Prace komisji nauk.pdf - Instytut Filologii Angielskiej Uniwersytetu ...
Prace komisji nauk.pdf - Instytut Filologii Angielskiej Uniwersytetu ... Prace komisji nauk.pdf - Instytut Filologii Angielskiej Uniwersytetu ...
environment, where mind has objectified itself in various semiotic structures that mimic and enhance its internal representations. Turing adds a new structure to this list of external objectified devices: an abstract tool, the (Universal) Logical Computing Machine (LCM), endowed with powerful mimetic properties. We have concluded the section 3.3. remarking that the creative “mind” is in itself extended and, so to say, both internal and external: the mind is semiotic because transcends the boundary of the individual and includes parts of that individual’s environment, and thus constitutively artificial. Turing’s LCM, which is an externalized device, is able to mimic human cognitive operations that occur in that interplay between the internal mind and the external one. Indeed Turing already in 1950 maintains that, taking advantage of the existence of the LCM, “Digital computers […] can be constructed, and indeed have been constructed, and […] they can in fact mimic the actions of a human computer very closely” (Turing 1950: 435). In the light of my perspective both (Universal) Logical Computing Machine (LCM) (the theoretical artifact) and (Universal) Practical Computing Machine (PCM) (the practical artifact) are mimetic minds because they are able to mimic the mind in a kind of universal way (wonderfully continuing the activity of disembodiment of minds and of semiotic delegations to the external materiality our ancestors rudimentary started). LCM and PCM are able to re-represent and perform in a very powerful way plenty of cognitive skills of human beings. Universal Turing machines are discrete-state machines, DMS, “with a Laplacian behavior” (Longo 2002; Lassègue 1998, 2002): “it is always possible to predict all future states”) and they are equivalent to all formalisms for computability (what is thinkable is calculable and mechanizable), and because universal they are able to simulate – that is to mimic – any human cognitive function, that is what is usually called mind. A natural consequence of this 262
perspective is that Universal Turing machines do not represent (against classical AI and modern cognitivist computationalism) a “knowledge” of the mind and of human intelligence. Turing is perfectly aware of the fact that brain is not a DSM, but as he says, a “continuous” system, where instead a mathematical modeling can guarantee a satisfactory scientific intelligibility (cf. his studies on morphogenesis). We have seen that our brains delegate meaningful semiotic (and of course cognitive and epistemic) roles to externalities and then tend to “adopt” what they have checked occurring outside, over there, in the external invented structured and model. And a large part of meaning formation takes advantage of the exploitation of external representations and mediators. Our view about the disembodiment of mind certainly involves that the Mind/Body dualist view is less credible as well as Cartesian computationalism. Also the view that Mind is Computational independently of the physical (functionalism) is jeopardized. In my perspective on human cognition in terms of mimetic minds we no longer need Descartes dualism: we only have semiotic brains that make up large, integrated, material cognitive systems like for example LCMs and PCMs. These are new independent semiotic agencies that constitute real artificial minds aiming at “universally” imitating human cognition. In this perspective what we usually call mind simply consists in the union of both the changing neural configurations of brains together with those large, integrated, and material cognitive systems the brains themselves are continuously building in an infinite semiotic process. Minds are material like brains, in so far as they take advantage of intertwined internal and external semiotic processes. It seems to me at this point we can better and more deeply understand Peirce’s semiotic motto “man is an external sign” in the passage we have completely quoted above in section 5.1: “[…] as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of 263
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environment, where mind has objectified itself in various semiotic structures that<br />
mimic and enhance its internal representations.<br />
Turing adds a new structure to this list of external objectified devices: an<br />
abstract tool, the (Universal) Logical Computing Machine (LCM), endowed with<br />
powerful mimetic properties. We have concluded the section 3.3. remarking that<br />
the creative “mind” is in itself extended and, so to say, both internal and external:<br />
the mind is semiotic because transcends the boundary of the individual and includes<br />
parts of that individual’s environment, and thus constitutively artificial. Turing’s<br />
LCM, which is an externalized device, is able to mimic human cognitive operations<br />
that occur in that interplay between the internal mind and the external one. Indeed<br />
Turing already in 1950 maintains that, taking advantage of the existence of the<br />
LCM, “Digital computers […] can be constructed, and indeed have been<br />
constructed, and […] they can in fact mimic the actions of a human computer very<br />
closely” (Turing 1950: 435).<br />
In the light of my perspective both (Universal) Logical Computing Machine<br />
(LCM) (the theoretical artifact) and (Universal) Practical Computing Machine<br />
(PCM) (the practical artifact) are mimetic minds because they are able to mimic the<br />
mind in a kind of universal way (wonderfully continuing the activity of<br />
disembodiment of minds and of semiotic delegations to the external materiality our<br />
ancestors rudimentary started). LCM and PCM are able to re-represent and perform<br />
in a very powerful way plenty of cognitive skills of human beings.<br />
Universal Turing machines are discrete-state machines, DMS, “with a<br />
Laplacian behavior” (Longo 2002; Lassègue 1998, 2002): “it is always possible to<br />
predict all future states”) and they are equivalent to all formalisms for<br />
computability (what is thinkable is calculable and mechanizable), and because<br />
universal they are able to simulate – that is to mimic – any human cognitive<br />
function, that is what is usually called mind. A natural consequence of this<br />
262
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