Shannon v. Koehler - Northern District of Iowa

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question Shannon about his “felony conviction,” even if the nature of the crime itself is inadmissible. Rule 609(a)(1) provides in pertinent part: For the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a witness, (1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused . . . . FED. R. EVID 609(a)(1). Shannon’s 2011 conviction for Operating While Intoxicated, Third Offense, is a class D felony, see Defendants’ Exhibit 1011, punishable by a prison sentence up to five years, 16 and thus falls squarely within 609(a)(1). Still, the question remains whether I should exclude the conviction, or at least its nature, under Rule 403. In the case of an accused in a criminal trial, Rule 609(a)(1) modifies the language of the Rule 403 balancing test to tip the scales in favor of exclusion. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). In contrast, where, as here, the witness is not an accused, evidence of a conviction is subject to the standard Rule 403 test, which only excludes evidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial in the Rule 403 sense not simply because it hurts a party’s case; rather, evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it would influence the jury to decide the case on an improper basis.” Cummings, 995 F.2d at 824 (citations omitted). Regarding the probative value of a felony conviction, Rule 609 reflects the “proposition that one who has transgressed society’s norms by committing a felony is less 16 IOWA CODE § 321J.2. 42
likely than most to be deterred from lying under oath.” Id. at 826 (citing Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 707 (7th Cir.1987)); accord United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 617 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Rule 609(a)(1) presumes that all felonies are at least somewhat probative of a witness’s propensity to testify truthfully.”). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that district courts should attribute more probative value to a conviction when a case largely turns on a witness’s credibility. Cummings, 995 F.2d at 825-26 (reversing district court’s decision in an excessive force case to exclude the plaintiff’s prior felony convictions where the plaintiff’s case turned on his own testimony and where the convictions would have contradicted the plaintiff’s testimony). As far as the specific nature of a felony conviction, because “felony” includes a wide array of offenses, “most jurors . . . need to know the specific crime in order to evaluate its effect on credibility.” Id. at 826. But see Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 699-700 (8th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing Cummings, where the plaintiff’s convictions contradicted his testimony, and affirming the district court’s exclusion in an excessive force case of the names of the plaintiff’s prior convictions of rape and sodomy as unfairly prejudicial under Rules 609(a) and 403). Here, the probative value of the nature of Shannon’s felony OWI conviction is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to him. Shannon’s felony conviction certainly has probative value for his credibility under Rule 609(a), especially because his testimony is so important to proving his case, just as in Cummings. See Cummings, 995 F.2d at 826. Indeed, I denied summary judgment for the defendants because of the many genuine issues of material fact where Shannon’s version of events differs from that of the defendants. Shannon v. Koehler, 673 F. Supp. 2d 758, 784 (N.D. Iowa 2009). However, although Shannon’s case largely turns on his own testimony, the probative value of his conviction for his credibility is less substantial here than in 43
Page 1 and 2: Not To Be Published: IN THE UNITED
Page 3 and 4: Plaintiff’s Second Motion In Limi
Page 5 and 6: However, Shannon alleges that he di
Page 7 and 8: B. Procedural Background On August
Page 9 and 10: On September 20, 2010, the defendan
Page 11 and 12: neither is sufficiently qualified t
Page 13 and 14: On May 17, 2011, Shannon filed his
Page 15 and 16: elevant is not admissible.” FED.
Page 17 and 18: intoxication in case number SMSM445
Page 19 and 20: Alternatively, Shannon asserts that
Page 21 and 22: incident.” (citing Schulz v. Long
Page 23 and 24: of force was reasonable because the
Page 25 and 26: 10 (...continued) Dettman v. Krucke
Page 27 and 28: There are two primary reasons why a
Page 29 and 30: as a witness in the plaintiff’s c
Page 31 and 32: and his conviction for interference
Page 33 and 34: and (4) similar in kind and close i
Page 35 and 36: cannot use the July 2, 2005, compla
Page 37 and 38: substantially outweighed by the dan
Page 39 and 40: v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U
Page 41: B. Plaintiff’s Second Motion In L
Page 45 and 46: Therefore, the defendants may only
Page 47 and 48: knew at the time. The defendants al
Page 49 and 50: e ‘dealt with as the circumstance
Page 51 and 52: Navrkal admitted she was intoxicate
Page 53 and 54: “probably” reflected what she b
Page 55 and 56: ecause it relies on an incomplete a
Page 57 and 58: determine a fact in issue, a witnes
Page 59 and 60: state], testimony in the form of an
Page 61 and 62: that although officers “acted cor
Page 63 and 64: whether Stine used reliable methods
Page 65 and 66: to grant the defendants’ request
Page 67 and 68: ) Defendants’ motion to exclude o

Shannon v. Koehler - Northern District of Iowa

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