On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...

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Main Result Proposition (Abhishek and Hajek 2010) If the conditional distribution of X n given B n = s is nondecreasing in s, in the hazard rate ordering on probability distributions, then 1 w n (s, v n ) ≥ w n (t, v n ) if s ⊆ t, 2 the candidate auction satisfies truth-telling and voluntary participation constraints, 3 the candidate auction is revenue optimal.
Concluding Remarks A revenue optimal auction can be very different from an efficient auction. Characterizing revenue optimal CA in full generality - an open problem. A possible direction - reducing strategy space and imposing some structure on private information. The single-minded buyers model - an initial step towards solving the general CA problems.
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On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Au
Page 3 and 4:
What Makes It Hard? Private values:
Page 5 and 6:
Our Contributions Most of the liter
Page 7 and 8:
Outline 1 Review of revenue optimal
Page 9 and 10:
Model A Bayesian framework The valu
Page 11 and 12:
The Components of an Auction .Bid v
Page 13 and 14: The Constraints First, focus on one
Page 15 and 16: Geometric Interpretation Let A 0 (
Page 17 and 18: Simplifying the Constraints A payme
Page 19 and 20: Graphical Construction of Virtual V
Page 27 and 28: The Optimal Auction Problem Extendi
Page 29 and 30: Simplifying OAP Revenue(π) maximu
Page 31 and 32: The Maximum Weight Algorithm (MWA)
Page 33 and 34: Outline 1 Review of revenue optimal
Page 35 and 36: Some Questions How different is a r
Page 37 and 38: Revenue vs Efficiency - Example 1 T
Page 43 and 44: Revenue vs Efficiency - Example 3 E
Page 45 and 46: Quantifying Efficiency Loss For an
Page 47 and 48: Worst Case ELR Computation - Exampl
Page 49 and 50: Worst Case ELR Computation - Exampl
Page 51 and 52: ELR Bound - Single Item Auctions wi
Page 53 and 54: Limitations of General CAs Implemen
Page 55 and 56: Why Study Single-Minded Buyers Mode
Page 57 and 58: Extending the Model to Single-Minde
Page 59 and 60: Does It Work? Buyer 1 Buyer 2 1 1/2
Page 61 and 62: Does It Work? Buyer 1 Buyer 2 1 1/2
Page 63: The Sufficient Condition Hazard rat
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