Beyond Struggle and Power: Heidegger's Secret ... - Interpretation
Beyond Struggle and Power: Heidegger's Secret ... - Interpretation
Beyond Struggle and Power: Heidegger's Secret ... - Interpretation
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Leo Strauss on the Underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the Politically Better <strong>and</strong> Worse<br />
5<br />
Strauss goes on to speak of the reinterpretation of “freedom”<br />
<strong>and</strong> “civilization” that took place with the emergence of modern democracy<br />
<strong>and</strong> notes that its true importance resides in its claim to be superior to the original<br />
interpretation without renouncing the criteria of the original<br />
interpretation. Whatever additional discussions may be called for regarding<br />
this point, the st<strong>and</strong>ards of freedom <strong>and</strong> civilization are definite enough. To the<br />
extent that we reasonably desire to live in societies that are both civilized <strong>and</strong><br />
free we will not want to live in either North Korea or a restored seventh-century<br />
caliphate.<br />
Strauss explains why he uses the term “civilization” rather<br />
than the term “culture” in a passage from his lecture “German Nihilism”:<br />
I said civilization, <strong>and</strong> not: culture. For I noticed that many nihilists are<br />
great lovers of culture, as distinguished from, <strong>and</strong> opposed to, civilization.<br />
Besides, the term culture leaves it undetermined what the thing is<br />
which is to be cultivated (blood <strong>and</strong> soil or the mind), whereas the term<br />
civilization designates at once the process of making man a citizen, <strong>and</strong><br />
not a slave; an inhabitant of cities, <strong>and</strong> not a rustic; a lover of peace, <strong>and</strong><br />
not of war; a polite being, <strong>and</strong> not a ruffian. (Strauss 1999, 364–65)<br />
Numerous passages similar to those quoted above should<br />
leave little doubt that Strauss regarded knowledge of what one should strive for<br />
politically to be not only attainable but also tacitly claimed to have attained it.<br />
To quote Jacob Klein regarding this point, Strauss’s “main interest throughout<br />
his life was the way man has to live here on earth…He achieved an underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />
not only of what is written about political life, but also about what it<br />
is <strong>and</strong> can be” (Klein 1974). Given the examples cited above of what the content<br />
of such knowledge would be, there is no reason why anyone should find this<br />
possibility upsetting, frightening, or “vulgar.” Nevertheless, reluctance to<br />
acknowledge that this is indeed his claim <strong>and</strong> that it might even be a valid claim<br />
seems to be motivated in part by the belief that it is bad for democracy for<br />
knowledge of good <strong>and</strong> bad or right <strong>and</strong> wrong to be possible. The reason<br />
given, when it is given, is that if it were possible, someone might feel justified in<br />
imposing it. This argument overlooks the possibility that deadly serious resolute<br />
acts of will can easily move into any empty space vacated by reason’s<br />
alleged incompetence regarding these matters <strong>and</strong> that they can do so with<br />
very undemocratic consequences. When the National Socialists came to power<br />
in Germany, their victory was celebrated in a movie that was called “The<br />
Triumph of the Will.” Acts of will that are heroic in the eyes of those who perform<br />
them <strong>and</strong> that serve a fanatically obscurantist cause, a cause which does