On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
On Revenue Optimal Combinatorial Auctions - IFP Group at the ...
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Model<br />
Feasible alloc<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
<strong>Combin<strong>at</strong>orial</strong> constraints restrict <strong>the</strong> set of possible winners, e.g.,<br />
Single item auction - <strong>at</strong> most one buyer can win.<br />
Auction of S identical items - subsets of buyers of size <strong>at</strong> most S.<br />
Each buyer wants a specific bundle of items - subsets of buyers<br />
with disjoint bundles.<br />
A collection of all possible sets of winners.<br />
Assume th<strong>at</strong> A is downward closed:<br />
If A ∈ A and B ⊆ A, <strong>the</strong>n B ∈ A.
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