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Souvik Bhattacharyya et al, Int. J. Comp. Tech. Appl., Vol 2 (4), 1069-1077<br />

ISSN:2229-6093<br />

<strong>Steganalysis</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>LSB</strong> <strong>Image</strong> <strong>Steganography</strong> <strong>using</strong><br />

<strong>Multiple</strong> Regression and Auto Regressive (AR)<br />

Model<br />

Souvik Bhattacharyya 1 and Gautam Sanyal 2<br />

1 Department <strong>of</strong> Computer Science and Engineering, University Institute <strong>of</strong> Technology<br />

The University <strong>of</strong> Burdwan, West Bengal, India, e-mail: (souvik.bha@gmail.com)<br />

2 Department <strong>of</strong> Computer Science and Engineering, National Institute <strong>of</strong> Technologyy<br />

West Bengal,India, e-mail: (nitgsanyal@gmail.com)<br />

Abstract—The staggering growth in communication technology<br />

and usage <strong>of</strong> public domain channels (i.e. Internet) has greatly facilitated<br />

transfer <strong>of</strong> data. However, such open communication channels<br />

have greater vulnerability to security threats ca<strong>using</strong> unauthorized<br />

in- formation access. Traditionally, encryption is used to realize<br />

then communication security. However, important information is not<br />

protected once decoded. <strong>Steganography</strong> is the art and science <strong>of</strong> communicating<br />

in a way which hides the existence <strong>of</strong> the communication.<br />

Important information is firstly hidden in a host data, such as digital<br />

image, text, video or audio, etc, and then transmitted secretly to<br />

the receiver. <strong>Steganalysis</strong> is another important topic in information<br />

hiding which is the art <strong>of</strong> detecting the presence <strong>of</strong> steganography. In<br />

this paper a novel technique for the steganalysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>Image</strong> has been<br />

presented. The proposed technique uses an auto-regressive model to<br />

detect the presence <strong>of</strong> the hidden messages, as well as to estimate<br />

the relative length <strong>of</strong> the embedded messages.Various auto regressive<br />

parameters are used to classify cover image as well as stego image<br />

with the help <strong>of</strong> a SVM classifier. <strong>Multiple</strong> Regression analysis <strong>of</strong><br />

the cover carrier along with the stego carrier has been carried out<br />

in order to find out the existence <strong>of</strong> the negligible amount <strong>of</strong> the<br />

secret message. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness<br />

and accuracy <strong>of</strong> the proposed technique.<br />

Keywords—Cover <strong>Image</strong>,Stego <strong>Image</strong>,Multi-Core,MPI.<br />

innocent ones. Its basic requirement is to determine accurately<br />

whether a secret message is hidden in the testing medium.<br />

Further requirements may include judging the type <strong>of</strong> the<br />

steganography, estimating the rough length <strong>of</strong> the message,<br />

or even extracting the hidden message. The challenge <strong>of</strong> steganalysis<br />

is that: Unlike cryptanalysis, where it is evident that<br />

intercepted encrypted data contains a message, steganalysis<br />

generally starts with several suspect information streams but<br />

uncertainty whether any <strong>of</strong> these contain hidden message. The<br />

steganalyst starts by reducing the set <strong>of</strong> suspect information<br />

streams to a subset <strong>of</strong> most likely altered information streams.<br />

This is usually done with statistical analysis <strong>using</strong> advanced<br />

statistics techniques.<br />

A block diagram <strong>of</strong> a generic image steganographic system<br />

is given in Fig. 1.<br />

I. INTRODUCTION<br />

To protect secret message from being stolen during transmission,<br />

there are two ways to solve this problem in general.<br />

One way is encryption, which refers to the process <strong>of</strong> encoding<br />

secret information in such a way that only the right<br />

person with a right key can decode and recover the original<br />

information successfully. Another way is steganography and<br />

this is a technique which hides secret information into a cover<br />

media or carrier so that it becomes unnoticed and less attractive.Capacity<br />

and invisibility are the benchmarks needed for<br />

data hiding techniques <strong>of</strong> steganography.A famous illustration<br />

<strong>of</strong> steganography is Simmons’ Prisoners’ Problem [27].For a<br />

more thorough knowledge <strong>of</strong> steganography methodology the<br />

reader may see [23], [29].Some Steganographic model with<br />

high security features has been presented in [1], [2] and [3],<br />

[21].Almost all digital file formats can be used for steganography,<br />

but the image and audio files are more suitable because<br />

<strong>of</strong> their high degree <strong>of</strong> redundancy [29].<br />

<strong>Steganalysis</strong>, from an opponent’s perspective, is an art <strong>of</strong><br />

deterring covert communications while avoiding affecting the<br />

IJCTA | JULY-AUGUST 2011<br />

Available online@www.ijcta.com<br />

Fig. 1.<br />

Generic form <strong>of</strong> <strong>Image</strong> <strong>Steganography</strong><br />

A message is embedded in a digital image (cover image)<br />

through an embedding algorithm, with the help <strong>of</strong> a secret key.<br />

The resulting stego image is transmitted over a channel to the<br />

receiver where it is processed by the extraction algorithm <strong>using</strong><br />

the same key. During transmission the stego image, it can be<br />

monitored by unauthenticated viewers who will only notice the<br />

transmission <strong>of</strong> an image without discovering the existence<br />

<strong>of</strong> the hidden message.In this work a specific image based<br />

steganographic method for gray level image has proposed. In<br />

this method instead <strong>of</strong> embedding the secret message into the<br />

cover image a mapping technique has been incorporated to<br />

generate the stego image. This method is capable <strong>of</strong> extracting<br />

the secret message without the presence <strong>of</strong> the cover image.<br />

Types <strong>of</strong> Attacks: Attacks and analysis on hidden information<br />

may take several forms: detecting, extracting, and disabling<br />

or destroying hidden information. An attack approach is<br />

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dependent on what information is available to the steganalyst<br />

(the person who is attempting to detect steganography-based<br />

information streams).<br />

Fig. 2.<br />

Types <strong>of</strong> attack in <strong>Steganography</strong> System<br />

This paper has been organized as following sections: Section<br />

II describes Some Related Works on <strong>Image</strong> <strong>Steganography</strong><br />

and <strong>Steganalysis</strong>. Section III deals with Regression Analysis<br />

Method,Section IV deals with <strong>Image</strong> Feature Extraction.<strong>Steganalysis</strong><br />

Technique based on Regression analysis are<br />

discussed in Section V and Experimental results are shown<br />

in Section VI. Section VII contains the analysis <strong>of</strong> the results<br />

and Section IX draws the conclusion.<br />

II. RELATED WORKS ON IMAGE STEGANOGRAPHY AND<br />

STEGANALYSIS<br />

The various image steganographic techniques are: (i) Substitution<br />

technique in Spatial Domain: In this technique only<br />

the least significant bits <strong>of</strong> the cover object is replaced without<br />

modifying the complete cover object. It is a simplest method<br />

for data hiding but it is very weak in resisting even simple<br />

attacks such as compression, transforms, etc. (ii)Transform<br />

domain technique: The various transform domains techniques<br />

are Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), Discrete Wavelet Transform<br />

(DWT) and Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) are used to<br />

hide information in transform coefficients <strong>of</strong> the cover images<br />

that makes much more robust to attacks such as compression,<br />

filtering, etc. (iii) Spread spectrum technique: The message<br />

is spread over a wide frequency bandwidth than the minimum<br />

required bandwidth to send the information. The SNR in every<br />

frequency band is small. Hence without destroying the cover<br />

image it is very difficult to remove message completely. (iv)<br />

Statistical technique: The cover is divided into blocks and the<br />

message bits are hidden in each block. The information is<br />

encoded by changing various numerical properties <strong>of</strong> cover<br />

image. The cover blocks remain unchanged if message block is<br />

zero. (v) Distortion technique: Information is stored by signal<br />

distortion. The encoder adds sequence <strong>of</strong> changes to the cover<br />

and the decoder checks for the various differences between<br />

the original cover and the distorted cover to recover the secret<br />

message.<br />

<strong>Image</strong> based <strong>Steganalysis</strong>: <strong>Steganalysis</strong> is the science <strong>of</strong><br />

detecting hidden information. The main objective <strong>of</strong> <strong>Steganalysis</strong><br />

is to break steganography and the detection <strong>of</strong> stego image<br />

is the goal <strong>of</strong> steganalysis. Almost all steganalysis algorithms<br />

rely on the Steganographic algorithms introducing statistical<br />

differences between cover and stego image. <strong>Steganalysis</strong> deals<br />

IJCTA | JULY-AUGUST 2011<br />

Available online@www.ijcta.com<br />

with three important categories: (a) Visual attacks: In these<br />

types <strong>of</strong> attacks with a assistance <strong>of</strong> a computer or through<br />

inspection with a naked eye it reveal the presence <strong>of</strong> hidden<br />

information, which helps to separate the image into bit planes<br />

for further more analysis. (b) Statistical attacks: These types<br />

<strong>of</strong> attacks are more powerful and successful, because they<br />

reveal the smallest alterations in an images statistical behavior.<br />

Statistical attacks can be further divided into (i) Passive attack<br />

and (ii) Active attack. Passive attacks involves with identifying<br />

presence or absence <strong>of</strong> a covert message or embedding algorithm<br />

used etc. Mean while active attacks is used to investigate<br />

embedded message length or hidden message location or secret<br />

key used in embedding. (c) Structural attacks: The format <strong>of</strong><br />

the data files changes as the data to be hidden is embedded;<br />

identifying this characteristic structure changes can help us to<br />

find the presence <strong>of</strong> image.<br />

A. Types <strong>of</strong> <strong>Image</strong> Based <strong>Steganalysis</strong><br />

<strong>Steganalysis</strong> can be regarded as a two-class pattern classification<br />

problem which aims to determine whether a testing<br />

medium is a cover medium or a stego one. A targeted<br />

steganalysis technique works on a specific type <strong>of</strong> stegosystem<br />

and sometimes limited on image format. By studying<br />

and analyzing the embedding algorithm, one can find image<br />

statistics that change after embedding. The results from most<br />

targeted steganalysis techniques are very accurate but on the<br />

other hand, the techniques are inflexible since most <strong>of</strong> the<br />

time there is no path to extend them to other embedding<br />

algorithms. Also, when a targeted steganalysis is successful,<br />

thus having a higher probability than random guessing, it helps<br />

the steganographic techniques to expand and become more<br />

secure. A blind steganalysis technique is designed to work on<br />

all types <strong>of</strong> embedding techniques and image formats. In a few<br />

words, a blind steganalysis algorithm ’learns’ the difference<br />

in the statistical properties <strong>of</strong> pure and stego images and<br />

distinguishes between them. The ’learning’ process is done<br />

by training the machine on a large image database. Blind<br />

techniques are usually less accurate than targeted ones, but<br />

a lot more expandable. Semi-blind steganalysis works on a<br />

specific range <strong>of</strong> different stego-systems. The range <strong>of</strong> the<br />

stego-systems can depend on the domain they embed on, i.e.<br />

spatial or transform.<br />

B. Some Specific Approaches <strong>of</strong> <strong>Image</strong> Based <strong>Steganalysis</strong><br />

A specific steganalytic method <strong>of</strong>ten takes advantage <strong>of</strong> the<br />

insecure aspect <strong>of</strong> a steganographic algorithm. Some specific<br />

steganalytic methods for attacking the steganographic schemes<br />

are introduced in this section.<br />

Attacking <strong>LSB</strong> steganography: <strong>LSB</strong> steganography has<br />

been one <strong>of</strong> the most important spatial steganographic techniques.<br />

Accordingly, much work has been done on steganalyzing<br />

<strong>LSB</strong> steganography in the initial stage <strong>of</strong> the development<br />

<strong>of</strong> steganalysis. And many steganalytic methods toward <strong>LSB</strong><br />

steganography have been proved most successful, such as Chisquare<br />

statistical attack [30], [25],RS analysis [16], sample pair<br />

analysis (SPA) analysis [26], weighted stego (WS) analysis [7],<br />

and structural steganalysis [20], [19], etc.<br />

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Attacking <strong>LSB</strong> Matching <strong>Steganography</strong>: It may be noted<br />

that the equal trend <strong>of</strong> the frequency <strong>of</strong> occurrence <strong>of</strong> PoVs<br />

no longer exists for <strong>LSB</strong> matching steganography. Thus many<br />

steganalytic methods toward <strong>LSB</strong> steganography turn out to<br />

be invalid. <strong>LSB</strong> matching, or more general k steganography,<br />

may be modeled in the context <strong>of</strong> additive noise independent<br />

<strong>of</strong> the cover image. The effect <strong>of</strong> additive noise steganography<br />

to the image histogram is equivalent to a convolution <strong>of</strong> the<br />

histogram <strong>of</strong> the cover image and the stego-noise PMF. It may<br />

be analyzed more conveniently in the frequency domain [8].<br />

Attacking Stochastic Modulation <strong>Steganography</strong>: In [11]<br />

it has shown that the horizontal pixel difference histogram <strong>of</strong><br />

a natural image can be modeled as a generalized Gaussian<br />

distribution (GGD). However, as stated in stochastic modulation<br />

steganography adds stego-noise with a specific probability<br />

distribution into the cover image to embed secret message<br />

bits. The embedding effect <strong>of</strong> adding stego-noise may disturb<br />

the distribution <strong>of</strong> the cover natural image. A quantitative<br />

approach to steganalyse stochastic modulation steganography<br />

was presented in [15], [10].<br />

Attacking the BPCS <strong>Steganography</strong>: In BPCS steganography,<br />

the binary patterns <strong>of</strong> data-blocks are random and it<br />

is observed that the complexities <strong>of</strong> the data-blocks follow<br />

a Gaussian distribution with the mean value at 0.5 [22]. For<br />

some high significant bit-planes (e.g., the most significant bitplane<br />

to the 5th significant bit-plane) in a cover image, the<br />

binary patterns <strong>of</strong> the image blocks are not random and thus<br />

the complexities <strong>of</strong> the image blocks do not follow a Gaussian<br />

distribution.<br />

Attacking the Prediction Error Based <strong>Steganography</strong>:<br />

If there is no special scheme to prevent Wendy retrieving the<br />

correct prediction values, it is quite easy for Wendy to detect<br />

the steganographic method which utilizes prediction errors for<br />

hiding data, such as PVD steganography. Zhang et al.[33]<br />

proposed a method for attacking PVD steganography based<br />

on observing the histogram <strong>of</strong> the prediction errors.<br />

Attacking the MBNS <strong>Steganography</strong>: It’s hard to observe<br />

any abnormality between a cover image and its MBNS stego<br />

image through the histogram <strong>of</strong> pixel values and the histogram<br />

<strong>of</strong> pixel prediction errors. In [4] the authors observed and<br />

illustrated that given any base value, more small symbols are<br />

generated than large symbols in the process <strong>of</strong> converting<br />

binary data to symbols. Since the remainders <strong>of</strong> the division <strong>of</strong><br />

pixel values by bases are equal to the symbols, the conditional<br />

probability P D|B can be used to discriminate the cover<br />

images and stego images, where B and D denote the random<br />

variable <strong>of</strong> the base and the remainder, respectively.<br />

Attacking QIM/DM: The issue in steganalysis <strong>of</strong> QIM/DM<br />

has been formulated into two sub-issues by Sullivan et al [18].<br />

One is to distinguish the standard QIM stego objects from<br />

the plain-quantized (quantization without message embedding)<br />

cover objects. Another is to differentiate the DM stego objects<br />

from the unquantized cover objects.<br />

Attacking the F5 Algorithm: Some crucial characteristics<br />

<strong>of</strong> the histogram <strong>of</strong> DCT coefficients, such as the monotonicity<br />

and the symmetry, are preserved by the F5 algorithm. But F5<br />

does modify the shape <strong>of</strong> the histogram <strong>of</strong> DCT coefficients.<br />

This drawback is employed by Fridrich et al.[14] to launch an<br />

IJCTA | JULY-AUGUST 2011<br />

Available online@www.ijcta.com<br />

attack against F5.<br />

Attacking OutGuess: OutGuess preserves the shape <strong>of</strong> the<br />

histogram <strong>of</strong> DCT coefficients and thus it may not be easy to<br />

employ a quantitative steganalyzer to attack OutGuess with the<br />

statistics <strong>of</strong> DCT coefficients as that in attacking F5. Fridrich<br />

et al. [13] found a new path to detect OutGuess quantitatively<br />

by measuring the discontinuity along the boundaries <strong>of</strong> 8x8<br />

JPEG grid. A spatial statistical feature, named blockiness, for<br />

an image has been proposed. It is observed that the blockiness<br />

linearly increases with the number <strong>of</strong> altered DCT coefficients.<br />

Suppose that some data are embedded into an input image. If<br />

the input image is innocent, the change rate <strong>of</strong> the blockiness<br />

between the input image and the embedded one will be large.<br />

If the input image already contains some data, the change rate<br />

will be smaller. The change rate <strong>of</strong> the blockiness can be used<br />

to estimate the embedding rate.<br />

Attacking MB:MB steganography uses a generalized<br />

Cauchy distribution model to control the data embedding<br />

operation. Therefore, the histogram <strong>of</strong> the DCT coefficients<br />

will fit the generalized Cauchy distribution well in a stego<br />

image. Bohme and Westfeld [5] observed that the histogram<br />

<strong>of</strong> the DCT coefficients in a natural image is not always<br />

conforming the distribution. There exist more outlier high<br />

precision bins in the histogram in a cover image than in a<br />

stego image. Judging from the number <strong>of</strong> outlier bins, cover<br />

images and stego images can be differentiated.<br />

Attacking YASS: The locations <strong>of</strong> the H-blocks <strong>of</strong> YASS<br />

are determined by a key, which is not available to Wendy.<br />

Therefore, it may not be straightforward for Wendy to observe<br />

the embedding artifacts. Li et al. [4] proposed a method for<br />

attacking the YASS.<br />

C. Universal Approaches<br />

Unlike specific steganalytic methods which require knowing<br />

the details <strong>of</strong> the targeted steganographic methods, universal<br />

steganalysis [31] requires less or even no such priori information.<br />

A universal steganalytic approach usually takes a learning<br />

based strategy which involves a training stage and a testing<br />

stage. The process is illustrated in Figure below.<br />

Fig. 3.<br />

Universal approaches <strong>of</strong> <strong>Steganalysis</strong><br />

During the process, a feature extraction step is used in<br />

both training and testing stage. Its function is to map an<br />

input image from a high-dimensional image space to a lowdimensional<br />

feature space. The aim <strong>of</strong> the training stage is<br />

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to obtain a trained classifier. Many effective classifiers, such<br />

as Fisher linear discriminant (FLD), support vector machine<br />

(SVM), neural network (NN), etc., can be selected. Decision<br />

boundaries are formed by the classifier to separate the feature<br />

space into positive regions and negative regions with the help<br />

<strong>of</strong> the feature vectors extracted from the training images. In the<br />

testing stage, with the trained classifier that has the decision<br />

boundaries, an image under question is classified according<br />

to its feature vector’s domination in the feature space. If<br />

the feature vector locates in a region where the classifier is<br />

labeled as positive, the testing image is classified as a positive<br />

class (stego image). Otherwise, it is classified as a negative<br />

class (cover image). In the following, some typical universal<br />

steganalytic features has been discussed.<br />

<strong>Image</strong> Quality Feature: Steganographic schemes may<br />

more or less cause some forms <strong>of</strong> degradation to the image.<br />

Objective image quality measures (IQMs) are quantitative<br />

metrics based on image features for gauging the distortion. The<br />

statistical evidence left by steganography may be captured by<br />

a group <strong>of</strong> IQMs and then exploited for detection [12]. In order<br />

to seek specific quality measures that are sensitive, consistent<br />

and monotonic to steganographic artifacts and distortions, the<br />

analysis <strong>of</strong> variance (ANOVA) technique is exploited and the<br />

ranking <strong>of</strong> the goodness <strong>of</strong> the metrics is done according to the<br />

F-score in the ANOVA tests. And the identified metrics can<br />

be defined as feature sets to distinguish between cover images<br />

and stego images. Calibration Based Feature: Fridrich et al.<br />

[6] applied the feature-based classification together with the<br />

concept <strong>of</strong> calibration to devise a blind detector specific to<br />

JPEG images. Here the calibration means that some parameters<br />

<strong>of</strong> the cover image may be approximately recovered by <strong>using</strong><br />

the stego image as side information. As a result, the calibration<br />

process increases the features’ sensitivity to the embedding<br />

modifications while suppressing image-to-image variations.<br />

Applying calibration to the Markov process based features<br />

described in [32] and reducing their dimension, Pevny et al.<br />

merged the resulting feature sets to produce a 274-dimensional<br />

feature vector [24]. The new feature set is then used to<br />

construct a multi-classifier capable <strong>of</strong> assigning stego images<br />

to six popular steganographic algorithms.<br />

Moment Based Feature: The impact <strong>of</strong> steganography to<br />

a cover image can be regarded as introducing some stegonoise.<br />

As noise is added, some statistics <strong>of</strong> the image may be<br />

changed. It is effective to observe these changes in wavelet<br />

domain. Lyu and Farid [28] used the assumption that the<br />

PDF <strong>of</strong> the wavelet sub band coefficients and that <strong>of</strong> the<br />

prediction error <strong>of</strong> the sub band coefficients would change after<br />

data embedding. In ref. [9], a 3-level wavelet decomposition,<br />

the first four PDF moments, i.e., mean, variance, skewness,<br />

and kurtosis, <strong>of</strong> the sub band coefficients at each high-pass<br />

orientation (horizontal, vertical and diagonal direction) <strong>of</strong> each<br />

level are taken into consideration as one set <strong>of</strong> features. The<br />

same kinds <strong>of</strong> PDF moments <strong>of</strong> the difference between the<br />

logarithm <strong>of</strong> the sub band coefficients and the logarithm <strong>of</strong> the<br />

coefficients’ cross-sub band linear predictions at each highpass<br />

orientation <strong>of</strong> each level are computed as another set<br />

<strong>of</strong> features. These two kinds <strong>of</strong> features provide satisfactory<br />

results when the embedding rate is high.<br />

IJCTA | JULY-AUGUST 2011<br />

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Correlation Based Feature: Data embedding may disturb<br />

the local correlation in an image. Here the correlation is mainly<br />

referred to the inter-pixel dependency for a spatial image, and<br />

the intra-block or inter-block DCT coefficient dependency for<br />

a JPEG image. Sullivan et al. [17] modeled the inter-pixel<br />

dependency by Markov chain and depicted it by a gray-level<br />

co-occurrence matrix (GLCM) in practice.<br />

III. REGRESSION ANALYSIS METHOD<br />

In statistics, regression analysis includes any techniques for<br />

modeling and analyzing several variables, when the focus is<br />

on the relationship between a dependent variable and one<br />

or more independent variables. More specifically, regression<br />

analysis helps one understand how the typical value <strong>of</strong> the<br />

dependent variable changes when any one <strong>of</strong> the independent<br />

variables is varied, while the other independent variables are<br />

held fixed. In all cases, the estimation target is a function<br />

<strong>of</strong> the independent variables called the regression function.<br />

In regression analysis, it is also <strong>of</strong> interest to characterize<br />

the variation <strong>of</strong> the dependent variable around the regression<br />

function, which can be described by a probability distribution.<br />

Regression analysis is widely used for prediction and<br />

forecasting, where its use has substantial overlap with the<br />

field <strong>of</strong> machine learning. Regression analysis is also used to<br />

understand which among the independent variables are related<br />

to the dependent variable, and to explore the forms <strong>of</strong> these<br />

relationships. In restricted circumstances, regression analysis<br />

can be used to infer causal relationships between the independent<br />

and dependent variables. A large body <strong>of</strong> techniques for<br />

carrying out regression analysis has been developed. Familiar<br />

methods such as linear regression and ordinary least squares<br />

regression are parametric, in that the regression function is<br />

defined in terms <strong>of</strong> a finite number <strong>of</strong> unknown parameters that<br />

are estimated from the data. Nonparametric regression refers<br />

to techniques that allow the regression function to lie in a<br />

specified set <strong>of</strong> functions, which may be infinite-dimensional.<br />

The performance <strong>of</strong> regression analysis methods in practice<br />

depends on the form <strong>of</strong> the data-generating process, and how<br />

it relates to the regression approach being used. Since the<br />

true form <strong>of</strong> the data-generating process is in general not<br />

known, regression analysis <strong>of</strong>ten depends to some extent on<br />

making assumptions about this process. These assumptions<br />

are sometimes (but not always) testable if a large amount <strong>of</strong><br />

data is available. Regression models for prediction are <strong>of</strong>ten<br />

useful even when the assumptions are moderately violated,<br />

although they may not perform optimally. However, in many<br />

applications, especially with small effects or questions <strong>of</strong><br />

causality based on observational data, regression methods give<br />

misleading results.<br />

Regression models:Regression models involve the following<br />

variables<br />

• The unknown parameters denoted as β this may be a<br />

scalar or a vector.<br />

• The independent variables X.<br />

• The dependent variable Y.<br />

In various fields <strong>of</strong> application, different terminologies<br />

are used in place <strong>of</strong> dependent and independent variables.<br />

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A regression model relates Y to a function <strong>of</strong> X and β.<br />

Y = F (X, β) The approximation is usually formalized as<br />

E(Y |X) = f(X, β). To carry out regression analysis, the form<br />

<strong>of</strong> the function f must be specified. Sometimes the form <strong>of</strong> this<br />

function is based on knowledge about the relationship between<br />

Y and X that does not rely on the data. If no such knowledge<br />

is available, a flexible or convenient form for f is chosen.<br />

A. Linear regression<br />

In linear regression, the model specification is that the dependent<br />

variable, y i is a linear combination <strong>of</strong> the parameters<br />

(but need not be linear in the independent variables). For<br />

example, in simple linear regression for modeling n data points<br />

there is one independent variable: x i , and two parameters, β 0<br />

and β 1 :<br />

y i = β 0 + β 1 x i + ɛ i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (1)<br />

In multiple linear regression, there are several independent<br />

variables or functions <strong>of</strong> independent variables. For example,<br />

adding a term in x i 2 to the preceding regression gives<br />

parabola:<br />

1) Calculation <strong>of</strong> the AR parameters: There are many ways<br />

to estimate the coefficients: the OLS procedure, method <strong>of</strong><br />

moments (through Yule Walker equations). The AR(p) model<br />

is given by the equation<br />

p∑<br />

X t = ϕ i X t−i + ε t (5)<br />

i=1<br />

It is based on parameters where i = 1, ..., p. There is a direct<br />

correspondence between these parameters and the covariance<br />

function <strong>of</strong> the process, and this correspondence can be<br />

inverted to determine the parameters from the autocorrelation<br />

function (which is itself obtained from the covariances). This<br />

is done <strong>using</strong> the Yule-Walker equations.<br />

Yule-Walker equations: The Yule-Walker equations are the<br />

following set <strong>of</strong> equations<br />

p∑<br />

γ m = ϕ k γ m−k + σεδ 2 m,0 (6)<br />

k=1<br />

where m = 0, ... , p, yielding p + 1 equations. γ m is the<br />

autocorrelation function <strong>of</strong> X, δ ɛ is the standard deviation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the input noise process, and δ m , 0 is the Kronecker delta<br />

function. Because the last part <strong>of</strong> the equation is non-zero only<br />

if m = 0, the equation is usually solved by representing it as<br />

a matrix for m > 0, thus getting equation solving all ϕ .<br />

y i = β 0 + β 1 x i + β 2 x i 2 + ɛ i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (2)<br />

This is still linear regression; although the expression on<br />

the right hand side is quadratic in the independent variable<br />

x i , it is linear in the parameters β 0 , β 1 and β 2 . In both<br />

cases epsilon i is an error term and the subscript i indexes<br />

a particular observation. Given a random sample from the<br />

population, we estimate the population parameters and obtain<br />

the sample linear regression model:<br />

ŷ i = ˆβ 0 + β ˆ 1 x i (3)<br />

The residual e i = y i −ŷ i is the difference between the value<br />

<strong>of</strong> the dependent variable predicted by the model ŷ i and the<br />

true value <strong>of</strong> the dependent variable y i .<br />

B. Auto Regressive(AR)<br />

In statistics and signal processing, an autoregressive (AR)<br />

model is a type <strong>of</strong> random process which is <strong>of</strong>ten used to<br />

model and predict various types <strong>of</strong> natural phenomena. The<br />

autoregressive model is one <strong>of</strong> a group <strong>of</strong> linear prediction<br />

formulas that attempt to predict an output <strong>of</strong> a system based<br />

on the previous outputs. The notation AR(p) indicates an<br />

autoregressive model <strong>of</strong> order p. The AR(p) model is defined<br />

as<br />

p∑<br />

X t = c + ϕ i X t−i + ε t (4)<br />

i=1<br />

where ϕ 1 ,......,ϕ p are the parameters <strong>of</strong> the model, c is a<br />

constant (<strong>of</strong>ten omitted for simplicity) and ε t is white noise.<br />

IJCTA | JULY-AUGUST 2011<br />

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For m = 0 we have γ 0 = ∑ p<br />

k=1 ϕ kγ −k + σ 2 ε which allows<br />

us to solve σ 2 ε.<br />

The above equations (the Yule-Walker equations) provide<br />

one route to estimating the parameters <strong>of</strong> an AR(p) model, by<br />

replacing the theoretical covariances with estimated values.<br />

One way <strong>of</strong> specifying the estimated covariances is equivalent<br />

to a calculation <strong>using</strong> least squares regression <strong>of</strong> values X t on<br />

the p previous values <strong>of</strong> the same series.<br />

IV. IMAGE FEATURE EXTRACTION<br />

To construct the features <strong>of</strong> both cover and stego or suspicious<br />

images various auto regressive statistics <strong>of</strong> the image<br />

series has been used,namely AR(1) coefficients,Std error,Rsquared<br />

values,S.E.<strong>of</strong> regression,t-statistics.AR(1) coefficients<br />

are the auto regression coefficients <strong>of</strong> AR model <strong>of</strong> order 1<br />

For example an order 1 AR analysis gives a coefficient <strong>of</strong><br />

0.941872, this is not totally surprising as it is saying that by<br />

only looking at one term in the series the next term in the<br />

series is probably almost the same, i.e.: x t+1 = 0.941872∗x t .<br />

Std Error is the Error <strong>of</strong> the estimate between original and the<br />

predicted one.<br />

In statistics, the coefficient <strong>of</strong> determination R 2 is used in<br />

the context <strong>of</strong> statistical models whose main purpose is the<br />

prediction <strong>of</strong> future outcomes on the basis <strong>of</strong> other related<br />

information. It is the proportion <strong>of</strong> variability in a data set<br />

that is accounted for by the statistical model. It provides a<br />

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measure <strong>of</strong> how well future outcomes are likely to be predicted<br />

by the model.The t statistic is a measure <strong>of</strong> how extreme<br />

a statistical estimate is. This statistic can be computed by<br />

subtracting the hypothesized value from the statistical estimate<br />

and then dividing by the estimated standard error. In many,<br />

but not all situation, the hypothesized value would be zero.An<br />

indication is that the hypothesized value is reasonable when<br />

the t-statistic is close to zero. Alternately, it an be concluded<br />

the hypothesized value is not large enough when the t-statistic<br />

is large positive. Finally, it can be said that the hypothesized<br />

value is too large when the t-statistic is large<br />

V. STEGANALYSIS TECHNIQUE BASED ON REGRESSION<br />

ANALYSIS<br />

The <strong>Steganalysis</strong> technique proposed here to test the presence<br />

<strong>of</strong> the hidden message is the combination <strong>of</strong> multiple<br />

regression analysis based on the cover data and stego data<br />

series and the AR modeling <strong>of</strong> the suspicious data for the<br />

estimation <strong>of</strong> the presence <strong>of</strong> the secret message as well as<br />

the predictive size <strong>of</strong> the hidden message.<br />

Let C and S be the series modeling the distribution <strong>of</strong> the<br />

cover and stego image pixels, a multiple regression analysis<br />

can be done in order to express S (dependent variable) as a<br />

function <strong>of</strong> the cover data C (independent variable) can be<br />

modeled as multiple regression model S = I + a ∗ C where I<br />

is the constant and a is the regression coefficient.<br />

In order to measures <strong>of</strong> the strength <strong>of</strong> association <strong>of</strong><br />

the model the four regression statistics namely <strong>Multiple</strong> R,R<br />

Square ,Adjusted R square and standard error needs to be<br />

computed.<br />

It has been seen from the experiments that multiple<br />

regression model between two same series namely a and b<br />

can be expressed as b = (0) + (1) ∗ a and the model summary<br />

are as follows<br />

Regression Statistics Value(in percentage)<br />

R-Square 100%<br />

R-Square Adjusted 100%<br />

S (Root Mean Square Error) 0%<br />

The value <strong>of</strong> the regression statistics changes with the<br />

introduction <strong>of</strong> impurity in one <strong>of</strong> the series.<br />

<strong>Steganalysis</strong> approach has been designed here based on the<br />

above mentioned fact considering cover image data as the<br />

independent data series and stego image data as the dependent<br />

series data. From the experimental results it can be shown that<br />

with the introduction <strong>of</strong> secret message/increasing length <strong>of</strong><br />

the secret message those regression statistics changes. Hence<br />

it an be hypothesize that regression analysis between the cover<br />

data and stego data will cluster differently for clean and stegoimages.<br />

This is the basis <strong>of</strong> proposed steganalyzer that aims<br />

to classify images as original and suspicious.AR modeling is<br />

done in order to estimate the strength <strong>of</strong> the association among<br />

the variables <strong>of</strong> a series .It can be seen that with the increasing<br />

in the message length the AR parameters changes drastically.<br />

The steganalysis system works in in four stages: Regression<br />

based feature generation, feature selection, SVM classifier<br />

IJCTA | JULY-AUGUST 2011<br />

Available online@www.ijcta.com<br />

Fig. 4.<br />

Block diagram <strong>of</strong> proposed steganalysis system<br />

selection and training, and finally, steganalysis i.e. detection<br />

<strong>of</strong> the suspicious image. The first three steps were performed<br />

<strong>using</strong> only the training set. The final step was performed on<br />

the test collection to generate the submitted results.<br />

VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS<br />

The steganalyzer has been designed based on a training set<br />

and <strong>using</strong> various image steganographic tools. The steganographic<br />

tools used here Steganos [12] and S-Tools [13] since<br />

these were among the most popular and cited tools in the<br />

literature. In the experiments 10 images were used for training<br />

and 10 images for testing. After applying <strong>LSB</strong> replacement<br />

algorithm for embedding secret message into the cover image<br />

with the embedding ratio <strong>of</strong> p= 0,0.01,0.02,...,0.1 with 1%<br />

in increments and from 10% to100% respectively with 10%<br />

increments ,various stego images has been created. <strong>Multiple</strong><br />

Regression analysis and AR(1) modeling has been used to<br />

estimate the various regression statistics <strong>of</strong> those stego images.<br />

This steganalyzer can predicted the approximate area <strong>of</strong> the<br />

hidden message as well as the embedding message length can<br />

also be predicted on the basis <strong>of</strong> those regression statistics.<br />

Fig. 5.<br />

AR(1) coefficient <strong>of</strong> Lena as Cover <strong>Image</strong><br />

Fig 5 shows the AR(1) statistics <strong>of</strong> the original Lena image<br />

and Fig 6 shows the changes AR(1) statistics <strong>of</strong> that same<br />

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Fig. 6. AR(1) coefficient <strong>of</strong> Lena having Insertion rate 0.01<br />

image after embedding 0.01% <strong>of</strong> data .The Figure 7 shows the<br />

AR(1) statistics <strong>of</strong> the Lena image with different embedding<br />

rate. <strong>Multiple</strong> regression statistics <strong>of</strong> the Lena image has been<br />

shown in figure 8.<br />

Fig. 8. <strong>Multiple</strong> Regression statistics <strong>of</strong> the Lena image with different<br />

embedding rate<br />

Fig. 7.<br />

AR(1) statistics <strong>of</strong> the Lena image with different embedding rate<br />

From figure 7 and 8 it can be seen that with the introduction<br />

<strong>of</strong> small message AR (1) statistics and multiple regression<br />

statistics both changes drastically. To build the classes <strong>of</strong> cover<br />

images, multiple regression statistics and AR (1) statistics <strong>of</strong><br />

10 natural (cover) images (Lena, Pepper etc) are inserted in<br />

the database. Next step is to produce stego images with those<br />

natural images with random bits and different rates in another<br />

database. Natural images database with multiple regression<br />

statistics are used for training set from which the classifiers are<br />

tuned. With help <strong>of</strong> this an incoming image can be classified<br />

as stego or natural image.<br />

Fig 9 below shows the AR(1) statistics <strong>of</strong> the original<br />

segmented Lena image and Fig 10 shows the changes AR(1)<br />

statistics <strong>of</strong> those segmented block <strong>of</strong> the image after embedding<br />

0.01% <strong>of</strong> data .From these two figure it can be seen<br />

that AR(1) parameters has changed in block 1 and 2 with the<br />

introduction <strong>of</strong> data where as block 3 and block 4 parameters<br />

are remain un-changed.Thus it can be concluded that secret<br />

data has been embedded in block 1 and block 2 portion <strong>of</strong> the<br />

cover image.<br />

Next step is to predict the length <strong>of</strong> the hidden message. The<br />

classifier is trained with the AR (1) statistics <strong>of</strong> the natural<br />

Fig. 9.<br />

Fig. 10.<br />

AR Series <strong>of</strong> LENA<br />

Residual Plot <strong>of</strong> LENA<br />

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rate as follows<br />

Fig. 11.<br />

AR(1) parameters in different segment <strong>of</strong> Lena as Cover <strong>Image</strong><br />

Fig. 14.<br />

Prediction <strong>of</strong> Embedding Capacity<br />

Fig. 12. AR(1) parameters in different segment <strong>of</strong> Lena as with embedding<br />

rate 0.01 percent<br />

images in order to form a relation between the embedding<br />

capacity and AR(1) statistics.The classifier is trained with the<br />

AR (1) statistics <strong>of</strong> the natural images in order to form a<br />

relation between the embedding capacity and various AR(1)<br />

statistics. Insertion rate can be computed from the AR(1)<br />

statistics <strong>using</strong> <strong>Multiple</strong> Regression analysis.Insertion Rate<br />

(IR) can be calculated from eqn given below.<br />

From the above table it can be concluded that insertion rate<br />

can be predicted with an average error rate <strong>of</strong> 30-35 %.Thus<br />

we can say embedding length <strong>of</strong> the secret message can be<br />

successfully predicted 65-70% with this steganalyzer.<br />

A comparision has been done with the proposed method<br />

along with the BSM,FBS and WBS algorithms.It can be seen<br />

that the proposed method has a good performance in terms <strong>of</strong><br />

detection rate and prediction <strong>of</strong> the message length.<br />

IR = (−5390.1) + (5302.1) ∗ AR(1)Coeff<br />

+(124397) ∗ Std.Error<br />

+(0.007858) ∗ R.SquaredV alue. (7)<br />

Embedding capacity can be predicted based on the insertion<br />

Fig. 15.<br />

Comparison with other method<br />

Fig. 13.<br />

Detection rate <strong>of</strong> the classifier at various embedding rate<br />

IJCTA | JULY-AUGUST 2011<br />

Available online@www.ijcta.com<br />

VII. CONCLUSION<br />

In this paper a new approach <strong>of</strong> <strong>LSB</strong> steganalysis is<br />

proposed.In this method auto regression as well as multiple<br />

regression parameter has been used for steganalysis. This<br />

algorithm not only detect the presence <strong>of</strong> the hidden message<br />

but can also be able to predict the length <strong>of</strong> the secret message.This<br />

method is also capable <strong>of</strong> finding the approximate<br />

hidden area <strong>of</strong> the secret message. This new proposed method<br />

is a good steganalysis algorithm that is useful for both cases<br />

gray-scale and color images which is one <strong>of</strong> the superiority<br />

factor <strong>of</strong> the proposed method in comparison with the some<br />

other existing methods that are efficient either for gray-scale<br />

or color image.<br />

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