brought under the dominican republic - central america - ita
brought under the dominican republic - central america - ita
brought under the dominican republic - central america - ita
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of a particular agreement”, citing NAFTA Article 1113 and also testimony before<br />
<strong>the</strong> US House of Representatives by one of CAFTA‟s US negotiators (paragraph 3).<br />
4.56. The USA observes (in common with Costa Rica) that a CAFTA Party is not required<br />
to invoke denial of benefits <strong>under</strong> CAFTA Article 10.12.2 before an arbitration<br />
commences; and that it may do so as part of a jurisdictional defence after a claim has<br />
been submitted to arbitration (paragraph 5). The USA likewise observes that this<br />
CAFTA provision contains no time-limit for its invocation; and that a contrary interpretation<br />
would place an untenable burden on a CAFTA Party, contrary to <strong>the</strong> purpose<br />
of CAFTA Article 10.12.2:<br />
― ... It would require <strong>the</strong> respondent, in effect, to monitor <strong>the</strong> ever-changing business<br />
activities of all enterprises in <strong>the</strong> territories of each of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r six CAFTA-DR Parties<br />
that attempt to make, are making, or have made investments in <strong>the</strong> territory of<br />
<strong>the</strong> respondent [citing Ms Kinnear‘s NAFTA Commentary]. This would include conducting,<br />
on a continuing basis, factual research, for all such enterprises, on <strong>the</strong>ir respective<br />
corporate structures and <strong>the</strong> extent of <strong>the</strong>ir business activities in those<br />
countries. To be effective, such monitoring would in many cases require foreign investors<br />
to provide business confidential and o<strong>the</strong>r types of non-public information<br />
for review. Requiring CAFTA-DR Parties to conduct this kind of continuous oversight<br />
in order to be able to invoke <strong>the</strong> denial of benefits provision <strong>under</strong> Article<br />
10.12.2 before a claim is submitted to arbitration would <strong>under</strong>mine <strong>the</strong> purpose of<br />
<strong>the</strong> provision‖ (paragraph 6).<br />
4.57. The USA also observes that nei<strong>the</strong>r CAFTA Article 10.12.2 nor CAFTA Article<br />
18.3 require a CAFTA Party to give any notice to a claimant (such as <strong>the</strong> Claimant<br />
in <strong>the</strong> present case); and <strong>the</strong> USA notes that CAFTA Article 20.4.1 is only discretionary<br />
even as to CAFTA Parties: “Any Party may request in writing consultations<br />
with any o<strong>the</strong>r Party ...” (emphasis supplied).<br />
(05) Amicus Curiae<br />
4.58. The Amicus Curiae observes in its Submission that CAFTA Article 10.12.2 “provides<br />
an important safeguard to CAFTA Parties and <strong>the</strong>ir citizens” and “cannot be<br />
emptied of practical effect” or rendered “a nullity” (page 13).<br />
4.59. The Amicus Curiae also observes that an imposed time-limit for <strong>the</strong> invocation of<br />
denial of benefits by a CAFTA Party “would necessarily be expensive” for that<br />
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