The targeted killing of terrorists on foreign soil - Institute of Advanced ...
The targeted killing of terrorists on foreign soil - Institute of Advanced ...
The targeted killing of terrorists on foreign soil - Institute of Advanced ...
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Tobias Ruettersh<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>f<br />
Panel 4 (a)<br />
Especially with smaller terrorist cells, where leadership, knowledge, and power are<br />
combined in <strong>on</strong>ly a few people, decapitating strikes can have the effect <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> completely<br />
destroying the group (ibid., 312). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se assumpti<strong>on</strong>s rest <strong>on</strong> the understanding that terrorist<br />
organisati<strong>on</strong>s rely <strong>on</strong> the work <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a few individuals. As Ben-Israel et al. (2006, 5) note: “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
number <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> key activists in the Hamas, […] who are actually engaged in preparing an act <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
terror, is <strong>on</strong>ly a few hundred. One <strong>on</strong>ly needs to neutralize 20%-30% <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> them for the<br />
organisati<strong>on</strong>'s “producti<strong>on</strong>” <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> acts <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> terror to drop significantly.” To make coordinated acts<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> violence possible, terrorism requires a “producti<strong>on</strong> line” (Wilner 2010, 312) <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> activity,<br />
from looking for potential targets to preparing suicide bombers. Most importantly,<br />
organisati<strong>on</strong>s become de-pr<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>essi<strong>on</strong>alised. C<strong>on</strong>trary to popular myth, <strong>on</strong>ly few individuals<br />
have the skills needed to make effective bombs or the leadership qualities required to<br />
successfully manage such an organisati<strong>on</strong> (see Byman 2006, 103). Moreover, the failure to<br />
replace killed leaders can also lead to defecti<strong>on</strong>s and purges, especially if speculati<strong>on</strong>s over<br />
traitors and informants arise (see Lotri<strong>on</strong>te 2002, 81).<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> questi<strong>on</strong> is, whether these assumpti<strong>on</strong>s are c<strong>on</strong>firmed by empirical data. It is worth<br />
looking at the number <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> attacks and deaths by terrorist organisati<strong>on</strong>s in the two countries<br />
where <str<strong>on</strong>g>targeted</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>killing</str<strong>on</strong>g> operati<strong>on</strong>s are most prevalent, Israel and Pakistan 14 .<br />
Chart 1. Number <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> Attacks and Deaths<br />
by Terrorists in Israel, 2001-2009<br />
450<br />
3,50<br />
400<br />
3,00<br />
350<br />
2,50<br />
300<br />
250<br />
2,00<br />
200<br />
1,50<br />
150<br />
1,00<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0,50<br />
0<br />
0,00<br />
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009<br />
Incidents<br />
Fatalities<br />
Lethality Rate<br />
Source:RAND<br />
Database <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Worldwide Terrorism<br />
Chart 1 displays the figures for Israel from 2001 to 2009. As visible <strong>on</strong> the chart, the<br />
fatalities rose in 2002 and stayed high until 2005. During that time the Sec<strong>on</strong>d Intifada took<br />
place. However, the number <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> incidents stayed quite low and even went down by half in<br />
2004. Thus, the attacks were not as numerous, but lethal. For the period from 2005 to 2009<br />
the picture is reversed. In 2006 and 2008 the number attacks dramatically rose, which can be<br />
explained by an increasing predominance <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the radical Hamas which w<strong>on</strong> the parliamentary<br />
14 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se charts were made by the author, using data compiled by the RAND Database <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> Worldwide Terrorism<br />
Incidents (http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php).<br />
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