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MLJ Volume 36-1.pdf - Robson Hall Faculty of Law

MLJ Volume 36-1.pdf - Robson Hall Faculty of Law

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The Trial Judge's Four Discretions 169<br />

discretion to exclude the evidence. Consequently, where he or she has a<br />

reasonable basis for concluding that the evidence’s prejudicial effect<br />

outweighs its probative value, the trial judge may exclude the evidence<br />

regardless <strong>of</strong> any submissions, joint or otherwise, from counsel that dictate<br />

the opposite outcome.<br />

Needless to say, depending on the particular circumstances <strong>of</strong> any<br />

case, a variety <strong>of</strong> factors that serve to inform the level <strong>of</strong> prejudicial effect<br />

<strong>of</strong> the evidence will present themselves. “The relative weight to be assigned<br />

to factors requires an ad hoc judgment and is not a process that can be<br />

captured by a bright line capable <strong>of</strong> yielding a single correct result.” 127<br />

Once the assessments <strong>of</strong> prejudice and probative value are complete, a<br />

balancing <strong>of</strong> one against the other occurs. Where prejudice is found to<br />

outweigh probative value, the evidence may be excluded. This exercise<br />

must be completed by a trial judge before any application <strong>of</strong> the<br />

exclusionary discretion, though he or she may not need to refer explicitly<br />

to this balancing in their reasons for decision. 128 The exclusionary<br />

discretion, while integral to ensuring the fairness <strong>of</strong> the trial process,<br />

should not be viewed as “a blanket discretion for judges to repudiate<br />

conduct on the part <strong>of</strong> authorities regarded as distasteful or<br />

inappropriate.” 129 In other words, where the probative value <strong>of</strong> Crown<br />

evidence is found to outweigh its prejudicial effect, even by the slightest <strong>of</strong><br />

margins, the evidence, no matter how objectionable, must be received. 130<br />

127<br />

R v Pilon, 2009 ONCA 248 at para 54, 243 CCC (3d) 109. The same can no doubt be<br />

said <strong>of</strong> the statutory discretions that exist within statutory rules <strong>of</strong> admissibility.<br />

128<br />

R v Devine, 2008 SCC <strong>36</strong> at para 30, [2008] 2 SCR 283 [Devine].<br />

129<br />

Rothman, supra note <strong>36</strong> at 696, per Lamer J. While this statement was made in the<br />

context <strong>of</strong> a different exclusionary rule, a “pure discretion” to exclude (see Section I<br />

and note 40 above) contained within then section 178.16 <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Code (supra<br />

note 23), it is equally applicable to the trial judge’s exclusionary discretion regarding<br />

Crown evidence at common law established in Seaboyer.<br />

130<br />

A properly crafted jury instruction cautioning the jury about the impermissible use <strong>of</strong><br />

the evidence can sometimes provide a piece <strong>of</strong> evidence, which might not otherwise<br />

have enough probative value to exceed prejudicial effect, with sufficient probative<br />

value to make it receivable. This is because a proper jury direction can reduce or<br />

remove prejudicial effect, such that prejudicial effect no longer exceeds probative<br />

value: See generally Paciocco & Stuesser, supra note 1 at 44.

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