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Tobias Ruettersh<strong>of</strong>f Panel 4 (a) Finally, even the argument <strong>of</strong> ‘named <strong>killing</strong>’ can be invalidated. On the one hand, it has the permissive moral premise that soldiers can (morally) be killed in war, regardless <strong>of</strong> their individual innocence but on the other hand, its conclusion is very restrictive in the sense that even actors who are not innocent (either morally or materially) are illegitimate targets. This is quite paradoxical but results from the collectivist solution to the problem <strong>of</strong> <strong>killing</strong> in wartime. If self-defence does not provide ample justification for <strong>killing</strong>s in war, then it must be concluded that these <strong>killing</strong>s are morally unjustified and, therefore, war in general is unjustified. Seeing people killed in war as agents <strong>of</strong> a state rather than as individuals is thus not helpful, because their moral dignity is not contingent to a certain status (see Statman 2004, 190). Furthermore, targeting <strong>terrorists</strong> does not mean <strong>killing</strong> them by name, but by role. Terrorists are <strong>targeted</strong> for the special role they play in a terrorist organisation and for the actions they committed. This is similar to <strong>killing</strong>s in conventional wars, where agents in a prominent position such as generals or military leaders are more preferentially <strong>targeted</strong> by the enemy. <strong>The</strong>se targetings show no “personal” grievance, but simply mean the recognition <strong>of</strong> their special position in their role as agents (ibid., 190). To sum up, there are certainly strong arguments for and against the legitimacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong>. Even though the negative side seems to be overwhelming at first, it can be invalidated by the positive aspects. In particular the fact that <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> has a strong deterrent potential (if used correctly and not excessively) and keeps <strong>terrorists</strong> on the run, alienating them from society is a strong argument for it. However, they only concern the ‘input’ side <strong>of</strong> legitimacy and the ‘output’ side, or effectiveness needs to be assessed as well. 4.2 Effectiveness Some literature on <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> suggests that this policy diminishes the coercive and operational capabilities <strong>of</strong> terrorist organisations in several ways (see e.g. David 2002, 6; Byman 2006, 101 f.; Blum/Heymann 2010, 166 f.). <strong>The</strong> constant targeting <strong>of</strong> key leaders significantly disrupts an organisation and leaves it in general disarray. Even in decentralised organisations such as Al-Qaeda, skilled and experienced leaders are rare and difficult to replace, particularly in the short-term (see Cullen 2007, 8). In Afghanistan, the US Army has observed that “in several cases, insurgents have actually refused to take over the leadership positions, have had difficulty finding technical experts, such as IED (Improvised Explosive Device) facilitators, gun runners and bomb trainers” (Brook 2011). By removing <strong>terrorists</strong> in leadership positions, the ability to coordinate attacks is substantially disrupted and the communication between leaders and operators breaks down, which complicates both shortterm tactical planning and long-term strategic planning (see Wilner 2010, 312). - 26 -
Tobias Ruettersh<strong>of</strong>f Panel 4 (a) Especially with smaller terrorist cells, where leadership, knowledge, and power are combined in only a few people, decapitating strikes can have the effect <strong>of</strong> completely destroying the group (ibid., 312). <strong>The</strong>se assumptions rest on the understanding that terrorist organisations rely on the work <strong>of</strong> a few individuals. As Ben-Israel et al. (2006, 5) note: “<strong>The</strong> number <strong>of</strong> key activists in the Hamas, […] who are actually engaged in preparing an act <strong>of</strong> terror, is only a few hundred. One only needs to neutralize 20%-30% <strong>of</strong> them for the organisation's “production” <strong>of</strong> acts <strong>of</strong> terror to drop significantly.” To make coordinated acts <strong>of</strong> violence possible, terrorism requires a “production line” (Wilner 2010, 312) <strong>of</strong> activity, from looking for potential targets to preparing suicide bombers. Most importantly, organisations become de-pr<strong>of</strong>essionalised. Contrary to popular myth, only few individuals have the skills needed to make effective bombs or the leadership qualities required to successfully manage such an organisation (see Byman 2006, 103). Moreover, the failure to replace killed leaders can also lead to defections and purges, especially if speculations over traitors and informants arise (see Lotrionte 2002, 81). <strong>The</strong> question is, whether these assumptions are confirmed by empirical data. It is worth looking at the number <strong>of</strong> attacks and deaths by terrorist organisations in the two countries where <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> operations are most prevalent, Israel and Pakistan 14 . Chart 1. Number <strong>of</strong> Attacks and Deaths by Terrorists in Israel, 2001-2009 450 3,50 400 3,00 350 2,50 300 250 2,00 200 1,50 150 1,00 100 50 0,50 0 0,00 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Incidents Fatalities Lethality Rate Source:RAND Database <strong>of</strong> Worldwide Terrorism Chart 1 displays the figures for Israel from 2001 to 2009. As visible on the chart, the fatalities rose in 2002 and stayed high until 2005. During that time the Second Intifada took place. However, the number <strong>of</strong> incidents stayed quite low and even went down by half in 2004. Thus, the attacks were not as numerous, but lethal. For the period from 2005 to 2009 the picture is reversed. In 2006 and 2008 the number attacks dramatically rose, which can be explained by an increasing predominance <strong>of</strong> the radical Hamas which won the parliamentary 14 <strong>The</strong>se charts were made by the author, using data compiled by the RAND Database <strong>of</strong> Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php). - 27 -
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