The Role of State Constitutions in Protecting ... - International IDEA
The Role of State Constitutions in Protecting ... - International IDEA
The Role of State Constitutions in Protecting ... - International IDEA
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epresentation was accepted, however, the larger <strong>State</strong>s tended to favor a weaker,<br />
rather than a stronger Senate. In the end, this difficult issue ended <strong>in</strong> compromise.<br />
<strong>The</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>State</strong>s would be equally represented <strong>in</strong> the Senate. <strong>The</strong> Senate would<br />
have almost co-equal power with the House <strong>of</strong> Representatives. It would not,<br />
however, be able to <strong>in</strong>itiate tax or appropriation bills, nor amend bills impos<strong>in</strong>g<br />
taxation or the key appropriation bills. <strong>The</strong> voters <strong>of</strong> each <strong>State</strong>, act<strong>in</strong>g as a s<strong>in</strong>gle<br />
electorate, would also directly elect the Senators for the <strong>State</strong>.<br />
A second, very difficult issue was the fiscal settlement. It was accepted that both<br />
levels <strong>of</strong> government would have their own tax<strong>in</strong>g powers. It was also accepted,<br />
however, that the Commonwealth would have exclusive power to impose duties<br />
<strong>of</strong> customs. This was an important taxation source for the colonies. If it were<br />
transferred to the Commonwealth, it would be necessary for some revenue to be<br />
redistributed regularly by the Commonwealth to the <strong>State</strong>s. <strong>The</strong> disagreement<br />
was over the basis on which redistribution should occur. More customs revenue<br />
was collected <strong>in</strong> some colonies than <strong>in</strong> others. <strong>The</strong>se colonies took the view that<br />
the moneys should be redistributed <strong>in</strong> proportion to collections. Other colonies,<br />
understandably, preferred another basis for redistribution; population numbers<br />
was the obvious alternative. In the end, there was another compromise. Revenue<br />
would be distributed <strong>in</strong>itially on the basis <strong>of</strong> collections. After a short <strong>in</strong>itial<br />
period <strong>in</strong> which this was guaranteed, however, distribution would be made on<br />
whatever basis the Commonwealth Parliament deemed “fair”.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re was some conflict between the <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>of</strong> the various colonies over the<br />
procedure for constitutional change as well. A referendum was the obvious<br />
procedure, given the means by which the Constitution would be approved <strong>in</strong> the<br />
first place. But should the people vote nationally, which would give the larger<br />
<strong>State</strong>s greater <strong>in</strong>fluence, or with<strong>in</strong> <strong>State</strong>s, giv<strong>in</strong>g the smaller <strong>State</strong>s more <strong>of</strong> a say?<br />
<strong>The</strong> result was to require both: a national majority and a majority <strong>in</strong> a majority<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>State</strong>s to approve a referendum. In addition, certa<strong>in</strong> parts <strong>of</strong> the Constitution<br />
<strong>of</strong> particular importance to the <strong>State</strong>s, such as their proportionate representation<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Parliament, and the protection for <strong>State</strong> boundaries, could be altered only<br />
with the approval <strong>of</strong> voters <strong>in</strong> the <strong>State</strong>s that were concerned.<br />
For the most part, the British Parliament simply enacted the Constitution<br />
approved <strong>in</strong> Australia. <strong>The</strong>re was, however, conflict between the British<br />
government and the colonists over appeals to the Privy Council, which had been<br />
greatly restricted by the Australian draft. Without compromise, enactment <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Constitution was threatened, at least <strong>in</strong> the form that the Australians had agreed.<br />
<strong>The</strong> restrictions on appeals were relaxed, a little, while still preserv<strong>in</strong>g exclusively<br />
for Australian courts the sensitive constitutional issue <strong>of</strong> the boundary <strong>of</strong> power<br />
between the Commonwealth and the <strong>State</strong>s.<br />
<strong>The</strong>se are old battles. Upper Houses and fiscal federalism are issues <strong>in</strong> federations<br />
everywhere, but the detail <strong>of</strong> these struggles <strong>in</strong> Australia is not relevant for Burma.<br />
<strong>The</strong>y are noted here as examples <strong>of</strong> conflicts between <strong>State</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests, <strong>in</strong> form<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
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