105 - Sudan - Approaches to Armed Groups Kuol ... - The ICHRP

46. The presence of the relief organizations contributes indirectly to the protection of civilian
populations to some extent. Their association with the outside world enabled them to share
information and expose the human rights violations they might witness. The SPLA field commanders
are aware of that. In fact many of them listen regularly to the BBC African radio broadcast. The
occasional human rights reports on the SPLA or the government’s violations find their way to them
and the soldiers through this radio broadcast. The SPLA has scanty means of disseminating
information to the troops. The external connections of the NGOs and their exclusive devotion to
needy civilians is seen by many SPLA soldiers to leave no chance of closer association of NGOs with
the military.
47. Prior to the Ground Rules agreement, there was no definite reference to human rights or
humanitarian law in SPLA documents. However, it was understandable that the concept was
enshrined in the objectives of the struggle enumerated in the Manifesto and the preamble to the 1984
laws. The Ground Rules brought to the fore the obligations of SPLA under Customary International
Law. These are the obligations of a belligerent group that has attained a specified threshold in its
armed conflict with the central government. Common Article (3) of the 4 Geneva Conventions
requires the combatants in non-International Conflict to observe certain fundamental principles. The
requirements are relevant to the Sudanese conflict. The SPLA, in this regard, is as equally bound by
this Article as the Sudan government which has ratified the Conventions.
48. In their Documents on the Laws of War, Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff have commented that
"By referring expressly to 'parties to the conflict'; and not merely to states parties to the Convention,
Common Article (3) attempts to ensure the insurgents engaged in armed conflict against a lawful
government would be bound to observe the same provisions as those which would bound lawful
government." 12
49. The magnitude of the conflict between the SPLA and the government conforms to the paradigm
specified in their explanation that “. . . Common Article (3) is only applicable in cases where there is a
genuine ‘armed conflict’ as distinct from riots, isolated or sporadic acts of violence, or other acts of a
similar nature.”
50. The SPLA had detained and released prisoners of war, through the offices of ICRC, at the early
stages of the war. The last group release was effected in 1998 when the ICRC flew the group of over
forty prisoners from Loki-Kenya to Khartoum. As the capture of POWs was in practice well before
the signing of the Ground Rules, the SPLA has not claimed that their combatants were strictly
complying to the requirement of Common Article (3). The SPLA soldiers were not specifically
instructed about the Geneva Conventions in their military training Their action was following either
the local traditional values of war or SPLA political objectives. These fundamental values were likely
to be damaged by unnecessary excesses in combat. But in the general conduct of the war and the
treatment of presumed political opponents, the movement had been liable to human rights violations
though to lesser proportions in comparison to Khartoum government. The major human rights
organizations have invariably investigated and published reports exposing the abuses of each party.
51. The SPLA structures and legal procedures needed to pursue justice against human rights abusers
within its rank and file are still far from adequate. The absence of clear courts to handle the cases
against the military, since the repeal of the 1984 laws in 1994, has affected the standards of judicial
process required in this field. The new hierarchy of civilian courts set out by the 1994 laws was not
matched with any martial courts complementary to the reforms.
SPLA PROCESS OF REFORM
12 Roberts, Adam and Guelff, Richard (1995) “Documents on the Laws of War”, Oxford University Press, p.13.
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