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MLJ Volume 36-1.pdf - Robson Hall Faculty of Law

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The Trial Judge's Four Discretions 177<br />

In Buhay, 160 a case in which a Charter breach was found and hence a<br />

subsection 24(2) analysis undertaken, the Supreme Court recognized these<br />

two overlapping discretions in its obiter comments – though curiously it<br />

does not expressly recognize the “constitutional stature” <strong>of</strong> the<br />

exclusionary discretion laid down in Harrer. 161<br />

In Riley, 162 the Court appeared to contemplate an overlap between the<br />

Harrer and Seaboyer exclusionary discretions (exercisable against Crown<br />

evidence), stating that “the framework” laid down in these two cases for<br />

the exclusion <strong>of</strong> evidence is the one to be employed to exclude hearsay<br />

evidence where its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value. But it<br />

makes no express comment about these discretions’ abilities (or lack <strong>of</strong><br />

abilities) to exclude improperly obtained evidence.<br />

In Hawkins, 163 the Supreme Court says the discretion at common law<br />

exercisable against Crown evidence has simply been “constitutionalized”<br />

by its decision in Harrer. In other words there is only a single discretion<br />

generally employable against Crown evidence. Thus, according to the<br />

Supreme Court in this decision, there is complete overlap. If this<br />

interpretation is accepted to be the current state <strong>of</strong> the law, then the<br />

Harrer decision is best viewed as simply having further broadened the<br />

scope <strong>of</strong> the common law exclusionary discretion in Seaboyer – by expressly<br />

recognizing that, unlike the Wray discretion, it is readily employable<br />

against improperly obtained evidence – and elevated its legal stature by<br />

“constitutionalizing” it.<br />

In Harrer, 164 La Forest J, writing for the majority <strong>of</strong> the Supreme<br />

Court, characterized the discretion as free-standing and necessary to<br />

ensure that a trial is fair from the outset. To ensure a fair trial, resort to<br />

sections 24(1) or 24(2) <strong>of</strong> the Charter 165 was not always appropriate, nor<br />

160<br />

Supra note 14 at para 40.<br />

161<br />

Supra note 13.<br />

162<br />

Supra note 18 at paras 22-24 & 32-33.<br />

163<br />

Supra note 18 at para 85.<br />

164<br />

Supra note 13.<br />

165<br />

Charter, supra note 4, ss 24(1) and 24(2). Section 24(1) provides for the exclusion <strong>of</strong><br />

evidence, which while not obtained in breach <strong>of</strong> the Charter would if admitted<br />

undermine the right to a fair trial as defined by section 11(d). In its own words, it<br />

provides for “such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the<br />

circumstances.” As can be seen, this section applies to prospective breaches <strong>of</strong> section<br />

11(d). Section 24(2), on the other hand, provides for the exclusion <strong>of</strong> evidence

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