previous appointments include SAMCO Ranjit & Rajput, Gunnery 

Officer Kirch & Jalashwa and Commanding officer Vibhuti. He is presently undergoing Staff Course at DSSC, 

Welligton. 


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Cdr Gaurav Agarwal 

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Introduction 

‘All work and no play makes the Overseer a dull 

boy’ was the ardent philosophy of the WPS (MB), who 

relentlessly pushed us to do more than just our routine 

jobs as overseers. So the overseers at the Warship 

Overseeing Team, Mumbai found themselves 

researching and writing book reviews, technical 

papers, scripts for monsoon lectures & CEPs and, of 

course, articles like this for Naval Despatch, alongwith 

Daily Inspection Reports, Weekly Minutes of Meeting, 

Monthly Progress Reports, and Quarterly Briefs for the 

CPRM. In between they also had to find time for 

organizing and going for treks, rappelling and 

mountain climbing !! Of course, the hectic days at sea 

for the CSTs of Yard 617 (Shivalik), the frenetic activity 

prior launch of Yard 702 (Kochi) and delivery of two 

water barges (one without a single D448 defect 

liability) filled in all the possible time gaps, if any, in the 

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Year of the Lord 2009. If there ever was a spare hour 

anywhere in between, it was taken up by preparing 

briefs and presentations for one and all, up and down 

the chain of command, and even laterally, at times. 

The brain storming sessions, reading up on the 

equipment fit of the ships, poring over drawings and 

carrying out technical trouble shooting was relegated 

to lunch or after ‘secure’ !!! 

Be that as it may, despite the cribbing at the 

‘unnecessary’ extra load, when one looks back at the 

year gone by, it was with a feeling of immense 

satisfaction. Never would so much of training, 

adventure and personal development have taken 

place in a unit of this size, that too with a never-beforeload 

of six frontline warships and five water barges 

under construction. 

Technical Papers 

Lt Cdr Hariharan’s paper on ‘Design Parameters 

of Water Jet Propulsion’ was accepted for publication 

at the National Seminar on Shipbuilding at Jaipur in 

Sep 09. Where he found time to research the paper, 

during the hectic activity for the administrative 

arrangements and safe launching of Yard 702 (Kochi), 

will remain one of the unsolved mysteries of time. 

When as a ‘reward’ he was nominated for a week long 

course at Valsura and to give a presentation at the 

Shipbuilding CEP at Shivaji thereafter in mid-Oct 09, 

he did not know whether to laugh or to cry. 

At the same National Seminar as above, Captain 

SS Chitale presented a paper titled ‘Integrated Full 

Electric Propulsion‘, his first ever. This spurred him on 

to present another paper on ‘Interactive Electronic 

Technical Manuals (IETM)‘ at an International 

Conference at DIAT Pune in Jan 10. He is now writing 

a BR on Standardisation of Electrical Inspection 

Procedures on ships under construction. 

Cdr S Ganeshan’s paper on ‘Preservation of 

Equipment during Shipbuilding’ was first presented 

at a Workshop on Shipbuilding’ in WOT (Kol) / GRSE 

in Oct 09. He ascribed the success of his paper to the 

serenity of the Himalayas during the Gaumukh Glacier 

Trek, where he was hit by a number of ideas all of 

which he used in his paper !!! After refinement, he 

presented it at the International Conference at DIAT 

Pune in Jan 10. Buoyed by the positive reaction to his 

work, he is now enthusiastically working on his next 

project ‘Challenges thrown up by Modular 

Construction’. Did I mention that he also was deputed 

to the Shipbuilding CEP at Shivaji to give a day long 

lecture on Shafting Alignment, a subject on which he 

can now claim mastery over. 

Cdr (Dr) PR Kulkarni (now Capt.), the Thinker of 

the unit, was awarded the ‘Sam Dotiwala Prize for the 

Best Technical Paper 2009’ by the Institute of Naval 

Architects. He also delivered a technical paper ‘Quality 

Inspection Procedures in Shipbuilding’ at the 

Shipbuilding Workshop at GRSE / WOT Kolkatta. For 

those not in the know, Dr Kulkarni is the Editor of the 

Journal of Ship Technology, in his spare time i.e. from 

midnight to dawn. Where he found time and energy 

to do all this, amidst personally calculating, checking 

and rechecking the myriad calculations involved in the 

launching of Yard 702 (Kochi) in Sep 09, is something 

he is not willing to tell. Apart from guiding a PhD 

student, he also authored / co-authored the following 

papers : 

• “Wind tunnel Study on the Interac¬tion of Hot 

Exhaust from Funnel with Superstructure of a 

Naval Ship”, International Conference on 

Ocean Engineering, IIT Ma¬dras, 01-05 Feb 09. 

• ‘Chronology of Indian Shipping’, Journal of Ship 

Technology, Jan 09. 

Motivated by the ‘Stealth Technology’ they were 

dealing with on Yard 617, Cdr Bhupesh Tater (now 

Capt.) and Vineeth Aerat came out with a informative 

paper on Stealth Technology titled ‘ Signature 

Management and the Shipbuilder’ for the Journal of 

Marine Engineering. The duo authored a number of 

path breaking documents, including the 

‘Standardisation of Inspection Procedures in Warship 

Building’ for their respective disciplines of Engineering 

and Hull. Their partnership was broken in Jun 09, 

when Cdr Tater was transferred out for his sea time. 

Personnel of the WNC were updated on a wide 

spectrum of technological advances by the officers of 

WOT (Mb) during the Monsoon lecture Series as 

follows : 

• ‘Interfacing & Commissioning of IMCS on P17 

Ships’ by Cdr S Ganesan. 

• ‘Smoke Nuisance on Delhi Class of Ships’ by 

Cdr PR Kulkarni. 


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• ‘Modernisation of Weapon Systems’ by 

Cdr J Prakash. 

The ‘Overseer’s Diary’, a six monthly forum for 

exchange of ideas on shipbuilding, conceived by WPS 

(MB) and edited (again !!) by Cdr Kulkarni, was 

launched in Jan 09. It has grown from a 8 page 

compilation of only WOT (Mb) articles in Jan 09, to a 

12 page looked-forward-to journal in Jan 2010, with 

articles from almost all the WOTs, in India and abroad. 

It is our endeavour that the shipyards too contribute 

to it. 

As on date, a number of technical articles and 

book reviews are awaiting publication in various 

journals, including : 

• Alignment Requirements during Ship 

Construction for Weapon Systems’ by Cdr PD 

Giri. 

• Improvements and Innovations in Aircraft Carrier 

Design’ by Cdr AK Sud. 

• Replacement of GTG with 1MW D/A on SNFs’, 

by Cdr Pradeep Kumar (now Capt.). 

• Privitisation of DRDO’ by Cdr Sai Manohar. 

• Power Management of P17 Ships’ by Cdr Ashish 

Saxena. 

• Design Considerations of FREMM Frigates’ by 

Cdr Pradeep Kumar. 

• Gods, Demons and Spirits’ by Abraham Kovoor, 

reviewed by Lt NS Hemant. 

• Working with Emotional Intelligence’ by Daniel 

Goleman, reviewed by Cdr PD Giri. 

The success of their colleagues and constant 

goading (to put it mildly) by the WPS saw a number of 

first timers hesitantly forward articles for inclusion in 

various publications. The pain of researching, writing 

and editing their articles notwithstanding, nothing 

could beat the satisfaction and pride of seeing their 

names in print, enforcing their claims forever to be 

counted as a ‘writer’. ‘The feeling was a mixture of 

pain and pleasure, not exactly describable’, as one first 

timer put it. ‘There is a Feel Good factor to it’, said 

another. 

Not content with the effort and research we 

were putting into our technical literary efforts, the WPS 

decreed that, as overseers, we had to be at the cutting 

edge of technology. We were soon organizing 

technical presentations by firms promoting new 

technology. Officers of the unit (and those from MDL 

and SOT) were soon being enlightened on Noise 

Abatement Techniques (Stealth), Removal of scale by 

Magneto Hydrodynamics (Preservation), Effective 

Spray Insulations (Weight, time and space efficiency), 

Revolutionary Paints (life and application advantages), 

Hi Tech Specialised Sewage Treatment Plants et al. 

Much as we may have fidgeted and fretted through 

the presentations, in the end, we did end up more 

knowledgeable than before. Hmmm ! Something to 

do with the famous Rule 1 and Rule 2 about the boss 

always being right. 

Having tasted blood, by the WOT (MB) being 

awarded only ‘Appreciation Certificates’ in the 

Rajbhasha Trophy Competition for earlier two years, 

the bar was raised and WOT became Runner-Up in 

2009. The WPS then decided that a KRA would be 

winning the Rajbhasha Trophy 2010. Towards this 

end, a Hindi magazine has just been successfully 

published by the unit by Mr Pandey, CTA, and two 

South Indian officers !!! And it threatens to be a six 

monthly affair, but thankfully out of sync with the 

Overseer’s Diary. 

Apart from all of the above, the only things extra 

in the year ahead are a Coffee Table Book, a Golden 

Jubilee Seminar, a special edition of Overseer’s Diary, 

a compilation of all technical papers and book reviews 

by WOT officers in recent years, and a special series 

of technical lectures from high end OEMs !!! I wonder 

if the number of hours in a day can be increased. 

Adventure Activities 

Not willing to play second fiddle to the ship 

building activities and technical writing activities, the 

adventure activities decided to chip in too, with the 

unit taking off for a number of outbound excursions. 

As it is, after the Camel Safari and Rappelling Camp 

organized by WOT (Mb) in 2008, adventure activities 

by us were eagerly awaited by all. 

After the Camel Safari in the hot deserts of 

Rajasthan in 2008, it was time for the colder climes of 

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the Himalayas as the WPS decided to propriate the 

Shivaliks for the early commissioning of Shivalik !!! A 

trekking expedition was organised to Pindari Glacier 

by WOT(MB) under the aegis of WNC from 03 to 14 

Apr 09. The Pindari glacier is situated in the Kumaon 

ranges in Uttarakhand at an altitude of 3600 m above 

sea level. The glacier gives birth to the Pindari river 

which ultimately joins the mighty and holy Ganges. 

The trek to Pindari was a lifetime experience for all the 

team members especially for the ladies and children. 

The tough conditions of heavy snowfall close to the 

zero point made the expedition even more 

adventurous and memorable. 

With the fantastic memories of the Pindhari 

Glacier refusing to go away, we continued our tryst 

with the Himalayas, organizing a trekking expedition 

to Gaumukh Glacier from 25 Sep – 04 Oct 09 to 

inculcate the spirit of adventure, team spirit and 

camaraderie. 22 personnel, including 13 Officers 

(including one MNS lady Officer), 06 ladies and 02 

children took part in the trekking expedition to 

Gaumukh Glacier and Tapovan, which left a deep 

sense of accomplishment and achievement in the 

hearts and minds of team members of having 

attempted and successfully reached almost half the 

altitude (4550 meters) of Mount Everest, braving the 

sub-zero temperatures and hostile conditions. During 

the expedition the participants took part in all the 

activities with a high level of josh and energy. The grit, 

perseverance, self-confidence, positive attitude, team 

spirit, stamina and will power shown by the officers 

and families participating in the expedition under the 

most testing and extreme conditions was highly 

commendable. 

On the occasion of the 49th Anniversary of the 

unit, a trekking expedition was organized to Kondane 

caves at Karjat (100 Kms from Colaba) for WOT (MB) 

officers, sailors and civilians alongwith their families on 

08 Aug 09 to promote adventurism, team spirit and 

developing a sense of concern for the environment. 

The Kondane caves are the smallest (but interesting) 

Buddhist caves excavated in the western face of a high 

hill overlook¬ing the stream of Ulhas River. 

The adventure of the year were rounded off by 

a two day trek to Sapta Sringi for all personnel and 

families of the unit in end December. The bonhomie 

observed during the trek was truly an eye opener. 

Wars are indeed won on the trekking paths of our 

great country. 

Note : Very early into the year 2010, we already 

had one wet excursion to a water park, with all 

families. Plus when the Mumbai Marathon rolled 

around in Jan 2010, one would have expected the 

overseers to be having a well deserved Sunday 

morning sleep. But no !! Four officers volunteered on 

their own to get up early in the morning and go 

running all over Mumbai, for fun !!! One of them (Cdr 

PV George) even ran the Full Marathon, this a week 

after joining. Just shows how quickly he got into the 

groove of the unit. 

One more adventure activity is planned before 

the end of the Year, this time in tandem with MDL in 

order to improve the teamwork with the Yard’s officers. 

Thereafter, let’s see what the rest of the year has in store 

for us in terms of adventure, considering our Golden 

Jubilee is approaching. Que Sera Sera. Whatever will 

be, will be. 

Conclusion 

The overseeing activities were not willing to take 

a backseat to the extra-curricular activities. Basin trials, 

CSTs, drydocking and FMT of Yard 617 continued 

relentlessly, with Cdr Pradeep Kumar (now 

Capt.)piloting the whole show, with assistance from 

Cdrs J Prakash, Ashish Saxena, A Vinith, S Ganeshan 

and PD Giri The launching of Yard 702 (Kochi) was 

flawless due to the professionalism of Cdr PR Kulkarni 

(now Capt.) and his team of LCdrs Nagendra and 

Hariharan. Work progressed on all six warships being 

built at MDL, with no quarter being asked for by the 

Overseers, and no quarter given by the WPS. The 

delivery of two (of the five) water barges being built at 

Surat took place, one with a Nil defect D448. Along 

the way, by sheer grit and perseverance of the 

Weapons team, we created history of sorts by 

progressing Part IV trials of Yard 617 (Shivalik) to such 

an extent that they threatened to get over before Part 

III trials !!! That would have definitely been a first, and 

only one of the many firsts achieved in the past year. 

All these overseeing activities jostled for attention 

with treks, technical papers, book reviews, workshops 

and monsoon lectures. But no work suffered. All 

reports and returns, letters and faxes, inspections and 

visits were still made on time i.e. as of ‘yesterday’ in line 


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with the WPS’s requirement. Of course, the fact that 

28 personnel of the unit were recognized for their 

work in the past 28 months, in the form of 

Commendations and Cash Awards did keep the 

morale of the unit high. 

Demanding as it was, at the end of the year, 

buoyed by the success of all the activities, curricular 

and extra-curricular, we can proudly say ‘We Did It’ 

(with that li’l bit of extra goading (to put it mildly) by 

the WPS). 

ITF of Shivalik during Maiden Sortie 

Pindari Glacier Trek 

SATs of RBU 6000 (Shivalik) 

Gaumukh Glacier Trek 

Launching of Yard 702 (Kochi) 

************ 


Cdr Gaurav Agarwal was commissioned in the Indian Navy on 07 Mar. 88. He is presently serving as Senior Naval 

Engineering Overseer at the Warship Overseeing Team, Mumbai 

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Cdr Sriram Amur 

I have always wondered as to how our Navy 

manages the mammoth task of training everyone all 

the time. This needs a special mention as in other 

organisations an employee once trained continues 

to pay back to the organisation for a long time, while 

a few would need occasional refresher courses only 

to adjust to the changes in the environment. When 

most people hear "military training," the first thing they 

think of is boot camp (at Naval Academy or at Chilka). 

Actually the Military provides cutting-edge training 

throughout an individual's time in the Service. Training 

schools are geographically dispersed from Chilka to 

Kochi to Valsura, and training is spreadover a few 

weeks to a few months, depending on the complexity 

of the subject matter. 

Since joining the Navy I have been tasked at 

different levels of job regularly and required 

continuous training. First the technical courses, then 

the submarine course, then specialization course, 

then a course to qualify as PCO, then staff course and 

then a COQC to qualify as a CO of a submarine. In fact 

even to be an instructor one is trained in our Navy. 


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While we lay so much stress on training, how many at every stage, then using this data base, the individual 

of us understand the process of learning? 

Some learners have no difficulty learning using 

only textbooks. Others need to have hands-on 

experience or experiment with the subject matter in 

order to understand. Still some learners benefit from 

group work and discussions. In my own course, I have 

witnessed a few who cannot but hate the instructor, 

and learn the content on their own, and are ever ready 

for arguing and proving the instructor wrong (Cat A). 

There are a few who learn only what the instructor 

speaks and are wary of ‘Out of syllabus’ questions in 

the exam (Cat B). There are always those who can’t 

score marks, are averse to reading by themselves but 

when given the responsibility practically, get the job 

done in the best way and can be relied upon (Cat C). 

There is nothing wrong with any of them, it is just that 

their learning styles are different. The grades in each 

phase of the course such as theory, simulators or OJT 

should not be viewed in isolation as people would 

perform as per their learning styles. 

Each individual has a different learning ability 

and style and one should avoid stereotyping learners. 

In fact, learning styles are similar to personality traits. 

While we all share personality traits, we differ 

significantly with each other. The same goes for 

learning styles. Research has shown that the more 

aware we become of our own learning styles, the 

better we learn. 

If one has difficulty learning a particular subject 

or skill, he/she can search for alternative methods for 

understanding the new content. 

However, while every person in the Navy 

undergoes so much of training, there is seemingly no 

effort in teaching the learners how to learn and in 

assessing the learners according to their learning 

styles at the schools. We seem to take it for granted 

that a standard capsule of theory, practicals and OJT 

would serve the purpose across the spectrum of 

learners. We want learners to be 'Cat B' and also 'Cat 

C'. If we can identify the learning style of each learner 

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************ 



can be better trained and could be correctly selected 

for various tasks. Moreover. When an indindual is made 

aware of his style of learning, he could make amends 

or choose the field of work according to his strengths. 

'Cat C' learner is made aware and puts in effort to 

become Cat B also, he would have best of the two 

worlds. 

More than anything this data could help in 

grading the learner in a particular course. Are we not 

surprised sometimes when a student who has scored 

high in his professional school seems to 

underperform onboard, or when an average scorer 

in the school performs very well on job. The mismatch 

between the assessment of the student in the school 

and his actual performance onboard (which is the 

goal for which he is being trained) is because the 

school does not consider his learning style while 

assessing him. If varying learning styles is a reality, why 

don’t we cash on it and try to maximise the effect of 

learning process so as to reduce the mismatch 

between the school assessments and onboard 

performances. After all, we train people to optimise 

the onboard performance and not to identify the 

intellectuals who can memorise figures and write what 

the evaluator wants. 

The best part is that, the Navy caters for all the 

styles to a large extent but we expect everyone to 

perform well in all the styles of learning. In most of the 

courses, we begin with theory, follow it up with 

practical sessions / simulators and finally undertake 

the OJT. However there is no analysis carried out the 

way one performes in different phases and use it for 

tasking him, instead, the marks are just totailed and a 

merit list is prepared. In fact, for every course, the 

weightages for each phase of training would need 

to be different. In how many cases is the appointer 

aware of the attributes of the student of a course, 

which could be derived by this sort of analysis? I feel, 

we are lacking in that finishing touch where the data 

is all there and we only need to use it to task the right 

man for the right task, instead of forcing all the 

students to ape the established stereotype. 

Commander Sriram Amur is an alumni of Naval Academy. He specialized in communication and is a graduate 

of DSSC. His appointments include Instructor and Training Coordinator at Submarine School, INS Satavahana 

and Commanding officer, INS Sindhuvijay at Visakhapatnam. He is presently posted as officer - in - charge of 

Submarine School, Visakhapatnam. 

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Cmde Rakesh Kumar Mehta 

This paper discusses the impact of Article 82 of 

Protocol-I of the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the 

role of Legal Advisor in providing legal advice and 

service to the Command on "Law-of-War" matters and 

advice on implementing the dissemination 

requirements of the Geneva Convention and the 

Protocols. 

Before adverting on the responsibility of Legal 

Advisor as envisaged under Article 82, I shall briefly 

discuss the concept of International Humanitarian 

Law and its principal instruments, viz, the four Geneva 

Conventions and their two Additional Protocols. 

International Humanitarian Law 

International Humanitarian Law, also known as 

the Law of Armed Conflict or the Law of War, is the 

body of rules which, in wartime, protects persons 

who are not or are no longer participating in the 

hostilities. It limits the methods and means of warfare. 

Its central purpose is to limit and prevent human 


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suffering in times of armed conflict. The rules are to 

be observed by the armed forces and the parties to a 

conflict. 

The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 

two additional protocols of 1977 are the principal 

instruments of humanitarian law. Other humanitarian 

texts include the Geneva Protocol barring the use of 

gas, the 1980 United Nations Convention on certain 

Conventional Weapons, and the Ottawa Convention 

on Landmines. 

The four Geneva conventions of 1949 are 

applicable to international armed conflicts. They 

stipulate that civilians and people who are no longer 

taking an active part in the hostilities, such as wounded 

or captured combatants, must be spared and treated 

humanly. 

Whom Does International Humanitarian Law 

Protect? 

• First Geneva Convention (1949) protects 

the wounded and sick in armed forces in the 

field. 

• Second Geneva Convention (1949) 

protects the wounded, sick andshipwrecked 

among armed forces at sea. 

• Third Geneva Convention (1949) protects 

prisoners of war. 

• Fourth Convention (1949) protects civilian. 

• Additional Protocol I (1977) strengthens 

the protection of victims of international armed 

conflicts. 

• Additional Protocol II (1977) strengthens 

the protection of victims of non-international 

armed conflicts. 

Development of the Humanitarian Law 

The Geneva Conventions are founded on the 

idea of respect for the individual and his dignity. 

Personnel not directly taking part in hostilities and 

those put out of action through sickness, injury, 

captivity or any other cause must be respected and 

protected against the effects of war; those who suffer 

must be aided and cared for without discrimination. 

The Additional Protocols extend this protection 

to any person affected by an armed conflict. They 

furthermore stipulate that the parties to the conflict 

and the combatants shall not attack the civilian 

population and civilian objects and shall conduct their 

military operations in conformity with the recognized 

rules and by laws of humanity. 

The conventions and Protocol-I prohibit 

repraisals against the wounded, the sick and the 

shipwrecked, medical personnel and medical 

services, civil defence personnel and prisoners of war, 

civil personnel, civil and cultural objects, the natural 

environment and works & installations containing 

dangerous forces. 

Implementation 

In times of war, certain humanitarian rules are 

required to be observed, even with regard to the 

enemy. These rules are set out mainly in the four 

Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. As explained 

earlier the Geneva Conventions concerning 

protection of the victims of war have been expanded 

by two Protocols completed in 1977. Protocol-I 

focuses on victims of international armed conflicts, 

and Article 82 thereof requires state parties to the 

protocol to provide legal advisors to their military 

commanders. 

Under the Armed Forces, Judge Advocates 

perform the role of Legal Advisors in terms of Article 

82, and they are required to advise commanders 

concerning the requirements of the law of war and 

concerning dissemination of information to the 

troops about those requirements. 

Provisions of Article 82 

The high contracting parties at all times and the 

parties to the conflict in time of armed conflict, shall 

ensure that legal advisors are available, when 

necessary, to advice military commanders at the 

appropriate level on the application of the 

conventions and this protocol, and on the 

appropriate instruction to be given to the armed forces 

on this subject. 

The drafters of Article 82 determined that 

inclusion of this provision would promote the 

observance of the conventions and the protocols by 

the military community. The original draft of the 

Protocol-I was prepared by the International 

Committee of the Red Cross with the aid of two 

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53


conferences of International Government Experts 

held during 1971 and 1972. Article 82 appeared 

therein as Article 71. 

The basis for its inclusion within the Protocol was 

that it was observed by the world community that 

many violations of humanitarian law arose from 

unfamiliarity with the rules involved. In the words of 

Mr. Martin of the International Committee of the Red 

Cross, many experts considered that the Geneva 

Conventions and the draft protocols would be better 

applied if the commanders of military units were 

accompanied by legal advisors whose main task 

would be to ensure that the armed forces received 

appropriate instructions and to answer any questions 

put to them. 

Thus, the International Law specifically requires 

that the commander be provided with a legal advisor 

who will be available to advise him of Law-of-War 

implications during the planning and execution of 

tactical operations. It implies that the Commander's 

Judge Advocate will be available to assist in instructing 

the members of the Command on the Conventions 

and the Protocols. Article 82 thus provides clear 

guidance to the commander which, if implemented, 

should result in heightened sensitivity to the provisions 

of the Conventions and the Protocol. Article 82 to 

Protocol-I represents a novel approach to the problem 

of assuring that members of military units consider the 

applicability of the conventions and the protocols 

during the conduct of the tactical operations. Article 

82 accomplishes this by providing the Commander 

with a legal advisor whose purpose is to advice him 

of the conventions and protocol as they relate to a 

particular operation, and by requiring that the advisor 

provide appropriate advice on the instructions to be 

given to the members of the Command on the Law 

of War. 

Article 82 can be characterized as a procedural 

provision in that it obligates the military parties to seek 

and obtain legal advice relating to the conventions 

and the Protocol, and to supervise appropriate Lawof-War 

instructions. 

Commanders Responsibilities 

Protocol-I bears duly upon the commander to 

prevent breaches of the conventions and the Protocol. 

It also requires him to personally intervene to limit 

breaches by his subordinates. Further, it holds him 

liable for their breaches in those instances in which 

he fails to take appropriate action in consonance with 

the conventions and the Protocol. 

Article 86 of the Protocol concerns the 

commander's failure to act. It requires the parties to 

the conflict to suppress all breaches of the conventions 

and the Protocol which result from a "failure to act 

when under a duty to do so". 

Provisions of Article 86 of Protocol-I 

• The High Contracting Parties and the 

Parties to the Conflict shall repress gave 

breaches, and take measures necessary to 

suppress all other breaches, of the conventions 

or of this Protocol which result from a failure to 

act when under a duty to do so. 

• The fact that a breach of the conventions 

or of this Protocol was committed by a 

subordinate does not absolve his superiors from 

penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case 

may be, if they knew, or had information which 

should have enable them to conclude in the 

circumstances at the time, that he was 

committing or was going to commit such a 

breach and if they did not take all feasible 

measures within their power to prevent or 

repress the breach. 

The aforesaid codifies the existing Law of War 

norm relating to Command responsibility. It clearly 

announces that the superior will be held responsible 

in those instances where he knew or should have 

known about real or potential breaches of the Law of 

War but failed to act. 

Article 57 is an important article which is worth 

mentioning when the responsibilities of commander 

is being discussed. Article 57 entitles precautions in 

attack, sets forth uniform guidance for the 

commander or his responsibility to civilians and to the 

civilian population in carrying out attacks against 

military objectives. 

Article 82 and the Judge Advocate's Role 

Article 82 provides the Legal Advisor / Judge 

Advocate a responsibility to significantly increase the 

impact he may have on advising the Command to 


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observe and to enforce the law of war. Article 82 of 

Protocol I sets forth a twofold mission for the Judge 

Advocates; advice to the commander on Law-of-War 

matters, and advice on implementing the 

dissemination requirements of the conventions and 

the Protocols. 

Judge Advocate plays a significant role in 

shaping nature and extent of the training given to 

Armed Forces Personnel in the Law of War. In my view, 

Judge Advocates could be permitted to participate in 

peacetime tactical training which would familarise the 

commander and the Judge Advocate with their 

respective responsibilities and permit the two to 

establish procedures designed to meet the Article 82 

requirement. Accordingly,in my opinion, Judge 

Advocates could be included at the highest level of 

planning. Given the limitation on manpower, I would 

recommend that implementation of Article 82 Judge 

Advocate's programme could be retained at the 

Headquarters Level. Officers possessing the required 

attributes could be trained for this purpose. 

The Judge Advocate can play a significant role 

in shaping the nature and extent of the training given 

to Armed Forces Personnel in the Law of War. Various 

presentations, seminars and workshops could be 

arranged at Command level for disseminating the 

information relating to the Geneva Conventions. In 

fact these conventions and Protocols must be 

included in the training curriculum at various levels for 

both officers and men specifying the degree of 

knowledge required to be imparted to each category 

of such personnel. 

Conclusion 

If the Geneva Conventions are to succeed in 

preventing unnecessary suffering during hostilities, 

their provisions must be known to the Commanders 

having an obligation to carry them out. 

Article 82 of Protocol-I provides the armed forces 

with a unique opportunity to demonstrate its 

commitment to the precepts of humanitarianism as 

contained within conventions. In order to accomplish 

this mission, the Judge Advocate will be required to 

elevate the commitment shown to the Law of War. 

************ 


Cmde Rakesh Kumar Gupta is a law Graduate who joined the Indian Navy in 1983. He has held independent 

assignments of Command Judge Advocate of Fortress Headquarters Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Eastern Naval 

Command and is presently Judge Advocate, Headquarters Western Naval Command. 

************ 

"All you idiots, fall out!" shouted the sergeant at the soldiers standing in formation. As the rest of 

the squad dispersed, one soldier remained at attention. 

The sergeant stalked over and raised a single eyebrow. The private grinned. "Sure was a lot of 

them, huh, sir?" 

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55


Book Review by Lt Shameer Puri 

It is commonplace to hear discussions by the 

erudite about the impending event - India becoming 

a super power in the years/decades to come. India’s 

rate of growth has made it a focal point of international 

debate in many a forum. It is veritably an awesome 

experience to witness the country bustling with 

youthful energy (sixty percent of the country’s 

population is in the age group of 15-50) , the home 

grown companies raging battle with the best in the 

world and acquiring conglomerate giants, Indians at 

the helm of affairs in many multinational firms and 

Government owned banks setting up shops abroad 

and surviving the most stifling business environment 

in the world. 

Growth and economic prosperity in the Indian 

context seems to be self contradictory and continues 

to be a paradox with three Indians in the top ten 


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wealthiest men in the world , sharing the podium with 

their countrymen who constitute forty percent of the 

world’s hungry. Changes in India are the result of 

many factors, some more tangible or visible than 

others—often having much to do with the persistence 

of the past and fragility of the future, about modest 

victories and difficult challenges. This is what Shashi 

Tharoor has attempted to capture in his eclectic and 

whimsical compilation of “Reflections on India.” 

The volume spans the topics of history, culture, 

society and sports, with occasional thoughts on 

economy and business. The book is divided into six 

parts, each of which focuses on a very broad theme. 

However, in spite of this focus, each chapter covers 

subjects at times unrelated to one another. For 

instance, in his chapter “India at Work and Play” Mr. 

Tharoor writes about Gandhi, democracy, Indian 

holidays, his Bombay childhood, the sari, police, 

literacy, renaming of Indian cities and India’s urban 

heritage. In other chapters he tackles not so adeptly, 

both serious and light topics: Hinduism and 

nationalism, cricket, Bollywood and politicians, 

poverty, relations with Pakistan, Indian Muslims, Indian 

women, finishing up with a glossary, “A to Z of Being 

Indian.” 

All the essays, however, fall roughly into one of 

the three categories: memoirs, essays on 

development and international relations, and pieces 

on idiosyncratic subjects, like the decline in the 

popularity of the sari, Indian police, name spelling and 

superstitions, Indian intelligence services, etc. Essays 

in the latter category make for an interesting read, not 

least because they are less familiar and rare to come 

across in the press. However, when Mr. Tharoor— 

perhaps as a result of his background as a former 

senior United Nations official—delves into 

international relations theory, or topics widely covered 

by the media, the tone becomes somewhat dry and 

brings to mind a policy memo. These few didactic 

chapters aside, the author’s knowledge of Indian 

history and domestic politics, reinforced by his 

profound concern for the country, personal 

experiences and literary skill, makes for an engaging 

read. 

“Indians Who Made My India” is perhaps my 

favorite chapter, thanks to the Mr. Tharoor’s 

compassionate and moving account of the lives of 

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India’s prominent personages as well as the people 

dear to him, including his family and friends. The 

author dusts off the portraits of frequently forgotten 

or misunderstood political and cultural icons— 

Krishna Menon, Srinivasa Ramanujan, M.F. Husain, 

Amartya Sen and a few others. In this chapter, he also 

candidly writes about his friends’ accomplishments 

and their tragedies, rendering a more intimate picture 

of his country’s global citizens. 

Judging from the book’s subtitle, Mr. Tharoor’s 

selected topics are supposed to illustrate aspects of 

India’s changing position as a power to be contended 

with on the global stage. On one level, most economic 

indicators—the Indian economy has grown at the 

average rate of 7% in the past few years and poverty 

dropped by 10% between 1991 and 2001—may give 

credence to the author’s optimistic outlook of India 

turning into another Asian tiger. But on another level, 

a portrayal of India as an emerging power is too 

premature. Although the author mentions India’s 

many political, economic and social challenges in the 

“Dangers to India’s Future” chapter, he glosses over 

the gravity of certain problems. He understates the 

Herculean effort required from the government, civil 

society and the aam admi, the common man, to meet 

the challenges that India faces on its way to creating 

broad-based economic prosperity and a tolerant 

society. 

Problems such as demographic pressures, 

communal violence, sectarianism, a weak judiciary, 

absence of civic culture and overall apathy, are just a 

few of the daunting challenges India’s government 

and its people have to overcome. If these issues aren’t 

tackled, the inequity gap and sectarianism may tear 

India apart. Mr Tharoor’s scenario of the rising India 

might be rewritten by India’s desperate masses taking 

things into their own hands. The Naxalite movement, 

its supra-state status and its resort to spontaneous 

tribunals in search of justice, doesn’t make this 

scenario that implausible. 

The author, however, rightly points out that in 

order to leverage India’s soft power—its attractiveness 

to the outside world—Indians “must ensure that they 

do enough to keep their people healthy, well-fed, and 

secure not just from jihadi terrorism but from the daily 

terror of poverty, hunger, and ill health.” Moreover, in 

Mr. Tharoor’s opinion, the cultural pluralism and 

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tolerance, at the core of the notion of Indianness, is a 

remarkable “civilizational asset” that may contribute 

eventually to a building up of its hard power – the 

strength to wield stick if necessary. 

Those who are unfamiliar with Indian history, 

culture or current affairs won’t get much out of the 

book in terms of either a comprehensive introduction 

to Indian society, or an in-depth understanding of its 

problems. Mr. Tharoor himself notes that the “book is 

not a survey of modern Indian history or politics,” and 

refers readers in search of this to his book "India: From 

Midnight to the Millennium and Beyond". 

************ 


Lieutenant Shameer Puri (05787-A) was commissioned into the Indian Navy on 10 Jun 05. He is presently 

carrying out the duties of Navigating Officer INS Vibhuti. 

************ 


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Cdr Kanchan Mukherjee 

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“Aal izz well” will soon make it’s entry in 

management lessons. Bollywood is not about just 

masala entertaining flicks but a few films also depict 

lessons for life. Some of them are great inspiration for 

us and also act as an unflattering mirror to our everchanging 

society. 

Often, we miss learning because we have not 

recognized the teacher in the other person. The story 

of hindi movie “IQBAL” in which the character Iqbal, 

a young deaf-mute with a skill for fast cricket bowling, 

is a classic lesson of teacher-student relationship. In 

Iqbal’s life enter two teachers – one is the district club 

cricket coach and the other is a self-proclaimed loser. 

While the cricket coach recognizes Iqbal’s talent, he 

sees the game as a means of furthering his own selfinterest 

rather than skill wherein the teacher-student 

relationship slowly weans away from the ideal. 

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Iqbal though crestfallen, cajoled the other teacher 

who was a self-proclaimed loser. Here, tables are 

turned! A young man’s zeal and dream results in the 

re-integration of a sportsman who had turned his 

back to the world. Truly, every school teacher, 

irrespective of his/her age, experience or 

background, has the capacity to change. A student 

needs to recognize his teacher. The simple faith 

between a teacher and his student needs to be 

inculcated in all students today. 

Movies make a huge impact on teaching as the 

acceptance of concept is easy and comprehending 

the management fundamentals is simpler. As it is 

rightly said, "one picture is equal to a thousand words". 

The film “3 Idiots” reveals “Learning the idiotic 

way” as follows:- 

• Never try to be successful, excellence 

always creates success. 

• Live every moment to the fullest. 

• Passion leads to excellence. 

• Learning is very simple, teachers do fail. 

• Current education system causes 

pressures among students. 

• Life is emotion management, not 

intelligence optimisation. 

• Necessity is the mother of invention. 

• Simplicity is life. 

• Industrial leadership. 

• Love is time and space free. 

• Importance of a word in communication. 

At the end of the film, one is left feeling a sense 

of triumph, and a question for oneself – “What is it that 

I believed in and why did I give it up?” Real life does 

not have larger-than-life heroes and villains; it does not 

have dramatic emotions or black-and-white 

characters. Real life is about simple acts of caring, 

touching glimpses of unconditional support, simple 

occasions of affectionate humour and of 

unpretentious moments of faith and courage. If each 

student is able to find the freedom to discover his own 

potential and then within him the courage to pursue 

it and then finds a teacher who will suffer the agonies 

of failure with him – well, then each student could be 

Iqbal, and every teacher, Mohit. 

The power of Bollywood lies not in refitting 

stereotypes but in playing with them to suggest new 

possibilities. This, "3 Idiots" does with laughter and 

intelligence, by treating lightly what we usually 

pontificate about, turning education into a world of 

nostalgia and anticipation that we deeply treasure. 

The last word is – “Education is not embedded in the 

chalkboard, textbook and in the exam but in the 

friendships, values and ideas seeded in `centres of 

learning’ that might germinate later.” 

************ 


Commander Kanchan Mukherjee (70325-B) was commissioned on 13 Feb 89. He has held appointments as 

Education Officer at NIETT (K), INS Mandovi & INS Valsura; Headmaster at Sainik School Nagrota (J&K) and 

Senior Education Officer at INS Chilka. At present, he is appointed as Senior Education Officer at INS Hamla. 


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Cdr G R Balakrishnan 

EK. DO, DUS ! 

Commands in Hindi have always been a 

Waterloo for the non-Hindi speaking under trainees 

at the Academy. The scenario worsens further in the 

initial days, when there is a barrage of commands to 

be followed/ executed in quick time under the eagle 

eyes of the Gl. One such under trainee even went to 

the extent of firmly adhering to a particular position 

in the routine fallins and he had even memorized his 

position count in the fall in to avoid the impending 

"up-rifle" in the event of a mistake in calling out his 

position. This arrangement went on fine till one day 

the Gl decided to shuffle the rank and file and the 

under trainee was displaced from his usual position. 

The post shuffle 'ginti kar' was Ek, Do, Dus, Char and 

five rounds 'up-rifle' for the shuffled under trainee!!. 

QUICK NOTES 

There was this officer who was notorious for his 

sleeping habit in the class. His bench mates were really 

tired of the daily ritual of waking him at the end of the 

day. One day this ritual was discontinued and the 

officer continued to be in deep slumber while the 

entire class had secured for lunch. An instructor, 

during his post lunch walk in the class corridor noticed 

the officer in 'head-on-desk' position and decided to 

verify his well being. On a pat from the instructor, the 

officer looked up, saw the instructor's face looming 

above and immediately started scribbling notes in his 

ever open note book in the desk!!. 

FOR THE UNINITIATED 

The newly married Lieutenant's wife was 

seething in anger on his drinking, after their 

welcoming party by his course mate. Any amount of 

convincing by the Lieutenant did not see any change 

on her grouse that, while the course mate had 

consumed only three dark coloured drinks, in small 

quantity, that too diluted with soda, while he had two 

full bottles of Beer!! 

HEARD SOME WHERE ..... 

During an NBCD exercise, words of the instructor:- 

"In case of fire-shout, shout, shout!" 

Heard during a farewell speeh, 

"Now we would like to give our love of token to the 

guest - a gift" 

Command while coming along side, 

"Quarter deck, push the tug"!! 

************ 


Cdr G R Balakrishnan was commissiond in the Navy on 10 Nov. 89. He is currently posted at DQA (N) as 

Joint Director



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Directorate of Naval Training, Integrated Headquarters of MOD (Navy) 

'C' Wing, Sena Bhawan, New Delhi - 110010 Tel.: 23793142 Fax: 23010319

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