On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
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The High Level Idea<br />
Design a game for revenue maximiz<strong>at</strong>ion:<br />
An auction induces a game of incomplete inform<strong>at</strong>ion among <strong>the</strong><br />
buyers.<br />
Maximize <strong>the</strong> expected revenue <strong>at</strong> its Bayes-Nash equilibrium<br />
(BNE).<br />
Reduce it to a constrained optimiz<strong>at</strong>ion problem:<br />
Truth-telling as a BNE - incentives to be truthful.<br />
This is with no loss of optimality by <strong>the</strong> revel<strong>at</strong>ion principle.<br />
Voluntary particip<strong>at</strong>ion - nonneg<strong>at</strong>ive payoff from particip<strong>at</strong>ion.
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