Baber Johansen

30
Ibn ÝAqÐl answers this claim of the theologians by invoking the indicants
that the widespread economic and scholarly practice of specialization and
division of labor offers to the authority of the specialist in all fields:
To these [indicants] belongs [the fact] that these [theologians] are
ordinary people as far as Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is
concerned, because they do not know the method of independent
judgment (ijtihÁd), and [therefore] their dissent is not taken into
account, much as that of the ordinary person (ÝÁmmÐ).
He explains that this holds true for the relation between specialists and
laymen in all scholarly disciplines:
To these [indicants] belongs [the fact] that we have a consensus
that, in each of these sciences, one does not, if a doubt or a dissent
occurs within them, turn to anyone except the specialists of that
discipline (ilÁ ghayri ahlihÁ). One does not take into account the
statement of a jurist (faqÐh) who has no knowledge of language,
arithmetic, and grammar in anything of this [i.e. concerning these
disciplines] (fÐ shayÞin min dhÁlika). The same holds true for [the
specialists] in estimating the value of commodities (taqwÐm alsilaÝ);
concerning the fixing of a fine [for the value of the
destruction or unlawful appropriation of a merchandise], one turns
to the experts of textiles, and to the merchants in foodstuff for its
appraisal and the experts of its value and similar things. There is
no reasonable aspect for introducing the scholars of [other]
disciplines into the discipline of fiqh. One also does not have
recourse to jurists in the disciplines of other [scholars] as we have
explained. 84
The general principle of an increasing division of labor in society and
scholarship is here mustered to prove the exclusive authority and control
of the jurists and their methods over the field of law. 85 AbÙ IsÎÁq ShÐrÁzÐ,
certainly the most influential ShÁfiÝÐ jurist of the eleventh century, has an