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Beyond Struggle and Power: Heidegger's Secret ... - Interpretation

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8 4 <strong>Interpretation</strong><br />

citizens, bonds stronger than those forged either by fanatical passion or vague<br />

fellow-feeling. The regime of democracy means the rule of equals; “because<br />

equality must have some referent, some dimension on which all are equal,”<br />

democracy typically looks to “our common membership in the human race,”<br />

or, as Tocqueville puts it, “the constitution of man, which is everywhere<br />

the same” (305). Christians have not invented this constitution; they have<br />

discovered it <strong>and</strong> proselytized in its favor, freeing each person “to act as an<br />

independent moral agent” (305).<br />

But democracies do not embrace the whole of humanity. The<br />

nations that find themselves in conditions of democracy, themselves “historical<br />

legacies or constructs” <strong>and</strong> emphatically not natural groupings, thus find<br />

themselves both part of <strong>and</strong> differentiated from the human race. In another<br />

regime this distinction might not trouble souls so much. But Tocqueville “was<br />

afflicted with permanent double vision” on its account (309). He tended<br />

toward exaggeration of the dangers of racial differences, even <strong>and</strong> especially in<br />

democratic America, where natural human sociality gets “denatured by artificial<br />

taboos” that are nonetheless popular. He hoped to avoid the malign effects<br />

of racial prejudice in the French Empire, particularly in Algeria. But his efforts<br />

to find a way to prevent the problem—especially his recommendation of stateenforced<br />

racial intermingling—obviously contradicted his intention to defend<br />

political liberty. His own visit to Algeria forced him to “ab<strong>and</strong>on the hope of<br />

enforced fraternity between French <strong>and</strong> indigenes. But this left him with only<br />

two choices: the ab<strong>and</strong>onment of the imperial project or the “long-term domination”<br />

of the Algerians by the French (322). For instruction on the latter he<br />

looked to his usual model, Britain, <strong>and</strong> its rule of India. He hoped that firm<br />

rule wisely managed might make Arabs see mutual interests with the French,<br />

but this again contradicted his longst<strong>and</strong>ing claim “that interest alone cannot<br />

generate lasting association” (325).“A theorist who sees the growth of unrepresentative<br />

state bureaucracies <strong>and</strong> the usurpations of military despots as among<br />

the greatest threats to a culture of freedom, Tocqueville nevertheless proposes<br />

to counter the criminal eruptions of democratic xenophobia, exclusionary<br />

racism, <strong>and</strong> retaliatory nationalism with long periods of unaccountable imperial<br />

tutelage,” a likely breeding ground for bureaucratization <strong>and</strong> demagoguery,<br />

two principal evils of democracy that alike threaten republicanism (327).<br />

On this, as a supplement to Welch’s sharp-eyed account it<br />

might be worthwhile to consider Tocqueville’s geopolitical concerns. French<br />

imperialism did not exist in a vacuum; British imperialism might not only provide<br />

a source for tips in ruling an empire but also loom as a rival to France. So

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