Beyond Struggle and Power: Heidegger's Secret ... - Interpretation
Beyond Struggle and Power: Heidegger's Secret ... - Interpretation
Beyond Struggle and Power: Heidegger's Secret ... - Interpretation
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Leo Strauss on the Underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the Politically Better <strong>and</strong> Worse<br />
9<br />
to the question “What is the right way of life?” Taken more narrowly, only<br />
answers to the question “What is the right way of life?” which include morality<br />
as ordinarily understood can be called moral teachings. Kant’s moral philosophy<br />
is moral in both the broad <strong>and</strong> the narrow sense. Aristotle’s moral teaching<br />
is a more ambiguous case. To the extent that Aristotle teaches that the life of<br />
theoretical underst<strong>and</strong>ing is the highest life, ranks the life of intellectual virtue<br />
higher than the life of moral virtue, <strong>and</strong> contrasts them as two ways of life, he<br />
endorses an underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the right way of life that is transmoral (rather<br />
than immoral) in addition to one that is moral. When Strauss writes to Kojève:<br />
“I agree: philosophy is just, but I hesitate on the basis of Plato to identify ‘just’<br />
with ‘moral,’” an ambiguity similar to the one we have just found in Aristotle is<br />
at work (Strauss 1991, 274). (Does Klein’s remark that “the ultimate consideration<br />
of things, as far as one is ever capable of doing that,” never frees man from<br />
the compulsion to act rightly mean anything more than this [Strauss 1997, 465]?)<br />
In his preface to the American edition of The Political<br />
Philosophy of Hobbes, Strauss writes:“I had seen that the modern mind had lost<br />
its self-confidence of having made decisive progress beyond pre-modern<br />
thought; <strong>and</strong> I saw that it was turning into nihilism, or what is in practice the<br />
same thing, fanatical obscurantism” (1952, xv). As long as the modern belief in<br />
Progress remained intact, the modern mind’s self-confidence was not shaken.<br />
A crucial component of that belief was the conviction that “once mankind has<br />
reached a certain stage of development, there exists a solid floor beneath which<br />
man can no longer sink” (1989, 267). That belief was shattered, in Europe, not<br />
only by the experiences of the First World War but even more in 1933 by the<br />
success in one of the most advanced countries of Europe of a movement dedicated<br />
to the destruction of the principles of civilization. The threat to<br />
civilization did not vanish with the victory of the allies in World War II, though<br />
the threat to freedom diminished. The harm done by the collapse of the full<br />
modern belief in Progress has led to disorientation regarding the ends of education<br />
(to say nothing of other ends). Strauss’s efforts as a writer addressing<br />
contemporary issues of public concern, as well as his private efforts as an<br />
admired teacher, were chiefly directed to combating this disorientation, <strong>and</strong> to<br />
encouraging his students to combat it by devoting their lives to teaching. His<br />
efforts in the practical sphere were directed more to the crisis of liberal education<br />
than to any other urgent practical issue, though he did, on occasion, take<br />
public st<strong>and</strong>s on other urgent practical issues.