Shannon v. Koehler - Northern District of Iowa

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ased on incomplete facts, Shannon argues that Stine’s report is factually accurate and indicates that he reviewed the surveillance video of the incident and various witness depositions. Shannon maintains that Stine’s opinion would be helpful to the jury. Shannon specifically asserts that Stine’s opinion as to whether Koehler followed generally accepted police practices and procedures in his take-down of Shannon would be helpful to the jury, as ordinary citizens are not familiar with proper police procedures or with the situations that police frequently encounter. In reviewing the case law on experts in excessive force cases, Shannon argues that numerous courts have allowed experts to testify as to whether an officer followed proper police policies. Shannon also asserts that Stine can offer expert testimony to explain Koehler’s training for the jury. He argues more generally that expert testimony is proper in this case because police work is becoming an increasingly professionalized field. Shannon maintains that Stine’s opinion should not be excluded for addressing whether Koehler used excessive force, as experts are permitted under Rule 704 to testify to ultimate issues in a case. Shannon insists that whether an officer used excessive force is not a legal question, but rather a question of fact for the jury. The defendants reply that Stine’s deposition and reports do not indicate that he relied on Sioux City Police Department Policies or CALEA standards. The defendants add, in response to Shannon’s argument that Stine can testify about Koehler’s training, that Stine is not qualified to testify as to Koehler’s training, as he is not an expert in Iowa police training. 2. Analysis Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for expert testimony as follows: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 56
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. FED. R. EVID. 702. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharamceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme Court explained that the trial judge’s role under Rule 702 is to act as “gatekeeper,” admitting expert testimony only if it is both relevant and reliable. Id. at 589. The Court later added in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), that this gatekeeping function applies to all types of expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. Id. at 147; see also Kudabeck v. Kroger Co., 338 F.3d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 2003). The trial court is granted broad discretion in its determination of reliability. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 142. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that “[t]he gatekeeper role should not . . . invade the province of the jury, whose job it is to decide issues of credibility and to determine the weight that should be accorded evidence.” United States v. Vesey, 338 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gwinner Oil Co., 125 F.3d 1176, 1183 (8th Cir. 1997)). “As the Supreme Court emphasized in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96, ‘Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.’” Id.; see also Synergetics, Inc. v. Hurst, 477 F.3d 949, 956 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[M]ere disagreement with the assumptions and methodology used does not warrant exclusion of expert testimony.”) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596)). 57
Page 1 and 2:
Not To Be Published: IN THE UNITED
Page 3 and 4:
Plaintiff’s Second Motion In Limi
Page 5 and 6: However, Shannon alleges that he di
Page 7 and 8: B. Procedural Background On August
Page 9 and 10: On September 20, 2010, the defendan
Page 11 and 12: neither is sufficiently qualified t
Page 13 and 14: On May 17, 2011, Shannon filed his
Page 15 and 16: elevant is not admissible.” FED.
Page 17 and 18: intoxication in case number SMSM445
Page 19 and 20: Alternatively, Shannon asserts that
Page 21 and 22: incident.” (citing Schulz v. Long
Page 23 and 24: of force was reasonable because the
Page 25 and 26: 10 (...continued) Dettman v. Krucke
Page 27 and 28: There are two primary reasons why a
Page 29 and 30: as a witness in the plaintiff’s c
Page 31 and 32: and his conviction for interference
Page 33 and 34: and (4) similar in kind and close i
Page 35 and 36: cannot use the July 2, 2005, compla
Page 37 and 38: substantially outweighed by the dan
Page 39 and 40: v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U
Page 41 and 42: B. Plaintiff’s Second Motion In L
Page 43 and 44: likely than most to be deterred fro
Page 45 and 46: Therefore, the defendants may only
Page 47 and 48: knew at the time. The defendants al
Page 49 and 50: e ‘dealt with as the circumstance
Page 51 and 52: Navrkal admitted she was intoxicate
Page 53 and 54: “probably” reflected what she b
Page 55: ecause it relies on an incomplete a
Page 59 and 60: state], testimony in the form of an
Page 61 and 62: that although officers “acted cor
Page 63 and 64: whether Stine used reliable methods
Page 65 and 66: to grant the defendants’ request
Page 67 and 68: ) Defendants’ motion to exclude o
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Shannon v. Koehler - Northern District of Iowa

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