On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
A Candid<strong>at</strong>e for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Revenue</strong> <strong>Optimal</strong> Auction<br />
Given a bid vector (b, v):<br />
Construct a conflict graph G b :<br />
A node n for each buyer n.<br />
An edge e n,m if b n ∩ b m ≠ ∅.<br />
Assign a weight w n (b n , v n ) to node n.<br />
Set of winners = maximum weight independent set of G b .<br />
Winner’s payment = <strong>the</strong> minimum value he needs to report to win.
Change language