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On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...

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Model<br />

A Bayesian framework<br />

The value of a buyer n:<br />

A realiz<strong>at</strong>ion of a discrete random variable X n .<br />

X n ∈ {xn 1 , xn 2 , . . . , xn<br />

Kn<br />

}, where 0 ≤ xn 1 < xn 2 < . . . < xn Kn<br />

.<br />

p i n P(X n = x i n), assume p i n > 0.<br />

<strong>On</strong>e-dimensional priv<strong>at</strong>e inform<strong>at</strong>ion:<br />

Beliefs:<br />

The exact realiz<strong>at</strong>ion of X n is known only to buyer n.<br />

X n ’s are independent across <strong>the</strong> buyers.<br />

The probability distributions of X n ’s are common knowledge.

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