On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
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Main Result<br />
Proposition (Abhishek and Hajek 2010)<br />
If <strong>the</strong> conditional distribution of X n given B n = s is nondecreasing in s,<br />
in <strong>the</strong> hazard r<strong>at</strong>e ordering on probability distributions, <strong>the</strong>n<br />
1 w n (s, v n ) ≥ w n (t, v n ) if s ⊆ t,<br />
2 <strong>the</strong> candid<strong>at</strong>e auction s<strong>at</strong>isfies truth-telling and voluntary<br />
particip<strong>at</strong>ion constraints,<br />
3 <strong>the</strong> candid<strong>at</strong>e auction is revenue optimal.
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