Prace komisji nauk.pdf - Instytut Filologii Angielskiej Uniwersytetu ...
Prace komisji nauk.pdf - Instytut Filologii Angielskiej Uniwersytetu ... Prace komisji nauk.pdf - Instytut Filologii Angielskiej Uniwersytetu ...
ecome signs when we think and interpret them. It is well-known that for Peirce all semiotic experience – and thus abduction - is also providing a guide for action. Indeed the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action. 55 Let us summarize some basic semiotic ideas that will be of help in the further clarification of the cognitive and computational features of model-based and manipulative abduction. One of the central property of signs is their reinterpretability. This occurs in a social process where signs are referred to material objects. As it is well-known for Peirce iconic signs are based on similarity alone, the psychoanalytic patient who thought he was masturbating when piloting the plane interpreted the cloche as an extension of his body, and an iconic sign of the penis; an ape may serve as an icon of a human. Indexical signs are based on contiguity and dynamic relation to the object, a sign which refers to an object that it denotes by virtue of being “really affected” by that object: a certain grimace indicates the presence of pain, the rise of the column of mercury in a thermometer is a sign of a rise in temperature, indexical signs are also the footprints in the sand or a rap on the door. Consequently we can say indexical signs “point”. A symbol refers to an artificial or conventional (“by virtue of a law”) interpretation of a sign, the sign ∞ used by mathematicians would be an example of Peirce’s notion of symbol, almost all words in language, except for occasional onomatopoeic qualities, are symbols in this sense, associated with referents in a wholly arbitrary manner. We have to immediately note that from the semiotic point of view feelings, too, are signs that are subject to semiotic interpretations at different levels of complexity. Peirce considered feelings elementary phenomena of mind, comprising all that is immediately present, such as pain, sadness, cheerfulness. He believes that 55 Cf. for example the contributions contained in recent special issue of the journal Semiotica devoted to abduction (Queiroz and Merrell 2005). 250
a feeling is a state of mind possessing its own living qualities independent of any other state of the mind. Neither icon, index, nor symbol actually functions as a sign until it is interpreted and recognized in a semiotic activity and code. To make an example, it is the evolutionary kinship that makes the ape an icon of the man, in itself the similarity of two animals does not mean anything. Where cognition is merely possible, sign action, or semiosis, is working. Knowledge is surely inferential as well as abduction, that like any inference requires three elements: a sign, the object signified, and the interpretant. Everywhere “A signifies B to C”. There is a continuous activity of interpretation and some of this activity – as we will see - is abductive. The Peircian notion of interpretant plays the role of explaining the activity of interpretation that is occurring in semiosis. The interpretant does not necessarily refer to an actual person or mind, an actual interpreter. For instance the communication to be found in a beehive 56 where the bees are able to communicate with the others by means of signs is an example of a kind of “mindless” triadic semiosis: indeed we recognize that a sign has been interpreted not because we have observed a mental action but by observing another material sign. To make another example, the person recognizing the thermometer as a thermometer is an interpretant, as she generates in her brain a thought. In this case the process is conscious, but also unconscious or emotional interpretants are widespread. Again, a person points (index) up at the sky and his companion looks up (interpretant) to see the object of the sign. Someone else might call out “What do you see up there?” that is also another interpretant of the original sign. As noted by Brent “For Peirce, any appropriate response to a sign is acting as another sign of the object originally signified. A sunflower following the sun across the sky with 56 This kind of communication is studied in Monekosso, Remagnino, & Ferri. 251
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- Page 238 and 239: or symbolic behavior. If we conside
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a feeling is a state of mind possessing its own living qualities independent of any<br />
other state of the mind. Neither icon, index, nor symbol actually functions as a sign<br />
until it is interpreted and recognized in a semiotic activity and code. To make an<br />
example, it is the evolutionary kinship that makes the ape an icon of the man, in<br />
itself the similarity of two animals does not mean anything. Where cognition is<br />
merely possible, sign action, or semiosis, is working. Knowledge is surely<br />
inferential as well as abduction, that like any inference requires three elements: a<br />
sign, the object signified, and the interpretant. Everywhere “A signifies B to C”.<br />
There is a continuous activity of interpretation and some of this activity – as<br />
we will see - is abductive. The Peircian notion of interpretant plays the role of<br />
explaining the activity of interpretation that is occurring in semiosis. The<br />
interpretant does not necessarily refer to an actual person or mind, an actual<br />
interpreter. For instance the communication to be found in a beehive 56 where the<br />
bees are able to communicate with the others by means of signs is an example of a<br />
kind of “mindless” triadic semiosis: indeed we recognize that a sign has been<br />
interpreted not because we have observed a mental action but by observing another<br />
material sign. To make another example, the person recognizing the thermometer<br />
as a thermometer is an interpretant, as she generates in her brain a thought. In this<br />
case the process is conscious, but also unconscious or emotional interpretants are<br />
widespread. Again, a person points (index) up at the sky and his companion looks<br />
up (interpretant) to see the object of the sign. Someone else might call out “What<br />
do you see up there?” that is also another interpretant of the original sign. As noted<br />
by Brent “For Peirce, any appropriate response to a sign is acting as another sign of<br />
the object originally signified. A sunflower following the sun across the sky with<br />
56 This kind of communication is studied in Monekosso, Remagnino, & Ferri.<br />
251
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