On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
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Reserve Prices<br />
No buyer n with w n (v n ) < 0 is a winner under MWA.<br />
Follows since A is downward-closed and ∅ ∈ A.<br />
Equivalently, <strong>the</strong> seller sets a reserve price for each buyer n.<br />
Follows since MVVs are nondecresing functions.<br />
The reserve price for buyer n = minimum v n such th<strong>at</strong> w n (v n ) > 0.
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