The targeted killing of terrorists on foreign soil - Institute of Advanced ...

Tobias Ruettersh<strong>of</strong>f
Panel 4 (a)
Finally, even the argument <strong>of</strong> ‘named <strong>killing</strong>’ can be invalidated. On the one hand, it has the
permissive moral premise that soldiers can (morally) be killed in war, regardless <strong>of</strong> their
individual innocence but on the other hand, its conclusion is very restrictive in the sense that
even actors who are not innocent (either morally or materially) are illegitimate targets. This
is quite paradoxical but results from the collectivist solution to the problem <strong>of</strong> <strong>killing</strong> in
wartime. If self-defence does not provide ample justification for <strong>killing</strong>s in war, then it must
be concluded that these <strong>killing</strong>s are morally unjustified and, therefore, war in general is
unjustified. Seeing people killed in war as agents <strong>of</strong> a state rather than as individuals is thus
not helpful, because their moral dignity is not contingent to a certain status (see Statman
2004, 190). Furthermore, targeting <strong>terrorists</strong> does not mean <strong>killing</strong> them by name, but by
role. Terrorists are <strong>targeted</strong> for the special role they play in a terrorist organisation and for
the actions they committed. This is similar to <strong>killing</strong>s in conventional wars, where agents in a
prominent position such as generals or military leaders are more preferentially <strong>targeted</strong> by
the enemy. <strong>The</strong>se targetings show no “personal” grievance, but simply mean the recognition
<strong>of</strong> their special position in their role as agents (ibid., 190).
To sum up, there are certainly strong arguments for and against the legitimacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>targeted</strong>
<strong>killing</strong>. Even though the negative side seems to be overwhelming at first, it can be
invalidated by the positive aspects. In particular the fact that <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> has a strong
deterrent potential (if used correctly and not excessively) and keeps <strong>terrorists</strong> on the run,
alienating them from society is a strong argument for it. However, they only concern the
‘input’ side <strong>of</strong> legitimacy and the ‘output’ side, or effectiveness needs to be assessed as well.
4.2 Effectiveness
Some literature on <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> suggests that this policy diminishes the coercive and
operational capabilities <strong>of</strong> terrorist organisations in several ways (see e.g. David 2002, 6;
Byman 2006, 101 f.; Blum/Heymann 2010, 166 f.). <strong>The</strong> constant targeting <strong>of</strong> key leaders
significantly disrupts an organisation and leaves it in general disarray. Even in decentralised
organisations such as Al-Qaeda, skilled and experienced leaders are rare and difficult to
replace, particularly in the short-term (see Cullen 2007, 8). In Afghanistan, the US Army has
observed that “in several cases, insurgents have actually refused to take over the leadership
positions, have had difficulty finding technical experts, such as IED (Improvised Explosive
Device) facilitators, gun runners and bomb trainers” (Brook 2011). By removing <strong>terrorists</strong> in
leadership positions, the ability to coordinate attacks is substantially disrupted and the
communication between leaders and operators breaks down, which complicates both shortterm
tactical planning and long-term strategic planning (see Wilner 2010, 312).
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