On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
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Extending <strong>the</strong> Model to Single-Minded Buyers<br />
The type of a buyer n = (bundle, value).<br />
Bundles of a buyer n - a realiz<strong>at</strong>ion of a random set B n .<br />
Value of a buyer n - a realiz<strong>at</strong>ion of a discrete random variable X n .<br />
Two-dimensional priv<strong>at</strong>e inform<strong>at</strong>ion:<br />
The exact realiz<strong>at</strong>ion of (B n , X n ) is known only to buyer n.<br />
Beliefs:<br />
(B n , X n )’s are independent across <strong>the</strong> buyers.<br />
The joint probability distribution of (B n , X n ) is common knowledge.