On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
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<strong>Revenue</strong> vs Efficiency - Example 3<br />
Efficiency loss in multiple items case:<br />
A Buyer 1<br />
B Buyer 2 C Buyer 3<br />
D<br />
1/2 1/2<br />
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2<br />
$1 $1.6 $1 $1.6 $1 $1.6<br />
Buyers 1 & 2, or Buyer 2 & 3 cannot win simultaneously.<br />
w n ($1) = $0.4, w n ($1.6) = $1.6.<br />
For <strong>the</strong> bid vector ($1, $1.6, $1):<br />
Efficient auction alloc<strong>at</strong>es to buyers 1 and 3.<br />
<strong>Revenue</strong> optimal auction alloc<strong>at</strong>es to buyer 2.
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