Who and where are the Equator Banks? - IILJ

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Introduction 1 

What are the Equator Principles? 2 

Who and where are the Equator Banks? 3 

What are the Equator Banks looking for? 4 

Why have the Equator Banks adopted the Equator Principles? 5 

What difference have the Equator Principles made to the Equator Banks? 11 

What do NGOs think of the Equator Principles? 16 

Loan documentation issues 19 

Where next for the Equator Principles? 23 

Recommendations for Equator Banks 25 

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This is a summary report of the results of a survey into the impact of the 

Equator Principles on the lending practices of the banks that have adopted 

them. Members of our London environmental, planning and regulatory 

group carried out the survey, with the assistance of partners and associates 

in the firm’s project finance group. The summary report is very much a 

work in progress. 

The survey was conducted first, by means of specially tailored 

questionnaires addressed to the major project finance banks (both Equator 

Banks and others); sponsors of major projects, ethical funds, consultants, 

and public bodies; and environmental and other non-government 

organisations (NGOs) (including some which specifically monitor the 

activities of banks). Secondly, a series of interviews was conducted with 

leading figures at the Equator Banks, non-Equator Banks, sponsors, NGOs, 

trade associations, law firms, accountancy firms, public bodies and 

consultancies experienced in implementing and advising on the Equator 

Principles. In some cases, it was possible to obtain good quality information 

in a single interview. However, in some cases more than one interview was 

carried out with the same person or with several people at one institution 

not only to fill in information gaps or deficiencies in knowledge but 

because we found that they had important insights and valuable knowledge 

of aspects of the evolution, drafting, implementation or impact of the 

Equator Principles. 

In this summary report, we have not identified any participants or 

organisations or attributed views or quotations to any participant and we 

have not cited more than a handful of written or electronic sources. 

We acknowledge gratefully the assistance of all those who participated in 

the survey. 

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The Equator Principles (Principles) are a set of voluntary guidelines, 

drafted by four banks (ABN Amro, Barclays, Citigroup and West LB) with 

assistance from the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The Principles 

were adopted in June 2003 by 10 banks and by the beginning of 2005 had 

been adopted by 28 financial institutions (27 banks and one export credit 

agency (ECA)). 

The Principles represent an attempt by a group of important banks 

influential in the project finance market (Equator Banks) to introduce into 

their lending decisions a more structured and rigorous consideration of the 

social and environmental impacts of the projects they are being asked to 

fund. 

An Equator Bank can only lend to projects whose sponsors the bank 

considers are able and willing to comply with comprehensive processes to 

ensure that projects are conducted in a socially responsible manner and 

according to sound environmental management practices. 

The Equator Banks apply the Principles to all loans for projects with a 

capital cost of $50m or more. 

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Unsurprisingly, most (although not all) of the Equator Banks are in north 

America or Europe. The Equator Banks account for about 80 per cent of 

global project finance. 

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The environmental and social screening process for projects is based on that 

used by the IFC. Projects are categorised as A, B or C projects 

(respectively, those displaying high, medium or low environmental or 

social risk). For all Category A and Category B projects (high and medium 

risk), a borrower must carry out an Environmental Assessment, which 

addresses the environmental and social issues identified in the 

categorisation process. 

The Environmental Assessment must show that the project complies with 

host country laws, regulations and permits required by the project, with the 

World Bank guidelines and IFC Pollution Prevention and Abatement 

Guidelines for the relevant industry sector. For projects in ‘low and middle 

income countries’ only 1 , the Environmental Assessment must also take into 

account the IFC Safeguard Polices, which provide guidance on issues such 

as natural habitats, indigenous peoples, involuntary resettlement, safety of 

dams, forestry, cultural property and other matters. 

For all Category A projects and certain Category B projects, the borrower 

or a third party expert must prepare an Environmental Management Plan 

(EMP). 

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The Equator Principles have been accepted by many of the world’s leading 

project finance banks, but not by all of them. 

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Why, then, have some banks adopted the Principles and some have not? 

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Banks are extremely sensitive to the impact of damage to their reputation, 

which can have long-lasting and spectacular effects, particularly in the field 

of retail banking. The famous examples of the student boycott of Barclays 

over its investment in pre-Mandela South Africa and the seizure of Nazi 

gold held by certain Swiss banks haunt the imaginations of many bankers. 

Furthermore, banks see themselves as particularly vulnerable, in that their 

own reputations may be adversely affected by the actions of a client over 

whose commercial strategy they have no direct control – indeed, the actions 

which bring public criticism of the client (and, therefore, by implication, of 

the bank) may not be those in which the bank is directly concerned. As one 

consultee put it during the survey, consumer boycotts may not be fair, but 

that does not mean that they are not effective! 

Furthermore, many banks value their inclusion in indexes such as 

FTSE4Good or the Dow Jones Sustainability Index highly, as an 

endorsement of their reputation. They see adoption of and compliance with 

the Principles as facilitating their inclusion in these indexes. 

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Some Equator Banks signed up because they thought that they had nothing 

to lose, because their pre-existing lending practices already satisfied (or 

nearly satisfied) the requirements of the Principles in that they had wellestablished 

in-house risk assessment capability and had adopted those 

principles, standards and policies to assess the social and environmental 

impacts of projects. 

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It was made clear to us during our survey that, for a number of Equator 

Banks, adopting the Principles was a top-down initiative being driven hard 

by their chairmen, chief executives and senior bankers. In one case, we 

were told that it would be a career-limiting move for anyone at the bank to 

fail to appreciate the importance the bank, the chairman, the chief executive 

and the global head of project finance attached to the Principles. 

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Unsurprisingly, many banks see the Principles as a way of demonstrating 

their sensitivity to widespread public concern over environmental and 

human rights issues. Many shareholders now reference these issues in 

making investment decisions, a trend which is most visible in the ‘ethical 

funds’ but is not confined to them. Similarly, the feeling that the bank is a 

socially responsible business may influence employee satisfaction and 

retention. 

The banking sector has also come under sustained pressure from 

environmental and human rights NGOs which see sponsor funding by 

banks as the oxygen of allegedly unsustainable projects. There are even 

NGOs which focus specifically on banking activities (of which BankTrack 

is perhaps the best-known). 

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Some Equator Banks have adopted the Principles in order to protect or 

increase their market share. This is based on the assumption that, in future, 

an increasing number of mature sponsors will choose an Equator Bank 

because the reputation and rigour of a leading Equator Bank may reduce 

political risk and protect projects against the possibility of expropriation by 

the host country as a result of non-compliance with its laws. 

Our survey suggested that there might be a trend among major sponsors to 

prefer Equator Banks for these reasons. There is, however, no hard 

evidence as yet that, in general, a virtuous circle of better social and 

environmental assessment of projects and better risk assessment in lending 

decisions is being formed between Equator Banks and major sponsors. 

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A number of sponsors have recognised an advantage in creating a level 

playing field for social and environmental assessment of projects in 

providing a wider syndication market. Equally, it is widely recognised that 

the levelling of the playing field may raise standards generally and squeeze 

out of the market those players not applying such rigorous standards of 

assessment. There is also a moral basis for what may ultimately result in a 

uniformity of approach. In response to the survey, one very senior banker 

said that he felt that environmental due diligence was not a ground upon 

which any bank should be competing with other banks. 

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Most of the Equator Banks endorse the view that the Principles, to quote the 

Principles website, ‘have become the project finance industry standard for 

addressing environmental and social issues in project financing globally’ 2 . 

Opinion on this point outside the circle of Equator Banks is mixed. While 

some non-Equator banks recognised the Principles as ‘the only game in 

town’, others (and, indeed, most Equator Banks) were sceptical whether 

sponsors would see any virtue in subjecting their projects to a more robust 

and expensive assessment process, although they recognised that there were 

pressures on sponsors to do so from stakeholders and governmental bodies. 

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Although the IFC sees the adoption of the Principles by private sector banks 

as representing a major advance, few Equator Banks took the view that the 

Principles in themselves marked a new chapter in sustainable development, 

but rather merely another step on the road towards its attainment. 

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Under the Basel II Framework agreement, as incorporated under the 

forthcoming EU Capital Requirements Directive, internationally active 

banks have to satisfy minimum capital requirements against credit risks and 

operational risks. However, the amount of capital reserved can be reduced 

if the bank can demonstrate to its banking supervisor that the internal risk 

assessment and management procedures employed by it are adequate to 

address those risks. Where banks have insufficiently developed internal risk 

assessment procedures to fully satisfy the entry criteria to qualify for the 

Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach to credit risk, they will be obliged to 

follow a supervisory category for risk weighting for specialised lending 

such as project finance. The supervisory categories are based upon certain 

slotting criteria that rate the exposure of a project finance transaction to 

various grades of risk (such as political and legal environment, including 

2 See www.equator-principles.com. 

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government support). It will be interesting to see whether banking 

supervisors will treat projects which are compliant with the Principles as 

contributing towards a higher supervisory rating grade and thereby 

requiring a reduced risk weighting. 

Banks that qualify for the advanced IRB approach are entitled to rely on 

their own internal estimates of risk components in determining the capital 

requirement for a given exposure. In order to achieve this standard, a bank 

must satisfy its supervisor that its credit risk management practices comply 

with certain minimum criteria. One such requirement is a credible track 

record in the use of internal ratings information for at least three years prior 

to qualification. To the extent that, based on such records, a bank has 

historical experience that projects which are Principles-compliant have 

lower default rates and loss estimates than similar projects which are not 

Principles-compliant, it would be entitled to allocate its own risk-weighting 

to the relevant risk component, which means that it could offer more 

competitive pricing to such a project. Similarly, compliance with the 

Principles could justify a bank reducing the capital charge allocated to the 

operational risk associated with the financing of such a project if this would 

mitigate the risk of the bank becoming directly liable for environmental 

losses. 

Linked to Basel II is the view of the rating agencies on the credit standing 

of banks and sponsors. Fitch Rating has stated that ‘in reflecting corporate 

governance within Fitch’s rating process, the focus primarily will be on 

how weak practices can impair a company’s financial position with 

somewhat less focus on how strong practices might help to enhance credit 

quality.’ However, our inquiries of rating agencies during the survey 

indicate that while corporate governance generally may be on the radar 

screen of the agencies, the Principles are not. 

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In the light of these advantages, why have some major project finance 

banks opted to stay out of the Equator fold? Their reluctance, of course, is 

not attributable to lack of concern about environmental and human rights 

issues, but to more sophisticated doubts about the value of the Equator 

process. It should be noted, incidentally, that the motivation of some (at 

least) of the non-Equator Banks in not adopting the Principles may bear 

comparison with the motives attributed by NGOs to those whom NGOs 

describe as ‘the PR Equator Banks’, i.e. Equator Banks which have adopted 

the Principles but are alleged to have done little more than emblazon the 

Principles on their websites. This criticism may be unjust to those banks 

which do not engage heavily in project finance but which have adopted the 

Principles in response to shareholder pressure. 

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A number of plausible reasons for staying out of the Equator group were 

advanced in answers to the survey. 

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Some non-Equator Banks feel that they are not yet ready to implement the 

Principles, because they do not have the internal mechanisms ready or the 

staff with the appropriate experience and expertise to enable them to review 

the environmental and other assessment material generated by an Equator 

project adequately. They are, therefore, afraid of being accused of 

hypocrisy if they were to adopt the Principles in such circumstances. Some 

of these banks, however, expressed an intention to adopt the Principles once 

they felt equipped to implement them properly. 

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One major UK bank already applies social and environmental review 

processes to all loans (not just project finance) of over £100,000 and 

therefore felt it would be a retrograde step to adopt the less demanding 

obligations in the Principles. 

A major absentee group is made up of the Japanese banks: only one has 

adopted the Principles. This phenomenon is explained by the adherence of 

the Japanese private sector banks to the social and environmental guidelines 

issued by the Japan Bank for International Co-operation (JBIC), which 

address similar issues to the Principles (although in a slightly different 

way). 

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Some outsiders doubted the real value of the Principles and whether the 

Equator Banks had in fact the capacity to implement them properly. They 

also felt that Equator Banks which claim that the Principles represent 

‘business as usual’ rather than a radical reform were both being 

disingenuous in promoting them as a new or important development and 

unnecessarily providing stakeholders and NGOs with another stick to beat 

the banks with, while the non-joiners were left relatively undisturbed. 

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There are market rumours that some banks which have not adopted the 

Principles are using that fact to suggest to less particular clients that it 

might be cheaper, quicker and less troublesome to finance a project through 

a bank which will not require costly and time-consuming environmental 

and social assessment. While this practice may occur in some localised 

project finance markets, it is unlikely to occur when loan syndication in 

more than one country is required. Our survey produced no hard evidence 

to support this view. 

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Some non-Equator Banks have hesitated to adopt the Principles because 

they see no rational grounds for confining social and environmental review 

to project lending and they are consequently uncertain of the extent of the 

final commitment and of its impact on their businesses. 

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A particular manifestation of this concern about uncertainty surrounds the 

forthcoming review of the IFC Safeguard Policies. As the Principles are 

linked to the Safeguard Policies, some banks have decided to ‘sit out’ the 

first stage until the Policies have been revised in a manner satisfactory to 

the private banking sector. 

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Our survey revealed that there is a vanguard of about four leading Equator 

Banks, in terms of their commitment to and development of the Principles. 

These banks were responsible for drafting and negotiating the Principles 

with the IFC. They liaise with each other on a regular basis and are at the 

forefront of development of policies and procedures. 

There follows a chasing pack of banks, which have demonstrated very real 

commitment to the Principles from top to bottom of their organisations. 

Behind the chasing pack are some ‘solid citizens’ who, while not leading 

the way on the Principles, nevertheless contribute fully to their 

development. 

There is, however, a fourth group of Equator Banks about which less 

positive views are expressed by NGOs and even by some of the Equator 

Banks and leading non-Equator Banks. It is said that members of this group 

do little project finance work, or have done little more than put their 

adoption of the Equator Principles on their websites and free-ride on the 

efforts of the other Equator Banks. 

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Our survey revealed pockets of deep ignorance about the Principles, but 

also that the Equator Banks are putting a great deal of resources, money and 

effort into training staff in order to correct this shortcoming. Former IFC 

staff provide much of this training on a consultancy basis. However, several 

Equator Banks have a self-standing IFC training package which can be run 

internally. 

Some banks only train very senior people, while others put all front-line 

staff through the programme. 

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Some banks already had significant in-house expertise, although usually 

only on environmental risk assessment. There is also a wide variation in 

numbers of staff deployed on Equator work. Some banks only employ a 

small specialist unit, while others have rapidly expanded their teams. There 

has been some outside recruitment, but in most cases staff have been 

redeployed internally. 

Few banks have panels of external expert advisers on social and 

environmental matters, although a small number of Equator Banks 

suggested that they had at this stage sufficient expertise in-house to provide 

complete coverage of all relevant issues. 

NN= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 

tÜ~í=ÇáÑÑÉêÉåÅÉ=Ü~îÉ=íÜÉ=bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=ã~ÇÉ=íç=íÜÉ= 

bèì~íçê=_~åâë\=EÅçåíáåìÉÇF= 

One area where there was uniform concern was social impact assessment, 

in spite of the fact that bilateral and multilateral lenders and export credit 

agencies have been carrying out such assessments for some time. 

Equator Banks and sponsors, in our view at least, have made some 

surprising choices when appointing external experts. For example, 

engineering firms (rather than environmental or legal experts or 

economists) appear to be charged with a wide range of tasks that are not 

wholly or partly within their field of expertise, qualification or knowledge. 

Equally worrying was the discovery that some Equator Banks appear to 

take the view that they had discharged their duty in respect of the Equator 

Principles by accepting the findings of sponsors’ consultants. In many 

cases, irrespective of the project categorisation, it may be prudent for the 

Equator Banks to engage independent consultants to review the reports 

provided by the sponsor or the sponsor’s technical consultants. 

fåíÉêå~ä=éêçÅÉëëÉë= 

There is a very real danger that information will be received by Equator 

Banks, but not acted upon or that the actions taken will be inadequate or 

unnecessarily delayed. As inaction may trigger civil or criminal liability for 

the Equator Banks, it is important that there should be a clear chain of 

communication within the bank discharging the Equator Principles function 

(the Environment Bank), and that a senior officer within the Environment 

Bank should be charged with supervising information assessment and 

communication within the Environment Bank itself and within the 

syndicate. This should be an ongoing process, rather than, as was suggested 

to us by a leading environmental consultant of an IFC practice, one where 

reports are left to fester over the year and then given superficial 

examination to comply with internal deadlines. 

Where a loan is syndicated, syndicate members will have to be confident 

that the Environment Bank (whether an Equator Bank or non-Equator 

Bank) nominated to ensure that the project is compliant with the Principles 

is sufficiently robust in its approach and application, in order to ensure that 

the reputation of each syndicate member is protected. 

j~âáåÖ=~=ÇáÑÑÉêÉåÅÉ=íç=íÜÉ=éêçàÉÅí= 

A problem with project assessment by Equator Banks which applies to all 

projects is that the lending banks may not become involved in projects early 

enough to influence the fundamentals of the project, laying the banks open 

to the charge that the Principles are just window-dressing or, in 

NGO-speak, carrying out ‘greenwash’. 

NO= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 



A particularly difficult assessment issue is raised by staged projects. Where 

the initial stages of a project, such as motorway projects, have not been the 

subject of review in accordance with the Principles but current or future 

stages are so assessed, complications arise. Equator Banks at the early stage 

of the development and implementation of the Principles have tended to be 

pragmatic in their approach to staged projects. At least as far as the future 

stages of staged projects are concerned, the difficulty of financing and 

syndication without some sort of framework for environmental and social 

review will mean that sponsors will, probably, have to adhere to the 

Principles, although doing so may well involve a more detailed assessment 

than cursory examination of the cumulative impact of the various stages of 

the project. 

Similar difficulties may arise with regard to projects that have been a long 

time in planning before the adoption of the Principles and cannot be 

unwound simply. It remains to be seen how this will be addressed in light 

of the Principles. 

During the course of our survey, it was made clear to us that a number of 

Equator Banks had decided not to participate in loan syndication of certain 

projects. This was not because the bank considered the environmental or 

social impacts of a project to be unacceptable, but simply because it felt that 

the project did not fit the risk profile of its existing loan portfolio or it did 

not have the resources or expertise to assess the project adequately in the 

time given by the sponsor or arranging bank to come to a conclusion. 

Other Equator Banks may feel that, because of their greater resources or 

expertise in projects of a certain type, an adequate assessment of the project 

could be made in the time available or that a project of a particular type can 

be accommodated within its loan portfolio. 

mêçàÉÅí=Å~íÉÖçêáë~íáçå= 

Some NGOs are concerned about ‘categorisation creep’ where the Equator 

Banks, under pressure from sponsors and loan arrangers, and given the 

scope for subjectivity in categorisation, may be tempted to place projects in 

lower risk categories to reduce costs associated with carrying out social and 

environmental impact assessment. Our own impression is that projects are 

not systematically downgraded in this way by Equator Banks. 

Many issues addressed by the Principles involve some element of 

judgement as to which equally qualified leading professional advisers may 

legitimately hold different opinions. That professionals acting for banks or 

sponsors may disagree does not necessarily involve a degree of artificial 

manipulation of categorisation of a project. 

NP= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 



bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=ÇìÉ=ÇáäáÖÉåÅÉ= 

What should the Equator Bank do by way of due diligence? NGOs have 

questioned whether, and to what extent, Equator Banks should rely on the 

work done by the sponsor or the advisers to the sponsor. If Equator Banks 

rely on such studies, it is clear that they must carefully examine the scope 

of the due diligence to ensure that it covers all relevant environmental and 

social issues and that sufficient time and resources were devoted to it. 

There is also a degree of cynicism shared by NGOs as to whether sponsors 

are being wholly transparent and comprehensive in their disclosures about 

projects and whether advisers who may have an existing relationship or 

hope for a future relationship with sponsors are or can be truly independent 

and objective. 

This is a criticism that can be levelled at all environmental assessment 

systems which rely on sponsor-sourced material. The difference, NGOs 

might say, is that those systems are ultimately reviewed by a public 

authority that is politically accountable, whereas that is not true in the case 

of a private sector bank. On the other hand, assessment by the Equator 

Banks of the environmental and social impact of a project tends to take 

place after or, at best, alongside assessment by a public authority. 

However, it is also true that sponsors or lenders sometimes like to have 

funding from a bilateral or multilateral lender or an export credit agency as 

a form of legitimisation of the project and this would involve clearance 

under the lending policies of the relevant institutions. 

Critical questions for banks arranging finance or members of a bank 

syndicate are: which of the banks involved in arranging or syndicating a 

project loan should carry out the Technical Bank or Environment Bank 

function and, as part of that role, lead the Principles due diligence and 

subsequently monitor the construction and operation of the project? 

We believe this role is critical to the successful implementation of the 

Principles as the reputation of all participating banks is dependent on the 

Environment Bank, both during the project assessment stage and when the 

Environment Bank is charged with monitoring the construction and 

operational stages of the project. 

The Environment Bank responsibilities should include: 

• advising the other banks whether the pre-condition requiring 

compliance with the Principles has been satisfied and monitoring 

compliance with the Environmental Management Plan (EMP) required 

for the project; and 

NQ= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 



• having special responsibility for protecting the reputation of each of the 

participating banks. 

Some Equator Banks are adamant that it is inappropriate for a non-Equator 

Bank to lead the Principles due diligence, while others are reluctant to 

question that bank’s commitment to carrying out a thorough Principles due 

diligence just because it has not itself adopted the Principles. 

Nonetheless, a non-Equator Environment Bank leading a Principles due 

diligence on behalf of Equator Banks, which has by definition not adopted 

the Principles, does look distinctly odd. 

If the Principles aim at providing more robust projects and protection of the 

reputation of banks from public criticism by stakeholders, it is difficult, in 

principle at least, to understand why Equator Banks, even if they retain a 

veto or have weighted voting rights, would concede the Environment Bank 

role to a bank which does not share their ambitions for, belief in or 

commitment to the Principles. 

NR= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 

tÜ~í=Çç=kdlë=íÜáåâ=çÑ=íÜÉ=bèì~íçê= 

mêáåÅáéäÉë\= 

NGO criticism has focused not only on the Principles but also on the 

perceived failure to apply the Principles, or inconsistent application by the 

Equator Banks of the Principles. 

k~êêçïåÉëë=çÑ=ëÅçéÉ=~åÇ=ÅçåíÉåí= 

NGOs are critical of the Principles, which they see as selective. Although 

based on the IFC model, they fail to reproduce some important elements of 

it. For example, none of the extensive obligations as to disclosure and 

transparency of IFC decision-making appear in the Principles. In the view 

of some NGOs, the Equator Banks have merely ‘cherry-picked’ from the 

model which the international community has adopted, leaving aside 

important safeguards. 

The Principles are limited to project finance above a $50m threshold. This 

is seen by NGOs as potentially ignoring: 

• the social and environmental impacts of activities funded by the 

Equator Banks from general or non-project finance lending; and 

• that the effect of projects under $50m may be much more harmful to 

society and the environment than the effect of more costly projects. 

The NGO community also has reservations about the scope of the 

Principles. It is said, for example, that the Principles ignore climate change. 

Certainly, there is no express mention of this important issue in the text of 

the Principles (although it may be subsumed within the concept of 

sustainable development). However, there are many other important 

environmental and social issues which the Principles do not specifically 

draw to the attention of the Equator Banks but which undoubtedly must be 

addressed as part of the Principles assessment. 

i~Åâ=çÑ=~ÅÅçìåí~Äáäáíó=~åÇ=íê~åëé~êÉåÅó= 

Some NGOs are concerned about a lack of transparency of Equator Bank 

decision-making. They observe that there is no mechanism for monitoring 

that Equator Banks actually implement the Principles and that the Equator 

Banks tend not to disclose what decisions they made or the basis of 

decision-making. There is no mechanism for affected communities to have 

recourse to the financial institutions, such as the availability of a dispute 

resolution mechanism for third parties (such as the IFC Compliance 

Advisory Ombudsman) in cases where standards are allegedly not being 

met or implemented, as the loan documentation places most of the 

responsibility in this respect on the borrower. 

NGOs have criticised the Equator Banks for failure to explain why they 

have supported or declined to support specific projects, sometimes 

comparing their decision to support an allegedly unsustainable project 

NS= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 

tÜ~í=Çç=kdlë=íÜáåâ=çÑ=íÜÉ=bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë\=EÅçåíáåìÉÇF 

unfavourably with that of the banks that declined to do so. Equator Banks 

may, though, have very good reasons for not explaining their actions 

publicly: 

• the Principles are general rules which do not eliminate discretion or the 

need for interpretation; 

• a bank may decline to support a project for reasons other than breach of 

the Principles; 

• client confidentiality; 

• it is primarily for the sponsors (who have access to better and more 

detailed information) and not for the banks to disclose information 

about sponsors’ projects; and 

• banks which have intimate knowledge of a sponsor or a greater 

exposure to an industry will be able to make more informed decisions 

in a shorter time than banks which have less experience of the sponsor 

or less exposure to that industry. 

For legal and practical reasons, it is difficult to see why, except in 

exceptional circumstances, the banks should make disclosure in respect of 

specific projects, but we see some merit in general disclosure by the 

Equator Banks of support for, or failure to support, projects in different 

industry sectors. In some jurisdictions, however, it is a criminal offence to 

reveal confidential information. A possible compromise may be for banks 

to disclose the number of applications approved or rejected, but not to name 

applicants, although this would not catch cases in which the bank did not 

tender for the project because of its incompatibility with the Principles. 

lé~Åáíó=çÑ=íÜÉ=bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë= 

The Principles do not state that all projects must comply with IFC 

guidelines, but merely emphasise the need for environmental assessment. 

They refer to projects being ‘generally consistent’ with IFC criteria and to a 

‘reasonable minimum period.’ Some NGOs argue such wording is vague 

and could lead to poor implementation. 

tÉ~â=çå=ëçÅá~ä=áëëìÉë= 

The Principles are modelled on IFC Safeguard Policies, which, compared to 

World Bank standards, inadequately address social concerns in relative 

terms 3 . This may be addressed in the course of the current consultation on 

the review of the IFC Safeguard Policies 4 . 

3 The IFC’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman has identified the assessment of social impact as a 

shortcoming of the operation of the IFC’s Safeguard Policies. See Compliance Advisor 

Ombudsman: A Review of IFC’s Safeguard Policies published January 2003 available at 

www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/advisor.htm. 

4 See ‘Where next for the Equator Principles?’ section on page 23 for further details. 

NT= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 

tÜ~í=Çç=kdlë=íÜáåâ=çÑ=íÜÉ=bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë\=EÅçåíáåìÉÇF 

Project assessment is particularly problematic when dealing with nonenvironmental 

assessment (such as the assessment of social, human rights, 

cultural, political and other impacts). This is because of the comparatively 

‘soft’ nature of the issues being assessed or the absence of agreed standards 

or a unified approach to assessment of these issues, as well as a shortage of 

established recognised experts working in the area. There is also, according 

to NGOs, a western developed economy bias in the Principles and a 

resulting absence of tailoring the regime to the specific needs of developing 

countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia and central Asia. 

_ê~âÉ=çå=ÇÉîÉäçéãÉåí=çÑ=ÖççÇ=éê~ÅíáÅÉ=~åÇ=éçäáÅáÉë= 

Many NGOs fear that the Principles will have a limiting effect, preventing 

or delaying the adoption of best practice sector standards, such as the ABN 

Amro forestry policy. Some NGOs see the Equator Banks as wedded to 

profits, rather than being enlightened and principled institutions seeking 

better ways to protect the environment and society. They say this is 

evidenced by the collective opposition of 11 of the Equator Banks to the 

Extractive Industry Review and by the approach which the Equator Banks 

have adopted towards the IFC review of its Safeguard Policies (although 

the involvement of the banks in the review contrasts with the attitude of 

several NGOs which have boycotted the process altogether). 

NU= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 

iç~å=ÇçÅìãÉåí~íáçå=áëëìÉë= 

Adoption of the Principles effectively requires the Equator Banks to review 

their loan documentation packages in light of the wider social and 

environmental assessment, monitoring and enforcement obligations that 

apply. The Principles, however, are voluntary guidelines adopted by 

Equator Banks. It is therefore inappropriate for lenders to oblige borrowers 

to comply with them. It is competent and desirable for lenders to require 

borrowers to comply with the EMP and environmental laws (defined as is 

appropriate to each case to cover social and environmental laws of the host 

country and transnational and international legislation, conventions and 

treaties dealing with the environment, employment, health and safety and 

human rights) and the policies and guidelines of the World Bank and IFC 

that underpin the Principles. 

aÉÑáåáíáçå=~åÇ=ÇÉêçÖ~íáçå= 

From the survey and in our experience it is market practice that, to the 

extent it is used at all in loan documentation, the definition of the Principles 

is fixed by reference to the date of the current published version at financial 

close. However, this practice may create a tension between the expectation 

of NGOs and stakeholders that the Equator Banks will implement the 

Principles as they evolve over time and the need of borrowers for certainty. 

Another important issue is whether Equator Banks will entertain borrower 

requests for specific derogation from the policies and guidelines of the IFC. 

If Equator Banks follow the IFC and allow exceptions to the Principles, this 

presents interesting questions of principle, implementation and 

transparency. 

båîáêçåãÉåí=_~åâ= 

Almost without exception, at least in our view, one of the Equator Banks in 

the syndicate should be allocated the role of Environment Bank. The loan 

documentation should expressly provide that the role of Environment Bank 

is not capable of delegation to a non-Equator Bank as the Environment 

Bank role entails onerous assessment, monitoring and enforcement 

obligations as a means of managing the reputation risk to which each 

Equator Bank is exposed. 

oÉéêÉëÉåí~íáçåë=~åÇ=ï~êê~åíáÉë= 

Our survey and experience indicate that specific provisions should be 

included under which a borrower represents and warrants that: 

• it has provided to the lenders all reports and (material) information in 

relation to social and environmental matters in its possession or control; 

NV= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 

iç~å=ÇçÅìãÉåí~íáçå=áëëìÉë=EÅçåíáåìÉÇF 

• no Environmental Claims (defined, if thought necessary, to include 

social matters, such as claims of human rights abuse, or subject to 

being in writing or an appropriate level of materiality) have been 

commenced or threatened against it; and 

• it has developed, constructed and (if applicable) operated and 

maintained the project (or procured the same) in compliance with the 

EMP and the following defined terms: (i) Environmental Laws; and (ii) 

the Lenders’ Environmental and Social Policies and Guidelines. The 

Lenders’ Environmental and Social Policies and Guidelines can be 

defined as the underlying World Bank and IFC policies and guidelines, 

with any derogation agreed by the Equator Banks. 

There will usually be some tension between the borrower and the lender as 

to the nature of the compliance warranty. Equator Banks should be wary of 

diluting compliance warranties by the use of materiality thresholds 

(particularly the use of Material Adverse Effect or Material Adverse 

Change thresholds) as the more such warranties are qualified the greater the 

risk of reputation damage and, as the IFC has suggested, the less 

straightforward enforcement becomes. Nevertheless, the use of 

environmental hair triggers is not to be encouraged if this will lead to 

acceleration of the loan merely to protect the reputation of some of the 

lenders. 

The Equator Banks need also to bear in mind the potential risks of 

exercising step-in rights or taking other action to enforce their security over 

a project which is not environmentally compliant, given the greater 

likelihood of exposure to environmental liabilities, whether directly through 

lender liability or indirectly through contractual indemnities granted to stepin 

vehicles or receivers. Banks may wish to have step-in rights, but no bank 

enters into loan agreements with the expectation or hope that step-in rights 

will be exercised. 

råÇÉêí~âáåÖë= 

In addition to the general undertaking in the loan agreement to comply with 

all laws, a separate undertaking should be drafted that obliges the borrower 

to comply (or procure compliance) in all respects with (i) the EMP; (ii) 

Environmental Laws; and (iii) the Lenders’ Environmental and Social 

Policies and Guidelines. 

Borrowers may resist an obligation to comply with the Principles on an 

ongoing basis for the reasons explained above, but the same effect can be 

achieved if the obligation is cast as an obligation to procure compliance 

with the requirements of the EMP prepared (both for construction and 

operational phases) for the project. Undertakings relating to the EMP 

should also include obligations to prepare and deliver (in a satisfactory 

OM= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 


form, annually or more frequently if an environment related default has 

occurred) an update of the EMP incorporating any required changes to the 

project; and periodically to review the EMP and to inform the relevant 

agent if any modification is required based on changes to the project. 

The reporting obligations in the loan documentation should provide that the 

borrower is obliged on receipt to provide promptly all material information 

and reports provided to the borrower by the construction contractor, 

environmental and social consultants, and the operator under the EMP. The 

obligations should also require the borrower to inform the relevant agent of 

any environmental claim against it which is current, pending or threatened 

or any circumstance which could reasonably be expected to trigger 

environmental liability, liability for breach of social protection laws, or to 

affect the borrower’s compliance with environmental laws and the EMP in 

addition to any facts or circumstances which are reasonably likely to result 

in any environmental claim being commenced or threatened against it. 

Again, there will be some tension between borrower and lender as to the 

qualification of such undertakings. 

bîÉåíë=çÑ=ÇÉÑ~ìäí= 

The loan agreement will contain a general event of default for failure to 

comply with the undertakings in the document. A separate default should be 

included for failure to comply with the borrower’s undertakings relating to 

environmental matters which would cover the EMP, Environmental Laws 

and, as defined appropriate to each project, Environmental Claims and 

Environmental Liability. 

fåíÉêÅêÉÇáíçê=áëëìÉë=~åÇ=Åçåíêçä= 

Our survey indicates that an issue for Equator Banks to consider is the 

negotiation of intercreditor rights with the other lenders to ensure that 

Equator Banks retain a controlling vote (or at least negative control) in 

respect of environmental matters. Depending on the size of the 

commitments of the Equator Banks in a syndicate and the relative size that 

the commercial bank tranche bears to other tranches of the overall financing 

package, Equator Banks may find themselves out-voted on intercreditor 

voting if a block of non-Equator Banks or other financial institutions hold 

the requisite voting entitlement when action on an environmental issue is 

being decided. 

We are aware from our survey that some Equator Banks have favoured the 

use of special weighted voting rights on any action to amend, vary or grant 

consents or enforce any provision of the loan documentation relating to 

Environmental Matters (as defined), although this suggestion did not meet 

with universal acceptance. The use of such rights is justified on the basis 

that the Equator Banks face a greater risk to reputation if they are not seen 

ON= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 


to be taking action to enforce environmental requirements that have been 

agreed to by the borrower. We do not expect that syndicate members who 

are non-Equator Banks or other co-financiers or borrowers will accept this 

argument. However, it may be that a similar result could eventually be 

achieved by the use of a step-down process applying a progressively 

reducing percentage of lenders whose decision is required to take the 

relevant action such that ultimately the Equator Banks could act alone if the 

majority is not prepared to act after an agreed period. A more acceptable 

solution may be to allow the Equator Banks to exercise negative control 

over the relevant decision by providing that the lender consent level is set 

sufficiently high, say 80 per cent of outstanding commitments or 

participations, to include at least one of the Equator Banks, thereby at least 

ensuring that the environmental requirements negotiated at the outset of the 

financing cannot be avoided by a majority that does not include the Equator 

Banks. 

póåÇáÅ~íáçå=áëëìÉë= 

A common component of primary syndication is conduct of roadshows by 

the lead arrangers and representatives of the borrower. This is an 

opportunity for Equator Banks who are considering participating in the 

financing to put questions to the lead arrangers and the borrower about the 

social and environmental impacts of the project. Given the growing 

importance of compliance with the Principles, lead arrangers may choose to 

market this as a selling point to potential participants. Participant banks are 

generally permitted to request that the reports produced by the arranger’s 

technical adviser be provided to them and should avail themselves of the 

opportunity to review this material. Lead arrangers should (and in our 

experience often do) make the point to sponsors that rigorous compliance 

with the Principles will aid syndication (keeping the door open to Equator 

Banks that form the significant majority of project financiers). 

As for secondary syndication, Equator Banks who are considering 

participating can mitigate risk to their reputation by demanding copies of 

the technical adviser reports (even if there is no opportunity to discuss these 

with the technical advisers) and having their internal environmental experts 

review these together with the information memorandum. Equator Banks 

should also request discussions with the Environment Bank to ascertain: (i) 

whether the environment-related provisions in the loan documentation are 

being properly monitored; and (ii) the borrower's compliance with the 

same. 

OO= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 

tÜÉêÉ=åÉñí=Ñçê=íÜÉ=bèì~íçê= 

mêáåÅáéäÉë\= 

_ÉóçåÇ=éêçàÉÅí=Ñáå~åÅÉ\= 

The most obvious limitation is that the Principles only apply to project 

finance. There are good reasons for applying the Principles to project 

finance as detailed due diligence is carried out on the proposed project and 

covenants can be tailored to performance relevant to social and 

environmental standards. Clearly, other financial structures, such as equity 

financing of offshore projects, general corporate lending and project bonds 

(whether or not wrapped by monoline insurers) are widely used to fund 

developments with significant social and environmental impacts. Many of 

these developments, of course, will be subject to other environmental 

impact assessment requirements, even if not subject to the Principles. 

Several Equator Banks extend the application of the Principles to areas of 

banking other than project finance, by adopting an ‘Equator-Lite’ approach 

to other forms of lending or sometimes by applying policies more stringent 

than the Principles to some areas of their activities. 

dççÇÄóÉ=íç=íÜÉ=ARMã=íÜêÉëÜçäÇ\= 

The $50m threshold was originally a concession made to some initially 

reluctant banks to encourage them to adopt the Principles. 

The threshold is said to be particularly damaging in developing countries 

where the capital costs of quite significant projects may be less than $50m 

and local laws may not require stringent environmental and social impact 

assessment. Another issue is the possibility of ‘salami-slicing’ projects so 

that each part of the project falls below the $50m threshold. For many 

banks, however, this clearly is impractical and simply does not make 

financial sense. It is doubtful whether many of the Equator Banks would 

have any interest in subdividing projects to come below this threshold 

value, although that is not to say that we have evidence that it is not done. 

In fact, our survey showed that the threshold is being quietly abandoned by 

a number of Equator Banks. 

fc`=êÉîáÉï= 

The scope of the Principles is about to undergo a major overhaul. The IFC 

has recently embarked on an integrated review of its Safeguard Policies, 

Policy on Disclosure of Information and Environmental, Health & Safety 

(EHS) Guidelines. The review involves a comprehensive update of the 

IFC’s policies and guidelines, subsequent to stakeholder consultation and 

expert guidance. The revised policies are scheduled to be presented to the 

IFC’s management and Board for approval in early 2005 5 . 

5 See www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf 

OP= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 

tÜÉêÉ=åÉñí=Ñçê=íÜÉ=bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë\=EÅçåíáåìÉÇF= 

There was general concern among the Equator Banks, not only about the 

review process within the IFC, but also at the lack of information provided 

to them to assess the merits of the proposed reforms. 

The revised policies will, when finalised, probably require the revision of 

the Principles and financial institutions expressed the need for their own 

consultation process with their stakeholders on the revised Principles before 

the new Principles are implemented. 

It is quite possible that the IFC review will cause a schism among the 

Equator Banks. While some Equator Banks may accept the new 

performance standards, particularly if the IFC takes on board the views of 

the Equator Banks’ lobby, other Equator Banks may seek to draw the line at 

the IFC Safeguard Policies as they existed at the date on which the bank 

adopted the Principles. The differences and difficulties that arose in 

negotiating and drafting the Principles in 2003 no doubt will re-emerge 

unless consensus amongst the Equator Banks is obtained to the proposed 

changes to policy. Avoidance of schism is a challenge that the Equator 

Banks have faced since 2003 but it will become more daunting as they go 

forward. 

OQ= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


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oÉÅçããÉåÇ~íáçåë=Ñçê=bèì~íçê=_~åâë 

_Éëí=áåÇìëíêó=éê~ÅíáÅÉ=êÉÅçããÉåÇ~íáçåë= 

• Continue to collaborate on developing best practice in implementing 

the Principles. The development of best practice could be improved 

further by: 

• sharing precedents, knowhow, systems, structures and materials 

(subject to client confidentiality); 

• setting up a working group of leading Equator Banks, project 

sponsors and professional advisers, to review policy, produce a 

best practice manual and to share knowhow; 

• developing panels of external experts in the fields which the 

Principles require the Equator Banks to address; 

• consulting with NGOs, sponsors and other stakeholders with a 

view to working towards consistent implementation of the 

Principles by developing consensus on the interpretation of the 

Principles and on the exercise of any discretion in implementing 

them; and 

• making use of the expertise and experience of the ECAs and 

Multilateral Lending Agencies (MLAs) on social and 

environmental issues. 

• Develop greater awareness of the Principles among staff and advisers. 

• Develop greater awareness among NGOs and stakeholders of the 

project finance market and the drivers and mechanics associated with 

funding major projects, and explain the role of banks from arranging to 

syndication in the life cycle of a project. 

• Subject to client confidentiality, disclose in the bank’s annual corporate 

and social responsibility report the number of Principles projects 

actively considered in the course of the year (both as lead arranger and 

as a syndicate member); the number of projects in each sector 

considered; the number of projects in each category considered; the 

number of applications by sponsors accepted (whether modified or not 

as a result of the application of the Principles) and rejected; and the 

occasions on which, and reasons why, the bank has chosen to deviate 

from strict application of the IFC Safeguard Policies. 

OR= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 

oÉÅçããÉåÇ~íáçåë=Ñçê=bèì~íçê=_~åâë=EÅçåíáåìÉÇF= 

• Adopt a conservative approach to the categorisation of a project with 

project sponsors and the sponsors’ legal, financial and technical 

advisers -where there is any doubt about which category a project falls 

into, apply a presumption which reflects the precautionary principle 

that the project falls into the higher or more onerous category. 

• Rely on the bank’s internal screening process and the advice of its legal 

and technical experts to assess the appropriate category of an Equator 

Principles project rather than relying upon a categorisation adopted by 

sponsors or others. 

• When acting as arranging banks or as financial advisers, enter into 

dialogue with sponsors on Principles issues as early as possible in the 

project cycle, in particular where syndication to Equator Banks (or 

other banks) is likely. 

• Encourage sponsors to be as transparent as practicable about their 

projects and particularly in respect of EMPs. 

• Consider lowering or abolishing the $50m threshold. 

• Not to delegate the role of Environment Bank to a non-Equator Bank, 

except in exceptional circumstances. 

• If possible, ensure that the Environment Bank has experience of 

funding projects of the type in question and of the application of the 

Principles to such projects. 

• Arrange for a sample of Principles projects to be audited externally to 

identify any shortcomings in or possible improvement to 

implementation of the Principles. 

• Appoint external advisers to review the rules, policy and procedures 

that underpin the Principles, following the example of JBIC. 

• Continue and develop dialogue with stakeholders and NGOs and 

encourage sponsors to do so. 

qÉÅÜåáÅ~ä=êÉÅçããÉåÇ~íáçåë= 

• Require a borrower to warrant that all social and environmental reports 

of which it is aware were disclosed to the borrower’s technical 

advisers. 

• Require a borrower to warrant that all relevant social and 

environmental reports have been disclosed by it and its technical 

advisers to the participating banks and their technical advisers. 

OS= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 

oÉÅçããÉåÇ~íáçåë=Ñçê=bèì~íçê=_~åâë=EÅçåíáåìÉÇF= 

• Agree standard terms and conditions with consultants and other 

professional advisers. 

• Review information handling procedures to ensure that reports from a 

borrower required by EMP are monitored adequately on a periodic 

basis. 

• Review loan documentation to: 

• ensure that there is no mismatch between the requirements to 

report on environmental issues under an EMP and/or the loan 

agreement and the bank’s ability to take action against the 

borrower to rectify that breach; 

• avoid the bank receiving information of an environmental issue but 

being powerless to act under the loan agreement in order to ensure 

it is rectified (to minimise the bank’s liability for environmental 

breaches of which they had knowledge); 

• ensure that the Equator Banks have an appropriate degree of 

negative control over decision making for amendments or waivers 

or consents to be given for the environmental aspects of the 

project; 

• ensure appropriate representations and warranties are given for 

environmental and social matters; 

• ensure appropriate covenants relating to compliance with 

environmental laws as well as lender environmental and social 

policies and guidelines are given; and 

• ensure there is a separate event of default if there is a failure to 

comply in any material respect with environmental laws and 

environmental and social policies and guidelines after a reasonable 

cure period has expired. 

• Review the legal liability of the bank and its officers: 

• for disclosure of confidential information; 

• for non-disclosure of social and environmental information to 

regulatory agencies; and 

• where failure to take enforcement action as provided for in the loan 

documentation concerning known pollution or the likelihood of 

pollution occurring results in pollution occurring or continuing. 

• Consider encouraging sponsors to appoint independent panels to assess 

and monitor projects, having regard to the scale, complexity and/or 

impact of the project. 

OT= bèì~íçê=mêáåÅáéäÉë=pìêîÉó=OMMR=Ó=pìãã~êó=oÉéçêíW=m~êí=f=Ó=qÜÉ=_~åâë= 


= 

AMSTERDAM 

Apollolaan 151 

1077 AR Amsterdam 

T + 31 20 485 7000 

F + 31 20 485 7001 

BARCELONA 

Mestre Nicolau 19 

08021 Barcelona 

T + 34 93 363 7400 

F + 34 93 419 7799 

BEIJING 

3705 China World Tower Two 

1 Jianguomenwai Avenue 

Beijing 100004 

T + 86 10 6505 3448 

F + 86 10 6505 7783 

BERLIN 

Potsdamer Platz 1 

10785 Berlin 

T + 49 30 20 28 36 00 

F + 49 30 20 28 37 66 

BRATISLAVA 

Laurinská 12 

81101 Bratislava 

T + 421 2 5413 1121 

F + 421 2 5413 1123 

BRUSSELS 

Bastion Tower 

Place du Champ de 

Mars/Marsveldplein 5 

1050 Brussels 

T + 32 2 504 7000 

F + 32 2 504 7200 

BUDAPEST 

Oppenheim és Társai 

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 

1053 Budapest 

Károlyi Mihály u. 12. 

T + 36 1 486 22 00 

F + 36 1 486 22 01 

COLOGNE 

Heumarkt 14 

50667 Cologne 

T + 49 221 20 50 70 

F + 49 221 20 50 79 0 

DÜSSELDORF 

Feldmühleplatz 1 

40545 Düsseldorf 

T + 49 211 49 79 0 

F + 49 211 49 79 10 3 

Mailing address 

Postfach 10 17 43 

40008 Düsseldorf 

FRANKFURT AM MAIN 

Taunusanlage 11 

60329 Frankfurt am Main 

T + 49 69 27 30 80 

F + 49 69 23 26 64 

HAMBURG 

Alsterarkaden 27 

20354 Hamburg 

T + 49 40 36 90 60 

F + 49 40 36 90 61 55 

Mailing address 

Postfach 30 52 70 

20316 Hamburg 

HANOI 

#05-01 

International Centre 

17 Ngo Quyen Street 

Hanoi 

T + 84 4 8247 422 

F + 84 4 8268 300 

HO CHI MINH CITY 

#1108 Saigon Tower 

29 Le Duan Boulevard 

District 1 

Ho Chi Minh City 

T + 84 8 8226 680 

F + 84 8 8226 690 

HONG KONG 

11th floor 

Two Exchange Square 

Hong Kong 

T + 852 2846 3400 

F + 852 2810 6192 

LONDON 

65 Fleet Street 

London EC4Y 1HS 

T + 44 20 7936 4000 

F + 44 20 7832 7001 

MADRID 

Fortuny 6 

28010 Madrid 

T + 34 91 319 1024 

F + 34 91 308 4636 

MILAN 

Via dei Giardini 7 

20121 Milan 

T + 39 02 625 301 

F + 39 02 625 30800 

MOSCOW 

Kadashevskaya nab 14/2 

119017 Moscow 

T + 7 (501 or 095) 785 3000 

F + 7 (501 or 095) 785 3001 

MUNICH 

Prannerstrasse 10 

80333 Munich 

T + 49 89 20 70 20 

F + 49 89 20 70 21 00 

NEW YORK 

Freshfields Bruckhaus 

Deringer LLP 

520 Madison Avenue 

34th floor 

New York, NY 10022 

T + 1 212 277 4000 

F + 1 212 277 4001 

PARIS 

2-4 rue Paul Cézanne 

75375 Paris Cedex 08 

T + 33 1 44 56 44 56 

F + 33 1 44 56 44 00 

ROME 

Piazza di Monte Citorio 115 

00186 Rome 

T + 39 06 695 331 

F + 39 06 695 33800 

SHANGHAI 

34th floor 

Jinmao Tower 

88 Century Boulevard 

Shanghai 200121 

T + 86 21 5049 1118 

F + 86 21 3878 0099 

SINGAPORE 

Freshfields Drew & Napier 

20 Raffles Place #18-00 

Ocean Towers 

Singapore 048620 

T + 65 6535 6211 

F + 65 6533 5007 

TOKYO 

Freshfields Law Office 

Freshfields Foreign Law Office 

Ark Mori Building 18F 

1-12-32 Akasaka 

Minato-ku 

Tokyo 107-6018 

T + 81 3 3584 8500 

F + 81 3 3584 8501 

VIENNA 

Seilergasse 16 

1010 Vienna 

T + 43 1 515 15 0 

F + 43 1 512 63 94 

WASHINGTON 

Freshfields Bruckhaus 

Deringer LLP 

701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Suite 600 

Washington, DC 20004-2692 

T + 1 202 777 4500 

F + 1 202 777 4555 

10942 

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Who and where are the Equator Banks? - IILJ

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