On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
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The Constraints<br />
First, focus on one buyer:<br />
q(x i ) conditional probability of winning for <strong>the</strong> buyer for bid x i .<br />
m(x i ) expected payment made by <strong>the</strong> buyer for bid x i .<br />
Incentives to be truthful:<br />
q(x i )x i − m(x i ) ≥ q(x k )x i − m(x k ).<br />
Nonneg<strong>at</strong>ive payoff from particip<strong>at</strong>ion:<br />
q(x i )x i − m(x i ) ≥ 0.