105 - Sudan - Approaches to Armed Groups Kuol ... - The ICHRP
105 - Sudan - Approaches to Armed Groups Kuol ... - The ICHRP
105 - Sudan - Approaches to Armed Groups Kuol ... - The ICHRP
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• <strong>The</strong> 1947 Conference in Juba was represented as having sanctioned the unity of the country,<br />
while southerners felt both ill-represented and misinformed.<br />
• <strong>The</strong> south felt cheated by the north at the <strong>Sudan</strong>ization of the civil service after the<br />
departure of foreign officials.<br />
• Northern politicians reneged on their promise <strong>to</strong> give the demands of the southerners ‘due<br />
consideration’ if the latter supported the Independence’s motion in parliament.<br />
• <strong>The</strong> national government revoked the amnesty order which was declared before some<br />
mutineers could surrender <strong>to</strong> its authorities.<br />
• <strong>The</strong> national government passed a law in 1962 banishing missionaries from the south; it also<br />
replaced the weekly Sunday holiday with Friday.<br />
• Growing apprehension about the government’s attempts <strong>to</strong> 'Islamise' and 'Arabise' life in<br />
the south was exacerbated by the northern drive <strong>to</strong> pass an Islamic constitution for the<br />
<strong>Sudan</strong>.<br />
9. Civil war had already raged on for 17 years at the time the Khar<strong>to</strong>um government and the South<br />
<strong>Sudan</strong> Liberation Movement (SSLM) reached a peaceful settlement in 1972. Church organizations<br />
had mediated the peace deal between the two parties. <strong>The</strong> agreement emphasised the distinct<br />
southern cultural and political identity and provided for its au<strong>to</strong>nomous self-government within the<br />
united <strong>Sudan</strong>. <strong>The</strong> widespread optimism generated by the agreement ensured considerable support<br />
among the southern people. Internationally <strong>Sudan</strong> was assisted by foreign governments and<br />
organisations in rehabilitating the returning refugees and restructuring social and political institutions.<br />
A relative peace then reigned in the region until 1983.<br />
Genesis of the Current War<br />
10. <strong>The</strong> implementation of the 1972 agreement had passed through a political period in which the<br />
country was still grappling with its national identity. After the 1972 Agreement, <strong>Sudan</strong> began <strong>to</strong><br />
moderate the emphasis on pro-Arabic and Islamic political leanings. <strong>The</strong> peaceful settlement also<br />
improved the standing of <strong>Sudan</strong> among the other African nations. However, later shifts in the official<br />
political attitude dealt a blow <strong>to</strong> both the regional authority and the southern public opinion. <strong>The</strong><br />
sum <strong>to</strong>tal of changes in policy bred the causes that led <strong>to</strong> the failure of the agreement and the out<br />
break of the present war. <strong>The</strong> main causes of the disturbances can be summed up in the following<br />
points:<br />
11. <strong>The</strong> explora<strong>to</strong>ry efforts of 1974, which resulted in the discovery of oil in the south in 1978, rekindled<br />
the his<strong>to</strong>rical suspicion that had marked the relationship between the two parts of the country. While<br />
southerners were becoming more vigilant, northern politicians were getting more wary about the<br />
impact of this new wealth on power relationship vis-à-vis the south.<br />
12. When the government succeeded <strong>to</strong> strike a reconciliation pact with the leading northern opposition<br />
parties in 1977, the northern politicians resolved <strong>to</strong> undermine the 1972 agreement. <strong>The</strong> government<br />
was convinced that the regional au<strong>to</strong>nomy was likely <strong>to</strong> facilitate the separatist tendencies in the<br />
south.<br />
13. By 1980 the government had not only ignored the call for having some areas consider their<br />
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