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[PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR ...
[PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR ... [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR ...
A diagnosis of borderline intellectual functioning will not qualify for exemption 8 from the death penalty. Id. We review the district court’s finding that Holladay is mentally retarded for clear error. Osborne v. Terry, 466 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 361 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying the clearly erroneous standard to a district court determination that the defendant was mentally retarded). “Clear error is a highly deferential standard of review.” Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 425 F.3d 1325, 1350 (11th Cir. 2005). A factual finding is clearly erroneous “‘when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (1985)). In Anderson, the Supreme Court explained that the clear error standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently. . . . In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts 8 Alabama’s brief on appeal indicated agreement that the foregoing standard for determining mental retardation is the appropriate standard under Alabama case law. It was the standard utilized by the district court; it is not challenged on appeal. Alabama does argue that certain Alabama decisions (finding no mental retardation on their facts) are controlling. However, we agree with the district court that the facts of those Alabama cases are sufficiently different from the instant facts that those decisions do not indicate that the district court erred in this case. 14
must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo. If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74, 105 S. Ct. at 1511 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). III. DISCUSSION A. Significantly Subaverage Intellectual Functioning Holladay has been administered IQ tests ten times, starting when he was nine years old. In 1958, when he was nine, school officials administered the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (“WISC”) to Holladay two times. The first time, Holladay scored a Verbal Score of 62 and a Performance Score of 44, for a Full Scale IQ score of 49. Twenty days later, Holladay was administered the test again and this time scored a 75 on the Verbal Scale portion and a 44 on the Performance Scale for a Full Scale IQ of 56. Holladay was administered the WISC once more, in 1963, when he was fourteen, and that time scored a 57 on Verbal Scale and 58 on the Performance Scale, for a Full Scale IQ of 54. Once he reached nineteen, he was administered the adult version of the test, the Wechler Adult Intelligence Scale (“WAIS”). On this March 1969 test, 15
- Page 1 and 2: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEA
- Page 3 and 4: I. BACKGROUND Holladay was convicte
- Page 5 and 6: navigate. The few jobs that Glenn h
- Page 7 and 8: experience as a site coordinator fo
- Page 9 and 10: By contrast, Dr. Ackerson testified
- Page 11 and 12: Several months later, the district
- Page 13: Turning to Alabama law, the Alabama
- Page 17 and 18: Scale, for a Full Scale IQ of 65. O
- Page 20 and 21: elied on the verbal score of 62 to
- Page 22 and 23: in light of the later tests and in
- Page 24 and 25: 13 of the Flynn effect. We cannot c
- Page 26 and 27: parents and placed in foster care.
- Page 28 and 29: would become confused when asked so
- Page 30 and 31: oth the trial and depositions, whic
- Page 32 and 33: self-direction, community living, a
- Page 34 and 35: his father’s painting business, h
- Page 36 and 37: 17 retardation and that was the sta
- Page 38 and 39: and substantial deficits in adaptiv
A diagnosis of borderline intellectual functioning will not qualify for exemption<br />
8<br />
from the death penalty. Id.<br />
We review the district court’s finding that Holladay is mentally retarded for<br />
clear error. Osborne v. Terry, 466 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006); see also<br />
Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 361 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying the clearly<br />
erroneous standard to a district court determination that the defendant was mentally<br />
retarded). “Clear error is a highly deferential standard of review.” Holton v. City<br />
of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 425 F.3d 1325, 1350 (11th Cir. 2005). A factual finding<br />
is clearly erroneous “‘when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing<br />
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a<br />
mistake has been committed.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,<br />
470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (1985)). In Anderson, the Supreme Court<br />
explained that the clear error standard<br />
plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the<br />
trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided<br />
the case differently. . . . In applying the clearly erroneous standard to<br />
the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts<br />
8<br />
Alabama’s brief on appeal indicated agreement that the foregoing standard for<br />
determining mental retardation is the appropriate standard under Alabama case law. It was the<br />
standard utilized by the district court; it is not challenged on appeal. Alabama does argue that<br />
certain Alabama decisions (finding no mental retardation on their facts) are controlling.<br />
However, we agree with the district court that the facts of those Alabama cases are sufficiently<br />
different from the instant facts that those decisions do not indicate that the district court erred in<br />
this case.<br />
14
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