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Manjunath Gadiparthi,Ramakrishna Paladugu,Sudhakar Paladugu,Muralidhar Vejendla Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (3),655-665<br />

ISSN:2229-6093<br />

A <strong>Fuzzy</strong> <strong>QOS</strong> <strong>Key</strong> <strong>Base</strong> <strong>Secured</strong> <strong>MANET</strong> <strong>Routing</strong> <strong>with</strong> <strong>Multipath</strong> Data<br />

Fragmentation (FQKSMR)<br />

Manjunath Gadiparthi * , Ramakrishna Paladugu ** , Sudhakar Paladugu # and Muralidhar Vejendla ##<br />

* Head, Dept. of CSE, Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Technology, Hyderabad.<br />

** Associate Professor, Department of CSE in Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Technology, Hyderabad.<br />

# Assistant Professor, Department of CSE in Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Technology, Hyderabad.<br />

## Assistant Professor in Department of CSE, Tenali Engineering Collge, Tenali.<br />

* gmanjunathc2000@yahoo.co.in, ** ramakrishna18.paladugu@gmail.com, # mails4sudhakar@gmail.com and<br />

## vmdharesearch@gmail.com<br />

Abstract<br />

<strong>MANET</strong> or Mobile Adhoc Network has drawn<br />

considerable research attention and application over<br />

the last few years. With the increase of applicability,<br />

and adaptability of the network in Private virtual<br />

network or wireless personal area network, the attacks<br />

and intrusion of MENT data has also increased which<br />

has lead to design various protocol extensions over the<br />

conventional 802.11 MAC security extensions for<br />

providing more security to such a network. <strong>MANET</strong><br />

sessions are generally short and busty which requires<br />

the security extension to be designed in such a manner<br />

that the keys are short lived and refreshed frequently in<br />

order to make it impossible for intruder to hack any<br />

data. Therefore conventional public key cryptography<br />

<strong>with</strong> centralized key distribution mechanisms are not<br />

well suited for <strong>MANET</strong>. Therefore in this work we<br />

propose a unique decentralized dynamic key generation<br />

and security extension for <strong>MANET</strong> where keys are<br />

generated depending upon the state of a node and it’s<br />

link status like its energy, relative mobility, <strong>QOS</strong><br />

parameters like delay, bandwidth, power loss based on<br />

fuzzy inference rule set. This key is further combined<br />

<strong>with</strong> a user level password for authentication and digital<br />

content encryption. As the state of the nodes differs<br />

almost in every session and sometimes in the middle of a<br />

session, hacking such key is theoretically “impossible”<br />

as the key refresh time is minimum here. The proposed<br />

technique is simulated <strong>with</strong> OMNET++ environment.<br />

Result shows significant proof of real time adaptability<br />

of the technique.<br />

<strong>Key</strong>words—<strong>Fuzzy</strong>, <strong>MANET</strong>, <strong>QOS</strong>, <strong>Multipath</strong>, Security, <strong>Key</strong><br />

Management.<br />

1. Introduction<br />

Mobile Adhoc Network is an infrastructure less<br />

network where nodes exchange data and packets<br />

through intermediate nodes. The directed set of<br />

intermediate nodes through which a source and<br />

destination pair exchange message is known as a route.<br />

The process of route building can be both proactive and<br />

reactive. Due to mobility of the nodes a preformed route<br />

may not service the end nodes well. Therefore most of<br />

the works consider reactive or on demand routing as the<br />

best solution for <strong>MANET</strong>. The route building process is<br />

shortly explained below to understand the security<br />

concerns in <strong>MANET</strong>.<br />

a) Each Node broadcasts a periodic hello message to<br />

its neighbors which contains its id, so that neighbors can<br />

build a routing table entry for this node. This node is<br />

periodic <strong>with</strong> 3 seconds is considered as most optimized<br />

refresh rate of the packets.<br />

b) A source node broadcasts RREQ message <strong>with</strong> the<br />

source and the destinations IDs. Each intermediate node<br />

checks whether the destination has a valid path or not. If<br />

so, they generate a RREP packet or they update a<br />

precursors list which is the path list from which the<br />

RREQ packet has traversed. Also it stores the ID of the<br />

RREQ and any subsequent RREQ from any other path is<br />

dropped.<br />

c) Once the packet reaches to the destination,<br />

destination generates RREP packet and unicast it<br />

through the path it had received the RREQ. All the nodes<br />

from destination to the source which are included in the<br />

RREP packets makes a table entry in the precursors list<br />

and they know that they will be part of communication<br />

path from source to destination.<br />

655


Manjunath Gadiparthi,Ramakrishna Paladugu,Sudhakar Paladugu,Muralidhar Vejendla Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (3),655-665<br />

ISSN:2229-6093<br />

d) Once the packet reaches to the source node, source<br />

note the path and generates acknowledgement packet<br />

which traverses through the intermediate node till the<br />

destination to inform it that a route is build and that the<br />

data packets are to be followed.<br />

e) Data transmission follows from source to<br />

destination through the nodes which are included in path<br />

cache during route building phase.<br />

The steps are more clearly explained in [1]. Now let us<br />

analyze the security loopholes of <strong>MANET</strong> and possible<br />

attacks by considering a sample topology as<br />

demonstrated in figure 1 which comprises of both<br />

authenticated and non authenticated nodes.<br />

Figure 2. Radio Range of the nodes. Also<br />

Showing an Impersonating node receiving a<br />

Hello Message.<br />

Figure 1. Initial node distribution in <strong>MANET</strong><br />

topology.<br />

Green nodes are the valid node and Red nodes are unauthenticated<br />

impersonating nodes.<br />

Figure 3. A valid Route formed through<br />

authentic nodes.<br />

Figure4. A path build through node 3 which is<br />

non authenticated node.<br />

656


Manjunath Gadiparthi,Ramakrishna Paladugu,Sudhakar Paladugu,Muralidhar Vejendla Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (3),655-665<br />

ISSN:2229-6093<br />

From figure 2 it is clear that control messages like<br />

RREQ and hello packets are received by all the nodes,<br />

including the authenticated nodes which lead to their<br />

inclusion in the path as shown in figure 4. Also a close<br />

observation of the topology in figure 1 and figure 4<br />

reveals that the <strong>MANET</strong> topology changes frequently<br />

due to node movement and the neighborhood of the<br />

nodes also changes <strong>with</strong> that. Therefore in a single<br />

session there may have to form more than one path from<br />

source to destination. Thus the observation leads to<br />

following criteria for secured <strong>MANET</strong> environment.<br />

a) Nodes must be pre-authenticated and that that each<br />

node must know the authenticity of all the other nodes in<br />

their neighborhood<br />

b) RREQ packets must be encrypted so that only<br />

authenticated nodes can read the header and therefore<br />

only authenticated nodes can include them in the path.<br />

c) <strong>Key</strong> must be refreshed frequently in order to avoid<br />

guessing. This is because wireless impersonating nodes<br />

will receive many messages in the wireless environment<br />

that leads to significant database for guessing the key.<br />

d) The initial authentication must be fast for fast route<br />

building process.<br />

In order to understand the possible framework for<br />

achieving the objectives in <strong>MANET</strong> security, we will<br />

first analyze the past works and proposals in Literature<br />

Survey in section II. The findings and discussions of this<br />

section will be used as a background for proposed<br />

technique which is presented in section III. Detailed<br />

methodology <strong>with</strong> discussion is presented in section IV.<br />

Detailed Simulation environment, settings and procedure<br />

is elaborated in section V. The proposed work is<br />

analyzed through the obtained results in the result<br />

section of VI. Lastly the work is concluded <strong>with</strong><br />

discussions about the findings, improvement achieved<br />

through proposed work and further improvement<br />

possible as a future direction.<br />

2. Literature Review<br />

Charles Perkins [1] introduced the fundamental<br />

concept of <strong>MANET</strong> and emphasized on demand routing<br />

protocol AODV. The paper introduces various aspects<br />

and stages of on demand routing and the common<br />

packets and events associated <strong>with</strong> the routing. The<br />

paper forms the fundamental base of understanding the<br />

actual model of security aspects in <strong>MANET</strong>.<br />

Understanding of route discovery structure and the<br />

various layer’s role in <strong>MANET</strong> provides a better<br />

foundation to understand the loopholes and attacks on<br />

<strong>MANET</strong> that can be addressed through new security<br />

extensions or modified version of the existing extensions.<br />

Hao Yang et al. [2] identifies the basic problem of<br />

<strong>MANET</strong> for offering a security to the traffic. Unlike the<br />

wired network, there is no fixed routers in <strong>MANET</strong>,<br />

which makes it impossible for monitoring and<br />

administrating the security of the network. The wireless<br />

channel is accessible by both legitimate and non<br />

legitimate nodes. Therefore [2] suggests that the security<br />

protocol in <strong>MANET</strong> must be divided into both proactive<br />

and reactive techniques where proactive techniques is<br />

the preventive measure where as reactive methods<br />

incorporates techniques like intrusion detection for<br />

detecting the attacks in the network. It also emphasizes<br />

on the fact that adding security features also adds<br />

overhead in communication and computation. Walking<br />

on this discussion ZhengMing Shen [3] claims that <strong>QOS</strong><br />

and Security are two integral part of <strong>MANET</strong> and<br />

security extensions must not affect the desired <strong>QOS</strong> of<br />

<strong>MANET</strong>. Papadimitratos [4] models a noval framework<br />

for demonstrating malicious disruption in data<br />

transmission and simulates secured message transmission<br />

over secured single path. The protocols are tested <strong>with</strong><br />

tolerable delay and data delivery rate variations and the<br />

results lays the foundation of the theory that security<br />

extensions, if designed appropriately never affects the<br />

overall quality of service to a great deal. The<br />

understanding of more fundamental problems for<br />

offering better security solutions for <strong>MANET</strong> is<br />

attributed by factors like change in topology,<br />

co-operative nature of the routing which both violates<br />

the basic principal of security systems[5]. Though<br />

technically there are various different attacks possible at<br />

different layers and different types of services in<br />

<strong>MANET</strong>, Eavesdropping and Traffic analysis of Physical<br />

layer attacks, Balckhole and Spoofing attacks of<br />

network layer are the most significant ones that desire<br />

strong security protocol to be incorporated in order to<br />

prevent impersonation, Pradip M.[6]. In order to bring<br />

network monitoring into play in the dynamic <strong>MANET</strong><br />

architecture, intermediate nodes must be given the<br />

responsibility of detecting attacks in a route. This scheme<br />

is presented by Kathirvel[7] where a node is given the<br />

responsibility of forwarding as well as monitoring or<br />

“umpiring”[15]. But the type of attack for which the<br />

system is designed are modifying the hop counts and<br />

dropping packets. The severe most problem as discussed<br />

is the eavesdropping. Therefore though the technique<br />

presents a framework and algorithm suitable for<br />

understanding the basic sequence of security system, the<br />

results can not be accepted <strong>with</strong>out really checking the<br />

response against intrusive and impersonating nodes. [8]<br />

657


Manjunath Gadiparthi,Ramakrishna Paladugu,Sudhakar Paladugu,Muralidhar Vejendla Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (3),655-665<br />

ISSN:2229-6093<br />

proposes a secured routing protocol on the background<br />

of Ashokan [9] who argues that secured key exchange in<br />

<strong>MANET</strong> is one of the most practical ways of ensuring<br />

security to the network functionality because the end<br />

nodes are trust worthy and at the time of deployment<br />

may decide about the key and should be able to<br />

authenticate each other. The main disadvantage of the<br />

solution is that key is considered to be persistent<br />

throughout the session which gives significant guessing<br />

time to the eavesdropping nodes. We have shown in our<br />

prior work[10] as how to develop a model for secured<br />

routing in <strong>MANET</strong> <strong>with</strong> automatic key refreshing. We<br />

have also demonstrated that such frequent changes of<br />

keys do not affect the network parameters by great deal.<br />

The key distribution technique for <strong>MANET</strong> was<br />

proposed long back in 1999 by Lidong Zhou[11]. But<br />

the system model is based on configuring special key<br />

distributing nodes called servers. <strong>MANET</strong> is widely<br />

accepted due to its decentralized nature. Therefore<br />

public key cryptography <strong>with</strong> centralized key distribution<br />

can not be considered as the best scheme for <strong>MANET</strong><br />

security. Though authors have proposed a mechanism of<br />

decentralizing the key distribution process as the<br />

communicant is progressed, such a scheme do not fit into<br />

original system model of <strong>MANET</strong>. Therefore we<br />

emphasize on developing a scheme where the keys are<br />

refreshed periodically and automatically and <strong>with</strong>out any<br />

need of key distribution mechanism. The idea of<br />

centralized security has not been rejected entirely though<br />

many papers have proposed a decentralized method; key<br />

distribution is argued and accepted as a centralized<br />

problem <strong>with</strong> secured infrastructure [19]. But the<br />

distribution center and security monitoring points are<br />

checked through special nodes which are dynamically<br />

selected in the beginning of a <strong>MANET</strong> session and are<br />

periodically updated. Such nodes are called cluster<br />

heads. Many papers[12],[13],[14] adopt this approach<br />

for security extensions in <strong>MANET</strong>. Clusters are not only<br />

responsible for key distribution but they can also be<br />

assigned <strong>with</strong> the responsibility of monitoring un desired<br />

behavior in <strong>MANET</strong>. Though as discussed early in the<br />

section, Srdjan Capkun et. al. [18] has also argued that<br />

<strong>MANET</strong> security mechanisms must be decentralized and<br />

at best should be node-to-node basis. In the papers<br />

authors have demonstrated a time bound key generation<br />

and authentication techniques whereby a source node<br />

authenticates the certificate of another node. The paper<br />

lay significant foundation in understanding how exactly a<br />

key trust lifetime be adopted and how should be initial<br />

trust model amongst the nodes.<br />

Shuyao Yu et al. [16] presents the entire security<br />

extension in <strong>MANET</strong> as a structured top down layer<br />

approach and divides the main operations into five<br />

categories: SL5 End-to-End Security,SL4 Network<br />

Security,SL3 <strong>Routing</strong> Security,SL2 Communications<br />

Security, SL1 Trust Infrastructure. We focus on SL3<br />

and SL4 because the common de-facto of 802.11<br />

protocol is that it has a WEP extension through which it<br />

can guarantee security to wireless transmission. It is the<br />

data and user level security that is a major concern in<br />

building security applications for <strong>MANET</strong>. The basic<br />

loophole of <strong>MANET</strong> is the broadcast storm. Many<br />

important <strong>MANET</strong> packets are broadcasted which<br />

makes it very difficult to control the intrusion. Therefore<br />

Balakrishna[20] approach of restricting the broadcasting<br />

packet may be an important direction towards <strong>MANET</strong><br />

security. Though the work is not meant to extend the<br />

security structure in <strong>MANET</strong>, it is a significant design<br />

where the nodes can select other nodes to whom they<br />

need to forward the packet rather than blindly putting<br />

broadcast address in the MAC packet of the control<br />

messages like the hello message and RREQ packet. But<br />

this paper also requires a temporary station called<br />

backbone. Therefore the work model do not suite the<br />

direction security model presented in this paper.<br />

Therefore rather than restricting the packets<br />

transmission, key exchange based mechanism is<br />

considered as the better option. But as pointed by Dr.<br />

Anil Kapil[21] the main problem <strong>with</strong> mutual trust model<br />

is that each node must remember (n-1) keys where n is<br />

the number of nodes in the network. As network<br />

increases, there is a need of updating n(n-1)/2 keys which<br />

is significantly time and bandwidth consuming. Though<br />

the basic model requires the initiation process to be done<br />

through a key distribution center, the significant<br />

improvement of the overall system over other<br />

mechanism is that once the trust model is build, the key<br />

distribution center can go offline and the keys are still<br />

updated. The key pairing protocol is explained in detail<br />

in[25]. Assuming that an initial security needs to be build<br />

before any communication begins, nodes need significant<br />

initial delay for trust building. Even after the trust<br />

building process is over through key exchange there<br />

needs to be a secured process for finding the route.<br />

Mamtha, Sharma[22] elaborates a unique type of routing<br />

attack in <strong>MANET</strong>. The intruder node once receives<br />

RREQ, floods the packets or rushes the packets to all the<br />

neighbors and incorporates itself in a route. Further all<br />

the packets are transmitted through this nodes which<br />

gets a chance of predicting the key if the key lifetime is<br />

long enough. Thus not only that the RREQ packets must<br />

also be encrypted, the key lifetime must also be small so<br />

658


Manjunath Gadiparthi,Ramakrishna Paladugu,Sudhakar Paladugu,Muralidhar Vejendla Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (3),655-665<br />

ISSN:2229-6093<br />

that the intrusive nodes cannot add themselves frequently<br />

in the route. <strong>Base</strong>d on Tseng[23] model authors in [24]<br />

proposes a node authentication scheme based on<br />

certificate revocation List(CRL) status check of the key<br />

distribution servers.<br />

3. Proposed Work<br />

There may be three types of nodes possible in the<br />

topology 1) Valid Nodes, 2) Nodes which are part of the<br />

authenticated network but not authenticated for<br />

participating in current data transmission, 3) Nodes<br />

which are unauthenticated for the network. Most of the<br />

security extensions consider only node type 3 as threat.<br />

Such nodes are eliminated through an initial key<br />

exchange which is derived from a preloaded hash table.<br />

The second category of nodes is more challenging <strong>with</strong><br />

respect to the network security perspective. In this work,<br />

the treat elimination of category 2 nodes is achieved<br />

through a second category of key that we propose in this<br />

work. This is called a <strong>QOS</strong> <strong>Fuzzy</strong>[31] key. This is<br />

generated from the <strong>QOS</strong> parameters in a node. The<br />

considered parameters are Residual Energy of a<br />

Node[26], Average Received Power[28], Relative<br />

Mobility[28], Residual Bandwidth[30], Average<br />

Observed Delay[29], Average MAC queue size. The key<br />

is generated from a binary sequence of the state of the<br />

parameters, resolved through <strong>Fuzzy</strong> as High, Low and<br />

Medium. The generated key is used to encrypt the packet<br />

header of both data and control packet. As the state of<br />

the impersonating nodes varies very rapidly, the key of<br />

the node also varies, which eliminates it from the routing<br />

entity. Further in order to achieve the more security a<br />

multipath approach[27] is adopted which prevents the<br />

entire data being exposed to the intermediate nodes.<br />

4. Methodology<br />

We divide the overall system into following<br />

sub-problem and present the security extension in each<br />

stage.<br />

a) Initial Authentication of the Nodes: In this work we<br />

consider the deposition of a Hash table in each valid<br />

nodes belonging to the network. The hash table contains<br />

several hash values in a matrix format. The sample<br />

matrix is as shown in table1 similar to [17].<br />

Table 1. Hash Table containing Hash Values in<br />

the nodes (Actual Structure of 512-512 Hash<br />

values)<br />

H11 H12 H13 H14<br />

H21 H22 H23 H24<br />

H31 H32 H33 H34<br />

H41 H42 H43 H44<br />

The hash table is generated from a hash function<br />

which converts the set of {node ID range, IP address<br />

Subnet mask, MAC address range} to hash function and<br />

uses a discrete random function for generating and<br />

randomizing the same. If it is assumed that all the valid<br />

nodes of the network are preloaded <strong>with</strong> the proposed<br />

protocol suite then each node <strong>with</strong> come on board <strong>with</strong><br />

the hash values.<br />

Initially as nodes exchange hello message. In the<br />

hello message, the node IDs and hop fields are appended.<br />

The initial hello message is incorporated <strong>with</strong> a cipher<br />

generated from user level password which is assumed to<br />

have been distributed amongst the nodes which are<br />

authenticated for transmission. This cipher text is<br />

encrypted <strong>with</strong> a random hash from the hash table. Once<br />

a node receives the message, it tries to decode the<br />

message <strong>with</strong> all possible combination of hashes from the<br />

table and matching the cipher text for each instance. This<br />

is time consuming and consumes a lot of computation<br />

cycle. To reduce the computation cycle, the hash value<br />

index is selected from a hash selection function which<br />

takes the common user password as input.<br />

This step reduces the search complexity to only<br />

single index search. Now the authenticated nodes can<br />

easily decipher the hello message and build the node ID.<br />

Type 2 of nodes cannot extract the actual hash because it<br />

does not know the initial password. Therefore it needs<br />

two steps for decoding. One search through all the hash<br />

values to select a particular hash. Even if it tracks the<br />

hash, it is not aware of the user level common password.<br />

Hence it cannot generate a valid hello message to embed<br />

itself in the routing table of the other nodes. As a worst<br />

case scenario, if the imposter somehow knows the initial<br />

password, it gets itself authenticated initially. Hence<br />

extreme caution must be adopted for this key exchange<br />

amongst the user. Nodes 3 are easily eliminated from the<br />

initial routing table.<br />

b) RREQ transmission phase and Route Building<br />

As First stage eliminates the node 3 type of node, the<br />

objective of the protocol is to eliminate the participation<br />

of node type 2 and authenticate and include only node 1.<br />

Most trusted end to end secured communication is<br />

carried out <strong>with</strong> the help of public key cryptography<br />

where each node maintains two pairs of keys: a public<br />

key and the private key. Transmitter encrypts the<br />

message <strong>with</strong> the public key and the receiver decrypts the<br />

message <strong>with</strong> the private key. As <strong>MANET</strong> routing must<br />

include intermediate node, the intermediate nodes must<br />

659


Manjunath Gadiparthi,Ramakrishna Paladugu,Sudhakar Paladugu,Muralidhar Vejendla Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (3),655-665<br />

ISSN:2229-6093<br />

know the public key. As it is understood from our<br />

proposal that each of these type 2 nodes have a valid<br />

hash table and know the possible public key. Therefore<br />

there exists a possibility that any of the routing node acts<br />

as an imposter and gets an access of the data. Therefore<br />

the trick is to segment the data in such a way that all the<br />

nodes along a route do not get access to the entire<br />

message. Thus every node receiving the RREQ message<br />

forwards the RREQ message irrespective of its duplicate<br />

arrivals from other nodes and a node disjoint multipath<br />

route is developed such that the traffic is splitted<br />

amongst the nodes. Hence no node is exposed to entire<br />

set of data. Thus even though type 2 attacks are not<br />

entirely eliminated, they are minimized. Figure 5 shows a<br />

result of Node disjoint multipath route.<br />

Figure 5. <strong>Multipath</strong> from source to destination.<br />

Now most interesting de-facto in network security is<br />

that intruding nodes induce another type of attack known<br />

as jamming attack. Once a node starts listening to the<br />

packets that are not meant for this node , then outgoing<br />

packets suffer more delay due to increased wait in the<br />

queue in these nodes. Beside the nodes observes more<br />

packet drop and abrupt energy losses due to more<br />

computation in the process of intrusion. Most of the<br />

network adopts a separate intrusion detection model in<br />

order to detect such abrupt pattern. We introduce a new<br />

mechanism of maintaining a fuzzy state result at each<br />

node. The structure is as given below.<br />

Table 2. Proposed Structure<br />

Bandwidth Delay Energy Queue<br />

Size<br />

Relative<br />

Mobility<br />

Power<br />

Loss<br />

We develop a fuzzy inference system <strong>with</strong> following<br />

outputs<br />

VERY LOW, LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, VERY<br />

HIGH<br />

Each of the matrices are associated <strong>with</strong> three type of<br />

input<br />

LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH<br />

Each authenticated nodes are loaded <strong>with</strong> a hash<br />

generation method that takes input as 7 byte characters<br />

generated from the input fuzzy set.<br />

LLHMML sequence is generated for low bandwidth,<br />

low delay, high energy, medium queue size, medium<br />

relative mobility and low power loss. The source node<br />

encrypts the RREQ packet <strong>with</strong> the generated hash from<br />

the desired set of values. As RREQ packet is received by<br />

a node, the node generates the hash from its own state of<br />

information and decrypts the RREQ. If the RREQ is<br />

decrypted successfully, a node forwards the packet. For<br />

type 3 node, decrypting the control message is widely<br />

difficult and thus it does not know the basic information<br />

of the message passing.<br />

Selected nodes when participate in the routing, the<br />

packet headers are encrypted <strong>with</strong> the hash key<br />

generated from the initial structure, where as the data is<br />

encrypted <strong>with</strong> the public key of the network which is a<br />

randomly selected initial hash value.<br />

c) Effect of impersonating on the <strong>QOS</strong> state and the<br />

<strong>Fuzzy</strong> <strong>Key</strong><br />

If a node in the route decides to impersonate, its<br />

energy goes down very fast, queue size decreases, node<br />

suffer more power loss which changes its <strong>QOS</strong> state very<br />

fast. Therefore further packet header which are to be<br />

routed through this nodes are not routed which shoots<br />

up an route error packet that leads to route error.<br />

5. Simulation<br />

Algorithm<br />

1) Set up a network <strong>with</strong> N mobiles Nodes. The<br />

nodes are spread over axb square meter area. ( Here we<br />

have considered 550x550 sq meter area for<br />

simulation).Assign mobility for the nodes. Select the<br />

speed(v) between 2m/s to 3m/s. Select the mobility<br />

model as Random way point algorithm. Position of each<br />

not is represented as a point P(x,y).Initialize the load(<br />

4096 packets/s, each packet of size 512 bytes)<br />

Start the transmission and continue for t seconds.<br />

2) Random waypoint:<br />

For i=1:1:N<br />

a) Select a position P1[i]<br />

b) Move towards P1[i] <strong>with</strong> persistent speed v m/s.<br />

c) Update P[i]<br />

d) If(P[i]==P1[i])<br />

Pause for pt milliseconds.// pt=pause time<br />

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Manjunath Gadiparthi,Ramakrishna Paladugu,Sudhakar Paladugu,Muralidhar Vejendla Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (3),655-665<br />

ISSN:2229-6093<br />

Goto (a)<br />

End<br />

update the co-ordinate values.<br />

End<br />

3) At MAC layer:<br />

Estimate the Received power of the packet PRx.,<br />

Queue size of the MAC and Estimate Energy of<br />

underneath Physical Layer.<br />

a) If(MAC has the contention and)<br />

Forward the packets that are been sent by<br />

routing layer<br />

Else<br />

Iff MAC packet is authenticated<br />

i) Store the packets in Queue<br />

ii) wait for the channel access.<br />

End<br />

4) At Network Layer:<br />

At any node K:<br />

As any Message is Received:<br />

Bandwidth=Total_bandwidth- ((No of Bits to be<br />

transmitted)+(No of Bits Received))<br />

Delay=Current_Time-Initial_time_stamp_in_message<br />

Generate HELLO Message, Encrypt <strong>with</strong> initial Hash<br />

Value.<br />

If( HELLO Packet is Received)<br />

{<br />

<strong>Key</strong>=Hash_Table(user_password)<br />

Msg=Decrypt(msg,<strong>Key</strong>);<br />

If(isValid(msg))<br />

{<br />

Update_routing_table_entry();<br />

Store powerLoss in the routing table.<br />

For(i=1:all the neighbors)<br />

{<br />

Relative_Mobility(k,i)=(PowerLoss(I,k)_current-Po<br />

werLoss(I,k)_Prev)<br />

//Extract the sign of relative mobility<br />

If Relative_Mobility is +ve then both the nodes are<br />

approaching, is –ve then they are moving away. Else they<br />

are steady.<br />

}<br />

}<br />

}<br />

If(Application_Data_is_Received)<br />

{<br />

If(k has a path to destination)<br />

{<br />

If (there exists P path)<br />

{<br />

Split DATA into P equal parts and<br />

transmit(EncryptedData(DATA,HashTable(<strong>Fuzzy</strong>_Desi<br />

red)))<br />

}<br />

Else<br />

{<br />

transmit(EncryptedData(DATA,HashTable(<strong>Fuzzy</strong>_D<br />

esired)))<br />

through the first Path.<br />

}<br />

}<br />

//it needs to be transmitted to other node so generate<br />

RREQ.<br />

<strong>Fuzzy</strong>_in=<strong>Fuzzy</strong>Rule(Desired Bandwidth, Desired<br />

Delay, Desired Queue Size, Desired Energy, Desired<br />

Power Loss, Desired Relative Mobility)<br />

<strong>Key</strong>=Hash_Table(<strong>Fuzzy</strong>_in);<br />

RREQ=Encrypt(RREQ,<strong>Key</strong>);<br />

}<br />

If(RREQ is Received)<br />

{<br />

<strong>Fuzzy</strong>_in=<strong>Fuzzy</strong>Rule(Desired Bandwidth, Desired<br />

Delay, Desired Queue Size, Desired Energy, Desired<br />

Power Loss, Desired Relative Mobility)<br />

<strong>Key</strong>=Hash_Table(<strong>Fuzzy</strong>_in);<br />

RREQ=Decrypt(RREQ,<strong>Key</strong>);<br />

If(isValid(RREQ)) // is valid checks the RREQ header<br />

{<br />

If(k is not destination)<br />

{<br />

UpdateRouteTable()<br />

Forward()<br />

}<br />

Else<br />

{<br />

Generate_RREP<br />

Wait for another RREQ to arrive<br />

Generate_path_for_That_also<br />

}<br />

}<br />

}<br />

a) Generate beacon Packets to Neighbors<br />

b) Receive beacon packets forwarded by the<br />

Neighbors<br />

c) Prepare <strong>Routing</strong> table (ID, Hops, Energy)<br />

d) update Neighbors table<br />

e) if receiving node is coordinator<br />

if coordinator has finished receiving all beacons<br />

generate coordinator beacon<br />

end<br />

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Manjunath Gadiparthi,Ramakrishna Paladugu,Sudhakar Paladugu,Muralidhar Vejendla Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (3),655-665<br />

ISSN:2229-6093<br />

else<br />

increase the hop field value<br />

forward the packets.<br />

end<br />

e) If (RREQ is received)<br />

Current Node has Eneough Energy?<br />

Yes: Forward RREQ<br />

Update Route Information<br />

No: Drop RREQ<br />

End<br />

f) if(RREP is received)<br />

update route information.<br />

Forward to precursor node.// previous nodes<br />

Notify PAN Coordinator<br />

End<br />

g) if (a data packet is received for Application)<br />

forward to MAC layer<br />

Update Energy<br />

end<br />

h) if( Packet is received from MAC)<br />

forward to application layer<br />

end<br />

i) If( Control Message is received from the MAC)<br />

Generate RERR.<br />

Update Energy<br />

End<br />

5.At Physical Layer:<br />

As the packet is received,<br />

Find type of packet<br />

Change the Energy level according to equation (1).<br />

6. At the end of simulation, calculate throughput,<br />

latency, control overhead, packet delivery ratio.<br />

b) Simulation Setup<br />

The system is simulated <strong>with</strong> omnet3.3 in windows<br />

operating system. The basic specification is provided in<br />

detail in table 2.<br />

Table 3. Simulation Parameters<br />

<strong>Routing</strong><br />

<strong>Multipath</strong> AODVM<br />

Channel Bandwidth<br />

11.2Mbit/s (IEEE 802.11b)<br />

Channel Delay<br />

0.0001 sec<br />

Channel Error rate 0.000001<br />

Channel data rate<br />

11.2 Mbit/s<br />

Channel Contention<br />

Mechanism<br />

slotted version of CSMA/CA<br />

channel access protocol.<br />

Node placement<br />

Random<br />

Mobility Model<br />

RWP, Rwalk<br />

Message packet size<br />

512 bytes(4096bits)<br />

Impersonating Nodes( type 2 30%<br />

and Type 3)<br />

Burst Interval<br />

Normally Distributed(2,1,0)<br />

Control Message Size 512 bytes(4096bits)<br />

Input Buffer Size<br />

8.38864e6 bits<br />

Radio Model<br />

Free Space Model<br />

Radio Range<br />

100 m<br />

Transmission Power 0.0756W<br />

Reception Power 0.0828W<br />

MAC Queue<br />

2 Mb<br />

Simulation Area<br />

500x500 m<br />

Maximum Node 10-100<br />

Beacon Interval<br />

10 Seconds<br />

Beacon Monitoring Timeout .1second<br />

SNR Threshold<br />

10dB<br />

c) Performance Metrics<br />

We measure different performance metrics. These<br />

performances are compared <strong>with</strong> standard AODV and<br />

triple umpiring based technique to analyze the<br />

performance of the proposed system.<br />

• End-to-End Delay: the time interval between the<br />

transmission of the packet by a source node and the<br />

reception at the sink.<br />

• Packet Loss: percentage of packets lost, as the ratio<br />

between the number of packets successfully received at<br />

the sink and all packets generated by the source node.<br />

• Control overhead: it is defined as number of control<br />

packets transmitted for every data packet delivered.<br />

Throughput: Throughput defines the amount of<br />

channel utilization by all nodes and is measured in<br />

MBPS.<br />

Network Lifetime: As the nodes communicate, they<br />

lose energy. When energy is bellow a minimum threshold<br />

level, the node dies and cannot participate in<br />

communication. The time interval from the start of<br />

simulation to the time when there exists at least one node<br />

for communication is called network lifetime. It it’s a<br />

quantities measure for energy efficiency.<br />

PauseTime: It is the time period between two<br />

subsequent movements in the mobility model of a node.<br />

Attacking Node Density: It is defined as Number of<br />

Malicious Node v/s Total Number of Nodes.<br />

Average Route Lifetime: This gives us an information<br />

about the duration of time for which a route has remain<br />

to be existed. The average value indicates the stability of<br />

the routes.<br />

Average <strong>Key</strong> change in type 2 Nodes: we observe the<br />

consecutive binary values at the impersonating nodes and<br />

plot a graph of rate of change of the keys in such nodes.<br />

Percentage of Data Acquired by Malicious Nodes:<br />

This is a measurement of amount of data being<br />

acquired by the malicious nodes which gives an<br />

662


Manjunath Gadiparthi,Ramakrishna Paladugu,Sudhakar Paladugu,Muralidhar Vejendla Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (3),655-665<br />

ISSN:2229-6093<br />

indication of the sensitiveness of the algorithm towards<br />

detecting attack.<br />

6. Results<br />

Simulation parameters for all the simulation is as<br />

given bellow.<br />

Node=50,Speed=2m/s, Pause time=10s, Sim<br />

Time=4hour, Packet Rate=20p/sec.<br />

nodes are very high. Whether they are being decrypted<br />

or not is not the question here. The main observation is<br />

that triple umpiring significantly reduces the overall<br />

exposure. This is further improved by the proposed<br />

technique.<br />

Figure 6. Percentage of Malicious Nodes v/<br />

control overhead<br />

Result 6 shows that as the density of malicious nodes<br />

varies, control overhead also increase. This is due to<br />

route refreshment and delay and pdr sensitivity of the<br />

network. Control Overhead is least in the proposed<br />

technique due to the presence of multiple paths. Hence<br />

RERR are not generated immediately and the<br />

transmission continues <strong>with</strong> existing paths.<br />

Figure 8. Network Life time performance<br />

against varying Malicious Nodes.<br />

Figure 8 is another prove of varying performance in<br />

the presence of malicious node. Network lifetime<br />

decrease significantly as such node increase due to many<br />

retransmission, packet drop and re-routing. Careful<br />

observation shows that the proposed technique has a<br />

better lifetime when the attack is severe where as if there<br />

are no attacks, the plain AODV has a better<br />

performance. This is also a prove that security extensions<br />

attributes for significant energy consumption in the<br />

nodes.<br />

Figure 9. Packet Delivery Ratio Performance in<br />

Various Malicious Node Presences.<br />

Figure 7. Percentage of Malicious Node v/s<br />

Percentage of Data Exposure to Malicious<br />

Nodes.<br />

Figure 7 is an interesting finding. Without any<br />

monitoring algorithm, data being exposed to malicious<br />

Figure 9 shows that packet delivery ration decreases<br />

<strong>with</strong> the increase in number of malicious nodes. The<br />

decrease in packet delivery ratio is minimized <strong>with</strong> the<br />

proposed technique because the proposed FQSMR by<br />

default is a <strong>QOS</strong> routing and it justifies that by improving<br />

the pdr performance.<br />

663


Manjunath Gadiparthi,Ramakrishna Paladugu,Sudhakar Paladugu,Muralidhar Vejendla Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (3),655-665<br />

ISSN:2229-6093<br />

Figure 10. Route Lifetime of Different<br />

Techniques in the Presence of Different<br />

Malicious Nodes.<br />

Routes are sensitive to intrusions and attacks. This is<br />

shown in Figure 10. The route lifetime is significant in<br />

understanding the attack behavior in the network. The<br />

figure shows that the proposed FQKSMR technique is<br />

more sensitive to attacks than the other techniques.<br />

7. Conclusion<br />

There are various monitoring and security extension<br />

proposed over the years. Mostly the key management<br />

and <strong>QOS</strong> are considered as related entities. But no work<br />

has presented a <strong>QOS</strong> offering through the key<br />

management itself. Further Intrusion detection through<br />

network parameter monitoring is considered as a<br />

separate entity. In this paper we have shown that by<br />

generating the key from the <strong>QOS</strong> state of a node, one can<br />

not only extend the security of the network also at the<br />

same time guarantee <strong>QOS</strong>. The adaptation of <strong>Multipath</strong><br />

routing further strengthens the security by minimizing<br />

the data exposure to malicious nodes. The system can be<br />

further improved by a hash function which not only can<br />

translate the <strong>Fuzzy</strong> Equal-Output to a key but also<br />

conditions like Greater-Than-Equal-To functions to<br />

keys. As the observation shows that network<br />

performance vastly degrades <strong>with</strong> attacks, nodes that<br />

provide good or better <strong>QOS</strong> must be incorporated.<br />

There bound to be performance variations if malicious<br />

nodes are present.<br />

8. References<br />

[1] C. Perkins and E Royer, “Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance<br />

Vector <strong>Routing</strong>,” 2nd IEEE Workshop on Mobile Comp.<br />

Sys. and Apps., 1999.<br />

[2] ZhengMing Shen, Thomas, J.P., “Security and QoS<br />

Self-Optimization in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks”, IEEE<br />

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2008.<br />

[3] Papadimitratos, P. Haas, Z.J., “Secure Data<br />

Communication in Mobile Adhoc Networks, IEEE<br />

Journal on Selected Areas in Communication, Vol. 24, Iss.<br />

2, February, 2006.<br />

[4] Monica, Mukesh Kumar, Rahul Rishi, “Security Aspects<br />

in Mobile Adhoc Network (<strong>MANET</strong>s):Technical<br />

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[5] Pradip M. Jawandhiya, “A Survey of Mobile Ad Hoc<br />

Network Attacks”, International Journal of Engineering<br />

Science and Technology, Vol. 2(9), pp. 4063-4071, 2010.<br />

[6] Ayyaswamy Kathirvel, Rengaramanujam Srinivasan,<br />

“Triple Umpire System for Security of Mobile Ad Hoc<br />

Networks”, International Journal of Network<br />

Management, DOI: 10.1002/nem.761, Nov. 2010.<br />

[7] Panagiotis Papadimitratos, Zygmunt J. Haas, “Secure<br />

<strong>Routing</strong> for Mobile Ad hoc Networks”, In Proceedings of<br />

the SCS Communication Networks and Distributed<br />

Systems Modeling and Simulation Conference (CNDS<br />

2002), San Antonio, TX, January 27-31, 2002.<br />

[8] N. Asokan, P. Ginzboorg, “<strong>Key</strong> Agreement in Ad Hoc<br />

Networks,” Computer Communications 23 (17):<br />

1627-1637, Nov. 1 2000.<br />

[9] Manjunath…”A Ligh weight Time Stamp <strong>Base</strong>d<br />

Distributed Security Protocol for Wireless Adhoc<br />

Network”, CiiT International Journal of Wireless<br />

Communication, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 2011.<br />

[10] Lidong Zhou, Zygmunt J. Haas, “Securing Ad Hoc<br />

Networks”, IEEE Network, special issue on network<br />

security, November/December, 1999.<br />

[11] G. S. R. Emil Selvan1, S. Sivagurunathan, P. Subathra,<br />

and S.Dina Nidhya, “Mobile Ad Hoc Network Security- A<br />

Cluster based Approach”, Journal of Computers Vol.20,<br />

No.3, October 2009.<br />

[12] J.Manikandan, S.Vijayaragavan, “Multihost Adhoc<br />

network <strong>with</strong> the clustered Security networks”,<br />

International Journal of Engineering Science and<br />

Technology Vol. 2(3), 2010.<br />

[13] Steffen Reidt, Stephen D. Wolthusen, “An Evaluation of<br />

Cluster Head TA Distribution Mechanisms in Tactical<br />

<strong>MANET</strong> Environments”, In Proceedings of the First<br />

Annual Conference of the ITA ,2007.<br />

[14] Ayyaswamy Kathirvel, Rengaramanujam Srinivasan, “A<br />

System of Umpires for Security of Wireless Mobile Ad<br />

Hoc Network, International Arab Journal of<br />

e-Technology, Vol. 1, No. 4, June 2010.<br />

[15] Shuyao Yu, Youkun Zhang, Chuck Song and Kai Chen.<br />

“A security architecture for Mobile AdHoc Network”<br />

ACM Workshop on Wireless Security (Wise 2003), San<br />

Diego, CA, September 19, 2003.<br />

[16] Shailender Gupta, Chander Kumar, “Shared Information<br />

based Security Solution for Mobile Adhoc Networks”,<br />

International Journal of Wireless and Mobile Networks,<br />

Vol. 2,No. 1, February 2010.<br />

664


Manjunath Gadiparthi,Ramakrishna Paladugu,Sudhakar Paladugu,Muralidhar Vejendla Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (3),655-665<br />

ISSN:2229-6093<br />

[17] Srdjan Capkun, Levente Buttya´ n, Jean-Pierre Hubaux,<br />

“Self-Organized Public-<strong>Key</strong> Management for Mobile Ad<br />

Hoc Networks”, IEEE Trans. On Mobile Computing, Vol.<br />

2, No. 1, January-March, 2003.<br />

[18] J. Kong, H. Luo, L Zhang, “Providing Robust and<br />

Ubiquitous Security support for Mobile adhoc Network”,<br />

IEEE 2001.<br />

[19] R.Balakrishna, “Reliability in <strong>MANET</strong>’s Using Enhanced<br />

Double Coverage Broadcasting (EDCB)”, International.<br />

Journal of Advanced Networking and Applications,<br />

Volume: 01 Issue: 03 Page: 147-153, 2009.<br />

[20] Dr. Anil Kapil, Sanjeev Rana, “Identity-<strong>Base</strong>d <strong>Key</strong><br />

Management in <strong>MANET</strong>s using Public <strong>Key</strong><br />

Cryptography”, International Journal of Security (IJS),<br />

Volume 3 : Issue 1, 2009.<br />

[21] G.S. Mamatha, Dr. S.C. Sharma, “Network Layer Attacks<br />

and Defense Mechanisms in <strong>MANET</strong>S- A Survey”,<br />

International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 –<br />

8887), Volume 9– No.9, November 2010.<br />

[22] Tseng, Y. Min., “A heterogeneous-network aided<br />

public-key management scheme for <strong>MANET</strong>S”, Wiley<br />

InterScience, International Journal of Network<br />

Management, v.17: pp.3–15, 2006.<br />

[23] Azeem Irshad, Wajahat Noshairwan, Muhammad<br />

Shafiq,Shahzada Khurram, Ehtsham Irshad, Muhammad<br />

Usman, “Security Enhancement for Authentication of<br />

nodes in <strong>MANET</strong> by checking the CRL status of Servers”,<br />

International Journal of Advanced Science and<br />

Technology, Vol. 22, September, 2010.<br />

[24] P.S.L.M. Barreto, B. Lynn, and M. Scott., “Efficient<br />

Implementation of Pairing-<strong>Base</strong>d Cryptosystems”,<br />

Journal of Cryptology, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 321-334, 2004.<br />

[25] Géraud Allard, Pascale Minet, Dang-Quan Nguyen,<br />

Nirisha Shrestha, “Evaluation of the Energy Consumption<br />

in <strong>MANET</strong>”, In Proceedings of ADHOC-NOW'2006.<br />

[26] Wenjing Lou, Wei Liu, Yanchao Zhang, “Performance<br />

Optimization using <strong>Multipath</strong> <strong>Routing</strong> in Mobile Ad Hoc<br />

and Wireless Sensor Networks”, Combinatorial<br />

Optimization in Communication Networks, 2005.<br />

[27] S.Muthuramalingam and R.Rajaram, “A Transmission<br />

Range <strong>Base</strong>d Clustering Algorithm for Topology Control<br />

<strong>MANET</strong>”, International journal on applications of graph<br />

theory in wireless ad hoc networks and sensor networks<br />

(GRAPH-HOC) Vol.2, No.3, September 2010.<br />

[28] Hafiz M. Asif, Tarek R Sheltami, Elhadi E. Shakshuki,<br />

Power Consumption Optimization and Delay<br />

Minimization in <strong>MANET</strong>, Proceedings of MoMM, 2008.<br />

[29] Lei Chen, Wendi B. Heinzelman, QoS-Aware <strong>Routing</strong><br />

<strong>Base</strong>d on Bandwidth Estimation for Mobile Ad Hoc<br />

Networks, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in<br />

Communications, Vol. 23, No. 3, March 2005.<br />

[30] Jishan Mehedi , Samir Biswas , M.K.Naskar, “A <strong>Fuzzy</strong><br />

<strong>Base</strong>d Distributed Approach to Maintain Connectivity of<br />

Nodes in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks”, Proceedings of 2nd<br />

National Conference on Challenges & Opportunities in<br />

Information Technology (COIT-2008) RIMT-IET, Mandi<br />

Gobindgarh. March 29, 2008.<br />

Manjunath Gadiparthi is working as an<br />

Associate Professor and Head Department of<br />

Computer Science in JAWAHARLAL<br />

NEHRU INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY<br />

(JNIT). He received his B.Tech Degree in<br />

Computer Science & Engineering from<br />

Narasaraopeta Engineering College Andhra<br />

Pradesh. He received his M.Tech Degree in<br />

Computer Science & Engineering from RVR & JC College of<br />

Engineering Andhra Pradesh. He is pursuing his Ph.D. in Computer<br />

Science & Engineering. His areas of interest are Image Processing,<br />

Data Mining & Network security. He published several journal articles<br />

and Conference papers, in the areas of Image Processing, Data Mining<br />

& Network security.<br />

Ramakrishna Paladugu is working as<br />

Associate Professor, Department of CSE in<br />

Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Technology,<br />

Hyderabad. He is currently working as Associate<br />

Professor, Computer Science Engineering,<br />

Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Technology,<br />

Hyderabad. His research interests are Data<br />

Mining, Wireless Networks and Network<br />

Security.<br />

Sudhakar Paladugu is working as Assistant<br />

Professor, Department of CSE in Jawaharlal<br />

Nehru Institute of Technology, Hyderabad. His<br />

research interests include Network Security.<br />

Muralidhar Vejendla was born in India in<br />

1980. He is currently working as Associate<br />

Professor in Tenali Engineering College, Tenali.<br />

His research interests are Data Mining, Wireless<br />

Networks.<br />

665

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