On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
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Extending <strong>the</strong> Model to Single-Minded Buyers<br />
The bid vector (b, v) = reported vector of (bundles, values).<br />
The collection of all possible sets of winners, A(b), depends on b.<br />
A ∈ A(b) if <strong>the</strong> reported bundles of buyers in set A are disjoint.<br />
The alloc<strong>at</strong>ion rule π and payments M depend jointly on (b, v).<br />
The virtual-valu<strong>at</strong>ion function, w n (b n , v n ), is now constructed from<br />
<strong>the</strong> condition random variable (X n |B n = b n ).