Shannon v. Koehler - Northern District of Iowa

“punishing” Shannon) are inadmissible because, beyond being speculative, they are
irrelevant to the objective reasonableness standard that governs this case. See Graham,
490 U.S. at 397 (subjective intent irrelevant). I find that the defendants paint with too
broad of strokes, however, in characterizing much of Stine’s opinion as speculation as to
Koehler’s state of mind. Whether Shannon constituted a threat to a reasonable officer, for
example, does not reflect Koehler’s subjective state of mind and, instead, is relevant to the
inquiry in this case. See id. at 396.
Despite these inadmissible portions of Stine’s report, I do not conclude at this time,
based on the information that the parties have provided me, that his testimony is wholly
inadmissible. If Stine is qualified and used reliable methods, his testimony as to whether
Koehler’s conduct complied with generally accepted police practices could be helpful to
the jury in determining whether Koehler acted reasonably. See, e.g., Wilson, 293 F.3d
at 453; Coleman, 154 F. App’x at 549; see also DiSantis, 565 F.3d at 364; Kladis, 823
F.2d at 1019. This is especially true here because the parties dispute whether Koehler’s
leg sweep was proper. Moreover, the defendants plan to offer their own expert, Ken
Katsaris, who intends to testify to the same issue of police practices and procedures: “Mr.
Katsaris is expected to provide expert testimony regarding standard police practice and
procedures relative to use of force and Officer Koehler’s compliance therewith . . . .”
Final Pretrial Order at 3 (docket no. 115). Therefore, if Stine were qualified and used
reliable methods, the jury could benefit from receiving an expert perspective from each
side on Koehler’s conduct.
Based on the information the parties have supplied, I cannot conclude at this time
that I should exclude Stine’s opinion because he is unqualified or because his testimony is
unreliable or wholly unhelpful to the jury. I reserve ruling on those issues until trial.
Therefore, this portion of the defendants’ motion in limine is denied, except
64