Beyond Struggle and Power: Heidegger's Secret ... - Interpretation
Beyond Struggle and Power: Heidegger's Secret ... - Interpretation
Beyond Struggle and Power: Heidegger's Secret ... - Interpretation
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6 4 <strong>Interpretation</strong><br />
of another state. Second, states must submit themselves to a “minimal world<br />
state” (199). The grounding of these two duties follows the same argument as<br />
above, based on the conditions for the possibility of state coexistence.<br />
However, Höffe addresses two differences between state <strong>and</strong><br />
cosmopolitan justice which could undermine the possibility of peace. First,<br />
unlike individuals in a state of nature, we have no reason to expect that states in<br />
the international state of nature will come to realize the value of peace. Kant’s<br />
philosophy of history, Höffe suggests in chapters 9 <strong>and</strong> 10, provides an account<br />
of how states will become peaceable in the long run: like Hegel, Kant argues<br />
that the “cunning of reason” is at work in human activity (162): the egoism of<br />
economic activity unaffected by political competition generates economic<br />
benefit for all, competition <strong>and</strong> war tend toward a balance of power <strong>and</strong> equilibrium,<br />
<strong>and</strong> the development of the arts <strong>and</strong> sciences leads to a more moral<br />
populace (160–74).<br />
The second difference is that, unlike individuals who must<br />
submit themselves to a rule of law in a state, the states of the world ought not to<br />
form a world state. Kant argues that such a world state would destroy the possibility<br />
of future freedom if it turned toward despotism because it would have<br />
no rivals to balance or question its authority. Yet, Höffe suggests, parting ways<br />
with Kant (notably rare in this text), neither should the states embrace a very<br />
loose federation of states, in which each state retains its absolute sovereignty,<br />
because the world state would then not have any coercive power to enforce justice<br />
among the member states. Höffe rejects the either/or of “either full<br />
sovereignty or none” (197), <strong>and</strong> argues that a federal world republic characterized<br />
by subsidiarity would promote peace more effectively than the Kantian<br />
loose federation (200–201).<br />
Such a division of sovereignty, however, faces theoretical <strong>and</strong><br />
practical difficulties. The Hobbesian theoretical objection is that sovereignty<br />
cannot be divisible because there must be a final decision in any particular case,<br />
which rests either in the member states or in the world state. Even if this theoretical<br />
objection can be overcome by a detailed exposition of the scope of<br />
sovereignty according to the principle of subsidiarity, a practical objection<br />
arises on the grounds that such a careful delineation of the limits of authority<br />
would likely break down when a conflict would occur. The balance of power<br />
would shift either to the world state, which would become more robust <strong>and</strong><br />
far-reaching, or to the member states, forcing a slide into a loose confederation.