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Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs ____________________________________________________________________________________________ such a reliable plan all these fields will present problems and are prone to substantial mismanagement. Escalating costs and extended delays are then likely. Under the current overall management structure of this project a considerable improvement of management control, work performance indicators, financial control instruments and internal timely communication is required to keep the process under control and to allow timely interventions in cases where weak performance requires this. The overall conclusion, in respect to this study, is that neither the project management nor the organisation form nor the gained performance level in the decommissioning process at Sellafield qualifies as a best practice example. 3.4. SELECTED EXAMPLE FROM GERMANY: EWN GREIFSWALD The former German Democratic Republic ( GDR) operated six nuclear reactors (Rheinsberg, Greifswald/Lubmin units 1 to 5) in its territory, which now makes up the eastern part of the Federal Republic of Germany ( FRG). Those were property of the state-owned combine 'Kombinat Kernkraftwerke Bruno-Leuschner'. When re-unification of East- and West-Germany came in 1990, this property was formally transferred to Treuhandanstalt, a privatization agency. The safety of the facilities was evaluated with the finding that major backfitting would be necessary if continued operation of the facilities was to be chosen. Talks were held in 1990 with major nuclear operating companies on a potential takeover of these facilities. These talks brought no viable result, and the property was transferred to the then-owner Bundesministerium der Finanzen (Federal ministry of Finance, BMF), the single owner since 2000. BMF became responsible to organize the decommissioning of the six reactors. This included the assumption of the associated costs because no reserves had been set aside by the previous owner to cover part or all of those expenses. The following descriptions are based on different sources: The information necessary to understand organisational and control issues was received in comprehensive telephone interviews with the operator; On certain issues (such as project and risk management) additional descriptions and documents were provided; The responsible contact person at BMF provided insights concerning the perspective of the main funder and described decision-making strategic issues and the control over EWN; Practical experiences with the decommissioning project were derived from several visits over the past years and working as consultant on behalf of the regulator on the decommissioning of one of the facilities at EWN’s Rheinsberg nuclear power plant provided a close insight. 3.4.1. Overall framework of the decommissioning project of EWN BMF set up a new organisation for decommissioning, Energiewerke Nord GmbH, a completely federally owned company. The formal structure is a limited liability company, with BMF as the sole owner. This organisational structure, not a state agency but acting like a privately organized company, allowed it to Streamline the new management level of the company; 80
Nuclear Decommissioning: Management of Costs and Risks ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Define the responsibilities of the acting management; Re-organise the whole company structure from operation towards decommissioning. A central accelerating factor was that after the talks on a takeover had failed it was clear for the management as well as for the workforce that re-opening energy production was not an option any more. That made clear from the beginning that re-organisation and re-structuring was unavoidable, so that this was already accepted in an early stage of the decommissioning project. 3.4.2. Responsibilities, decision making and control structures From setting up the company under the BMF - a ministry not at all familiar with nuclear, technical or regulatory issues - it was also clear from the beginning that it was expected that the management of the newly created company be solely responsible for all routine decisions and that BMF had more the role of a classical shareholder. The classical shareholder must not necessarily be qualified to track all management decisions, but has to closely control the more strategic management decisions and to evaluate the overall performance of the management in respect to the defined targets (in that case the cost effective and timely decommissioning of the six reactors). At all events the prime responsibility rests with the management. Among the strategic decisions of the management that had to be decided on were thus the following, many of which had to be taken in an early stage of decommissioning planning: To store all spent fuel and all decommissioning wastes in a single large storage facility in order to relieve the dismantling processes of any waste issues that potentially could delay the dismantling; To establish waste treatment and conditioning facilities at a large-enough scale; To remove and store large components for later cutting, treatment or conditional release; To release certain rooms of the facility from regulatory control in an early stage and to provide those for use by external companies; etc. In those strategic decisions (see chapter 2.4.3) the management has to prepare drafts, calculations and pre-planning, the decision makers have to evaluate these and to give management their preliminary and final ok. Keeping control over and tracking the implementation process then is solely the task of management. This kind of control concentrates on strategic issues and leaves the non-strategic issues with the management. It gives management the freedom but also the complete and undivided responsibility over the project. These control relationships are characterized in Figure 21. The central control structure for strategic decisions is the Supervisory board that consists of BMF representatives. Communication on strategic decisions between management and board includes formal agreements on final plans and informal communication on plans and status of decision issues. In between the regular sessions of the board the management keeps the board informally informed about its plans and preliminary ideas at an early stage and seeks consent. 81
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