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Tobias Ruettersh<strong>of</strong>f Panel 4 (a) behavioural standards, which could be detrimental to their interests (see David 2002, 13 f.). Such operations emphasise the disparity in power between the parties and reinforce popular support for the <strong>terrorists</strong>, who are seen as David fighting Goliath (see Blum/Heymann 2010, 165). Also, “assassination is a weapon <strong>of</strong> the weak” (David 2002, 13). It benefits those with limited resources. In other words, it plays to Palestinian strengths. If Israel erodes the norm <strong>of</strong> assassination, i.e. <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong>, it transforms the rules <strong>of</strong> conflict in a manner that benefits its most fervent adversaries (ibid., 13). Furthermore, the more frequent use <strong>of</strong> <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> may present cascading threats to world order in general (see Scharf 2004). Thirdly and obviously, when <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> operations are conducted on the territory <strong>of</strong> a foreign state, they run the risk <strong>of</strong> heightening international tensions between the attacking government and the host government. A prominent and recent example for this is the relations between the United States and Pakistan after the death <strong>of</strong> Osama Bin Laden, which really suffered due to the incident (see Borger 2011). <strong>The</strong> United States even withholds $ 800 million in foreign aid to Pakistan (see Rettig 2011). Fourthly, <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong>s comprise the risk <strong>of</strong> spiralling hatred and violence, which numbs both sides to the effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>killing</strong> and continues the vicious circle <strong>of</strong> violence. At the same time, civilians suffer whether they are the intended target <strong>of</strong> attack or they just happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time (ibid., 166). Moreover, the cycle <strong>of</strong> violence can also lead to cooperation among adversarial terrorist groups against a common enemy (see David 2002, 10). Lastly, there is a moral argument against <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong>. According to Michael Gross (2006), the only way to justify <strong>killing</strong>s in a conventional war is by considering soldiers not as individuals, but as agents <strong>of</strong> their polities. As individuals, most soldiers would be morally exempt from being killed, but as agents <strong>of</strong> a state, they would lose this immunity and become (morally) legitimate targets. Thus, the license to kill enemy soldiers is granted only because their personal merits or demerits are ignored. <strong>The</strong> problem with <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> is that it does not meet this condition, thereby undermining the very justification for <strong>killing</strong> in war. This violation <strong>of</strong> anonymity in <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> is referred to by Gross as ‘named <strong>killing</strong>’. However, there are certain benefits <strong>of</strong> <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> operations, which became apparent especially in Israel’s campaign during the Second Intifada but also in the American operations at the Hindu Kush. Firstly, <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> can act as a deterrent. Even though it seems unrealistic to deter people who are willing and eager to blow themselves up, but - 24 -
Tobias Ruettersh<strong>of</strong>f Panel 4 (a) behind every suicide attacker there are others who are might not be as willing to become martyrs, especially senior <strong>of</strong>ficials. <strong>The</strong> large numbers <strong>of</strong> Palestinian commanders who surrendered during the large-scale Israeli military operations in the spring <strong>of</strong> 2002 supports this assumption. Moreover, many skilled and capable Palestinians possibly do no engage in terrorist organisations because they fear Israeli reprisals (see David 2002, 7). <strong>The</strong>re is also strong evidence that <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong>s hurt terrorist organisations so much that they change their behaviour. When former prime minister Ariel Sharon met with Palestinian leaders in 2002, the first thing on their list was an end to <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong>s (see Safire 2002). <strong>The</strong>y even agreed to refrain from launching attacks on pre-1967 Israel territory as long as Israel refrained from <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong>. Although the cease-fire eventually broke, their willingness to abide it for a while shows the deterrent potential <strong>of</strong> <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> (see David 2002, 7). Secondly, <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> is keeping potential bombers and bomb-makers on the run. <strong>The</strong> Israelis <strong>of</strong>ten deliberately informed the Palestinian Authority about upcoming attacks, as they knew this information was passed on to the <strong>targeted</strong> individuals. Some then voluntarily handed themselves in to Palestinian police to avoid being killed, consequently diminishing the threat they posed to Israel (ibid., 7). Others take precautions such as sleeping in various places every night, praying in different mosques and not giving information <strong>of</strong> their whereabouts (see Stein 2001, 5). <strong>The</strong> time and effort <strong>terrorists</strong> spend to avoid being killed obviously reduces the time and effort they can spend on preparing, planning or conducting attacks (see Fisher 2007, 734 f.). Furthermore, militants <strong>of</strong>ten experience “social problems” due to their status as <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>terrorists</strong>. <strong>The</strong>y are not even welcome in their own communities: when they enter c<strong>of</strong>fee shops, patrons quickly leave, taxis refuse to take them and shop owners close their doors when they approach (see Wilner 2010, 315). Thirdly, <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> is popular with the public in Israel and the United States. A poll by the Israeli daily newspaper Ma’ariv in July 2001 found that 90 per cent <strong>of</strong> the Israeli public supported the government’s policy (see Goldenberg 2001). Similarly, a Wall Street Journal poll found that 70 per cent <strong>of</strong> Americans favoured the use <strong>of</strong> <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> in counterterrorism operations (see Polling Report 2001). In this sense, <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> does not undermine democracy because democracies follow public opinion and the policy <strong>of</strong> <strong>targeted</strong> <strong>killing</strong> has never lost favour with the public (see David 2002, 8). Moreover, it is also effective in the media battle because it creates far less negative media attention than other operations, such as attacks on Palestinian cities (ibid., 8). - 25 -
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