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Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Figure 36: External PMU design and its roles Source: Authors That brought the managing institutions into a complex and intransparent situation and limited their sense of responsibility: The national administration, controlling the managing organisation, had no complete control over the PMU’s activities, as part of the PMU was controlled by EBRD. The consultant company did not bear responsibility for the decisions prepared by the PMU (strategic decisions, to be decided by a control institution) and taken (operational decisions, to be made by the management level of the managing organisation) or for those being in any way adequate, correct or appropriate. The only risk taken over was that the contract with EBRD failed, was delayed or the customer (EBRD) was not satisfied with the work provided. None of these risks has to do with the success or failure of the decommissioning process and the decisions to be taken and their risk. The external experts in the PMU had no obligation to report to the national administration and no formal right to do so, even if requested, because their (and the external consultant company) was formally a consultant for EBRD, and had no mandate from, obligations in respect to or reporting requirements towards the managing organisation or its control institution. In this structure responsibilities for management decisions, be they of a strategic or an operative character (see chapter 2.4.3), were In-transparently attributed (who prepares proposals for projects or strategic decisions to be taken, who decides on those proposals and on which legitimation basis, with which quality and reliability are those to be prepared and decided, etc.); Completely mixed (the difference between strategic and operational decisions got lost, the awareness of responsibilities is unclear, for insiders as well as for outsiders); In-transparently deployed over five different institutions, all responsible or not for selective parts of the whole process. The decision to install those units on this unclear basis neither strengthened the national administration’s nor the managing organisation’s sense of responsibility. This was even further weakened by the fact that for most of the strategic (see chapter 2.4.3) and as well for all operational 110
Nuclear Decommissioning: Management of Costs and Risks ____________________________________________________________________________________________ decisions the formal approval of the EBRD was required. So the national controller and the managing organisation as such were only required for usual routine work, their role was not of any importance for the final decisions and for their success or failure. The European Court of Auditors has, in its section on 'Programme Accountability and Management Organisation', named 'Weak accountability of Programme’s performance' a relevant point: 'Effective management requires the definition of clear lines of responsibility for the use of programmes’ resources and the achievement of their objectives. Whatever the management method, the Commission should be in a position to exercise its ultimate responsibility for the implementation of the programmes and be held accountable for the use of the funds.' (ECoA 2011, # 30., page 23 of the PDF version) It should be a clear consequence of this to: Strengthen the roles of the managing organisation; Remove all external PMU construction elements from the management structures; Clearly define the management’s responsibilities; Establish clear management and supervising structures. 4.4.3. Recommendations It is recommended to aim for a more clear attribution of responsibilities in respect to strategic decisions (see chapter 4.3.3). In accordance with this proposed re-organisation and under consideration of the specific conditions in this case (e.g. co-financing, shared control) a possible advanced structure of the management organisation in accordance with the identified best practice is recommended. This structure is presented in Figure 37. Figure 37: Proposal for an improved structure of the management organisation Source: Author All management and control functions are clearly defined: The supervisory body controls strategic decisions, to be prepared by the management of the managing organisation (see chapter 2.4.3). 111
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