Link to the study - European Parliament - Europa

Nuclear Decommissioning: Management of Costs and Risks
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4.4.2. Comparison and evaluation of the national organisations with best practice
The change processes in the two best practice examples EWN and EDF were very different. The
organisation and processes at EWN were changed rapidly because it was already clear at an early
stage that decommissioning was the only option and that this requires a completely different
approach (project management). The setup process at EDF only started after the basic decision for
decommissioning was taken, but then was consistent and complete.
Compared to these two examples, the change processes in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia were
considerably slower, required more interim steps and in some aspects are still not sufficiently
effective. Several reasons played a role in the past:
The decision to shut the plants down was seen as possibly reversible. That kept responsible
management and workforce from adopting the task early and with the necessary rigor.
Decommissioning was not seen as an ambitious task but much less demanding than operation
of the facility. The complexity of this undertaking was generally underestimated.
In the first phase the management of the reactors had no experiences at all with the new
situation and tried to manage the changed situation with some additions or 'add-ons' to their
organisation until this, years later, proved to be inadequate.
In this phase nearly no exchange between the three countries was established so that learning
from more advanced countries (e.g. Slovakia) or a systematic, planned and well-organized
experience exchange with the other affected countries and/or with countries having advanced
experiences in decommissioning did not occur.
Organisational issues were in general underestimated so that continuity in the established
structures was chosen and kept as long as possible.
These aspects do not play a role any more. From our interviews, site visits and from the answers to
our questionnaire we evaluate today’s internal structures, the self-confidence of the management
and the awareness about the necessary changes are well-established in all three countries.
Another aspect that was over long periods very different from EWN and EDF’s principal practices was
that the main managing and planning instrument, the PMU, was constructed outside the managing
organisation. The PMU unit consisted of two different member categories:
Experts as employed by, nominated by, reporting to and under full control of the managing
organisation;
External consultants, as selected, controlled and fully administered by EBRD.
This construction was not in line with the framework agreement between the countries and EBRD,
which defined the task to establish PMUs as part of the managing organisation and under national
control (see the respective text of such an agreement on page 103). Decision-making, not only on
operational but also in strategic issues (see chapter 2.4.3), previously a task between the internal PMU
and its controlling ministry, was shifted towards the external PMU and EBRD. This PMU design is
shown in Figure 36.
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