On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
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The Components of an Auction<br />
.Bid<br />
vector<br />
v<br />
v 1<br />
. .<br />
Alloc<strong>at</strong>ion rule<br />
p(v)<br />
Payment rule<br />
M(v)<br />
Winners<br />
Buyer 1’s<br />
payment py<br />
. . .<br />
v N<br />
Auction<br />
Buyer N’s<br />
payment<br />
π(v) = a probability distribution over A, given v.<br />
π A (v) = P(<strong>the</strong> set of buyers A ∈ A win simultaneously, given v).<br />
The payoff of a buyer = value of <strong>the</strong> alloc<strong>at</strong>ion - payment made.
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