Impact Of Agricultural Market Reforms On Smallholder Farmers In ...

Impact Of Agricultural Market Reforms On Smallholder Farmers In ... Impact Of Agricultural Market Reforms On Smallholder Farmers In ...

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2.3 Evolution of Economic Policy 2.3.1 Early post-colonial period (1960- 1974) With independence in 1960, the new government inherited a largely agricultural and commercial economy. The main export crop was oil palm, supplemented by small quantities of cotton in the north and tobacco in the center. Through a series of five-year plans, the government attempted to incorporate food security objectives into its agricultural strategy. The strategy incorporated the following elements: Introduction of industrial crops in order to improve food crop production through training in modern methods of production Integration of crop and livestock production in order to provide manure for crop production Introduction and adoption of improved planting materials Investment in irrigation to reduce the risks associated with rainfed agriculture Use of fertilizer to raise yields Economic development during this period was hampered, however, by political instability. Regional rivalries and conflicts between civilian and military leaders resulted in a series of shortlived regimes and little continuity in economic policy. 2.3.2 State-led development (1974-1989) In October 1972, a coup marked the beginning of 17 years of military dictatorship. In 1974, the government declared that Benin would adopt a socialist development path based on Marxist-Leninist principles. In the industrial sector, this strategy led to the nationalization of medium and large enterprises and the creation of new state enterprises to carry out commercial activities in various sectors. In the agricultural sector, farmers were assembled into various organizations including 4-D clubs, groupements villageois, groupements revolutionaires de vocation cooperative, and experimental agricultural collectives. The goal was to collectivize agricultural production and marketing under structures supervised by the state. The government also created a number of state farms, generally dedicated to producing maize. Also created were state enterprises to manage production and 7

marketing in specific sectors: the Societé Nationale des Fruits et Légumes, the Societé Béninoise de Palamier à Huile, the Societé Nationale de Forêts, and the Societé de Développement des Ressources Animales, and the Societé Nationale des Pêches. The government attempted to control agricultural markets through various means, although it was only successful in the case of cotton. In 1971, the Societé Nationale de Coton (SONACO), a mixed enterprise, was created to manage the cotton sector, taking over the role of the Compagnie Française de Développement de Fibres Textiles (CFDT). SONACO maintained a monopoly on every phase of collection, processing, and marketing of cotton. As a result of the departure of CFDT and policies giving greater priority to food crop production, however, cotton output fell from 50 thousand tons in 1972 to 14 thousand tons in 1981. In 1982, the Societé Nationale de Promotion Agricole (SONAPRA), formed earlier to manage the distribution of inputs, was given responsibility for marketing cotton as well. Attempts to control food markets were less effective. Neither the Office de Commercialisation et de Crédit Agriolce du Dahomey (OCAD), created in 1963, nor the Societés Provinciales de Commercialisation Agricole (SOPROCA), created in the 1970s, nor the Office Nationale des Céréales (ONC), created in 1983, were able to influence food markets in any significant way, much less control them. For example, the ONC was given the assignment of collecting and marketing 25 percent of the grain supply but was never able to capture more than 5 percent of the total. Although official prices were announced every year for oil palm, seed cotton, and staple foods, the official food prices were largely irrelevant, with actual prices being set according to supply and demand (Soulé, 1996). The government was more successful in controlling the distribution of fertilizer and pesticides because they were imported. Input policy was characterized by the following elements: Agricultural inputs (fertilizer and pesticide) for the cotton sector could be imported duty-free, while inputs for other crops were subject to import taxes. Agricultural inputs for the cotton sector were sold to farmers at heavily subsidized prices, with the subsidies reaching 75 percent at the end of the 1970s. The inputs for the cotton sector were sold to farmers on credit, with repayment being deducted from the cotton payments at harvest time. 8

marketing in specific sectors: the Societé Nationale des Fruits et Légumes, the Societé Béninoise de<br />

Palamier à Huile, the Societé Nationale de Forêts, and the Societé de Développement des<br />

Ressources Animales, and the Societé Nationale des Pêches.<br />

The government attempted to control agricultural markets through various means, although it was<br />

only successful in the case of cotton. <strong>In</strong> 1971, the Societé Nationale de Coton (SONACO), a mixed<br />

enterprise, was created to manage the cotton sector, taking over the role of the Compagnie<br />

Française de Développement de Fibres Textiles (CFDT). SONACO maintained a monopoly on<br />

every phase of collection, processing, and marketing of cotton. As a result of the departure of<br />

CFDT and policies giving greater priority to food crop production, however, cotton output fell from<br />

50 thousand tons in 1972 to 14 thousand tons in 1981. <strong>In</strong> 1982, the Societé Nationale de Promotion<br />

Agricole (SONAPRA), formed earlier to manage the distribution of inputs, was given responsibility<br />

for marketing cotton as well.<br />

Attempts to control food markets were less effective. Neither the <strong>Of</strong>fice de Commercialisation et<br />

de Crédit Agriolce du Dahomey (OCAD), created in 1963, nor the Societés Provinciales de<br />

Commercialisation Agricole (SOPROCA), created in the 1970s, nor the <strong>Of</strong>fice Nationale des<br />

Céréales (ONC), created in 1983, were able to influence food markets in any significant way, much<br />

less control them. For example, the ONC was given the assignment of collecting and marketing 25<br />

percent of the grain supply but was never able to capture more than 5 percent of the total. Although<br />

official prices were announced every year for oil palm, seed cotton, and staple foods, the official<br />

food prices were largely irrelevant, with actual prices being set according to supply and demand<br />

(Soulé, 1996).<br />

The government was more successful in controlling the distribution of fertilizer and pesticides<br />

because they were imported. <strong>In</strong>put policy was characterized by the following elements:<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<strong>Agricultural</strong> inputs (fertilizer and pesticide) for the cotton sector could be imported duty-free,<br />

while inputs for other crops were subject to import taxes.<br />

<strong>Agricultural</strong> inputs for the cotton sector were sold to farmers at heavily subsidized prices, with<br />

the subsidies reaching 75 percent at the end of the 1970s.<br />

The inputs for the cotton sector were sold to farmers on credit, with repayment being deducted<br />

from the cotton payments at harvest time.<br />

8

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