The Role of State Constitutions in Protecting ... - International IDEA

epresentation was accepted, however, the larger States tended to favor a weaker,
rather than a stronger Senate. In the end, this difficult issue ended in compromise.
The original States would be equally represented in the Senate. The Senate would
have almost co-equal power with the House of Representatives. It would not,
however, be able to initiate tax or appropriation bills, nor amend bills imposing
taxation or the key appropriation bills. The voters of each State, acting as a single
electorate, would also directly elect the Senators for the State.
A second, very difficult issue was the fiscal settlement. It was accepted that both
levels of government would have their own taxing powers. It was also accepted,
however, that the Commonwealth would have exclusive power to impose duties
of customs. This was an important taxation source for the colonies. If it were
transferred to the Commonwealth, it would be necessary for some revenue to be
redistributed regularly by the Commonwealth to the States. The disagreement
was over the basis on which redistribution should occur. More customs revenue
was collected in some colonies than in others. These colonies took the view that
the moneys should be redistributed in proportion to collections. Other colonies,
understandably, preferred another basis for redistribution; population numbers
was the obvious alternative. In the end, there was another compromise. Revenue
would be distributed initially on the basis of collections. After a short initial
period in which this was guaranteed, however, distribution would be made on
whatever basis the Commonwealth Parliament deemed “fair”.
There was some conflict between the interests of the various colonies over the
procedure for constitutional change as well. A referendum was the obvious
procedure, given the means by which the Constitution would be approved in the
first place. But should the people vote nationally, which would give the larger
States greater influence, or within States, giving the smaller States more of a say?
The result was to require both: a national majority and a majority in a majority
of States to approve a referendum. In addition, certain parts of the Constitution
of particular importance to the States, such as their proportionate representation
in the Parliament, and the protection for State boundaries, could be altered only
with the approval of voters in the States that were concerned.
For the most part, the British Parliament simply enacted the Constitution
approved in Australia. There was, however, conflict between the British
government and the colonists over appeals to the Privy Council, which had been
greatly restricted by the Australian draft. Without compromise, enactment of the
Constitution was threatened, at least in the form that the Australians had agreed.
The restrictions on appeals were relaxed, a little, while still preserving exclusively
for Australian courts the sensitive constitutional issue of the boundary of power
between the Commonwealth and the States.
These are old battles. Upper Houses and fiscal federalism are issues in federations
everywhere, but the detail of these struggles in Australia is not relevant for Burma.
They are noted here as examples of conflicts between State interests, in forming a
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