brought under the dominican republic - central america - ita
brought under the dominican republic - central america - ita
brought under the dominican republic - central america - ita
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Legislativa was fully aware that <strong>the</strong> wording of Article 15 provided consent by <strong>the</strong><br />
Respondent to ICSID jurisdiction. 167<br />
5.19. In this regard, <strong>the</strong> Claimant alleges that <strong>the</strong> Respondent has not only declined to address<br />
<strong>the</strong> contents of this legislative presentation, but also has failed to provide any<br />
evidence contradicting <strong>the</strong> Claimant‟s case. Indeed, according to <strong>the</strong> Claimant, <strong>the</strong><br />
Respondent did not provide any evidence (i.e. witness statement, legislative history,<br />
academic commentary, etc.) confirming its case that it was never <strong>the</strong> intention of <strong>the</strong><br />
Salvadoran legislature to provide for <strong>the</strong> Respondent‟s unilateral consent to ICSID<br />
arbitration in <strong>the</strong> Investment Law. 168<br />
5.20. With respect to <strong>the</strong> Respondent‟s invocation of Article 146 of <strong>the</strong> Salvadoran Constitution,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Claimant states that: (i) <strong>the</strong> Respondent provides no legal authority to<br />
support its contention that <strong>the</strong> Salvadoran Supreme Court has ever applied <strong>the</strong> maxim<br />
“expressio unius est exclusio alterius” to interpret <strong>the</strong> Respondent‟s Constitution;<br />
and since <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to interpret <strong>the</strong> Salvadoran<br />
Constitution in El Salvador, this Tribunal should not allow itself to be pressed into<br />
doing what <strong>the</strong> Respondent‟s Supreme Court would not itself do; and (ii) even if <strong>the</strong><br />
Tribunal were to decide that it could properly apply <strong>the</strong> maxim ―expressio unius est<br />
exclusio alterius‖, it should appreciate its limited value as a tool for legal interpretation<br />
in <strong>the</strong> present case. 169<br />
5.21. With regard to <strong>the</strong> Respondent‟s attempt to attribute significance to <strong>the</strong> fact that Article<br />
15 does not contain <strong>the</strong> exact same language as used in some of <strong>the</strong> Respondent‟s<br />
BITs or in CAFTA, 170 <strong>the</strong> Claimant submits that <strong>the</strong> facts, that <strong>the</strong> word “consent”<br />
or references to “mandatory” arbitration were included in some BITs, is not<br />
sufficient to conclude that <strong>the</strong> absence of such mandatory language or <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong><br />
word “consent” in <strong>the</strong> Investment Law established that <strong>the</strong> Respondent did not intend<br />
to consent to ICSID jurisdiction in that legislative instrument. 171<br />
167<br />
168<br />
169<br />
170<br />
171<br />
Jurisdiction Counter-Memorial, § 458; Jurisdiction Rejoinder, § 301; Hearing D1.148; <strong>the</strong> Claimant‟s Post-<br />
Hearing Submissions, footnote 172.<br />
Jurisdiction Rejoinder, §§ 284 and 303; Hearing D1147; Claimant‟s Post-Hearing Submissions, § 96.<br />
Jurisdiction Counter-Memorial, §§ 463-466; Jurisdiction Rejoinder, §§ 307-312; Hearing D1.147; <strong>the</strong><br />
Claimant‟s Post-Hearing Submissions, § 95.<br />
Claimant‟s Post-Hearing Submissions, § 94.<br />
Jurisdiction Counter-Memorial, § 462; Jurisdiction Rejoinder, §§ 313-316.<br />
Part 5 - Page 6