Beyond Struggle and Power: Heidegger's Secret ... - Interpretation

6 4 Interpretation
of another state. Second, states must submit themselves to a “minimal world
state” (199). The grounding of these two duties follows the same argument as
above, based on the conditions for the possibility of state coexistence.
However, Höffe addresses two differences between state and
cosmopolitan justice which could undermine the possibility of peace. First,
unlike individuals in a state of nature, we have no reason to expect that states in
the international state of nature will come to realize the value of peace. Kant’s
philosophy of history, Höffe suggests in chapters 9 and 10, provides an account
of how states will become peaceable in the long run: like Hegel, Kant argues
that the “cunning of reason” is at work in human activity (162): the egoism of
economic activity unaffected by political competition generates economic
benefit for all, competition and war tend toward a balance of power and equilibrium,
and the development of the arts and sciences leads to a more moral
populace (160–74).
The second difference is that, unlike individuals who must
submit themselves to a rule of law in a state, the states of the world ought not to
form a world state. Kant argues that such a world state would destroy the possibility
of future freedom if it turned toward despotism because it would have
no rivals to balance or question its authority. Yet, Höffe suggests, parting ways
with Kant (notably rare in this text), neither should the states embrace a very
loose federation of states, in which each state retains its absolute sovereignty,
because the world state would then not have any coercive power to enforce justice
among the member states. Höffe rejects the either/or of “either full
sovereignty or none” (197), and argues that a federal world republic characterized
by subsidiarity would promote peace more effectively than the Kantian
loose federation (200–201).
Such a division of sovereignty, however, faces theoretical and
practical difficulties. The Hobbesian theoretical objection is that sovereignty
cannot be divisible because there must be a final decision in any particular case,
which rests either in the member states or in the world state. Even if this theoretical
objection can be overcome by a detailed exposition of the scope of
sovereignty according to the principle of subsidiarity, a practical objection
arises on the grounds that such a careful delineation of the limits of authority
would likely break down when a conflict would occur. The balance of power
would shift either to the world state, which would become more robust and
far-reaching, or to the member states, forcing a slide into a loose confederation.