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Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Slovakia As of the end of 2008, altogether 1 242 people were employed at JAVYS, of which the V1 NPP division had 382 employees. The amount of the employees was reduced in several steps of changing the organisational structure of JAVYS according to the pre-decommissioning and the 1 st decommissioning stage (as defined in the license requirements). In January 2012, JAVYS had 897 employees; 382 people of them were employed at the V1 Decommissioning Division and the Project Management Unit division (CPD 2012). After 2006, an intensive communication with and training programs for those, who were previously operational personnel, was required in order to achieve a general acceptance of the new profession. JAVYS also hired external workforce for several activities in reasonable cases and where an economic benefit for the company was expected (ANNEX 5). 4.8.2. Comparison and evaluation of workforce aspects In accordance with the best practices identified at EDF and EWN all three countries have either directly (Lithuania) or indirectly, via a change in the managing institution (Bulgaria, Slovakia), decided to use knowledge and skills of existing personnel in the NPPs. While the change at EWN took only short time, it took a longer phase in the similar Lithuanian case to establish new structures and a different understanding. This points to a possible previous underestimation that the conversion will in any way be necessary and unavoidable by the previous management, or to an unwillingness to change the approach as rapidly as necessary. Bulgaria and Slovakia, which took a more indirect way of installing new substructures in their managing organisations, are more comparable to EDFs approach (establishing CIDEN as managing organisation, see chapter 3.2.2). In these cases the conversion ran faster and in a more strict form, but was associated with a higher risk for fundamental frictions and failures (Bulgaria). 4.8.3. Recommendations The relevance of workforce issues, such as conversion management and training, is well recognized in all three countries. Explicit training, e.g. in the less technical and more soft skill areas of project management, risk communication and knowledge management is recommendable. 4.9. EXAMPLE OF DISTRIBUTED RESPONSIBILITY: THE PLASMA OVEN AT KOZLODUY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT In order to understand decision distribution and its weaknesses better, the plasma oven facility at Kozloduy NPP is selected as an example. It shows how difficult it is to identify responsible persons and organisations for a certain decision in a distributed responsibility environment. 4.9.1. First failure to identify responsible decision makers The European Court of Auditors described this example as follows: 'In Bulgaria, an experimental plasma melting technology was selected in Kozloduy without proper demonstration of its effectiveness and without due consideration of the design and construction costs (some 30 million euro compared to one fifth for traditional technologies).' (ECoA 2011) 124
Nuclear Decommissioning: Management of Costs and Risks ____________________________________________________________________________________________ In its answer in the same document the European Commission did not address the named arguments (experimental technology, high investment costs), but explained, without going into details, on the potential purposes of the selected technology: 'The plasma melting technology was the market response to the procurement process and was approved by the relevant safety authorities. The project is co-financed from national resources. Plasma melting technology can potentially serve many more purposes than traditional technologies.' (ECoA 2011) The answer says, in a simplified form: The 'procurement process' and the 'market' decided over which technology to prefer for that purpose. The regulatory agency decides on the technology to use, this agency’s compliance decision is supporting the technology selection. It is in no way the managing organisation (in this case DP RAO) and its national control institutions (in this case MEE) that are finally responsible for this strategic decision. In order to understand this decision process additional background seems necessary. 4.9.2. The basics: project rationale The project of installing a plasma oven at the Kozloduy NPP to treat LAW, which was in part generated during the operational phase and, in part, stems from decommissioning, is rationalized by the missing space for storing wastes at the site (EWN 2013b). Alternatives to this technology are not at all discussed nor evaluated in EWN 2013b. Waste treatment technologies During the operational phase of nuclear power plants operational wastes are generated and, if not treated, accumulate over the lifetime of the reactor. These wastes are of very different types: Evaporation waste, majorly dissolved/crystallized contaminated boric acid from the partial evaporation of cooling water; Spent resins, organic plastic pellets with adsorbed contamination suspended in water; Decontamination liquids and cleaning tools; Contaminated filters, protective clothes and other materials; Removed/exchanged metal parts such as valves or pipes. If not treated, those wastes are stored at the facility in tanks (liquids), barrels or containers (e.g. metal parts or filters) or vaults (reactor internal or externally added). 125
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